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Abstract
In recent years, the Member States of the European Community (EC) have 
acknowledged the need for greater cooperation in the field of asylum as they 
recognised the extra-territorial impact of their laws and policies on asylum. The 
recognition of the European dimension of asylum matters reached its height with 
their “communautarisation” by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 2 October 1997 which 
inserted a Title IV on visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free 
movement of persons.
It follows that provisions on the right to seek refugee status within the meaning of 
the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees now fall within the scope of 
EC law. Thus, issues arise as to the standards to be set at EC level. In that respect, 
serious concern has been raised with regard to the protection of the right to seek 
refugee status within the EC in the light of the restrictive policies developed at both 
national and European level. It is argued that significant changes in the developing 
common asylum policy are needed if compliance with international refugee law is to 
be achieved and the right to seek refugee status safeguarded within the EC.
With this in mind, this thesis makes a number of law reform proposals with a view 
to preserving the right to seek refiigee status, thus setting comprehensive minimum 
standards designed to ensure compliance with international refugee law. To that 
end, current EU and EC measures regarding the right to seek refugee status as well 
as Member States’ (France and the United Kingdom) laws and practices are 
measured against the requirements of international refugee law with a view to 
identifying their strengths and failings. Whilst a pragmatic approach is 
recommended in legislating on the right to seek refugee status at EC level, 
pragmatism shall not prevail over compliance with international refugee law and the 
latter remains the fundamental requirement. This means that the need to protect the 
right to seek refugee status within the EC may be balanced out with the Member
States’ views on the matter so long as adherence to international refugee law is 
ensured.
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Chapter I 
Introduction
In the aftermath of the horrors of the second world war, a shell-shocked 
international community realised that it had a duty to prevent the violation of human 
rights and protect individuals’ rights as human beings. To that end, a number of 
organisations were created and conventions adopted. On 10 December 1948, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) adopted the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights^ In 1951, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) was established by the General Assembly of the UN in order to provide 
“international protection” and seek “permanent solutions for the problem of 
reftigees.”  ^The creation of UNHCR was followed by the adoption on 25 July 1951 
of the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees^, referred to as the 1951 
Convention. The same year, the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)^ was adopted under the auspices of the Council of 
Europe^ In 1957, the European Economic Community was established. Whilst its 
original activities were confined to the economic sphere, its aspirations, as 
expressed in the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome, were more ambitions. It stated 
that its signatories were “[djetermined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe” and “[rjesolved by thus pooling their resources to 
preserve and strengthen peace and liberty(...)” The EC institutions were soon to 
declare their commitment to the protection and promotion of human rights. This
* Resolution 217 A(III) o f 10 December 1948.
 ^UNGA Resolution 428(V) of 14 December 1950. UNHCR succeeded the International Refugee 
Organisation (IRQ) created in 1946 (18 UNTS 3).
 ^ 189 UNTS 150.
The ECHR was adopted on 4 November 1950 {ETS  ^No. 5).
 ^The Council o f Europe was created in 1949.
commitment is, inter alia, expressed in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam; Article 6(1) reads that “[t]he 
Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fondamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the 
Member States.”
However, this thesis argues that the EC and its Member States are in danger of 
distancing themselves from that humanitarian vision .^ In recent years, the climate 
towards those seeking international protection within the EU^ has become hostile 
and the EU has little by little raised the walls of its fortress. While Member State 
nationals were granted more and more rights as EC nationals and EU citizens^, third 
country nationals were increasingly excluded. Stricter controls at external borders 
were presented as the necessary counterpart of the creation of an area without 
internal borders. In other words, access to the EU territory was rendered more 
difficult for third country nationals. With strict immigration laws and policies in 
force in the Member States^, this hostile attitude towards third country nationals 
wishing to enter the EU was primarily felt by those who sought international 
protection.
® This concern was expressed within the wider framework of the Council o f Europe in a report of 
tlie Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography (Doc. 8598, Restrictions on asylum in 
the Member States o f  the Council o f  Europe and the European Union, report of the Committee on 
Migration, Refugees and Demography, Council o f Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, 21 December 
1999).
 ^ Reference to both the EC and tlie EU is intended to reflect tlie nature of the framework. Hence, 
where reference is made to laws and policies developed within the Community framework, the 
term EC is used whilst the term EU is used in relation to the intergovermnental framework.
® Article 2 of the TEU as amended by tlie Treaty o f Amsterdam, third indent.
 ^ Due to the economic recession in the mid-70s, the immigration policies of western European 
countries became increasingly restrictive.
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In that context, asylum became an increasingly sensitive issue which has, in the 
recent years, occupied a predominant place in the political agenda of the EU and its 
Member States. Whilst originally perceived as a purely national matter, the Member 
States realised that their policies and laws on asylum had an impact beyond national 
borders and that cooperation in that area was necessary if the Member States were 
to attain their objectives. The recognition of the European dimension of asylum 
matters resulted in their “communautarisation” by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 2 
October 1997^“. This “communautarisation” took the form of a new Title IV on 
visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons 
introduced in the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC)^\
Asylum has been the object of heated debates and growing concern at both national 
and European level. A general trend towards increasingly restrictive asylum policies 
can be identified from an examination of national and EU measures. People in need 
of international protection have become “unwanted guests”. This hostility towards 
those in search of a safe haven questions the Member States’ commitment to that 
humanitarian awareness developed in the wake of the second world war in a world 
where the need for international protection remains acute. More specifically, there 
are serious doubts as to the compatibility of some EU and national measures with 
the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees which is legally binding upon 
the Member States. These concerns have prompted the choice of topic for this 
thesis.
It is argued here that a right to seek refugee status may be inferred fi*om 
international refugee law and that this right is currently under threat. With this in 
mind, the aim of this work is to determine the standards that EC law must meet in 
order to meet international refugee law standards and thus preserve the right in
10 OJ C 340/173, 10/11/1997.
” The issues regarding the framework for a common asylum policy are examined in chapter II on 
the EC: a more suitable framework.
question. This is achieved by analysing and measuring the relevant EU measures 
against international standards with a view to identifying and redressing 
inconsistencies and deficiencies. It is argued that it is necessary for the EC to adopt 
a comprehensive approach if it is to fully safeguard the right to seek refugee status. 
This is reflected in the scope of the research. Four areas of concern have been 
identified. These relate to the interpretation of the 1951 Convention definition of 
the term refugee, access to asylum procedures, the establishment of fair and 
effective procedures and, finally, asylum seekers’ status pending determination of 
their asylum claims. The objective is to secure the compliance of the measures 
regulating these areas, inherent in the right to seek refugee status, with international 
standards. In that respect, it is argued that the EC offers a more suitable framework 
than intergovernmental cooperation. The view taken is that a piecemeal approach 
would allow breaches of international refugee law to persist and could undermine 
the positive impact of EC measures in line with international requirements. For 
instance, the establishment of fair and effective procedures would seriously be 
jeopardised by national measures restricting asylum seekers’ access to these 
procedures; EC measures securing access would be required^ .^
International protection is an extremely complex concept which covers a variety of 
situations and types of protection. Therefore, it is important to stress that this piece 
of research is confined to issues regarding the right to seek refiigee status within the 
meaning of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention. Other forms of protection as 
well as the status of recognised refugees within the EC are not examined '^*. This 
introduction will define the scope of this research as well as the chosen approach. It 
will also tackle methodological issues and give a survey of the literature before
To date, most of the asylum measures have been adopted within the EU framework; however, 
witli the "communautarisation" of asylum matters, future developments will take place within the 
EC.
These particular issues are examined in chapter IV on access to substantive asylum procedures 
and chapter V on fair and effective procedmes.
14 As a result the loss of refugee status is not considered.
determining what are the standards set by international refogee law that EC law 
must meet.
1. The scope of the research
The focus is on those seeking refugee status within the meaning of Article 1(A)(2) 
of the 1951 Convention, referred to as asylum seekers^ ;^ Article 1(A)(2) reads:
“For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply to any 
person who (...) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it.”
This definition forms the basis for international refugee law and the standards that it 
sets are legally binding upon all the Member States as parties to the 1951 
Convention. It follows that the EC cannot afford to disregard the Convention 
definition without the EC endorsing and facilitating breaches of international law.
This focus on the right to seek refugee status within the EC has a number of 
implications.
Firstly, it means that the position of individuals in need of international protection, 
but who do not apply for refugee status within the meaning of the 1951 Convention, 
is not examined. It follows that issues regarding de facto refugee and temporary 
protection are not examined. De facto refugees may be defined as “persons who are 
refugees in a broader sense than that allowed for by the Refugee Convention, but
15 They may also be referred to as asylmn claimants or applicants for asylimi.
who cannot be returned to their country of origin for humanitarian reasons.”*® The 
concept of de facto refugees covers individuals who are in need of international 
protection, but do not fall within the scope of the Convention definition of the term 
refugee or have not applied for refugee status. This concept also covers 
unsuccessful asylum seekers who cannot be returned to their country of origin* .^ 
The concept of de facto refugee is often associated with the concept of temporary 
protection**. These two concepts took a new dimension in the EU with the events 
in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Member States considered, in general, that those fleeing 
these events were not entitled to refiigee status and protection within the EC was 
granted on a temporary basis* .^ Whilst it is recognised that refugee status may not 
have been appropriate in all cases, a quasi-systematic rejection of the claims lodged 
by individuals who fled these conflicts was not justified. UNHCR agreed that those 
who sought refugee status on the ground that their place of residence was 
threatened by war fell outside the scope of the Convention definition. However, 
UNHCR stressed that a great number of conflicts occurred in a political context 
which could lead to serious human rights violations against members of particular 
ethnic or religious groups^ **. According to UNHCR, a situation of internal armed
Johan Cels, “Responses to European States to de facto refugees” in Loescher and Monahan, 
Refugees and International Relations (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) at p. 187.
Issues regarding unsuccessful asylum seekers are not examined as the rejection of their claim 
means that they loose their status o f asylum seeker and thus fall outside the scope of the 1951 
Convention.
See, for instance, Karoline Kerber, “Temporary protection: an assessment of the harmonisation 
policies of the European Union Member States”, URL Vol. 9 No. 3 (1997) 453-471 and Sophie 
Albert, Les Réfugiés Bosniaques en Europe (Cedin-Paris I, Perspectives Internationales, 
Monchrestien, Paris, 1995) in particular at p. 152-166.
Many of those fleeing these conflicts stayed in refugee camps located close to the borders with 
neighbouring countries.
UNHCR, Information Note relating to Article 1 of the Geneva Convention (Paragraph 9).
conflict did not justify the use of torture, arbitrary punishment and indiscriminate 
bombings against certain groups of the population. Such acts could fall within the 
scope of the 1951 Convention. Hence, when determining an asylum claim, it is vital 
that the specific circumstances of the case are subject to close examination including 
an evaluation of the conflict. Secondly, cases where protection is granted outside 
the EC territory are not considered. This implies, for instance, that issues relating to 
people who find themselves in refugee camps are not addressed. Finally, the status 
of recognised refugees within the EC falls outside the scope of this thesis.
This focus on the right to seek refugee status within the meaning of the 1951 
Convention is justified by the fact that, to date, this status constitutes the most 
effective form of protection, particularly when compared to temporary protection. 
This does not mean that other forms of international protection must be 
disregarded; different types of protection may address different types of situations 
and thus different needs. In cases of mass influx of refugees, the individual approach 
that characterises the Convention may not always be adequate. Indeed, asylum 
claims are examined on an individual basis and supposes individuals being able to 
reach a country where they can apply for refugee status.
However, refugee status remains an essential component of international protection 
as the need for protection on a more permanent basis outside the country of origin 
is unlikely to disappear. With this in mind, temporary protection, for instance, 
should not be used to justify curtailments to the right to seek refugee status and 
thus legitimise restrictive asylum policies in breach of international refugee law.
In determining the standards that EC law must meet in order to preserve the right to 
seek refugee status, it is argued that pragmatism constitutes the most appropriate 
approach. However, the latter must apply within the limits of compliance with 
international refugee law.
2. A pragmatic approach
As already stressed, the purpose of this thesis is to ensure that the right to seek 
refugee status is folly implemented within the EC. In recent years, asylum seekers 
have faced increasing hostility which manifested itself through the adoption of 
increasingly restrictive measures on asylum at European and national level.
It is argued that two elements need to be taken into consideration in establishing EC 
standards regarding the right to seek refogee status, namely the need to comply 
with international refogee law, but also the need to acknowledge Member States’ 
views on the matter. Reference to the Member States’ positions considering their 
restrictive nature may, at first glance, appear paradoxical. However, the view taken 
is that totally ignoring the Member States’ views on the grant of refogee status 
would be detrimental to asylum seekers’ rights as the Member States retain an input 
in the EC decision-making process through the Council. This means that 
compromises may have to be found if the right to seek refogee status is to be 
preserved within the EC. In other words, a pragmatic approach is needed.
Pragmatism, however, should not jeopardise compliance with international refogee 
law. It follows that Member States’ views should only be taken into account 
provided that they allow consistency with international standards. For instance, it is 
argued that the loss of asylum seekers’ right to lodge multiple applications in the 
EC may be tolerated provided that access to fair and effective asylum procedures is 
guaranteed irrespective of the Member State responsible for determining the asylum 
claim^ *.
This pragmatic approach is commended as a way of avoiding the temptation to 
make proposals that may be seen as going beyond the requirements of international 
refogee law. This statement may be illustrated with regard to the flight from
These particular issues are examined in chapter IV on access to substantive asylum procedures 
and in chapter V  on fair and effective procedures
extreme poverty. Poverty as a ground for a well-founded fear of persecution 
entitling people to refogee status is a highly controversial issue. The introduction of 
such a ground could be justified in cases where poverty is caused by political 
decisions resulting in individuals being discriminated against and condemned to a 
state of total destitution. However, a proposal for an enlargement of the Convention 
definition of the term refogee to cover these cases would be with no doubt rejected 
by the Member States. Such a proposal would clash with the Member States’ 
efforts to keep a strict distinction between asylum seekers and economic migrants. 
For the thirty years that followed the adoption of the 1951 Convention, that 
distinction did not raise any serious difficulties as immigration channels were still 
open. However, with these channels hardly available, the Member States revived the 
distinction in question on the ground that economic migrants were abusing asylum 
procedures in order to enter the EC territory. Traditionally, UNHCR and other 
organisations involved with the protection of asylum seekers and refogees had little 
to say about this distinction between asylum seekers and economic migrants fearing 
that any dilution of this distinction could have an adverse impact on people in need 
of international protection^^. However, they have reviewed their position and 
recognised that in certain circumstances this distinction could be blurred^ .^ The 
reasons for leaving the country of origin may be founded on both socio-economic 
and political reasons. As already suggested, poverty may be the result of 
discrimination on the ground of religion or ethnicity. Moreover, mixed migrations 
are a source of further difficulties. In some countries, population movements may 
have different causes. Individuals may flee the country concerned owing to a well- 
founded fear of persecution within the meaning of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 
Convention while others may decide to leave for economic-related reasons '^*.
UNHCR, The State o f  the World’s  Refugees: in Search o f  Solutions (Oxford University Press, 
1995) at p. 196.
An analysis o f the distinction between asylum seekers and economic migrants falls outside the 
scope of this thesis. However, tliis could constitute the basis for further study.
This is for instance the case in Cliiiia.
Extreme care in assessing asylum claims is therefore required. Member States 
should not assume that countries that traditionally produce large numbers of 
economic migrants cannot produce asylum-seekers.
It is important to stress that although compromises may be required with a view to 
protecting the right to seek refogee status, this should not be at the detriment of 
asylum seekers’ rights. In other words, breaches of international refogee law should 
not be tolerated in the name of pragmatism. In the course of this study, it became 
apparent that significant changes in the developing common asylum policy would be 
necessary if the right to seek refogee status is to be preserved within the EC.
3. Methodology issues
The purpose of this work is to design standards to be satisfied by EC law with a 
view to securing the exercise of the right to seek refogee status within the EC. It is 
thus a proposal for law reform. A comprehensive approach at EC level is 
recommended. To that end, EC and EU as well as national initiatives have been 
measured against the standards established by international refogee law. The 
research is therefore essentially based upon an analysis of the relevant laws, 
proposals and case-law.
The current sources of EC and EU law on asylum are scattered across a complex 
area of measures. The principal measures are:
- the Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for 
asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities of 15 
June 1990, referred to as the Dublin Convention^^;
OJ 254/1 1997.
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- the Resolution on a harmonised approach to questions concerning host third 
countries adopted by the Ministers of the Member States of the European 
Communities at their meetings in London on 30 November to 1 December 1992^ ;^
- the Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum adopted by the 
Ministers of the Member States of the European Communities at their meetings in 
London on 30 November to 1 December 1992^ ;^
- Conclusions on countries in which there is generally no serious risk of persecution 
adopted by the Ministers of the Member States of the European Communities at 
their meetings in London on 30 November to 1 December 1992^ ;^
- the Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum 
procedures' ;^
- the Joint Position of 4 March 1996 defined by the Council on the basis of Article 
K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the harmonized application of the 
definition of the term “refiagee” in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 
1951 relating to the status of refugees^®; and
Referred to in European Parliament, Asylum in the European Union; “the safe country o f origin 
principle”. People’s Europe Series, November 1996, Amiex II, at p. 33-37 (not published in the 
Official Journal).
Ibid., Annex I, at p. 26-32 (not published in the Official Journal).
Ibid., Annex III, at p. 38-41 (not published in tlie Official Journal).
OJ C 274/13, 19/09/1996.
OJ L 63/2 1996, 13/03/1996.
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- Title IV of the TEC on visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to 
free movement of persons, in particular Article 63, inserted by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam of 2 October I997^\
These measures not only differ in their nature, they also vary in their legal effect. 
Whilst the Dublin Convention and Article 63 are legally binding upon the Member 
States, the other measures are not. This absence of binding effect has affected their 
ability to achieve effective harmonisation. Moreover, this situation is aggravated by 
the fact that there are inconsistencies between the EU and EC instruments 
concerning the right to seek refugee status; these are discussed in the course of the 
thesis.
What is proposed in this thesis is to measure the provisions concerning the right to 
seek refugee status which have been adopted within the EU and EC frameworks 
against the standards set by international refugee law. The purpose of this 
comparison is to identify the strengths and failings of these provisions and make the 
recommendations for law reform necessary to protect the right to seek refugee 
status within the EC in line with international standards.
The primary source of international refugee law is the 1951 Convention, and in 
particular Article 1(A)(2) on the definition of the term refugee and Article 33 on the 
principle of non-refoulement. The existence of a right to seek refugee status is 
inferred from Article 1(A)(2)^ .^ However, the principle of non-refoulement also 
plays a fundamental role in the protection against persecution^^. UNHCR 
documentation is also highly relevant as the Convention needs to be read in the light 
of UNHCR’s interpretations and recommendations if the Convention is to meet 
today’s needs for refugee protection. For instance, UNHCR recommends that
See supra n. 10.
See section 5.2 of the present chapter.
The relevance of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention is examined in section 5.3 of this chapter.
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“membership of a particular social group”, one of the Convention grounds, is 
interpreted as covering gender-based persecution^" .^ These sources are used to 
determine the standards against which EU measures are measured. It is argued that 
the standards in question must be met by EC law. European material is mainly 
comprised of measures adopted by the EU which relate to the right to seek refugee 
status.
However, attention was also paid to measures and practices developed in two 
Member States, i.e. the UK and France. This is justified for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, measures adopted at EU and national level influence each other. The impact 
of national measures on the right to seek refugee status within the EC cannot be 
ignored. Secondly, since EU measures are not comprehensive on the matter, it was 
necessary to turn to national laws and practices. For instance, issues relating to 
substantive asylum procedures have been hardly tackled by the EU. Thirdly, some 
issues could only be measured against international standards following an 
examination of Member States’ laws, case-law and practices. This is, for example, 
the case with regard to issues arising from the interpretation of “membership of a 
particular social group” in relation to gender-based persecution^ .^ Fourthly, the use 
of UK and French material is also justified by the fact that there are some clear 
differences in the laws and policies of the Member States^ .^ This demonstrates that, 
despite the existence of some common EU standards, there are still discrepancies, 
thus laying bare the failure of existing EU provisions. It also shows that an 
harmonisation in line with international refugee law is not only in the interest of 
asylum seekers, but may also be beneficial to the Member States. Indeed, the 
Member States vrith more generous provisions may argue that this situation makes 
them more “attractive” to asylum seekers. For instance, the UK could argue that the 
fact that it endorses a wider interpretation of the term “refugee” than France makes
34 See chapter III on the need for an up to date interpretation of the tenu “refugee”.
Ibid.
See in particular chapter III on the need for an up to date interpretation o f the tenu “refugee”.
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it a more appealing option for asylum seekers. In that context, the UK could benefit 
from an harmonised and legally binding interpretation of the term “refugee”. Finally, 
the focus on these two Member States was justified by practical considerations. The 
author had access to both French and UK material. This type of consideration 
explains why Germany was not considered despite the fact that that Member State 
deals with considerable numbers of asylum claims^ .^
Another source of information was found in the Canadian case-law of the 
interpretation of “membership of a particular social group”. The use of this case-law 
was considered relevant as it demonstrated that that 1951 Convention ground could 
be interpreted in a manner allowing the Convention to address gender-based 
persecution^^. The relevance of the Canadian case-law is reinforced by the fact that 
Canada deals with non-negligible numbers of asylum claims^ .^
It is important to stress that, although UK, French and Canadian material was used, 
this thesis as such is not a comparative one. French and UK material was used as 
evidence of the need for effective harmonisation. The purpose behind the 
examination of national material was to show how failure to comply with 
international refugee law could affect the right to seek refugee status. However, it 
also aimed at demonstrating that compliance could be achieved, this is particularly
Between 1984 and 1993, around 50% of the asyluin applications submitted in Europe were 
lodged in Germany (see http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pub/state/95/box5_3.htin). This situation 
persisted from 1994 to 1996(see Current Issues o f  UK Asylum Law and Policy, Frances Nicholson 
and Patrick Twomey (Eds.)(Ashgate, Aldershot, 1998) Table 2.1, at p. 40), Whilst Germany is still 
tlie Member State which deals with tlie greater numbers of asylum claims, it is now closely 
followed by the UK. In 1998, Germany received 27.3% of the applications lodged in Europe and 
22.1% in 1999 while the UK received 16.2% in 1998 and 20.8% in 1999 (see 
http://www.unhcr.ch/statis/0001euro/fig2.htm).
38 See chapter III on the need for an up to date interpretation of the term “refugee”.
In 1998, 23.840 persons requested refugee status in Canada; 22.580 in 1997; 26.120 in 1996; 
and 26.070 in 1995 (see http://www.unlicr.ch/world/amer/canada.htm).
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the case with regard to the Canadian case-law on non-State persecution"^ ® and 
women as a particular social group" \^
Finally, attention was also paid to the views and recommendations emanating from 
NGOs which are actively involved in the protection of asylum seekers’ rights. 
NGOs such as Amnesty International were the first ones to raise the alarm at the 
EU and Member States’ “change of heart”.
In recent years, asylum has become a priority on the agenda of the EU and its 
Member States. This resulted in proposals and laws affecting directly or indirectly 
the right to seek refugee status. For instance, while this research was being carried 
out, the UK adopted two Acts on Immigration and Asylum"*^  which both affected 
the right to seek refugee status. With the “communautarisation” of asylum matters, 
EC measures on asylum are now expected. Whilst its fast-moving nature made the 
chosen topic a particularly interesting and relevant one, it was also a source of 
difficulties. In that respect, the challenge was to keep up with developments and 
incorporate them where necessary.
4. Summary of literature survey
As already stressed, the purpose of this thesis is to make recommendations for law 
reform with a view to preserving the right to seek refugee status within the EC It 
follows that this thesis is mainly based upon an analysis of the relevant international, 
European and, to a certain extent, national legal provisions. However, the literature 
written on the subject was of valuable assistance in measuring European measures 
against the standards set by international refugee law.
See chapter III on the need for an up to date interpretation of the term “refugee” section 1.2. 
Ibid., section 2.2.2(i).
The Immigration and Asylum Act 1996 and the Innnigration and Asylmn Act 1999.
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There is an abundant literature on asylum and refugee matters. However, an 
important part of this literature does not directly concern the right to seek refugee 
status. For instance, a significant part of this literature deals with specific issues 
arising from mass influxes of refugees and thus focuses on other forms of protection 
than that offered by refugee status within the meaning of the 1951 Convention. The 
relevance of the available literature was assessed on the basis of its contribution to a 
thorough and critical analysis of the right to seek refugee status in the specific 
context of the EC.
In the course of this research, it became evident that the emergence of an asylum 
policy common to the Member States prompted the development of literature on 
the subject. This was particularly the case with the adoption of the Dublin 
Convention and, the Treaty on European Union in particular. Indeed, the latter 
brought asylum matters within the EU framework by their insertion into the Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA) Pillar, also known as the third pillar. As to the literature 
regarding the subsequent “communautarisation” of asylum matters operated by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, it is still in its early stages"^ .^
Whilst institutional and substantive issues are closely connected, the literature 
relating to the development of a common asylum policy tends not to envisage these 
matters in relation to each other" .^ Hence, the focus is either on institutional issues"^ ^
However, on this issue see Steve Peers, EU  Justice and Home Affairs Law (European Law 
Series, Pearson Education, Harlow 2000)
However, a more comprehensive approach may be found, for example, in Steve Peers (supra n. 
43), and in Michael Petersen, "Refugee protection issues in Europe”, in New Forms o f  
Discrimination, Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (éd.) (Editions A. Pedone, Paris, 1995).
See, for instance, Walter Van Gerven, "Towards a coherent constitutional system within the 
European Union”, EPL Vol. 2, Issue 1 (1996) 81-101; Richard McMahon, "Maastricht’s Third 
Pillar: load-bearing or purely decorative”, LIEI (1995/1) 51-64; Muller-Graff, “The legal bases of 
the Third Pillar and its position in the framework of the Union Treaty”, 31 CMLRev. (1994) 493- 
510; and Peers (supra n. 43).
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or on substantive aspects"^ ®. Moreover, the former are usually part of a larger debate 
on European institutional law"^  ^and do not necessarily specifically address the issues 
arising from asylum matters in that respect. While it is accepted that a 
comprehensive approach is not always feasible"^ *, the selected issue(s) should be put 
in context. This means that their close connection with other questions arising from 
the right to seek refugee status within the EC should be stressed.
With regard to substantive issues, commentators such as Guild"^ ,^ Shah^ ® and Joly^  ^
have expressed concern about the impact of the measures jointly adopted by the
See, for example, on the interpretation of the term “refugee”, Nadine Finch and Jane Coker, 
“Does the Refugee Convention protect women or is it blind to issues of gender”. Immigration and 
Nationality Law and Practice, Vol. 10 No. 3 (1996) 83-85 and Todd Stewart Schenk, “A proposal 
to improve the treatment of women in asylum law: adding a “gender” category to the international 
definition of “refugee”. Global Legal Studies Joiuiial II (1995) 
http://www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/vol2/schenk.html; on asylum procedures, Pieter Boeles and 
Ashley Terlouw, “Minimum guarantees for asylum procedures”, URL Vol. 9 No. 3 (1997) 472- 
491 and Pieter Boeles, “Effective legal remedies for asylum seekers according to the Convention of 
Geneva 1951”, NILR, XLIII (1996) 291-319; and on tlie safe tliird countiy principle, Prakash 
Shah, “Refugees and safe third countries: United Kingdom, European and international aspects”, 
EPL, Vol. 1 Issue 2 (1995) 259-288.
47 See supm  n. 45 and Peers (supra n. 43).
For instance, a journal article cannot be expected to thoroughly examine the riglit to seek 
refugee status within the EC.
Elspeth Guild, “Towartb an European asylum policy: developments in the European 
Community”, Immigration and Nationality Law and Practice, Vol. 7 No. 3 (1993) 88-92.
See supra n. 46.
Danièle Joly, Lynette Kelly and Clive Nettleton, Refugees in Europe: The Hostile Agenda, 
Minority Rights Group international, 1997.
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Member States on asylum seekers’ rights^ .^ Particular attention seems to have been 
paid to the Resolution on host third countries and the Resolution on manifestly 
unfounded applications for asylum and on the related concepts of safe third country 
and fast-track procedures'^. Another issue that seems to have come under close 
scrutiny is that relating to the scope of the definition of the term “refugee” 
enshrined in the 1951 Convention "^ .^
Whilst the risk of inconsistency with international refugee law appears to have been 
identified in the literature, the approach remains piecemeal in most cases. In other 
words, the different issues arising fi*om the right to seek refiagee status in the light 
of European developments tend to be examined individually. Hence, the interaction 
between the different European measures on asylum and their combined impact on 
the right to seek refiagee status within the EC is not efficiently demonstrated. In that 
respect, one may say that there is a lack of literature adopting a global approach.
Moreover, it is important to note that a comparative approach is frequently 
adopted^ .^ This means that the literature concerned does not so much focus on the
See also, for instance, Petersen, supra n. 44. Concern was also raised with regard to national 
developments; see, for example. Dallai Stevens, “The Asylum and Immigration Act 1996: erosion 
of the right to seek asylum”, Vol. 61 MLR (1998) 207-222 and Colin Harvey, “Excluding 
refugees?”, New Law Journal, November 3 (1995), at p. 1630.
See, for instance, Shah (supra n. 46), Guild (supra n. 49) and Roel Femhout, “Status 
determination and the safe third country principle”, in Europe and Refugees: a Challenge? 
L Europe et les Réfugiés: un Défi?, Edited by Jean-Ives Carlier et Dirk Vanheule (Eds.) (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague/ London/ Boston, 1997) at p. 187.
See, for example, Isabelle Daoust and Kristina Folkelius, “Developments - UNHCR Symposium 
on gender-based persecution, URL Vol. 8 No. 1/2 (1996) 161-183, Finch and Coker (supra n. 46) 
and Schenk (ibid.).
See, for instance. Who Is a Refugee? A Comparative Case Law Study, Jean-Ives Carlier, Dirk 
Vanlieule, Klaus Hullmami and Carlos Pefia Galiano (Eds.) (Kluwer Law International, The
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provisions adopted at European level, but on the asylum lavrs and policies of the 
Member States. Comparative literature was usefiil as European and national 
measures concerning the right to seek refiagee status influence each other. 
Furthermore, as already noted, as the current European provisions on asylum are 
not comprehensive, an analysis of national provisions was necessary in some 
instances.
In the late 1990s, it appears that the literature concerning the right to seek refiagee 
status within the EC became less abundant. The emphasis seems to have been put 
on the study of other forms of protection than that offered through refiagee status 
within the meaning of the 1951 Convention. This shift was, to a considerable extent, 
prompted by the factual context, and in particular the crisis in former Yugoslavia. 
Whilst the importance of these other forms of protection is recognised, refugee 
status remains a crucial form of international protection.
However, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which provides for 
the adoption of a number of provisions regarding the right to seek refugee status 
within the EC, this topic will probably become the object of a more significant 
literature.
A final and fundamental issue needs to be addressed in this introduction. It is argued 
that the protection of the right to seek refiagee status within the EC requires the 
latter to adopt comprehensive standards in line with those set by international 
refugee law. It is therefore essential to determine what are these international 
standards.
Hague/ London/ Boston, 1997) and Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, A Guide to 
Asylum Law and Practice in the European Union, Compiled by G. Gare, ILPA December 1995,
19
5. International standards
The instrument central to the protection of refijgees is the 1951 Convention. The 
Convention is analysed specifically in relation to the right to seek refugee status. It 
follows that the provisions that concern the status of recognised refugees and the 
loss of refugee status fall outside the scope of this thesis. The provisions that are 
considered are primarily Article 1(A)(2) on the definition of the term “refiagee” and 
Article 33 on the principle of non-refoulement. These two Articles are fundamental 
to asylum seekers’ rights and it is argued that these provisions form the standards 
that EC law must satisfy. However, in order to fully grasp the extent of the 
obligations encompassed in Articles 1(A)(2) and 33, the latter must be read in the 
light of the UNHCR’s interpretations. Indeed, UNHCR’s guidelines are 
indispensable if the 1951 Convention is to be adapted to today’s needs for 
international protection. This is particularly the case with regard to the definition of 
refugee^ .^
The next section focuses on Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention and how, it is 
argued, it gives rise to a right to seek refugee status. Then, the principle of non­
refoulement is examined as its implementation is crucial to the protection of asylum 
seekers’ rights.
5.1. Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention: the right to seek refugee status
It is argued that a right to seek refugee status may be inferred from Article 1(A)(2) 
of the Convention which defines who is eligible for refiagee status.
5.1.1. The definition of the term refugee
Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention defines a refugee as an individual who is 
outside his or her country of origin or residence, where he or she is stateless, and is
See chapter III on the need for an up to date interpretation of the term “refugee”.
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unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country or to 
return there owing to a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
The Convention definition was originally confined to events that had occurred 
before 1 January 1951. However, it was acknowledged that this temporal limitation 
would prevent the Convention from addressing new refugee situations arising after 
that date. This limitation was removed by the Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees of 1967^ .^ The 1951 Convention allowed a further limitation on 
ratification. States were offered the option to limit the scope of the Convention to 
events in Europe (Article 1(B)(1)). However, this limitation does not apply to the 
Member States. Indeed, both the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol have 
been ratified by the fifteen Member States. These two instruments are therefore 
legally binding upon the Member States.
The purpose of this research is not to analyse the Convention definition, but to 
ensure that EC law secures compliance with international standards; this implies 
ensuring the correct implementation of the Convention definition throughout the 
EC. It is argued that a full implementation of that definition requires taking into 
consideration the position of UNHCR. Over the years, UNHCR has been concerned 
with recommending interpretations of the term refugee which address new refugee 
situations in line with the spirit and purpose of the 1951 Convention. Two main 
issues have been identified in that respect, namely non-State persecution and 
gender-based persecution^^.
While an in depth analysis and discussion of the Convention definition is not the 
purpose of this research, an understanding of who is a refiagee under Article 1(A)(2) 
remains necessary. The four elements of the definition are therefore considered.
Article 2(1) o f the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (606 UNTS 267). 
See chapter III on the need for an up to date interpretation of the term “refugee”.
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(i) The asylum seeker’s presence outside his or her country of origin
In order to be eligible for refugee status, an individual must, inter alia, be outside 
his or her country of origin. Indeed, as noticed by Goodwin-Gill, “(...) the fact of 
having fled, having crossed an international frontier, is an intrinsic part of the quality 
of refugee, understood in its ordinary s e n s e . I t  follows from Article 1(A)(2) that 
the expression country of origin refers to the State of nationality or the State of 
residence where asylum seekers are stateless.
(ii) Inability or unwillingness to avail oneself of the protection of the country 
of origin or to return there
The inability or unwillingness to request one’s country of origin for protection or 
return to the country in question is the rationale for the availability of international 
protection, which may take the form of refugee status. Indeed, international 
protection is construed as a substitute for national protection, i.e. protection 
emanating from the country of origin.
This element of the Convention definition has been and remains contentious as it 
has been subject to restrictive interpretations where an individual has a well- 
founded fear of persecution owing to the activities of non-State agents. In such 
circumstances, some States, including some Member States, have interpreted that 
element of the Convention definition as excluding cases where the country of origin 
is unable to provide effective protection. This position, which is contested by 
UNHCR, has been justified on the ground that the Convention definition only refers 
to State persecution. It is argued that this interpretation of the Convention 
definition is inconsistent with the wording, spirit and object of the Convention®®.
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996) (2nd 
éd) at p.40.
See chapter III on the need for an up to date interpretation of the term “refugee”.
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(iii) A well-founded fear of persecution
The term persecution is not defined in the 1951 Convention or in any other 
international instrument. However, as observed by Plender, “[t]he persecution that 
the refugee fears consists primarily in a serious disadvantage, including jeopardy to 
life, physical integrity or liberty”®\ Plender's statement is inferred fi’om Articles
Richard Plender, International Migration Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1988) (2nd ed) at p.417.
Article 31 on “refiigees unlawfully in the countiy of refiige” reads;
‘T. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account o f their illegal entry or presence, 
on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the 
sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they 
present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or 
presence.
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than 
those winch are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the 
country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country. The Contracting States shall 
allow refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission in another 
country.”
Article 31 of the 1951 Convention is considered in relation to document requirements imposed on 
asylum seekers (see chapter IV on access to substantive asylum procedures).
Article 32. on “expulsion” reads:
“1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refiigee lawfully in their territory save on groimds of 
national security or public order.
2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance 
with due process o f law. Except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, 
the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear liimself, and to appeal to and be 
represented for the purpose before a competent authority or a person or persons specially 
designated by the competent authority.
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to 33 of the 1951 Convention tvhich contemplate threats to life or freedom. This 
can be regarded as referring to the heart of the term persecution. However, as 
suggested by Plender, “(...) any other serious disadvantage will constitute 
persecution when it gives rise to intolerable psychological pressure”^^ . It follows 
that the determination of what amounts to persecution remains very much a 
question of degree that must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
There seems to be a consensus that the core-meaning of persecution for the purpose 
of the 1951 Convention includes threat to life, freedom or physical integrity. 
However difficulties arise when attempting to determine what is persecution in the 
broader sense. As noted by Goodwin-Gill, (...) [a] comprehensive analysis requires 
the general notion of persecution to be related to developments within the broad 
field of human rights” '^*. In that respect, particular attention should be paid to the 
rights that have an absolute character and cannot therefore be subject to 
derogations®^ These rights include the right to life to the extent that individuals are 
protected against “arbitrary” deprivation®®, the right to be protected against torture.
3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period within which to seek 
legal admission into another countiy. The Contracting States reserve the right to apply during 
that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary.”
Article 32 is not examined in this thesis as it concerns recognised refugees.
Article 33 is examined in section 5.3. of the present chapter.
Richard Plender, see supra n. 61.
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, supra n. 59, at p. 67.
See, for instance. Article 15(2) of the ECHR; Article 4 of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and Article 27 of the American Convention of Human Rights.
See, for example. Article 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 2 of the
ECHR.
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or cruel or inhuman treatment® ,^ the right not to be subjected to slavery or 
servitude® ,^ the right not to be subjected to retroactive criminal penalties®  ^and the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion^ ®. It is interesting to note that 
that this right is not construed as an absolute right for the purpose of the ECHR 
(Article 9). In addition to these absolute rights, there are a number of rights that 
cannot be ignored .. in view of the frequent close connection between persecution 
and personal freedom” ’^. These rights include the right to liberty and security of the 
person which covers arbitrary arrest and detention^ ,^ the right to freedom from 
arbitrary interference in private home and family life^ .^ As stressed by Goodwin- 
Gill, “[rjecognition of these rights is essential to the maintenance of the integrity 
and inherent human dignity of the individual. Persecution within the Convention 
thus comprehends measures, taken on the basis of one or more of the stated 
grounds, which threaten deprivation or liberty; torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment; subjection to slavery or servitude; non-recognition as a person 
(particularly where the consequences of such non-recognition impinge directly on 
an individual's life, liberty, livelihood, security, or integrity); and oppression.
See, for example. Article 7 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 3 of the 
ECHR.
See, for example. Article 8 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 4(1) o f the 
ECHR
See, for instance. Article 15 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 7 of the
ECHR.
Article 18 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, supm  n. 59, at p. 69.
See, for instance, Article 9 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 5 of the 
ECHR.
See, for example. Article 17 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 8 of the 
ECHR.
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discrimination or harassment of a person in his or her private, home, or family 
life”' \
One may infer from the fundamental character of these rights that violations of the 
rights in question combined with the State of origin’s inability to provide protection 
may amount to persecution for the purpose of the 1951 Convention. Hence, 
“[ajssessments must be made from case to case by taking account, on the one hand, 
of the notion of individual integrity and human dignity and, on the other hand, of the 
manner and degree to which they stand to be injured”^^ . It follows from Article 
1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention that asylum claimants must demonstrate a well- 
founded fear of persecution.
The Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems stated in a Draft 
Report of 15 February 1950 that the words ‘^ veil-founded fear” implied that the 
person applying for refugee status had to give a “plausible account” of the reasons 
why he or she feared persecution’®. According to the final report, the expression 
well-founded fear of persecution meant that the individual seeking refugee status 
had been exposed to persecution or had good reason to fear persecution” .
The assessment of the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution within the 
meaning of Article 1(A)(2) requires an examination of both objective and subjective 
elements. According to the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status, the determination of the refiagee status will “(...) 
primarily require an evaluation of the applicant's statement rather than a judgement
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, supra n. 59, at p.69.
UN DOC. E/AC 32/L38 (1950) E/1658, reprinted in UN-YBK (1950) 569. 
”  E/1618)-E /A C  32/5.
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of the situation prevailing in his own country of origin”.”  This means that, in 
determining whether there is a well-founded fear of persecution, particular attention 
must be given to the circumstances specific to the case. Focusing on the situation in 
the State of origin could result in individuals being denied refugee status on the 
ground that the situation in their country of origin appears satisfactory on the 
whole. However, a State may only be safe for certain groups of individuals^ .^ Thus, 
objective elements cannot prevail where assessing the existence of a well-founded 
fear of persecution.
Finally, in order to be eligible for refugee status, asylum seekers must demonstrate 
that their well-founded fear of persecution is based on a Convention ground.
(iv) The Convention grounds
The 1951 Convention mentions five grounds for persecution, namely race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group and political opinion. An 
asylum claim may be founded on one or more Convention grounds.
An overview of the different Convention grounds is given; however, the purpose is 
not to analyse and discuss these grounds. They are considered in relation to the 
need for EC law to comply with Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention with a 
view to securing the right to seek refugee status within the EC territory. To that 
end, it is vital that the Convention definition is not subject to restrictive 
interpretations inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of the Convention, which is 
to provide refugee status to those in need of international protection within the
UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria fo r  Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status o f  Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV. 1, 
reedited, Geneva, January 1992.
See chapter V  on fair and effective procedures.
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meaning of its provisions. This is particularly important if the Convention is not to 
become an anachronism^®.
Race
Where considering race as a ground for persecution within the meaning of the 1951 
Convention, one has to look at the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination; Article 1 reads:
“(•••) [T]he term “racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin 
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.”
However, whilst the international community has condemned on a large number of 
occasions discrimination on racial grounds, whether such practices constitute 
persecution is a more contentious issue. In Ah v. Secretary o f State, the racial 
discrimination likely to be faced by Kenyan citizens of Asian origin was not 
considered to amount to persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Convention. 
The applicants claimed they did not wish to be returned to their country of origin 
because they feared political and racial persecution as a result of the State’s 
“africanisation” policy”®’. It is not sufficient for asylum seekers to establish that they 
are discriminated against owing to their race, they must also demonstrate that racial 
discrimination in their particular case amounts to persecution. In other words, racial 
discrimination is not a synonym for persecution by reason of race, although they 
may overlap and thus fall within the scope of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951
® See chapter III on the need for an up to date interpretation of the term “refiigee”. 
U / /  V. Secretary o f  State [1987] Imin AR 126.
28
Convention. Racial discrimination is likely to amount to persecution where rights 
fundamental to human dignity are violated
• Religion
A number of international instruments guarantee the right to freedom of religion. 
Pursuant to Article 18 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone shall have the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, which shall include the 
freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of choice and the freedom to manifest 
such religion or belief. This right is also protected by the ECHR (Article 9)^\
The right to freedom of religion also implies that no one shall be subject to coercion 
which would impair that freedom or be forced to embrace a religion or belief. The 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief, adopted in 1981, indicates the interests to be 
protected®'*. As in the case of racial discrimination, asylum seekers who allege that 
they have a well-founded fear of persecution owing to their religion must 
demonstrate that the infringement to their right to freedom of religion amounts to 
persecution^^ For instance, the French Commission des Recours des Réfugiés
82 See this chapter, section 5.1.1 (iii).
However, within the framework of the ECHR, a distinction was made between the freedom to 
practice a religious belief and the right to proselytise. In Kokkinakis v. Greece, the European 
Court of Human Rights distinguished between “bearing Christian witness and improper 
proselytism” (paragraph 48), wiiich could, for instance, consist in “offering material or social 
advantages witli a view to gaining new members for a Church or exerting improper pressirre on 
people in distress or in need ... [or] the use of violence or brainwashing” (paragraph 
^9).(Kokkinakis v Greece, judgment of 25 May 1993, Series A  No. 260-A, p. 19).
Declaration adopted without vote by the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA res. 
36/55 of 25 Nov. 1981).
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(CRR)^ ® held in Nahmany that the applicants, Jews who had become Christians, had 
good reasons to fear persecution in their country of origin, Israel, owing to their 
religion®’. Indeed, Jews who had converted to Christianity faced serious 
discrimination.
• Nationality
As observed by Goodwin-Gill, “[t]he reference to persecution for reasons of 
nationality is somewhat odd, given the absurdity of a State persecuting its own 
nationals on account of their membership of the body politic. Those who possess 
the nationality of another State will, in normal circumstances, be entitled to its 
protection and so fall outside the refiagee definition”®®. However, the concept of 
nationality within the meaning of the 1951 Convention is usually interpreted in a 
broader sense. As a result, the term nationality includes origins and membership of a 
particular ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic minority. It is interesting to note 
that Article 27 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declares that “[i]n 
those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise 
their own religion, or to use their own language”. However, as noted by Goodwin- 
Gill, “[i]t is not necessary that those persecuted should constitute a minority in their 
own country, oligarchies traditionally tend to resort to oppression”®^. Asylum
See tills chapter, section 5.1.1(111).
®® See chapter III on the need for an up to date Interpretation of tlie term “refugee”, section 1.1.
®’ CRR, 30 July 1982, Nahmany referred to In Frederic Tlberglilen, La Protection des Réfugiés en 
France (Collection Droit Public Positif, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marsellle, Economica, Paris, 
1988)(2nded)atp.338.
®® Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, see supra n. 59, at p. 45.
Ibid., at p. 45-46.
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seekers relying on that Convention ground will have to establish that the treatment 
that they are exposed to owing to their nationality amounts to persecution®®. As 
observed by Grahl-Madsen, persecution on the ground of nationality also includes 
persecution by reason of lack of nationality, namely statelessness®’.
• Membership of a particular social group
Membership of a particular social group as a ground for persecution raises a 
number of definitional issues. This Convention ground is characterised by its 
“vagueness” that allows it to cover a wider range of refiigee situations than the 
other Convention grounds. In the absence of a Convention definition, the onus was 
on UNHCR and on the States party to the 1951 Convention to state more precisely 
the scope of membership of a particular social group. It is argued that the 1951 
Convention must be read in the light of UNHCR’s guidelines and that the latter 
must be regarded as being part of the standards set by international refugee law. 
The States should therefore be under the obligation to follow the guidelines 
provided by UNHCR. With regard to membership of a particular social group, the 
latter allows that Convention ground to cover new refugee situations, and in 
particular gender-based and non-State persecution. Compliance with the positions 
advocated by UNHCR is therefore crucial to the preservation of both the object and 
spirit of the 1951 Convention. It is unfortunate that restrictive national policies on 
asylum have resulted in the scope of that Convention ground being construed 
narrowly. It is argued that EC law should secure that membership of a particular 
social group is interpreted in a purposive manner®^ .
90 See this chapter, section 5.1.1 (iii).
®’ Gralil-Madsen, The Status o f  Refugees in International Law (Vol. 1, Sijthoff, Leyden, 1966) at 
p. 219.
92 See chapter III on the need for an up to date interpretation of the term "refugee".
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• Political opinion
The right to freedom of opinion and expression is embodied in a number of 
international instruments. For instance. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights reads that “everyone has the right to freedom and expression; the 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” 
This right is also protected by the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Article 19(1) and (2)®®) and, at a regional level, by the European Convention on 
Human Rights®'*. Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights reads 
that “everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers (...)”
Traditionally, a refugee is seen as someone who has a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted by the State authorities owing to his or her political opinion or/and 
involvement. However, persecution by reason of political opinion, as well as 
persecution owing to other grounds, must not be confined to State persecution as it 
may well emanate from non-State agents®^ .
®® Article 19(1) and (2) of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Riglits reads;
“1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in 
writing or in print, in the form o f art, or through any other media of his choice.”
®"* Handyside v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 7 December 
1976, Series A No. 24; Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, European Court of Hmnan Riglits, 
judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A No. 30; Arrowsmitk v. United Kingdom (7050/75) European 
Conmiission on Human Rights, 12 October 1978,19 Decisions and Reports 5.
®^ The issues raised by non-State persecution are examined in chapter III on the need for an up to 
date interpretation of the term “refugee”.
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Goodwin-Gill considers that if “political opinions have been expressed, and if the 
applicant or others similarly placed have suffered or been threatened with repressive 
measures, then a well-founded fear may be made out. Problems arise, however, in 
assessing the value of the “political act”, particularly if the act itself stands more or 
less alone, unaccompanied by evident or overt expressions of opinion.”®® The latter 
part of this statement is another illustration of the fact that assessment for the 
purpose of refugee status under the 1951 Convention must take place on a case-by- 
case basis.
Where an individual falls within the scope of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 
Convention, he or she is entitled to refugee status. It is argued that this provision 
gives rise to a right to seek refugee status.
5.2. The right to seek refugee status
It is argued that a right to seek refugee status can be inferred from Article 1(A)(2) 
of the 1951 Convention. In that respect, refiigee status must be distinguished from 
issues arising from the concept of asylum and the absence of a right to asylum.
5.2.1. The absence of a right to asylum
As noted by Goodwin-Gill, “[t]he term “asylum” and the expression “right of 
asylum” have lost much of their pristine simplicity. With the growth of nation States 
and the corresponding development of notions of territorial jurisdiction and 
supremacy, the institution of asylum has been subject to a radical change”®’.
Before the development of the concept of the modern State, asylum was regarded 
as a religious institution, which has now disappeared. Religious asylum was 
practised by Jews, Greeks and Romans, but it is the Catholic Church that turned 
asylum into a universal institution. From the sixteenth century, the concepts of
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, supra ii. 59, at p.49.
Ibid., at p. 101.
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sovereignty and the modem State resulted in the development of a new form of 
asylum, which is known as territorial asylum. It is based on the sovereignty of the 
State. A number of national constitutions expressly mention the right to territorial 
asylum. However, the right of asylum is not guaranteed in the sense of a legal 
obligation endorsed by the State.
Asylum was defined by the Institute of International Law at its 1950 Bath Session 
as the protection which a State grants under the control of its organs on its territory 
or in some other place to a person who comes to seek it®®. Hence, the protection 
granted by a State to a non-national of a foreign country lies at the heart of the 
institution of asylum.
The institution of asylum, as modelled by the concepts of nation State and 
sovereignty was and is still regarded as belonging to the exclusive competence, or 
'^'domaine réservë\ of the State. Therefore, right of asylum and international 
protection were originally perceived as the same institution whose grant depended 
upon the discretionary power of the head of the State. In 1949, Morgenstem based 
the competence of States to grant asylum on “the undisputed rule of international 
law that every State ha[d] exclusive control on the individuals in its territory, 
including all matters relating to exclusion, admission, expulsion and protection 
against the exercise of jurisdiction by other States”®®.
Asylum, understood as referring to territorial asylum, and international protection 
are now regarded as two different concepts. Therefore, the protection granted 
through territorial asylum must not be confused with that gained through refiigee 
status within the meaning of the 1951 Convention. International protection is a 
creation of international law, which finds its root in the provisions of the 1951
98 Encyclopaedia Universalis, Corpus 3, 1995, at p. 200.
®® Morgenstem, “The Right to Asylum”, 26 BYIL (1949) 327 referred to in Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, 
supra n. 59, at p. 102.
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Convention, whereas asylum remains the prerogative of the State’®*’. Thus, whilst 
States are not under the obligation to grant asylum’®’, those which are parties to the 
1951 Convention are obliged to grant refugee status to individuals who fall within 
the scope of the Convention definition of the term “refugee” enshrined in Article 
1(A)(2). It follows from this Article and the obligation that it imposes on States that 
individuals who fall within its scope are entitled to seek refiigee status. Hence, a 
right to seek refugee status may be inferred from Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 
Convention.
5.2.2. The existence of a right to seek refugee status
Under Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention, those who are outside their country 
of origin and are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that 
State or to return there owing to a well-founded fear of persecution based on a 
Convention ground are refugees for the purpose of the Convention. In other words, 
those who satisfy the requirements of Article 1(A)(2) are entitled to refiigee status. 
By becoming party to the Convention, the States concerned have endorsed the 
obligation to grant refiigee status to individuals who are eligible under the 
Convention definition.
In order for a State to be able to determine whether an individual is entitled to 
refugee status, that State must examine his or her application. This supposes, in the 
first instance, that the applicant, i.e. the asylum seeker, is given the opportunity to 
lodge his or her claim. If this opportunity is denied or restricted, individuals who 
would otherwise fall within the scope of Article 1(A)(2) will be deprived from a 
protection, i.e. refugee status, they were entitled to. Hence, it is argued that 
compliance with Article 1(A)(2) generates a number of obligations to be imposed
100 See, for instance, Sopliie Albert, supra n. 18, particularly at p. 53.
There have been a number of unsuccessful attempts to impose on States an obligation to grant 
asylum to those in need. The history of international instruments dealing with asylum illustrates 
the States’ reluctance to be bomid by such an obligation.
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on States party to the 1951 Convention, and these include all the Member States. 
The above mentioned obligations, inherent in Article 1(A)(2), are designed to 
secure its effectiveness^^ .^ Indeed, if access to fair and effective asylum procedures 
is not secured. States will not be in a position to fulfil their obligations under the 
Convention as they will have failed to determine whether an individual is eligible for 
refugee status. The fact that the 1951 Convention does not cover procedural issues, 
and thus leave them to the States’ discretion, does not mean that they can 
undermine their obligations under the Convention by limiting its applicability in 
practice.
It is argued that the obligations imposed on States inherent in Article 1(A)(2) and to 
the spirit and purpose of the 1951 Convention as a whole create a right to seek 
refugee status. The obligation to ensure access to adequate asylum procedures in 
order to determine whether individuals are entitled to refugee status implies that 
there is a right to seek refugee status. Such a right can therefore be inferred from 
Article 1(A)(2). With this in mind, it is argued that any national or regional measure 
which, directly or indirectly, jeopardises that right is in breach of the 1951 
Convention, and thus inconsistent with the standards set by international refugee 
law. In that respect, the initiatives of the EU and its Member States have been a 
source of growing disquiet that must, it is argued, be addressed by EC law^ ®^ .
Another element central to the safeguard of the right to seek refugee status is the 
principle of non-refoulement. The view taken is that this right cannot be adequately 
implemented in the absence of full compliance with the principle in question.
See chapter III on the need for an up to date interpretation of the term “refugee”.
It is also necessary to secure that the treatment reserved to asylum seekers pending determination 
does not undermine their right to see refugee status (see chapter VI on asylum seekers’ status 
pending determination).
The inconsistencies of these measures with international standards are evidenced in the 
subsequent chapters.
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5.3. The principle of non-refoulement
The principle o f non-refoulement prohibits States from returning individuals to a 
country where their life or freedom may be endangered. This principle is enshrined 
in Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention which reads:
'"No Contracting State shall expel or return Ç;^refoulef") a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.”
Article 33(2) further states that:
“The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee 
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger for the community of that country.”
The principle of non-refoulement is also stated in other international instruments 
such as the OAU Convention on refugees (Article 11(3)), the American Convention 
on Human Rights (Article 22(8))^ '^ '* and the Declaration on Territorial Asylum 
(Article 3(1))'°^
Article 22(8) of tlie American Convention on Hmnan Rights reads:
“In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless of whether or not it is his 
country of origin, if in that country his right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being 
violated because o f his race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions.”
Resolution 2312 (XXII).
Article 3(1) of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum reads:
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It is not contended that the principle of non-T’efoulement has legal authority as 
treaty law and is therefore legally binding upon the signatories of the 1951 
Convention. However, scholars and UNHCR regard the principle of non­
refoulement as a rule of customary law’®'^ and not only as a treaty provision. In the 
opinion of UNHCR, the principle of non-refoulement has become an imperative 
norm of international law which has been universally recognised on many 
occasions^UNHCR had previously observed that this fundamental humanitarian 
principle, expressed in a number of universal and regional instruments, is generally 
accepted by States’ll
“No person referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1, shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at 
the frontier or, if  he has already entered the territory in which he seeks asylnm, expulsion or 
compulsory return to any State where he may be subjected to persecution.”
However, the Declaration provides for exceptions.
Article 3(2) reads:
“Exception may be made to the foregoing principle only for overriding reasons of national security 
or in order to safeguard the population, as in the case of mass influx of persons.”
And Article 3(3) adds:
“Should a State decide in any case that exception to the principle stated in paragraph 1 of this 
article would be justified, it shall consider the possibility of granting to tlie person concerned, 
under such conditions as it may deem appropriate, an opportunity, whether by way of provisional 
asylmn or otherwise, of going to another State.”
Richard Plender, see supra n. 61, at p. 427.
Conclusion n. 6 (XXVIII), adopted in 1977.
See Report A/ 40/ 12, n. 23.
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The customary nature of the principle of non-refoulement is still open to discussion. 
Some argue that the fact that this principle is not always implemented by States 
demonstrates that it is not a rule of customary law. However, as noted by Marx, 
“[s]imply citing cases in which this principle has not been respected by some States 
is not sufficient evidence that there is no consistent and uniform practice among 
States with regard to the principle of non-refoulemenf"^^^. As stressed by the 
International Court of Justice, “if a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible 
with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or 
justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct 
is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather 
than weaken the rule”"^ . Moreover, the element of opinio juris must be given 
greater credence. During the debates of the UN General Assembly, no State has 
ever overtly contested the binding nature of the principle of non-refoulement\ this 
statement includes those who are not party to the 1951 Convention. Finally, where 
UNHCR had to intervene because States had returned people in need of 
international protection to their country of origin in breach of the principle of non­
refoulement, the States concerned never argued that they had a right to compel 
these people to return. The existence of the principle of non-refoulement in itself 
was not challenged. The issue at stake was not related to the recognition of the 
principle, but to its implementation. This shows that States recognise that they are 
bound by the principle of non-refoulement, although their practices may not be 
consistent with their legal obligation. It follows that the principle of non­
refoulement must be implemented by all the States as a rule of customary law’” .
Marx, Reinhard, “Refugee Protection at Risk?”, in New Forms o f  Discrimination, Liiios- 
Alexander Sicilianos (éd.) (Editions A. Redone, Paris, 1995) at p. 186.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua {Nicaragua v. USA), merits, 
judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 186.
Ill Marx, Reinliard, see supra n. 109, at p. 187.
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The principle of non-refoulement constitutes the very basis of the protection offered 
to those in need of refuge because their State of origin failed them in that respect. 
This is reflected in its legal authority. It follows that that principle covers those who 
have fled their country of origin with a view to seeking refugee status. In other 
words, asylum seekers must enjoy the benefit of the protection that confers the 
principle of non-refoulement. Hence, they must not be returned to a country where 
their life or freedom may be threatened.
This imperative need to comply with the principle of non-refoulement in relation to 
asylum seekers took on a new dimension with measures adopted by the EU and its 
Member States in the field of asylum. Indeed, the Member States have been eager 
to transfer responsibility for examining asylum claims to other Member States or, 
preferably, to third countries” .^ It is argued that compliance with the principle of 
non-refoulement is an essential pre-requirement to any transfer of responsibility^
If transfers were to be carried out in breach of the principle of non-refoulement, the 
right to seek refugee status would be seriously undermined as such practice would 
amount to deny these individuals the possibility to exercise the right in question. It 
follows that any measure to be adopted and implemented within the EC must be 
strictly consistent with the principle of non-refoulement.
6. Outline of the chapters
It is argued that international refugee law recognises the existence of a right to seek 
refugee status which arises from Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention and the 
obligations imposed on States inherent in that provision. In considering the 
Convention provisions, it is vital to take into consideration the guidelines of 
UNHCR as these are essential to the purposive interpretation of the Convention.
See chapter IV on access to substantive asylum procedures.
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This is particularly apparent with regard to the definition of the term refiigee"'*. 
Moreover, as individuals who may be in need of international protection, asylum 
seekers fall within the scope of the principle of non-refoulement which prohibits 
their removal to a country where their life or freedom could be at risk. As a rule of 
customary law which is also enshrined in the 1951 Convention, the principle of non­
refoulement is legally binding upon the Member States.
It is argued that the measures to be adopted by the EC in relation to asylum seekers 
must comply with the provisions of the 1951 Convention as interpreted by 
UNHCR, including the principle of non-refoulement. These requirements constitute 
the international standards against which EU and national measures are measured in 
order to identify inconsistencies and deficiencies. The latter must be addressed by 
the EC in line with international standards if the right to seek refiigee status is to be 
safeguarded within the EC. A number of issues have been identified, in addition to 
that of the framework, which reflect the need for a comprehensive approach.
Chapter II focuses on the framework for a common asylum policy which fully 
recognises the right to seek refugee status. The view taken is that the EC offers a 
more suitable fi*amework than intergovernmental cooperation and that the 
“communautarisation” operated by the Treaty of Amsterdam offers an opportunity 
to redress the “wrongs” committed by the EU and its Member States. It is argued 
that the characteristics inherent in the intergovernmental framework, i.e. the use of 
the unanimity rule, the absence of legal binding effect, the role left to the 
Commission and the lack of parliamentary and judicial control, prevents it from 
offering an adequate framework. Whilst the “communautarisation” operated by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam is to be welcome, it suffers from a number of drawbacks 
which lie with the existence of a possibility for the Member States to opt out fi*om 
Title IV and the provisions regarding the ECJ’s jurisdiction and the decision-making 
process.
114 See chapter III on the need for an up to date interpretation of the term “refiigee”.
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For the right to seek reffigee status to be preserved within the EC, it is argued that 
four areas must be addressed. Firstly, Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention must 
be interpreted and applied in a purposive manner in order to allow the Convention 
definition to cover new refugee situations, i.e. non-State persecution and gender- 
based persecution. Secondly, it is vital that access to asylum procedures is secured. 
Thirdly, asylum claims must be determined following asylum procedures that satisfy 
international standards; these are referred to as fair and effective procedures. 
Finally, the right to seek refugee status must not be undermined by asylum seekers’ 
status pending determination.
Chapter III deals with the need to secure that the interpretation of the term 
“refugee” addresses the needs of today’s asylum seekers. In that respect, two main 
issues have been identified, namely the need to recognise non-State and gender- 
based persecution. With regard to non-State persecution, it is argued that, since the 
Convention definition does not impose requirements as to the identity of the 
perpetrator, eligibility for refugee status must not be contingent on State 
involvement in cases of non-State persecution. As to gender-based persecution, the 
view taken is that asylum seekers who have a well-founded fear of persecution 
owing to their gender must have access to refugee status. It is recommended that 
this can be achieved through a purposive interpretation of the Convention ground 
“membership of a particular social group” that must be enshrined in EC law.
The purpose of chapter IV is to set standards designed to secure asylum seekers’ 
access to substantive asylum procedures. With this in mind, two types of issues 
have been identified, i.e. those regarding asylum seekers’ access to the EC territory 
and those directly concerning their access to substantive asylum procedures in the 
Member States. The first category of issues relate to documentation requirements 
imposed on asylum seekers and carrier sanctions. It is argued that these measures 
must be abolished as they ignore asylum seekers’ specific circumstances and hinder 
the right to seek refugee status. The second category concerns the transfers of 
responsibility carried out by Member States whereby they decline responsibility for 
determining applications for asylum on the ground that another State should
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endorse responsibility. It is argued that compliance with international refugee law is 
contingent on these transfers satisfying a safety test to be laid down in EC law.
Chapter V aims at ensuring that substantive asylum procedures in the Member 
States are consistent with international refiigee law. To this end, it is argued that 
EC law must set minimum standards applicable to asylum proceeding in their 
entirety, i.e. fi"om the time the application for asylum is submitted to the final 
decision on the application.
Finally, the purpose of chapter VI is to ensure that the right to seek refugee status 
within the EC is not undermined by asylum seekers’ poor living conditions pending 
determination of their application for asylum. To that end, it is argued that EC law 
must set minimum standards designed to secure that asylum seekers enjoy decent 
living conditions throughout asylum proceedings. The issue of asylum seekers’ 
detention is also examined. In that respect, the view taken is that detention must be 
construed as an exceptional measure. With this in mind, it is argued that EC law 
must thoroughly regulate the use of detention in relation to asylum seekers with a 
view to securing that detention is always justified and does not affect the rights of 
those detained.
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Chapter II 
The EC: A More Suitable Framework
The development of an asylum policy in line with international refugee law at 
European level is contingent upon adherence to international standards. Hence, the 
issues at stake are essentially of a substantive nature and relate to the right to seek 
refugee status.’. However, instrumental to the completion of this goal is the choice 
of legal framework. This issue must be addressed in the light of the objective being 
pursued. The contemplated frameworks must therefore be assessed on the basis of 
their ability to facilitate the adoption and implementation of measures consistent 
with the right to seek refugee status.
In the 1980s, the Member States started to realise that asylum issues could no 
longer be confined to national boundaries and that cooperation in that area had 
become necessary .^ With the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, 
the Member States realised that the creation of an internal market by 1992 would 
require greater cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), and in 
particular in asylum and immigration matters. JHA had previously developed and 
become more structured and covered civil and commercial issues as well as anti­
terrorism and policing matters.^
’ As already stressed in the introduction, the thesis only focuses on the right to seek refugee status.
 ^ Intergovernmental cooperation involving third country nationals was not limited to asylum, it 
was extended to other areas such as immigration.
 ^From 1976, the Member State ministers responsible for anti-terrorism and policing issues as well 
as their civil servants began to meet on a more regular basis; the latter were referred to as the 
“Trevi Group”.
On JHA cooperation, see Steve Peers, E U  Justice and Home Affairs Law (European Law Series, 
Pearson Education, Harlow, 2000) in particular at p. 9-10.
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However, while aware of this need to cooperate, the Member States intended to 
retain complete control over their asylum policies. This resulted in the Member 
States opting, in the first instance, for intergovernmental cooperation as opposed to 
the integrated form of cooperation that the EC fi'amework offered. Originally on an 
ad hoc basis, intergovernmental cooperation in the field of asylum was 
institutionalised in the TEU (Title VI). However, with national asylum policies 
becoming increasingly interdependent, it became apparent for most Member States'’ 
that intergovernmental cooperation had reached its limits and that a change of 
framework was required. This step was taken with the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on 2 October 1997 which transferred competence to the EC in the field 
of asylum (Title IV of the TEC).
It is argued that the EC, because of its characteristics, constitutes a more suitable 
fi'amework for developing an asylum policy in compliance with international 
standards. The transfer of competence operated by the Treaty of Amsterdam was 
therefore welcome. However, this “communautarisation” as currently construed, 
undermines the potential of the EC as a framework.
With this in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to discuss both types of legal 
framework and consider the “communautarisation” achieved by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and the changes that are required to maximise the efficiency of the EC 
fi-amework. Efficiency also requires us to determine through which type of legal 
instrument is harmonisation to be achieved.
1. Intergovernmental cooperation: a “/«a/ nécessaire’^
The Member States originally considered that intergovernmental cooperation was 
the most appropriate framework for asylum and they decided to institutionalise that
'' The use of the term “some” is intended to reflect the fact that tliree Member States (i.e. tlie UK, 
Ireland and Denmark) have excluded themselves from the scope of the “communautarisation” 
operated by the Treaty o f Amsterdam.
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form of cooperation. Whilst the Commission and the European Parliament took the 
view that “communautarisation” was the logical outcome of the cooperation 
developed in the field of asylum in the late 80s ,^ the Member States were reluctant 
to take that step.
The Member States' position on framework issues was dictated by the correlation 
made between national sovereignty and asylum, including the right to seek refugee 
status. The Member States traditionally regarded matters concerning third country 
nationals as being inherent in State's sovereignty and therefore as belonging to their 
“domaine réservé'\ Hence, they wanted to retain complete control over the entry, 
stay and removal of third country nationals and any proposed transfer of 
competence in these areas would be seen as a threat to their national sovereignty.
The Member States' recognition of the need for greater cooperation combined with 
their persistent hostility towards “communautarisation” resulted in an 
institutionalisation of intergovernmental cooperation in the field of asylum. The 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed on 7 February 1992, contained a Title,
i.e. Title VI, on provisions on cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, 
known as the third pillar.
In such a context, intergovernmental cooperation appeared as an unavoidable stage 
in the development of an asylum policy common to the Member States. However, it 
is argued that this form of cooperation does not constitute a suitable basis for the 
development of a comprehensive asylum policy in line with international refugee 
law. The challenge was therefore to make it a transitional framework as opposed to 
a permanent one'’. An overview of what was achieved prior to the
 ^ See Commission Opinion of 21 October 1990 on the proposal for an amendment of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community with a view to political union, COM (90) final 
12 .
 ^This issue is discussed in section 2 of this chapter.
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“communautarisation” of asylum matters is given, before discussing the inadequacy 
of the intergovernmental framework.
1.1. Intergovernmental cooperation prior to the TEU
In the late 1980s, the Member States began to cooperate on immigration-related 
issues including asylum and refugee matters^ As already observed, cooperation in 
the field of asylum was prompted by the adoption of the SEA. The view taken by 
the Member States was that the creation of an area without internal borders 
required them to jointly focus on control at the EC external borders and thus deal 
with issues regarding third country nationals’ access to the EC This meant that 
cooperation in the field of asylum was now on the agenda of the Member States. 
Discussions were based on the Palma Document which listed the measures 
necessary to achieve free movement of persons within the EC before 1993^ Ad hoc 
arrangements for intergovernmental cooperation were made under the UK 
Presidency of the Community in 1986. The bases for a common asylum policy were 
laid down by the “Working Group on Immigration” which dealt with asylum, 
controls at external borders and visa matters. This Working Group drafted, inter 
alia, the Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications 
for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities of 15 
June 1990 ,^ referred to as the Dublin Convention. Mention should also be made of 
two resolutions on asylum adopted by EC immigration ministers at their meetings in 
London on 30 November and 1 December 1992, namely the Resolution on
 ^ See David O'Keeffe, “The free movement of persons and the Single Market”, 18 ELR (1992) 3- 
19, at p. 11-12.
 ^ Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, 1992: Border 
Control o f  People, Appendix 5, Session 1988-89, 22nd Report (H.L. Paper 90).
® OJ C 254/1 1997. The provisions of the Dublin Convention and their impact on asylum seekers’ 
rights are examined in chapter IV on access to substantive asylum procedures.
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manifestly unfounded applications for asylum’’ and the Resolution on a harmonised 
approach to questions concerning host third countries” . These resolutions 
constituted a first step towards harmonisation.
Intergovernmental cooperation also developed outside the purview of the EC with 
the adoption of the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 as well as the Convention 
applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the governments of the 
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic, on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders of 19 
June 1990, referred to as the Convention applying the Schengen Agreement. This 
Agreement was joined by Italy in November 1990, Spain and Portugal in June 1991 
and Greece in November 1992. Chapter 7 of the Convention applying the Schengen 
Agreement contained provisions equivalent to those of the Dublin Convention. Both 
Conventions aimed at allocating responsibility for examining asylum claims as well 
as removing asylum seekers’ right to lodge multiple applications. Officials argued 
that the loss of the right to submit more than one asylum claim within the EC (or 
within the Schengen area) would be compensated by the fact that examination was 
now secured’^  Although the Schengen Conventions were not negotiated under the
Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum adopted by the Ministers of the 
Member States of the European Communities at their meetings in London on 30 November to 1 
December 1992, in Eiuopean Parliament, Asylum in the European Union: the “safe comitry of 
origin principle”, People’s Europe Series, November 1996, Aimex I, at p. 26-32.
” Resolution on a harmonised approach to questions concerning host third countries adopted by 
the Ministers of the Member States of the European Communities at their meetings in London on 
30 November to 1 December 1992, in European Parliament, Asylum in the European Union: the 
“safe country of origin principle”, People's Europe Series, November 1996, Annex II at p. 33-37.
However, the view taken is that, in the absence of harmonised substantive asylmn procedures 
meeting international standards regarding refugee protection, the loss of the right to lodge 
multiple applications for asylum undermines the right to seek refugee status. This issue is 
examined in chapter IV on access to substantive asylum procedures.
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auspices of the EC, they were considered part of the ad hoc intergovernmental 
cooperation. Their drafters always expressed the view that these Conventions 
should be regarded as a model of what could be achieved at EC level, without 
prejudice to the objectives and initiatives of the Community. The final clauses of the 
Convention applying the Schengen Agreement (Article 134) made it clear that the 
provisions of the Convention would apply only insofar as they were compatible with 
Community law. Furthermore, Article 142 of the Convention read:
“1. When Conventions are concluded between the Member States of the European 
Communities with a view to the completion of an area without internal frontiers, the 
Contracting Parties shall agree on the conditions under which the provisions of the 
present Convention are to be replaced or amended in the light of the corresponding 
provisions of such Conventions.
The Contracting Parties shall, to that end, take account of the fact that the 
provisions of this Convention may provide for more extensive co-operation than 
that resulting from the provisions of the said Conventions.
Provisions which are in breach of those agreed between the Member States of the 
European Communities shall in any case be adapted.
2. Amendments to this Convention deemed necessary by the Contracting Parties 
shall be subject to ratification, acceptance and approval. The provision contained in 
Article 141(3) shall apply, it being understood that the amendments will not enter 
into force before the said Conventions between the Member States of the European 
Communities come into force.”
Since the Dublin Convention was concluded between the Member States, its 
provisions could not be affected by those of a Convention concluded outside the EC 
framework, namely the Convention applying the Schengen Agreement. To that end, 
the Schengen States agreed the Protocol on the consequences of the Dublin 
Agreement coming into effect for some regulations of the Schengen Supplementary
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Agreement of 26 April 1994, referred to as the Bonn Protocol. This Protocol 
provided that, with the entry into force of the Dublin Convention’^ , Chapter 7 of the 
Convention applying the Schengen Agreement, which dealt with asylum, would no 
longer apply (Article 1).
With the development of JHA cooperation, which included asylum matters, the 
Member States felt that a more structured framework was now required. However, 
anxious to retain full control over developments in JHA matters, the Member States 
decided to keep JHA within the intergovernmental framework. This explains why 
the next stage in the cooperation process did not consist in a “communautarisation” 
of the areas concerned, but in an institutionalisation of intergovernmental 
cooperation which was achieved by the TEU. This institutionalisation did not bring 
any change of direction in the developing common policy on asylum. From the 
beginning, the harmonisation process in the field of asylum mainly focused on 
means to cut down the numbers of individuals seeking refiigee status within the EC 
and at its borders’'’.
1.2. The TEU: the institutionalisation of intergovernmental cooperation
The TEU, which entered into force on 1 November 1993, created, in the 
Commission's view, “new opportunities for the development of policies relating to 
immigration and asylum, as it [brought] in the single fi'amework of the Treaty 
aspects (...) of Justice and Home Affairs (Title Vl)”’^  The Commission stressed 
that this move was prompted by the need to develop a comprehensive approach in
The Dublin Convention (see supra n. 9) entered into force on 1 September 1997 for the twelve 
original signatories, on 1 October 1997 for Austria and Sweden and on 1 January 1998 for 
Finland.
14 These issues are examined in chapters III to VI.
Communication from the Commission to the Comicil and European Parliament on Immigration 
and Asylum policies, COM (94) 23 final, 23/02/1994, p. 5, point 16.
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various areas, including asylum’^ . The purpose of Title VI of the TEU was to render 
intergovernmental cooperation compulsory in certain fields, referred to as areas of 
“common interest”” including asylum (Art. K 1(1)).
Although the nature of the legal framework remained the same, institutionalisation 
brought a new perspective on intergovernmental cooperation. As observed by the 
Commission, “[to] some extent, this formal commitment consolidate[d] and 
codifie[d] a co-operation which was already happening through more ad hoc 
machinery to deal with questions agreed to require a joined rather than dispersed 
response. The move from ad hoc intergovernmental cooperation, theoretically 
reversible at any time, to a Treaty commitment to cooperate on a permanent basis 
nevertheless constituted a considerable political signal both to public opinion in 
Member States and to the outside world”’ In that respect, an institutionalised 
intergovernmental cooperation in the field of asylum appeared as a “mal 
nécessaire''' if “communautarisation” was to eventually occur. However, most 
Member States, unlike the Commission, still perceived intergovernmental 
cooperation as a means to preserve their competence over asylum matters and not 
as a means to prepare a future “communautarisation”. This view was expressed by 
the Reflection Group on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference’^ . Although it was 
recognised that the challenges of the JHA pillar had not met the results^”, the
’" /w .
”  See Muller-Graff, “The legal bases of the Third Pillar and its position in the framework of the 
Union Treaty”, 31 CMLRev. (1994) 493-510.
Commission Communication, see supra n. 15, p. 5, point 17; see also David O'Keeffe, “The 
emergence of a European Immigration Policy”, 20 ELR (1995) 20-36, at p. 25,
The Reflection Group was largely composed of Member State representatives. It was established 
by the Corfu European Council of June 1994 to prepare for the 1996 intergovernmental 
Conference (see Bull. EC. 6 -1994 ,1. 25).
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position was that the existence of distinct pillars remained justified by the need to 
acknowledge that asylum matters were closely related to national sovereignty. 
Hence, what was proposed was not a change of framework, but practical 
improvements with a view to strengthening cooperation^’.
Institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation in essence allowed the Member 
States to retain control over asylum matters. This was reinforced by the application 
of the principle of subsidiarity. Its main features, namely unanimity and the place 
reserved to the European Parliament and the Court of Justice as well as the lack of 
binding effect, are also regarded as the weaknesses of the intergovernmental 
framework and are therefore examined in the next section. It follows that the 
current focus is on the principle of subsidiarity and the rationale behind its 
incorporation in the third pillar in relation to areas covering asylum.
Article 3(2)(b) of the TEU provided that the Council could “adopt joint action in so 
far as the objectives of the Union fcouldl be attained better bv joint action than bv 
the Member State acting individually on account of the scale or effects of the action 
envisaged; it [could] decide that measures implementing joint action [were] to be 
adopted by a qualified majority.”^^  This provision implicitly referred to the principle 
of subsidiarity as it suggested that the EU would only intervene where a common 
action would prove to be more efficient than an exclusively national one. The 
principle of subsidiarity was enshrined in Article 3b of the TEU that read, inter alia, 
that “[i]n areas which [did] not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community 
[should] take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in 
so far as the objectives of the proposed action [could not] be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States and [could] therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC 96), Reflection Group Report and other References 
for Documentary Purposes, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 
1995, at p. 49, point 46.
Ibid., at p. 51, point 50.
Emphasis added
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proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.” However, the Treaty did 
not give any definition. The principle of subsidiarity was described as being 
“possibly the most contentious abstract noun to have entered European policy since 
1 7 8 9  ”23 complex nature of the principle of subsidiarity was aggravated by 
differences in the Member States' and institutions’ interpretation of the principle. It 
was unanimously presented as a means to develop a Union closer to its citizens '^'. 
However, the views of the Commission and the European Parliament on the one 
hand and those of the Council on the other hand did diverge on other issues. In the 
opinion of both the Commission and the European Parliament, the principle of 
subsidiarity was also intended to strengthen the legitimacy of the EU whereas the 
Council, which shared the Member States' opinion in that respect, considered that 
subsidiarity was a means to limit the effects of the expansion of the Community's 
competencies. The latter viewed the principle of subsidiarity as a necessary 
counterpart to the growing competencies of the Community, particularly with the 
entry into force of the SEA and the TEU. The SEA marked a turning point in the 
development of the Community as it expanded its competencies to new areas^ %
Malting Sense o f  Subsidiarity - London Centre for Economic Policy, Research Annual report 
1993; referred to in Grâinne de Bùrca, “The quest for legitimacy in the European Union”, Vol. 59 
MLR (1996) 359-376, at p. 366.
In that respect, the principle of subsidiarity, as enshrined in Article 3b, should be considered 
together with Article A  of the TEU that provided that “[tjhis Treaty [the TEU] mark[ed] a new 
stage in the process o f creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which 
decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen.”
On subsidiarity as a means to bring the Union closer to its citizens, see, for instance, 1996 
Intergovermnental Conference (IGC 96), Reflection Group Report and other References for 
Documentary Purposes, see supra n. 20, at p. 21
The SEA essentially aimed at;
1) the strengthening of the Community's competence in the area of social policy (Articles 118A 
and 118 B E(E)C;
2) the economic and social cohesion (Articles 130A to 130E E(E)C);
3) the research and technological development (Articles 130F to 130Q EEC, now Articles 130F to 
130PEC).
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changed the voting system in broadening the scope of qualified majority to all 
matters relating to the achievement of the internal market^’ and reinforced the role 
of the European Parliaments^ The Community's competencies were further enlarged 
by the TEIP® and the use of qualified majority voting extended to a number of new 
competenciesS .^
S'’ The efficiency of the qualified majority voting-system was secured by a change in Article 5 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Council (20 July 1987, OJ, L 291, 15/10/1987). Article 5(1) now 
reads:
“The Council shall vote on the initiative of its president.
The President shall, furthermore, be required to open voting proceedings on tlie invitation of a 
member of the Council or of the Conunission, provided that a majority of the Council's members 
so decides.”
The purpose of this change in the Rules of procedure of the Council was to end the practice 
resulting from the “Luxembourg compromise”, according to which “[w]here, in the case of 
decisions wliich may be taken by majority vote on a proposal of the Commission, very important 
interests of one or more partners are at stake, the Members of the Council will endeavour, within a 
reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by all the Members of the Council while 
respecting their mutual interests and those of the Community, in accordance with article 2 of the 
Treaty. With regard to the preceding paragraph, the French delegation considers that where very 
important interests are at stake tlie discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement is 
reached...” (EEC Bull. 1966, No.3, 5-11, at p. 9).
See the cooperation procedure with the European Parliament introduced in Article 149(2) of the 
EEC Treaty that became article 189c of the TEC. Tliis procedure is now enshrined in Article 252 
of the TEC.
The TEU essentially extended the competences of the Community to:
1) citizenship of the Union (Articles 8 to 8e TEU);
2) common visa policy (Article 100c TEU);
3) economic and monetary policy (Articles 102a to 109m TEU);
4) education (Article 126 TEU);
5) culture (Article 128 TEU);
6) public health (Article 129 TEU);
7) consumer protection (Article 129a TEU);
8) trans-European networks (Articles 129b to 129d TEU);
9) industry (Article 130 TEU);
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Although the principle of subsidiarity was referred to in the TEC, it also applied in 
the context of the EU. Indeed, Article B of Title I of the TEU read that “[t]he 
objectives of the Union [should] be achieved as provided in this treaty and in 
accordance with the conditions and the timetable set out therein while respecting 
the principle of subsidiarity as defined in Article 3b of the treaty establishing the 
European Community”. However, it resulted from Article L of the TEU that the 
principle of subsidiarity would not be justiciable at Union level as this provision 
excluded, in principle, the competence of the ECJ in relation to the third pillar ’^’. 
The debate on the role of subsidiarity within the EC was also relevant in the context
10) development cooperation (Articles 130u to 130y TEU);
11) strengthening of Connnnnity competence in the area of social policy by means of the Protocol 
on Social Policy, wliich has the same legal authority as the Treaty itself (Article 239 TEU) and the 
Agreement on Social Policy Concluded Between the Member States of the European Community 
with the Exception of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, referred to in 
the Protocol.
Besides, the scope of Community competences as originally decided or added by the SEA have 
been defined in more detail and extended. See Article 127 (new Article 150) of the TEC as 
amended by the TEU on vocational training. Articles 130a to 130e (new Articles 158 to 162, 
economic and social cohesion. Articles 130f to 130p (new Articles 163 to 173) with exceptions 
(see infra n.29), on research and technological development and Articles 130r to 130t (new 
Articles 174 to 176) and on environment with an exception (see infra n. 29).
However, unanimity was still required with regard to culture (Article 128(5) (new Article 
151(5)), despite the powers of “codecision” of the European Parliament), industry (Article 130(3)) 
(new Article 157(3)), economic and social cohesion with respect to certain decisions (Article 
130b(3) (new Article 159) and 130d (new Article 161)) and certain aspects of the environment 
policy (Article 130s(2) (new Article 175(2)).
On the justiciability of the principle of subsidiarity, see, for instance, A.G. Toth, “Is subsidiarity 
justiciable?”, 19 ELR “1994” 268-285; Koen Lenaerts and Patrick van Ypersele, “Le principe de 
subsidiarité et son context; étude de l ’article 3b du traité CE”, Cahiers de Droit Européen, Nos 1-2 
(1994) 3-85 and José Palacio Gonzalez, “The principle of subsidiarity: a guide for lawyers with a 
particular Commmiity orientation”, 20 ELR (1995) 355-370.
This absence of judicial control that characterised the intergovermnental framework is considered 
as one o f its main pitfalls. This issue is discussed in section 1.3 of tlie present chapter.
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of the EU. In that respect, reference to the principle of subsidiarity, even implicit in 
the TEU (Article K.3(2)(b)), could be seen as a Member States' reaction to the 
expansion of the third pillar and a means to assert national control over the matters 
covered by that pillar, which of course included asylum.
Intergovernmental cooperation in its final form, i.e. the institutionalised form, 
appeared as a compromise between the Member States' need to closely cooperate in 
the field of asylum and their reluctance to transfer competence to the EC. However, 
it is argued that the features of institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation 
made it an unsuitable framework for the development of a common policy on 
asylum compatible with international refugee law; hence, it should retain a 
transitional nature. In other words, it should be construed as a step towards 
“communautarisation”.
1.3. The weaknesses of the intergovernmental framework
It is acknowledged that the institutionalisation of intergovernmental cooperation 
constituted a significant step significant step as it formally recognised the need for 
cooperation in the field of asylum.
Cooperation was necessary as Member State asylum policies and laws had an 
impact beyond national borders and were likely to have consequences for other 
Member States, even more so with the dismantling of internal borders. For instance, 
many asylum seekers decided to seek refugee status in Germany, which already 
dealt with high numbers of asylum claims^’, because of the introduction of 
increasingly restrictive provisions in other Member States. The asylum seekers’ 
preference also found its origin in the traditionally liberal nature of German asylum 
law which had been reinforced by the restrictive reforms taking place elsewhere in
Between 1984 and 1993, around 3,5 million asylum applications were submitted in Europe and 
nearly half of that number were lodged in Germany 
(see http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pub/state/95/box5_3 htm).
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the EC. With a view to making its asylum system less attractive and thus reducing 
the numbers of asylum seekers, Germany adopted more stringent provisions on 
asylum^  ^ which were more consistent with the restrictive trend developing across 
the EC The German example showed that asylum could no longer be regarded as a 
purely national matter as national laws and policies were interdependent. In other 
words, they influenced each other and could not be devised without taking on board 
developments in other Member States. This resulted in a progressive de facto 
harmonisation. In that context, cooperation in the field of asylum was unavoidable. 
Hence, the issue at stake did not lie with the existence of a need for cooperation, 
but with the form that that cooperation should take.
With this in mind, it is argued that, despite its institutionalisation, intergovernmental 
cooperation remained an unsuitable framework if the right to seek refugee status 
were to be preserved within the EC. Indeed, the view taken is that 
intergovernmental cooperation has failed asylum seekers in that respect. This 
inability of intergovernmental cooperation finds its roots in its characteristics as a 
framework which prevented the EU fi-om distancing itself from the restrictive trends 
developing in most Member States. Indeed, because of its specific features, the 
developing common policy on asylum could only reflect the Member States’ 
political will. Thus, this section focuses on the unanimity rule, the lack of binding 
effect, the Commission’s role and the absence of parliamentary and judicial control 
that characterise institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation.
1.3.1. The unanimity rule
The decision-making process within the intergovernmental framework, as organised 
by the TEU, was governed by the unanimity rule. Article K.4, inter alia, read that
Article 16 of the German constitution provided that “the politically persecuted enjoy the right to 
asylum.” For many years, anyone who arrived at the German border and requested asylum there 
had to be admitted to the German territory and allowed to apply for refugee status. Article 16 was 
repealed in 1996.
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“[t]he Council [should] act unanimously, except on matters of procedure and in 
cases where Article K.3 provide[d] for other voting rules.” This may be the case 
with regard to measures implementing joint actions (Article K.3(2)(b)) and those 
implementing conventions concluded by the Member States in the field of Justice 
and Home Affairs (Article K.3(2)(c)). Unanimity had the disadvantage of slowing 
down the decision-making process as a consensus amongst Member States had be 
found; if the Member States failed to agree the whole process was aborted. This 
unanimity requirement, meant, as observed by McMahon, that “[a] more likely 
scenario [was] that any measures that [did] get adopted [would], as a result of 
compromises, operate at the level of the lowest common denominator already 
applying in the Member States, meaning that progress in these areas [would] be 
incremental rather than dynamic”^^ . This was particularly worrying in the field of 
asylum as it defeated the need to comply with international refugee law and set 
standards in accordance with them. In that context, intergovernmental cooperation 
could be seen as having facilitated the erosion of asylum seekers’ rights throughout 
the EU. However, one should bear in mind that the asylum policy developing at EU 
level found its origin in national policies.
1.3.2. Absence of legal binding effect
One of the main features of intergovernmental cooperation was the lack of binding 
effect of most measures adopted within that fi'amework. This was for instance the 
case of the Resolutions on host third countries '^* and on manifestly unfounded 
applications for asylum^  ^ as well as the Conclusions on countries in which there is 
generally no serious risk of persecution^ .^ The only type of instrument that has
Richard McMahon, “Maastricht’s Third Pillar: load-bearing or purely decorative”, LBEI 1995/1, 
51-64, at p. 62.
See supra n. 11.
35 See supra n. 10.
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binding effect are Conventions concluded between the Member States; this is the 
case of the Dublin Convention.
It is argued that asylum measures adopted within the intergovernmental framework 
have had an adverse effect on the right to seek refugee status. In that context, one 
could argue that the absence of binding effect was to the asylum seekers’ advantage 
as Member States retained the right to have more liberal national laws. However, 
such an argument ignores the interdependent nature of the Member States’ asylum 
policies which contributed to the development of a restrictive trend at European 
level. Thus, the progressive de facto harmonisation that took place was not 
conducive to the introduction or maintenance of laws and practices that would be 
much more liberal that those of other Member States. This is inconsistent with the 
need to preserve the right to seek refugee status in line with international refugee 
law. An absence of legal binding effect combined with a common political will 
hostile to asylum seekers prevented harmonisation from embracing international 
standards.
Another weakness of the intergovernmental framework lay with the role left to the 
EC institutions and the detrimental impact of this situation on the democratic 
nature of the third pillar and the intergovernmental framework in general.
1.3.3. The role of the Commission
The EU framework distinguished itself from the EC framework in that the former 
only fully involved the Council because of its intergovernmental nature. Although 
the Commission was involved in the decision-making process, its role, and thus its 
imput, in the development of the third pillar remained limited.
Conclusions on countries in which there is generally no serious risk of persecution adopted by 
the Ministers of the Member States o f the European Communities at tlieir meetings in London on 
30 November to 1 December 1992, in European Parliament, Asylum in the European Union: the 
“safe coimtry of origin principle”. People's Europe Series, November 1996, Annex III, at p. 38-41.
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Article K.3 distinguished between the areas covered by Title VI in relation to the 
right of initiative. With respect to areas mentioned in Article K. 1(1) to (6)^\ which 
included asylum (Article K.l(l)), the Commission and the Member States shared 
the right of initiative while this right exclusively lay with the Member States with 
regard to the areas mentioned in Article K. 1 (7) to (9)^  ^The Commission would be 
excluded with regard to matters that were considered too sensitive to allow its 
involvement. In the field of asylum, however, the Member States did not object to 
sharing their right of initiative with the Commission. This could be seen as another 
acknowledgement of the increasing interdependence of the Member States’ asylum 
policies.
These areas listed in Article K. 1(1) to (9) o f Title VI of the TEU comprised:
“1. asylmn policy;
2. rules governing the crossing by persons o f the external borders or the Member States and the 
exercise of controls thereon;
3. immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries:
(a) conditions of entry and movement by nationals of tliird countries on the territory of 
Member States;
(b) conditions of residence by national of third countries on tlie territory of Member 
States, including family reunion and access to employment;
(c) combating imauthorised immigration, residence and work by nationals of third 
countries on the territory of Member States;
4. combating drug addiction in so far as this is not covered by 7 to 9;
5. combating fraud on an international scale in so far as this is not covered by 7 to 9;
6. judicial cooperation in civil matters.”
The areas mentioned in Article K .l (7) to (9) of Title VI of the TEU comprised:
“(7) judicial cooperation in criminal matters;
(8) customs cooperation;
(9) police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug 
trafficking and other serious forms o f international crime, including if  necessary certain aspects of 
custom cooperation, in connection with the organisation of a Union-wide system for exchanging 
information witliin a European Police Office (Europol).”
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Article K.4 of the TEU provided for a Co-ordinating Committee to be set up and 
Article K.4(2) specified that the Commission should be “fully associated” with the 
work of the Committee. Moreover, the Commission, through its President, took 
part in the sessions of the European Council. The Commission observed in its 
Communication that “Title VI la[id] down clear rules and procedures for co­
operation in [the] areas [referred to in Article K.l], spelling out the respective roles 
of the Member States, the Commission and the European Parliament It is
argued that the Commission's statement was open to criticism as the TEU failed to 
define the words “folly associated” and to provide the means to secure this 
association.
Although the Commission could express its views on asylum matters and attempt to 
implement them through its right of initiative, its role and influence remained 
limited. This was unfortunate as the Commission's views on asylum matters had 
traditionally been more liberal than those of the Council and thus the Member 
States. For instance, the Commission opposed a suggestion from the Austrian 
Presidency to move fi*om an asylum system based on the individuals' right to 
protection to one where, at its discretion, a State could offer protection to a person 
or a group at risk. The Commission stressed the importance of the individual's right 
to seek refugee status which found its very basis in the 1951 Convention''®.
Institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation also meant a lack of parliamentary 
and judicial control that contributed to the “democratic deficit” of the EU.
Commission Communication, see supra n. 15, at p. 6, point 18.
''® See the European Commission's Memo 98/55 o f 15 July 1998 on the Implementation of the 
Amsterdam Treaty in Immigration and Asylum referred to in the Immigration Law Practitioners’ 
Association, European Update: September 1998, atp.7-8.
The Coimnission's position constituted strong support for the "communautarisation’’ of asylum 
matters.
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1.3,4. The lack of parliamentary and judicial control
The European Parliament had no weight in the decision-making process within the 
EU. As to the ECJ, its jurisdiction was in principle excluded.
The role of the European Parliament, determined in Article K.6, was even more 
restricted than that of the Commission. The Parliament had the right to be regularly 
informed by the Presidency and the Commission of discussions in the areas covered 
by Title VI. It should also be consulted by the Presidency on the principal aspects of 
activities in the areas referred to in that Title; the Presidency should ensure that the 
views of the European Parliament were duly taken into consideration. However, as 
in the case of the Commission, the TEU failed to provide the European Parliament 
with the means to assert its role. The European Parliament could also ask questions 
to the Council and make recommendations. Finally, each year the Parliament should 
hold a debate on the progress made in the implementation of the areas covered by 
Title VI.
Article K.6, and the in the intergovernmental framework in general, confined the 
role of the European Parliament to a consultative one. Thus, its imput in the EU 
asylum policy was quite limited in practice and very much depended upon the 
goodwill of the Member States. Although the interest and involvement of the 
European Parliament in asylum matters should not be undermined, its influence was 
seriously curtailed. This very limited role conferred upon the Parliament partly 
explained the fact that the framework established by the EU failed to meet 
democratic requirements. Another reason was to be found in the quasi-exclusion of 
the ECJ.
The modest involvement of the European Parliament and the quasi-exclusion of the 
ECJ inherent in the intergovernmental framework raised questions as to its 
compatibility with democratic requirements. As observed by Van Gerven, 
“[djemocracy stands for a vision on the distribution of public powers or 
competencies which regards the will of the citizens, as expressed through general
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elections, as the only device that is able to legitimate sovereignty. The 
representatives so elected constitute the parliament which, because of its direct 
legitimation, is the most autonomous of public bodies and, as such, authorised to 
lay down general legislation” '^. The most important device to guarantee that a 
political system is democratic is the principle of separation of powers between the 
legislative and the executive, in which the judiciary takes part as ultimate protector 
of the rule of law and of the rights of individuals against the authorities and amongst 
themselves. The purpose of this principle is to prevent abuses of power in the 
exercise of power at the expense of the citizens as well as non-citizens. In western 
political systems, the power of the state is legitimated through the democratic 
process.
On that basis, the legitimacy of the EU was increasingly questioned on the ground 
that the traditional structures of the democratic state were missing. The EU, 
although it had many of the powers of a State, lacked the political structure or 
mode of governance that characterised a State. On the other hand, the EU could 
easily be distinguished from a typical intergovernmental organisation. It had 
legislative and regulatory powers, and many of its laws had a direct impact on the 
Member States' legal systems. As observed by De Burca, “[s]ome of the unelected 
law-making bodies, such as the Commission and the Court of Justice, ha[d] little or 
no democratic legitimacy and they [were] only weakly accountable in other ways, 
such as in the giving of reasons for their decisions”'*^. So long as the competencies 
of the Community remained confined to the economic sphere, legitimacy was not 
central to debates. However, with the rapid expansion of the competencies of the 
Community, its legitimacy started to be increasingly questioned. This “legitimacy 
crisis” reached its peak with the entry into force of the TEU.
Intergovernmental cooperation was characterised by secrecy and thus a lack of 
public discussion and transparency. For instance, the way the Schengen negotiations
Ibid., at p. 90.
Grâinne de Bùrca, supra n. 23, at p. 352.
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were carried out was highly criticised because of the failure to inform national 
parliaments. Another example could be found in the Draft Convention on the 
Crossing of External Borders which remained secret until its signing. This lack of 
transparency meant that parliamentary and thus public debate was made more 
difficult. Prior to the entry into force of the TEU, the rules prepared by the Ad Hoc 
Group on Immigration did not involve prior public discussion and parliamentary 
debate in the European and national parliaments on the basis of published drafts. 
Several Member States were opposed to public discussion either at European level 
or national level. As far as the content of the rules prepared by the Ad Hoc Group 
on Immigration was concerned, the main source of information to the public 
consisted in press communiqués. As for the Council, it did not seem inclined to 
change its practices in order to render the decision-making process more 
transparent. The Commission was critical of the fact that most of the Council's 
debates were still held behind closed doors. The lack of transparency that 
characterised intergovernmental cooperation was particularly obvious in the field of 
Justice and Home Affairs. However, the Commission made no radical proposal to 
significantly remedy the transparency problem. The Council was also criticised by 
the European parliament which considered that its involvement in the negotiation 
process would make that process more transparent and therefore more democratic. 
The Council argued that, to a certain extent, it had addressed criticism by amending 
its own rules with a view to achieving a higher degree of openness and improving 
access to information. The contribution of the European Parliament, although 
insufficient to remedy the transparency deficit, remained the most significant'' .^ 
Within the intergovernmental framework, public information was mainly confined to 
a few public relations efforts. A greater involvement of the European Parliament
The Committee on Institutional Affairs of the European Parliament organised public hearings in 
Brussels in late 1995 and early 1996, in which organisations could participate in the debate and 
state “what it was citizens expected from the Eiuope of tomorrow”. However, tliis initiative of the 
European Parliament, although in the right direction, remained quite superficial since the 
parliamentary hearings were not advertised or publicised in the national media of the Member 
States, but only in the Official Journal (OJ 1995 C 199, 3/8/1995). Besides, would-be participants 
were asked to submit an application to the Parliament as representatives of an organisation.
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would have allowed for a more transparent decision-making process by providing a 
forum for public debate and thus parliamentary control.
Another factor that affected democracy in relation to intergovernmental cooperation 
lay with the absence of judicial control. With regard to asylum matters, paragraph 3 
of Article K.3(2)(c) of the TEU made judicial control the exception. The ECJ could 
only have jurisdiction over Conventions concluded between the Member States 
provided that the latter expressly conferred jurisdiction upon the Court. However, 
the ECJ was never given such jurisdiction under Article K.3(2)(c). This meant that 
the measures adopted on the basis of the third pillar always enjoyed immunity from 
judicial control. In that context, if judicial control were to take place, it had to 
emanate either from national courts or the European Court of Human Rights and be 
exercised on implementing national measures. However, the existence of potential 
outside control did not compensate for the lack of judicial control within the 
intergovernmental framework.
The very nature of the intergovernmental framework and its ^^raison d'être’^ did 
exclude, as by principle, judicial control emanating from the ECJ. Although the ECJ 
was not totally absent from the third pillar, its scope for intervention was strictly 
controlled and defined. Indeed, as already mentioned, paragraph 3 of Article 
K.3(2)(c), provided that the Conventions adopted by the Member States would give 
jurisdiction to the ECJ to interpret their provisions and rule on any dispute 
regarding their application. This quasi-absence of judicial control, which was 
confirmed in Article L(b) '^', did contribute to the democratic deficit of the third 
pillar. Judicial control could occur, but would have to come from outside the Union. 
As observed by Van Gerven, “(...) although the ECJ ha[d] [almost] no jurisdiction 
under the second and third pillar, the requirement of efficient judicial protection
Article L(b) of the TEU read:
“The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the Treaty establisliing the 
European Coal and Steel Community and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community concerning the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the 
exercise of those powers shall apply only to (...) the third paragraph of Article K.3(2)(c).”
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which [was] in principle enshrined in Article 6 and 13 ECHR, applie[d] also there, 
which mean[t] that action by the Member States, individually or acting jointly in the 
European Council, remain[ed] subject to judicial review on the part of the Human 
Rights Court and of the Member States' national courts (...); such review [was] 
crucial when it [came] to protecting the fundamental rights of non-EU citizens in 
“matters of common interest” referred to in Article K.l TEU, amongst which the 
asylum policy and the immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third 
countries This statement stressed the crucial importance of judicial control
for the protection of individuals' fondamental rights. This absence of judicial 
control within the EU had also been detrimental to the effectiveness of the measures 
adopted under the third pillar as the ECJ could not secure a common interpretation 
and correct implementation.
It is argued that intergovernmental cooperation has unfortunately encouraged and 
legitimised highly questionable practices which have undermined the right to seek 
refugee status. Cooperation between the Member States became necessary because 
of the interdependent nature of their asylum policies which resulted in a de facto 
harmonisation. However, owing to its very characteristics, intergovernmental 
cooperation was unable to ensure that the common asylum policy was developing in 
line with international refugee law.
2. The ^communautarisation" of asylum matters
The view taken is that the first pillar, namely the EC, constitutes a more suitable 
framework for the development of a comprehensive policy on asylum than 
intergovernmental cooperation. The purpose of this section is therefore to 
demonstrate why the EC is considered a more appropriate framework and assess 
the “communautarisation” operated by the Treaty of Amsterdam in the light of the 
potential offered by the EC.
Walter Van Gerven, "Towards a coherent Constitutional system within the European Union”, 
EPL Vol. 2, Issue 1 (1996) 81-101, at p. 88-89.
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2.1. The EC: a suitable framework
Issues relating to the choice of framework for an asylum policy common to the 
Member States must be understood in the light of the need to establish standards in 
line with international refugee law. In that respect, it is argued that compliance is 
more likely to be achieved within the EC framework than through 
intergovernmental cooperation.
The measures adopted within the intergovernmental framework were symptomatic 
of a restrictive approach to asylum matters the objective of which was to cut down 
the numbers of asylum seekers within the EC'*®. These measures were, and still are, 
a serious source of disquiet as they often fail to comply with international refugee 
law. In that context, it is tempting to “blame” international cooperation for this 
“change of heart” and argue that asylum should have remained a national matter if 
asylum seekers' rights were to be preserved. This position also suggests that given 
the choice between the EU and the EC frameworks, the former would constitute a 
lesser “/wa/” as the measures adopted usually lack legal binding effect'*  ^ It is argued 
that this line of reasoning ignores an important fact, i.e. the interdependence of the 
Member States' asylum policy and its impact on law reform in that area. Indeed, as 
already noted, the asylum policy of a Member State is likely to have an effect on 
that of other Member States. Thus, in devising their asylum policy, the Member 
States take into consideration developments taking place elsewhere in the 
Community. This has resulted in a de facto harmonisation in the field of asylum that 
preceded formal intergovernmental cooperation in that area. In that context, the 
development of a common approach to asylum matters very much appears to be an 
unavoidable move. As already suggested, the challenge is, therefore, to secure that
The restrictive nature of tlie measures adopted at EU level is discussed in the next chapters. 
See section 1.3.2 of the present chapter.
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the measures collectively adopted by the Member States satisfy international 
standards regarding refugee protection.
Considering that the development of a common approach to asylum issues was 
inevitable and that the intergovernmental framework has failed to secure the 
adoption of measures in line with international refugee law, it is argued that the EC 
constitutes a more appropriate framework.
Unlike the intergovernmental framework, the EC had, and still has, the potential to 
secure the preparation, adoption and implementation of measures consistent with 
international standards regarding refugee protection while offering a more effective 
and democratic environment. However, a transfer of competence to the EC in the 
field of asylum will not in itself secure observance of international refugee law. This 
means that the adoption of measures satisfying international standards remains the 
critical point. If the Community were to adopt measures that undermine the right to 
seek refugee status, the measures in question would still be binding upon the 
Member States and what is regarded as a strength of the EC framework would 
become a threat to asylum seekers’ rights. In that respect, intergovernmental 
cooperation could, in theory, be considered a better framework as it lacks 
provisions on binding effect. However, recent developments in the EU asylum 
policy shows that this absence of binding effect has not prevented a deterioration of 
the standards in many Member States. This imperative need to comply with 
international refugee law explains why this thesis puts the emphasis on substantive 
issues regarding the right to seek refugee status.
Does “communautarisation” entail a risk that could be fatal to the right to seek 
refugee status? Intergovernmental cooperation has, to date, failed to secure 
compliance with international refugee law. It is argued that breaches of the law in 
question should no longer be tolerated for both legal and humanitarian reasons. If 
the EC were to set up standards in line with international requirements regarding 
refugee protection, it would then have the means to ensure compliance with the 
standards in question. This is one of the main advantages of the EC framework over
6 8
intergovernmental cooperation. However, will the Community take such a step and 
to a certain extent oppose the views currently expressed by most Member States? It 
is argued that the involvement of the Commission and the European Parliament in 
the decision-making process would facilitate the negotiation and adoption of 
instruments in line with international refugee law as these two institutions have 
traditionally taken positions compatible with international standards and have 
criticised the Member States and the Council in that respect. It is acknowledged 
that Member States’ views cannot be disregarded and that some degree of 
compromise may be required. However, compromise must not mean that violations 
of international refugee law can be incorporated into EC law and thus endorsed by 
the EC! On the contrary, the EC, which has always presented itself as an advanced 
legal order when compared to the international framework, should compensate for 
the deficiencies of the latter and secure that, at least within its territory, international 
standards are met. This does not mean that the idea of compromise is excluded: it is 
not. However, compromises can only take place within the limits of compliance 
with international refugee law. For instance, the Member States could still carry out 
transfers of responsibility so long as an adequate examination of the asylum claims 
concerned by another State is guaranteed'* .^
The EC's potential to facilitate the adoption and secure the implementation of 
measures in line with international refugee law lies with its decision-making process, 
the binding nature of EC law and the fact that it provides for judicial control.
A “communautarisation” of asylum matters would mean that the Commission would 
play a key role in the decision-making process and that the European Parliament 
could be properly involved. The Commission, which has expressed concern about 
the asylum measures adopted within the EU framework, could have a positive
A transfer of responsibility consists in an asylum seeker being removed from the territory of the 
State where he or she intended to submit his or her claim on tlie ground that another State is 
accountable for considering the claim in question. Transfers of responsibility are examined in 
chapter IV on access to substantive asylum procedures.
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imput by making proposals which would protect asylum seekers’ rights and aim at 
introducing standards compatible with international refugee law. The Commission 
supports the view that the EC constitutes a more suitable framework than the EU 
for addressing asylum matters. By reason of its very nature and composition, the 
Commission is not subject to the control and influence of the Member States. If the 
Commission were to make proposals that are incompatible with the right to seek 
refugee status, this would seriously affect the legitimacy of the Community as a 
whole. Indeed, such an attitude would mean that the Commission would encourage 
and endorse violations of legally binding obligations while disregarding human 
rights issues. If such proposals were to become law, all the EC institutions as well 
as its Member States would become accomplices. The implications of such a 
position would go beyond the sphere of asylum and seriously question the 
legitimacy of the EC
Another advantage of the EC framework would lie with the role conferred upon the 
European Parliament. Indeed, its role in the EC decision-making process has been 
reinforced securing a higher degree of public debate. Initially confined to a 
consultative role, the European Parliament gradually became, with the introduction 
of new procedures, more involved'*^ . The involvement of the Parliament would 
address one of the weaknesses of the intergovernmental framework, namely the 
absence of parliamentary debate and control. Moreover, as observed by O'Keeffe, 
“(...) the involvement of the European Parliament would be a powerful lobby for the
As a non-elected body, the original European Parliament had few powers and its role in the 
decision-making process was limited to an advisory one. However, with tlie introduction of direct 
elections, the Eiuopean parliament played an increasingly important part in that process. The 
requirement for consultation and cooperation with the Parliament, and thus its influence, were 
strengthened by the introduction of conciliation procedures in 1977 (Joint Declaration of the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, OJ C89/1, 22/4/1975) and the cooperation 
procedures introduced by tlie SEA. The role of the European Parliament was furtlier consolidated 
with the introduction of a right of co-decision with the Council in certain areas (Article 251 [ex 
Article 189b]).
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rights of third country nationals” ®^. On several occasions, the Parliament has 
expressed concern about the developments taking place within the 
intergovernmental framework in the field of asylum. It was reported that “the 
European Parliament ha[d] been extremely concerned with the intergovernmental 
character of the cooperation by Member States on migration and asylum policies in 
the past. It would have preferred that those policies be dealt with through 
communautarian procedures (...)” '^ This view was shared by the Commission.
An essential component of a democratic system and thus a necessary complement to 
parliamentary control is to be found in the existence of judicial control. Judicial 
control is indispensable to secure that the law is correctly applied. Thus, it is not 
enough to secure that the measures adopted are in line with international refugee 
law, it is essential to ensure their correct implementation. This would require 
jurisdiction being given to the ECJ, which is a feature of the EC legal system. In 
that respect, “communautarisation” appears as a necessary move. The ECJ would 
be in a position to exercise its jurisdiction with a view to ensuring the correct 
interpretation and implementation of asylum measures in the interest of both the EC 
and asylum seekers. Indeed, the establishment of standards in line with international 
ones would be a pointless exercise if these could be undermined by national 
restrictive interpretations and defective implementation.
It is acknowledged that the EC has suffered from a democratic deficit and still does 
to a certain extent. However, the EC nonetheless provides a more suitable 
framework than the EU even if there is still room for improvement.
The EC would also constitute a more effective framework in that it allows for a 
quicker decision-making process and ensures legal binding effect. This explains why
David O'Keeffe, see supra ii. 18, at p. 35. 
See supra n.I5, Annex III, paragraph 16.
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observance of international refugee law by EC measures adopted in that field is so 
critical to the preservation of the right to seek refugee status.
A “communautarisation” of asylum matters could mean a speedier decision-making 
process as qualified majority could apply instead of unanimity that characterises the 
decision-making process at EU level. The use of qualified majority would also 
decrease the need for compromises inherent in the unanimity rule, that too often 
result in lowering standards. It has been argued that the use of qualified majority 
would not necessarily mean a total exclusion of the unanimity rule from the 
decision-making process. According to McMahon, qualified majority “(...) would 
not apparently have prejudiced a Member State from invoking the Luxembourg 
Accords[^^], thereby requiring unanimous agreement or the qualified majority voting 
compromise on the most recent enlargement, where appropriate.”^^ However, this 
statement is open to criticism as the Rules of Procedure of the Council have been 
amended in order to limit the use of the practice resulting from the Luxembourg 
Accords^". Besides, the Council Decision of 29 March 1994^  ^concerning the taking 
of decisions by qualified majority by the Council as amended by the Council 
Decision of 1 January 1995^  ^provides that “if Members of the Council representing 
a total of 23 to [25] votes indicate their intention to oppose the adoption by the 
Council of a Decision by qualified majority, the council will do all in its power to 
reach, within a reasonable time and without prejudicing obligatory time-limits laid 
down by the Treaties and by secondary law, such as in Article 189b [new Article 
251]and 189c [new Article 252] of the Treaty establishing the European
See supra n. 26.
Richard McMahon, see supra, n. 33, at p. 62. 
See supra n. 26.
1994 C 105/1.
OJ 1995 C 1/1.
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Community, a satisfactory solution that could be adopted by at least [65] votes. 
During this period, and always respecting the Rules of Procedure of the Council, 
the President undertakes, with the assistance of the Commission, any initiative 
necessary to facilitate a wider basis of agreement in the Council. The Members of 
the Council lend him their assistance”. However, this search for a “wider basis of 
agreement” should not result in compromises that could compromise compliance 
with international refugee law. It is argued that qualified majority would be in the 
interest of asylum seekers as there is an urgent need to set up adequate standards 
across the EC. In that respect, although unanimity may not be totally excluded, the 
EC offers a better framework than intergovernmental cooperation as the latter is 
governed by the unanimity rule.
The preference given to the EC framework over intergovernmental cooperation also 
lies with the outcome of the EC decision-making process. Indeed, unlike most 
measures adopted under the third pillar, the measures adopted within the former 
framework, because of the very nature of the EC legal system, are binding upon the 
Member States. As already stressed, this makes the EC a more suitable framework 
provided that the standards to be set are consistent with international requirements 
regarding refugee protection. If the EC were to adopt measures incompatible with 
the requirements in question, the right to seek refugee status would be seriously 
undermined as legal action against such measures would be extremely limited 
because of the supremacy of EC law and the weaknesses of international law, 
including international refugee law, when it comes to enforcement. So long as no 
breaches of EC law are committed, remedies could not be found within the EC legal 
system and would have to come from outside. Action before the institutions of the 
ECHR could be taken against the Member States if they implemented EC measures 
in breach of their obligations under the ECHR. In that respect, proceedings before 
the European Court of Human Rights could assist in the enforcement of 
international refiigee law. However, this would be limited to cases where breaches 
of international refiigee law also entail a violation of the ECHR. This could be the 
case where a Member declines responsibility for examining an asylum claim and 
removes the applicant to a third country in breach of the principle of non-
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refoulement^ a principle central to international refugee law, but also in breach of 
Article 3 of the ECHR that prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.
It is argued that the EC has the potential to offer a more effective framework which 
could enable the development of an asylum policy consistent with international 
refiigee law. However, has the Treaty of Amsterdam met the hopes it raised in 
transferring competence to the EC in the field of asylum?
2.2. The “communautarisation” operated by the Treaty of Amsterdam
The third pillar contained “passerelles” to “communautarisation” which were finally 
used by the drafters of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
incorporated a new title in the TEC, i.e. Title IV on visas, asylum, immigration and 
other policies related to free movement of persons. However, it is argued that the 
“communautarisation” operated by the Treaty of Amsterdam is not satisfactory as 
Title IV under uses the potential of the EC as a framework for an asylum policy in 
line with international requirements.
2.2.1. The “passerelles” towards “communautarisation”
Although the TEU institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation, 
“communautarisation” remained an option. Indeed, “passerelles” to 
“communautarisation” were present in the third pillar. The main “passerelle” was to 
be found in Article K.9, although Article K.3(2)(c) could be seen as a sign of the 
potentially transitional nature of the intergovernmental framework^\
Article K.9 read that “[t]he Council acting unanimously on the initiative of the 
Commission or a Member State, may decide to apply Article 100c of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community to take action in areas referred to in Article
David O'Keeffe, see supra n. 18, at p. 25.
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K. 1(1) to (6), and at the same time determine the relevant voting conditions relating 
to it. It shall recommend the Member States to adopt the decision with their 
respective constitutional requirements”. Article K.9, therefore, enabled transfers of 
competence to the EC in a number of areas, including asylum. In the Declaration on 
Asylum attached to the TEU, the Council was required to consider by the end of 
1993 the possibility of applying Article K.9. Although in favour of 
“communautarisation”, the Commission submitted a report on this issue in 
November 1993 where it expressed the view shared with the European Parliament 
that it was too early for such a step and that this question should be re-examined at 
a later stage^ ®. The issue of “communautarisation” was raised again in the context of 
the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference^® and finally became part of the Member 
States' agenda with the negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Title IV of the 
TEC finds its origin in a proposal of the Irish Presidency made in its General Outline 
for a Draft Revision of the Treaties drawn up for the 'T)ublin II” European Council, 
as part of the intergovernmental Conference negotiations*'®. The Irish proposals 
suggested the introduction of a new Title on the firee movement of persons, asylum 
and immigration. Although the Irish Presidency left open the question relating to the 
framework, it expressed the view that “it would provide the most coherent basis for 
effective action” if the new Title was incorporated in the first pillar and not in the 
third pillar of the TEU®'. It is interesting to note that, although Title IV of the TEC 
finds its origin in an Irish proposal, Ireland decided to opt out fi-om Title IV when 
incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam® .^ It is believed that the attitude of the
See supra n. 8, at p. 15, point 19.
See supra n. 20.
®° Referred to in JUSTICE, Position Paper, “The jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in 
respect of asylum and inunigration matters”. Human Riglits and the EU Intergovernmental 
Conference 1996-97 (May 1997), at p. 1.
®' Ibid.
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Irish Government was prompted by the existence of a common passenger area with 
the UK. The proposals of the Irish Presidency were refined by the Dutch presidency 
at the beginning of 1997 in that the areas covered by the proposed new Title should 
be dealt with in conjunction with issues relating to external border controls and the 
prevention and combat of crime with a view to securing an area of freedom, justice 
and security®. The Dutch proposal is typical of the intergovernmental approach 
which tended, for instance, to primarily apprehend asylum matters as border control 
issues. However, one may affirm that the change of framework amounted to a 
recognition that the European dimension of asylum matters now prevailed over their 
national dimension and that a cohesive approach was required. The insertion of 
Article K.9 in the TEU indicated that the Member States already suspected that the 
interdependent nature of their asylum policies would call for more intensive 
cooperation and, in that respect, Article K.9 can be regarded as reflecting the 
transitional nature of the intergovernmental framework.
Another “passerelle” could, to a certain extent, be found in Article K.3(2)(c) of the 
TEU which granted, at the discretion of the Member States, jurisdiction to the ECJ 
over conventions concluded by Member States in the areas referred to in Article 
K.l (1) to (9) which included asylum. This provision, in making allowance for a 
possible intervention of the ECJ, could be seen as an indicator that a transfer of 
competence to the EC in the field of asylum and other areas was not totally 
excluded. However, this opportunity to involve the ECJ never materialised.
The Treaty of Amsterdam, in transferring to the EC matters that were initially part 
of the third pillar shifted the balance in favour of the former by reducing the scope 
for purely intergovernmental cooperation. However, it is argued that this 
“communautarisation” suffers from a number of weaknesses that could affect the 
right to seek refugee status.
® See this chapter, section 2.2.2, on tlie consequences of the Protocol on the Position of the United 
Kingdom and Ireland
See supra n. 60.
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2.2.2. An unsatisfactory “communautarisation”
The EC can be considered the most suitable framework for the development of an 
EC policy on asylum in line with international refugee law provided that its full 
potential is fully exploited. In that respect, it is argued that Title IV of the TEC does 
not meet the challenges that this change of framework entails.
The weaknesses suffered by the “communautarisation” of asylum matters is the 
direct result of a complex structure created by the right to opt out from Title IV, 
which, inter alia, undermines the role of the ECJ. Moreover, it also lies with the 
choices made by the drafters of the Treaty in relation to the scope of the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction and the decision-making process
The UK and Ireland decided not to take part in the adoption of Title IV [ex Title 
Ilia] of the TEC. Their position was enshrined in the Protocol on the Position of the 
United Kingdom and Ireland (Article 1). The same attitude was adopted by 
Denmark (Article 1 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark). These Protocols 
mean that measures adopted under Title IV are not binding upon these Member 
States; the same applies to the decisions of the ECJ regarding this Title (Article 2 of 
the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland and Article 2 of the 
Protocol on the Position of Denmark). However, the UK and Ireland may decide to 
be involved in the adoption of a particular measure; for that purpose, they need to 
notify the President of the Council within three months of the presentation to the 
Council of a proposal or initiative (Article 3). They may also accept any measure 
adopted under Title IV (Article 4). Moreover Ireland, but not the UK, may decide 
to fully apply the TEC and thus get out of the Protocol. This may indicate a greater 
hostility on the part of the UK towards “communautarisation”. As to Denmark, it 
may decide to no longer avail itself of all or part of the Protocol (Article 7). With 
regard to asylum, the fact that these three Member States have chosen and been 
allowed to exclude themselves from Title IV means that, unless they decide 
otherwise, they will not take part in the development of an EC asylum policy. As far
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as they are concerned, asylum remains a matter for intergovernmental cooperation. 
This lack of uniformity in the legal framework is inconsistent with the need for a 
global and comprehensive approach to asylum matters in line with international 
refugee law as EC measures in that field will not extend to the EC territory in its 
entirety. This may affect the efficiency of EC measures on asylum. For instance, 
measures adopted by the UK will have an impact elsewhere in the EC. Likewise, 
EC measures will affect the situation in the UK, Ireland and Denmark. Moreover, 
considering that the development of an EC asylum policy meeting international 
standards will require to depart from the restrictive trends developed within the 
intergovernmental framework®'*, any discrepancy between EC measures and 
measures adopted by these three Member States may engender conflicting 
situations®®. If these Member States oppose this change of direction, conflicts may 
arise between their position and that of the EC. Such conflicts could lead to 
tensions amongst Member States and between the Member States and the EC 
institutions and could even lead to institutional crises. It is argued that, if these 
Member States were to advocate more restrictive approaches to asylum matters, 
their views should not result in the EC lowering its standards with a view to 
avoiding conflicting positions as this would be detrimental to the right to seek 
refugee status. It is argued that these protocols have the potential to harm the 
development and implementation of an EC asylum policy compatible with 
international refugee law while creating problems for the EC. Moreover, if these 
three Member States were to develop asylum policies inconsistent with that of the 
EC, they may well face difficulties in implementing their laws and policies. Indeed, 
these Member States will not be in a position to ignore the impact of EC asylum 
law on their national provisions as they will remain interdependent. It is therefore
®'* The measures adopted within the intergovernmental framework and the need for changes are 
examined in the next chapters.
®® This statement would not be relevant if  the UK, Ireland and Deimiark were to adopt superior 
standards than those established at EC level. Although they may appear unrealistic in the current 
restrictive context, such national initiatives should be encouraged.
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hoped that these Member States will renounce to their right to opt-out from Title 
IV.
Granting jurisdiction to the ECJ in the field of asylum would mean an increase in the 
work load of the ECJ. In a Note of 19 February 1997, the Netherlands Presidency 
proposed four options with a view to addressing the concern about overburdening 
the Court®.
The first option consisted in limiting the numbers of requests for preliminary ruling 
by making them optional or by only allowing courts of last instance to make such 
requests. The first branch of this first option proposed by the Netherlands 
Presidency would have implied that requests for preliminary rulings would have 
ceased to be compulsory for courts of last resort as they were already optional for 
lower courts.
A second option was to allow the ECJ to filter requests for preliminary ruling by 
allowing the President or a chamber to decide on the admissibility of such requests. 
In ju s t ic e ' s opinion, this option was the most promising as it did not affect the 
scope of the Court’s jurisdiction and thus did not undermine judicial control. 
However, the Treaty should specify the conditions of the filtering; in any case 
should the President or a chamber refisse to deal with a request if the latter raised a 
principle of general public importance®^
According to the third option, the ECJ could proceed speedily if granted the power 
to decide to sit in chamber, whenever it deems it appropriate, to rule on a request 
for preliminary ruling or to use an interim-relief type accelerated procedure®®.
®® See supra n. 60, at p. 6. The proposals were designed to address the practical consequences of 
an extension o f the jurisdiction of the ECJ over asylum as well as immigration matters.
®^/W .,atp. 7.
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JUSTICE rightly considered that the third option was not really viable®®. Indeed, the 
ECJ had already the power to sit in chamber unless a Member State or an EC 
institution, which had submitted written observations, required the matter to be 
dealt with in plenary session. Since the Member States and the institutions have 
made little use of this right, the possibility to sit in chamber would not significantly 
contribute to reduce the workload of the Court. As to the use of an interim-relief 
type accelerated procedure, although it may shorten the whole procedure, it is 
judged inadequate as, if applied to all cases involving asylum and immigration, it 
could affect the quality of the decisions of the ECJ. This could not be compensated 
by savings of time. Furthermore, if this type of accelerated procedure was only use 
with regard to selected cases, the saving of time would be marginal.
The fourth proposal made by the Netherlands Presidency consisted in allowing the 
ECJ to rule where national law conflicted with EC law on a specific point. This new 
procedure was designed to replace the procedure of Article 234 in relation to 
asylum and immigration matters. However, the assistance provided to national 
courts under this new procedure would not be as thorough as the one provided 
under Article 234. For instance, what about cases where EC measures raise
®® This type of accelerated procedure already exists (Article 83 of the Rules of Procedures of the 
Court o f Justice); however, it was established for entirely different purposes. Article 83 of the 
Rules of Procedures of the Court o f Justice concerns applications to suspend the operation of any 
measure adopted by an institution under Article 242 of the TEC. Pursuant to Article 242, althougli 
actions brought before the ECJ do not have suspensoiy effect, the Court may allow suspension if  it 
considers tliat it is required tty the circumstances. The procedure laid down in Article 83 is 
characterised by shorter periods for written submissions (Article 84). Then, the President decides 
on the application or refers it to the ECJ (Article 85); in the latter case, the Court must postpone 
all other cases and, after hearing the Advocate General, give a decision (Article 85).
Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 19 June 1991, OJ L 
176/7, 4/07/1991, and OJ L 383, 9/02/992 (corrigenda), with amendments published in OJ L 
44/61, 28/02/1995, and in OJ L 103/1, 19/04/1997, and L 351, 23/12/1997 (corrigenda). 
Consolidated text reproduced in OJ C 65, 6/03/1999.
®® See supra n. 60, at p. 8.
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questions of interpretation that have not yet been dealt with by the ECJ? Although 
there may not be a conflict with national law, the assistance of the ECJ is still 
required. Moreover, the wording of this proposal may appear inconsistent with the 
fundamental principle of supremacy of EC law which, in any case, requires national 
courts to disregar d national law which is in contradiction with EC law.
A further option, contemplated by the Dublin II Outline, was to transfer the 
references under Article 234 to the Court of First Instance (CFI) on a case-by-case 
basis^ ®. However, this would only shift the problem from one court to the other as 
the CFI is already overburdened. In that respect, as mentioned above, allowing the 
ECJ to filter requests for preliminary appeared to be the best option so long as the 
filtering criteria would not result in the exclusion of cases raising issues of principle. 
It is argued that any solution that carried the risk of undermining the scope and 
quality of the control exercised by the ECJ, should have been disregarded. This 
suggests that the jurisdiction of the ECJ should not be truncated as there is no 
justification for asylum or any other measures being subject to a lesser degree of 
judicial control. Moreover, a weaker judicial control would be inconsistent with the 
need to satisfy democratic requirements within the EC.
The option implemented by the Treaty of Amsterdam was the third one (second 
branch). Indeed, pursuant to Article 68(1) of the TEC, “Article 234[ '^] shall apply
Ibid., at p. 9.
Article 234 of the TEC reads:
"The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation o f this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts o f the institutions of the Community and of the
ECB;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where 
those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that coirrt or 
tribunal may, if  it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give 
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
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to this Title [Title IV] under the following circumstances: where a question on the 
interpretation of this Title or on the validity or interpretation of acts of the 
institutions of the Community based on this Title is raised in a case pending before a 
national court or a tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no 
judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall, if it considers that a 
decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the 
Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.” It is argued that Article 68 significantly 
curtails the scope of Article 234 as no mention is made of national courts against 
whose decisions there is a judicial remedy. It appears that these courts have lost 
their right to request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ. Although this restriction 
could contribute to ease the burden of the ECJ, it would prevent important points of 
principle arising before such courts from being dealt with at that stage and would 
thus require the case to be brought to the court of last resort before assistance may 
be solicited fiom the ECJ through Article 234. Under Article 68, courts against 
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy are obliged to request a preliminary 
ruling from the ECJ if they consider that a decision of the ECJ on the question being 
raised is necessary to enable them to give judgment. Although the wording of 
Article 68 differs in that respect from that of Article 234, it is suggested that the 
former refers to the case-law developed by the ECJ with regard to Article 234(3) 
which specifies the limits of the obligation imposed on courts of last resort^ .^
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal o f a Member State 
against whose decisions there is no judicial reme<ty under national law, that court or tribmial shall 
bring the matter before the Court of Justice.”
In CILFIT Sri v Ministro della Sanità ((Case 283/81) [1982] ECR 3415), on a reference from 
the Italian Supreme Court concerning the mandatory Jurisdiction of national courts under Article 
177(3) (new Article 234(3)), the ECJ held: “it followed from the relationship between Article 
177(2) and (3) tliat the courts and tribmials referred to in Article 177(3) have the same discretion 
as any other court or tribunal to ascertain whether a decision on a question of Community law is 
necessary to enable them to give judgment.”
It follows from the guidelines given by the Court of Justice that there is no need to refer if:
“(a) the question of EC law is irrelevant; or
(b) the position has already been interpreted by the Court of Justice, even though the questions at 
issue are not strictly identical; or
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Finally, the extension of the jurisdiction of the ECJ over asylum raises an issue 
specific to that field regarding the involvement of UNHCR. It follows from Article 
35 of the 1951 Convention that the Contracting States, which include all Member 
States, undertake, inter alia, to facilitate UNHCR's duty of supervising the 
application of the Convention provisions. It is argued that a possible involvement of 
UNHCR where cases brought before the ECJ under Article 234 raise asylum issues 
would facilitate the maintenance of standards in line with international refugee law 
provided, of course, that UNHCR's opinions are duly taken into account. However, 
an intervention of UNHCR would require an amendment of Article 37 of the ECJ's 
Statute^ ® which currently restricts the participation of UNHCR to cases where it is a 
party to the proceedings; this is rarely the case.
(c) the correct application is so obvious as to leave no scope for reasonable doubt. This matter must 
be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of Community law, the particular difficulties 
to which its interpretation gives rise, and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions witliin the 
Community.”
Criteria (b) and (c) can be regarded as applying the doctrine of acte clair according to which a 
question will not be referred to the competent court where the meaning of a provision is 
considered clear. This doctrine was introduced by the French Conseil d’Etat with a view to 
minimising its obligation to refer treaties to the government for interpretation. If the provision was 
found to be an acte clair, tlie French Supreme Administrative Court would not refer the matter to 
the executive.
Article 37 of the ECJ’s Statute reads:
“Member States and institutions of the Community may intervene in cases before the Court.
The same right shall be open to any other person establishing an interest in the result of any case 
submitted to the Court, save in cases between Member States, between institutions of the 
Community or between Member States and institutions of the Community.
Without prejudice to the preceding paragraph, the States, other than tlie Member States, which are 
parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and also the EFT A Surveillance 
Authority referred to in that Agreement, may intervene in cases before the Court where one of the 
fields of application of that Agreement is concerned.
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The provisions regarding the decision-making process in the context of Title IV 
may be considered as falling short of what could have been achieved within the EC 
framework. Indeed, Article 67(1) provides that within five years of the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council must act unanimously on a proposal 
emanating from the Commission or a Member State after having consulted the 
European Parliament '^*, Thus, the unanimity rule, which governs the decision­
making process within the intergovernmental framework, remains and the 
Parliament is confined to a consultative role. However, this impression of under 
achievement must be moderated in the light of the transitional nature of Article 
67(1). After this period of five years, the Council, after having consulted the 
European Parliament, acting unanimously, may decide to bring Title IV or part of it 
under the scope of the co-decision procedure (Article 251) which would, in 
principle, be governed by qualified-majority voting^ ®. This would have the 
advantage of fully associating the Parliament in the decision-making process as it 
would enjoy a right of codecision with the Council. A greater involvement of the 
European Parliament would be in the interest of a more democratic system as well 
as in the interest of asylum seekers as the Parliament had traditionally expressed 
concern for the protection of their rights. It is hoped that the unanimity requirement
All application to intervene shall be limited to supporting the form of order sought by one of the 
parties.”
Protocol on the Statute o f the Court of Justice, signed at Brussels on 17 April 1957, as last 
amended by Article 19 of the Act of Accession 1994 (OJ C 241/25, 29/08/1994) and by the 
Council Decisions of 22 December 1994 (OJ L 379/1, 31/12/1994) and 6 June 1995 (OJ L 131/33, 
15/06/1995).
'^* However, the Irish Presidency’s proposal as redefined by the Netherlands Presidency initially 
provided for a shorter transitional period, i.e. three years (see supra n. 60).
®^ It is interesting to note tliat the generalisation of qualified- majority was on the agenda of the 
Intergovernmental Conference which took place in Portugal in June 2000. This initiative found its 
origin in a French and German proposal. However, this proposal faces strong hostility, in 
particular fi*om tlie UK and the Scandinavian States ( Henri de Bresson et ^ n a u d  Leparmentier, 
“France et Allemagne tentent de ressouder leur union à Rambouillet ”, Le Monde, 20 May 2000).
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will not prevent nor unnecessarily delay the use of the co-decision procedure in the 
field of asylum.
A further drawback of the decision-making process as designed by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam lies with the fact that Title IV does not provide for consultations with 
UNHCR with a view to securing adherence to international refugee law. Indeed, if 
its views are not take into consideration, compliance is unlikely to be achieved.
3. The type of legal instrument
The effectiveness of EC provisions on the right to seek refugee is contingent on 
their compliance with international refiagee law. However, a successful 
harmonisation in this field also depends on the chosen instrument. In that respect, 
three options may be contemplated, namely regulations, directives or a convention 
between the Member States.
The suitability of these legal instruments must be assessed in the light of the 
ambitions of EC law in relation to the right to seek refugee status. In that respect, it 
is argued that EC law should aim at harmonising the provisions on the right to seek 
refugee status in line with international refugee law. Moreover, considering the 
urgent need for such harmonisation, practical considerations such as time constrains 
must be taken into consideration.
With this in mind, it is argued that Directives constitute the most suitable type of 
legal instrument, although the adoption of a Convention can be contemplated. As to 
Regulations, there are considered the less appropriate instruments in that respect..
3.1. Regulations: an inappropriate type of instrument
Article 249 of the TEC defines Regulations as instruments having general 
application, binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
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The purpose of the direct application of regulations is to avoid the need for Member 
States to incorporate Regulation provisions into their legal order^ .^ In other words, 
Regulations do not require enactment into national law. Moreover, any re­
enactment of a Regulation is considered a breach of EC law^ .^
Considering their characteristics. Regulations are primarily regarded as instruments 
of uniformity^*. As already stressed, our purpose is to harmonise provisions on the 
right to seek refugee status in line with international refugee law. Hence, uniformity 
is not the objective. It is argued that the latter would constitute an unrealistic goal 
likely to face the opposition of many Member States. Moreover, achieving 
uniformity in this field, whilst complying with international requirements, would 
turn out to be an extremely arduous and lengthy process inconsistent with the 
urgent need for reform.
Whilst harmonisation requires EC law to set standards designed to ensure 
compliance with international refugee law, the Member States may enjoy some 
discretion in the implementation of EC provisions on the right to seek refiigee 
status. It is argued that such an approach would allow for the protection of the right 
to seek refugee status while making allowance for Member States' “sensitivity”. In 
other words, this approach would address the need for pragmatism. In that context.
See, for instance, T. A. Winter, “Direct applicability and direct effects”, 9 CMLRev (1972) 425- 
438.
Case 34/73 Variola v Italian Finance Administration [1973] ECR 981. However, it is recognised 
that some Regulations may require national implementation or national ancillary legislation (case 
31/78 Bussone v Italian Ministry fo r  Agriculture [1978] ECR 2429 and case 272/83 Italy [1985] 
ECR 1057).
However, Regulations have been used as coordinating instruments in some instances. This was, 
for example, the case in the field of free movement of workers where Regulations were adopted 
with a view to coordinating the Member States’ systems (see, for instance, Regulation 1612/68 of 
15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community as amended by 
Regulation 32/76 (OJ 1968 L 257/2).
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Directives appear to be the most suitable type of instrument, although the 
conclusion of a convention could be envisaged.
3.2. Directives: the most suitable type of instrument
Pursuant to Article 249 of the TEC, Directives “shall be binding, as to the result to 
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the 
national authorities the choice of form and methods.”
Directives have become the main instruments of harmonisation in EC law. Unlike 
Regulations, they were not conceived to achieve uniformity. However, in practice. 
Directives vary greatly as to the margin of manoeuvre left to the Member States 
with regard to means of implementation. This flexibility is actually regarded as a 
considerable advantage as the degree of discretion granted to the Member States 
can be moderated in order to address the specificity of the various provisions on the 
right to seek refugee status. The adoption of more than one Directive is suggested 
as, it is argued, all the issues arising from the right to seek refugee status could not 
be efficiently addressed in a single Directive.
Whilst Directives are considered the most suitable type of instrument, two pitfalls 
have to be avoided if they are to be effective instruments. Firstly, it is important that 
the time granted to Member States for implementation is not inconsistent with the 
urgent need for reform. With this in mind, it is argued that Directives concerning 
the various aspects of the right to seek refugee status should be implemented within 
one year of their adoption; in any case should the time for implementation exceed 
two years. One must bear in mind that the legal binding nature of international 
refirgee law preceded the “communautarisation” of asylum matters and that the 
adoption of EC provisions on that field should not require drastic changes in the 
laws and practices of those Member States which have complied with their 
international obligations. Secondly, it is vital that the Directives covering the 
various aspects of the right to seek refiigee status complement each other. This 
means that these Directives must be drafted in relation to one another with a view
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to adopting a comprehensive legislation on the right to seek refugee status. As 
stressed in the course of the thesis, the preservation of the right to seek refugee 
status necessitates a global approach. This also implies that the time that may elapse 
between the adoption of the different directives must be extremely short.
Directives are presented as the most appropriate legal instruments. However, a 
convention could be concluded between the Member States, although this option 
suffers a number of drawbacks.
3.3. A convention
An option that could be contemplated is the conclusion of a convention on the right 
to seek refugee status between the Member States. Unlike Regulations and 
Directives, conventions are not typical EC law instruments, but classical instruments 
of international law.
Whilst a convention would have the advantage of being able to cover all aspects of 
the right to seek refugee status, it has two important pitfalls.
Firstly, the process that goes from the negotiation of a convention to its entry into 
force is generally a lengthy one. When States party to a convention agree to its 
provisions and thus to its signing, implementation is not yet secured. Indeed, the 
convention needs to be ratified by national parliaments. The coming into force of a 
convention may be seriously delayed by a slow ratification process, depriving the 
convention from any legal authority and thus effectiveness in the meantime. It is 
argued that, considering the urgent need to adopt comprehensive EC provisions on 
the right to seek refugee status, such a risk cannot be taken.
Another feature inherent in conventions, that constitutes their second pitfall, lies 
with the possibility for States party to conventions to make reservations. 
Reservations give States the opportunity to reject some of the convention 
provisions. Reservations are defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
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Treaties of 1969. Article 2(l)(d) reads that a reservation is an “(...) unilateral 
statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, 
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to 
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that 
State.” It is argued that any reservation to the provisions of an EC convention on 
the right to seek refugee would entail the risk of undermining the right in question 
and should; the right to make reservations should therefore be excluded.
Whilst the difficulties arising from reservations may be overcome, the risk of a 
lengthy process remains. In that context, it is argued that Directives constitute the 
most appropriate type of legal instrument.
4. Conclusion
It is not contested that the Treaty of Amsterdam by granting the EC competence 
over asylum matters constitutes a considerable achievement as the EC is considered 
a more suitable framework. However, this positive statement must be moderated in 
the light of the Protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland and the Protocol on 
the position of Denmark. Indeed, these three Member States were allowed to opt 
out from Title IV. This means that the “communautarisation” operated by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam can be regarded as partial as it does not extend to the entire 
territory of the EC and leaves room for intergovernmental cooperation in the field 
of asylum. This concession made to the UK, Ireland and Denmark may have been 
the “price” of “communautarisation” and thus may have been unavoidable when 
negotiating the Treaty of Amsterdam and the transfer of competence to the EC. 
However, this “flexibility”, if maintained, is likely to have a detrimental effect on the 
EC, the Member States and asylum seekers. The UK, Ireland, and Denmark are 
therefore urged to “opt-in”. As already stressed, a “successfijil communautarisation” 
is conditional upon strict compliance with international refugee law. Moreover, the 
decision-making process and the jurisdiction conferred upon the ECJ as a result of 
the “communautarisation are not considered satisfactory.
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Improvements in the legal framework, although essential, will not in themselves 
ensure compliance with international refugee law. In that respect, it is critical to the 
protection of the right to seek refugee status that the EC does not simply endorse 
the measures adopted within the intergovernmental framework. The emphasis is 
therefore on the standards that the EC must satisfy in relation to the right to seek 
refugee status.
90
Chapter III
The Need for an Up to Date Interpretation of the Term “Refugee”
The definition of the term refugee is laid down in Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 
Convention and constitutes the common ground for granting refugee status.
Article 1(A)(2) reads:
“For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply to any 
person who (...) owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it.”
This definition is the result of the refugee situation existing at the time of the 
drafting of the 1951 Convention. This means that a number of issues that arise from 
the current refugee situation world-wide are not directly tackled by the Convention. 
This is the case with regard to non-State persecution and gender-based persecution. 
However, the purpose of the Convention has remained the same, i.e. to provide 
international protection through refugee status to those individuals failed by their 
State in that respect.
However, with the development of increasingly restrictive asylum policies and laws, 
there has been a reluctance to interpret the Convention definition in a purposive 
sense allowing the definition to take on board changes that have taken place in the 
refiigee situation.
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Two main issues have been identified in that respect. Firstly, increasing numbers of 
asylum claims have been lodged by people who have fled persecution non-State 
persecution. Because persecution was originally perceived as mainly emanating 
fi*om the State, some Member States have taken the view that non-State persecution 
per se falls outside the scope of the Convention definition. It is argued that this 
position has no legal foundation as the Convention does not impose any 
requirements as to the identity of the perpetrator and is inconsistent with the object 
of the 1951 Convention. Secondly, many women have claimed refugee status owing 
to gender-based persecution. Since the Convention does not mention gender as a 
ground for a well-founded fear of persecution, it has been difficult for these women 
to fit within the Convention definition and be granted refugee status. The view 
taken is that gender-based persecution may be covered by the Convention provided 
that membership of a particular social group is adequately interpreted.
It is argued that it is essential to the preservation of the right to seek refugee status 
that EC law interprets the definition of the term refugee in a manner consistent with 
the spirit and purpose of the 1951 Convention in order to address today's needs for 
international protection.
Finally, one shall also consider the attitude of the EC towards asylum claims lodged 
by Member State nationals within the EC. To date, the Protocol on asylum for 
nationals of Member States of the European Union considerably restricts EC 
nationals' right to seek refugee status within the EC
1. Non-State persecution
The drafters of the 1951 Convention had very much in mind the "traditional” 
asylum seeker, namely an individual, generally male, fleeing persecution by the 
authorities of his country of origin^ Therefore, the Convention initially essentially 
applied to cases of State persecution. This limited scope was very much the
' The drafters of the 1951 Convention had mainly in mind political opponents to communist 
regimes seeking refuge in western democracies.
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consequence of the refugee situation at the time the Convention was drafted and not 
the result of a deliberate restrictive interpretation of the term refugee. Hence, no 
serious difficulties were raised so long as individuals fitted the “classic asylum 
seeker profile”. However, changes in the refugee situation world-wide brought a 
new dimension to this issues. Indeed, increasing numbers of people have fled 
persecution emanating from non-State agents^.
The 1951 Convention does not impose any requirements as to the identity of the 
perpetrator. In other words, the Convention provisions does not confine its 
application to cases of State persecution. The history of the Convention drafting 
and the travaux préparatoires are also silent on this issue .^ The purpose of the 
Convention has always been to confer refugee status upon those who have a well- 
founded fear of persecution and cannot avail themselves of the protection of the 
country of their nationality or residence where people are stateless"^ . The 
Convention does not discriminate against those who are persecuted by non-State 
agents so long as they fall within the scope of Article 1(A)(2). As already noted, the 
fact that many recognised refugees were fleeing State persecution was 
circumstantial and did not reflect an intention to systematically exclude non-State 
persecution and impose an implicit requirement as to the identity of the perpetrator.
 ^This is for instance the case of a significant number of Algerian nationals who fled persecution 
emanating from extremist religious groups, such as the Salvation Islamic Front {Front Islamique 
du Salut).
 ^ Chaloka Beyani, “Introduction to the Refugee Convention, the Travaux Préparatoires analysed 
with
a commentary by Dr. Paul Weis”, in Paul Weis, with a Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis, Cambridge, 
International Documents Series, vol. 7 (1995).
" Future references to the State of nationality are understood as embodying the State of residence 
for stateless asylum seekers.
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Unfortunately, there has been a temptation to rely upon past cases to justify the 
exclusion of those persecuted by non-State agents from the scope of the refugee 
definition. Considering the restrictive nature of the asylum polices developed at 
national and European level, the fact that many Member States and the EU did 
endorse this restrictive and discriminatory approach to the concept of refugee 
comes as no surprise. As observed by Colville, ‘"[t]he welcome rapidly wore thin, 
and the restrictive interpretation, which excluded all those persecuted by a non- 
State agent, was one way of cutting down the numbers”^ In this hostile context. 
State persecution became in many cases a condition for granting refugee status. 
Such a requirement had an adverse effect on those fleeing civil wars or events 
seriously disturbing public order as such situations often entail persecution 
emanating from non-State entities. Nationals of former Yugoslavia and Algeria, for 
instance, felt the full impact of this hostile approach.
It is argued that the exclusion of non-State persecution from the Convention scope 
has no legal basis as this restriction is not enshrined in the Convention provisions. 
Moreover, this interpretation defeats the spirit and purpose of the Convention 
which is to grant refugee status to those who have a well-founded fear of 
persecution based on a Convention ground. With this in mind, the view taken is that 
EC law should address this issue by expressly recognising non-State persecution in 
order to prevent further exclusions. This position finds its justification in the 
wording of the Convention and in the adverse consequences of restrictive 
interpretations on refugee protection as illustrated, for instance, by the French case- 
law.
1.1. Persecution confined to State persecution: the French example
State persecution as a prerequisite to a successful asylum claim finds its origin in 
restrictive interpretations of the term refugee designed to cut down the numbers of
 ^ Rupert Colville, "Persecution complex”, Asylum and Protection, 
http://www.unhcr.cli/issues/asylum/rml0104.htni.
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recognised refiigees. In France, the Commission des Recours des Réfugiés (CRR)^ 
inferred from Article 1(A)(2) and 1(C)(1)^ of the 1951 Convention that persecution 
that has not been perpetrated by State agents fell outside the scope of the 
Convention. The French case-law is examined in order to demonstrate the 
inconsistency of any restriction to State persecution with the Member States’ 
obligations under the 1951 Convention. The French case-law is considered relevant 
as the exclusion of non-State persecution remains central to the case-law of the 
French competent bodies and representative of the impact of such a position on 
asylum seekers’ rights as France deals with a significant proportion of the asylum 
seekers within the EC. It follows from the case-law of the CCR and the Conseil 
d’Etat that asylum claims based on non-State persecution will be rejected unless the 
applicant demonstrates that the State was an accomplice*. This requirement has 
been construed as encompassing cases where the State has voluntarily encouraged 
or tolerated persecution^. These limits imposed on the concept of persecution have 
resulted in asylum seekers being refused refiigee status despite a well-founded fear 
of persecution based on a Convention ground in the absence of State involvement. 
The relevance of the French case-law is also explained by the fact that the Joint 
Position of 4 March 1996 defined by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the 
Treaty of European Union on the harmonized application of the definition of the 
term “refugee” in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to
® The Commission des Recours des Réfugiés (CRR) is competent for hearing appeals against 
decisions of the Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA).
 ^Article 1(C)(1) of the 1951 Convention reads that “[tjhe Convention shall cease to apply to any 
person falling under the terms o f section A if  [h]e has voluntarily re-availed himself of the 
protection of the country of his nationality.”
® CRR, 1 February 1977, Zaoude, referred to in Frederic Tiberghien, La Protection des Réfugiés 
en France (Collection Droit Public Positif, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, Economica, 
Paris, 1988) (2nd ed) at p. 393.
 ^Conseil d’Etat, 27 May 1983, Dankha, ibid, at p. 247.
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the status of refugee^ ,^ referred to as the Joint Position on the definition of the term 
refugee, endorses views on non-State persecution similar to those upheld in
France^ \
1.1.1. The concepts of persecution tolerated or encouraged by State 
authorities: the Dankha ruling
As already mentioned, the CRR has inferred from Articles 1(A)(2) and 1(C)(1) of 
the 1951 Convention that persecution committed by non-state entities falls outside 
the scope of the Convention. In Zaoude^^, the CRR decided that, although there 
was a serious level of insecurity in the applicant's country of origin, the alleged acts 
could not be regarded as amounting to persecution in the sense of Article 1(A)(2) 
of the 1951 Convention since they had not been committed by public authorities. 
This statement was amended in Dankhtf^ where the Conseil d'Etat declared that 
persecutions voluntarily tolerated or encouraged by State authorities should also be 
taken into consideration. However, in Redouane^^, although the CRR applied the 
Dankha test, the Commission held that the Convention provisions made refugee
O IL 63/2, 13/03/1996.
" This issue is examined in section 1.2 of the present chapter.
CRR, 1 February 1977, Zaoude, supra n. 8. The applicant argued that the degree of insecurity 
in his country of origin constituted an obstacle to Ms retiun. Although the CRR acknowledged the 
Mgh level of insecurity, it declared that the alleged persecutions could not be considered 
persecutions within the meaning of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention since they had not 
been committed by public authorities.
Conseil d’Etat, 27 May 1983, Dankha, supra n. 9.
CRR, 11 April 1995, Redouane, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des
Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre
d’information Contentieuse, 1995, at p. 66.
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status contingent, inter alia, upon the existence of persecution or fear of 
persecution emanating from the State authorities. The CRR construed the concept 
of State authorities as comprising the government in power^^ public and 
administrative authorities^^ as well as local authorities^ .^ This concept also includes 
the military and the police. It follows that individuals who are persecuted or fear to 
be persecuted by political parties which are in the opposition^*, groups fighting in 
the context of a civil war^ ,^ or individuals who have committed criminal acts^  ^ or 
are members of terrorist or extremist groups^  ^ will not, in principle, be eligible for 
refugee status. For their application to be successful, they will have to prove, inter 
alia, that the State has voluntarily tolerated or encouraged the alleged acts of 
persecution. The decision of the CRR in Dankhcf^ was based on the former 
decision in Duman^^ where the CRR introduced the concepts of ""accommodating 
passivity” {^^passivité complaisante^^) and ""passive behaviour” (^"comportement
See, for instance, CRR, 2 March 1956, Pritsch, in Tiberghien, supra n. 8, at p. 392 and CRR, 26 
June 1956, Gueron, ibid, at p. 219 and 392.
See, for instance, CRR, 25 July 1956, Yarhi, ibid., at p. 392.
See, for example, CRR, 1 June 1994, Slepcik in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, 
Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des 
Réfugiés, Centre dTnfonnation Contentieuse, 1994, at p. 59.
CRR, 21 May 1981, Thambiaiah, in Tiberghien, supra n. 8, at p. 393.
19 CRR, 13 July 1976, Nadjarian, ibid., at p. 355 and 393.
CRR, 25 April 1978, Brown, ibid., at p. 393 and CRR, 21 October 1986, Shanmugalingam, 
ibid., at p. 343 and 393.
CRR, 6 January 1986, Parekh, ibid, at p. 393.
See supra n. 9.
CRR, 3 April 1979, Duman, in Tibergliien, supra n. 8, at p. 394.
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passif) of the State authorities. This decision concerned organised and systematic 
ill-treatment inflicted by the local population. Tiberghien, on the basis of Duman, 
rejected the view that persecution was confined to State persecution. In his opinion, 
the ruling in Duman introduced exceptions that allowed non-State persecution to be 
taken into consideration under certain circumstances. However, it is argued that this 
line of reasoning disregards the fact that applicants still have to establish that the 
State adopted a certain conduct. This is even more so with the decision in Dankhcf^ 
that overruled Duman and requires persecution to have been voluntarily tolerated or 
encouraged by the State. These two decisions may have, to a certain extent, moved 
from the concept of active State persecution. However, they still require the 
persecution to emanate from the State, although indirectly.
In Dankh(f^, the Conseil d'Etat expressed the view that the 1951 Convention did 
not require persecution to be directly committed by State authorities. The CRR had 
rejected the asylum claim on the ground that the applicant had failed to establish 
that persecution was attributable to official authorities. The CRR applied its former 
case-law on the agent of persecution and ignored the changes introduced in Duman. 
The applicant challenged the decision of the CCR before the Conseil d'Etat and 
argued that the CRR had made an error on a point of law in rejecting his application 
on the sole ground that persecution had not been perpetrated by official authorities.
In his conclusions, the Commissaire du Gouvernement expressed the view that the 
1951 Convention did not confine refugee status to people being persecuted by 
official authorities of the country of nationality. In his opinion, the Convention only 
required applicants to show that they had a well-founded fear of persecution on a 
Convention ground and that they could not avail themselves of the protection of the 
State of their nationality. Hence, the Commissaire du Gouvernement proposed to
24 See supra n. 9.
Ibid.
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take into consideration, in addition to persecution inflicted by State authorities, 
persecution exercised by individuals where it was voluntarily encouraged or 
tolerated by public authorities, thus preventing the person in question from availing 
himself or herself of the protection of his country of nationality.
It is argued that there is a contradiction in the Commissaire du Gouvernements 
position. He recognises that once the existence of a well-founded fear of 
persecution is established, what needs to be determined is whether the individual 
concerned can avail himself or herself of the protection of the State. However, the 
Commissaire du Gouvernement reduces the State’s failure to provide protection to 
cases where the alleged acts have been voluntarily tolerated or encouraged by the 
State. As shown in subsequent decisions, the ruling in Dhanka does not cover cases 
where the State is unable to protect nationals in need as the involvement of the 
State is still required^ .^
The decision in Dankha constitutes an improvement as it no longer makes refugee 
status contingent upon direct State persecution and thus allow refugee status to be 
granted to individuals who were previously excluded from its scope. Indeed, it is 
not unusual for some States to organise or voluntarily allow the formation of 
groups, which, with a varying degree of police or army forces’ involvement, 
persecute opponents^^. However, it is important to note that the idea of persecution 
voluntarily encouraged by the State is very close to that of direct State persecution 
and that they may overlap to a considerable extent. This is reflected in the
In that respect, the position adopted by English courts differs significantly from that of the 
French courts. Wliere a well-founded, fear of persecution is established, the State’s inability to 
provide protection will suffice (see the decision of the Coiut of Appeal of 2 December 1999, Milan 
Horvath v Secretary o f  State fo r the Home Department (LTL 2/12/99 and TLR 8/12/99) confirmed 
by the House of Lords in a decision of 6 July 2000 ((2000) 3 WLR 379). The English position also 
differs from that agreed on by the Member States in the Joint Position. The latter is examined in 
section 1.2.
On this issue, see Tiberghien, supra n. 8, at p. 95.
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subsequent case-law; indeed, to date, the cases decided by the CRR and the Conseil 
d'Etat are essentially founded on the concept of persecution tolerated by the State. 
In France, non-State persecution per se is not acknowledged for the purpose of 
refugee status as State involvement must be established. It is argued that the French 
position resulting from the Dankha ruling is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
1951 Convention as the latter do not require persecution to have been voluntarily 
tolerated or encouraged by the State where it emanates from non-State entities. The 
only requirement enshrined in the Convention is that applicants must have been 
unwilling or unable, owing to their well-founded fear of persecution to avail 
themselves of the protection of the State of their nationality^*.
The Conseil d'Etat confirmed the Dankha approach in a number of cases^ .^ It 
follows from the decision of the Conseil d'Etat in Dankha that, in cases of non-State 
persecution, the OFPRA and the CRR have to establish whether the authorities of
Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention.
See, for instance, Conseil d’Etat, 22 November 1996, Mme Messara, in Commission des 
Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat e t de la 
Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre d’information contentieuse, 1996, at p. 29-30; 
Conseil d’Etat, 22 November 1996, M. Messara, ibid.'. Conseil d’Etat, 19 June 1996, Medjebeur, 
ibid., at p. 26; Conseil d ’Etat, 22 March 1996, Geevaratnam, ibid, at p. 18; Conseil d’Etat, 31 
January 1996, ^6/6, ibid., at p. 14; Conseil d’Etat, 13 December 1996, Lahcene, ibid., at p. 30-31; 
CRR, 12 March 1996, Seddiki, ibid., at p. 51-52; CRR, 11 October 1996, Wagih WasilyAtta, ibid., 
at p. 60-61; CRR, 29 November 1996, Bajramov, ibid., at p. 65-66; CRR, 29 November 1996, 
Asanoski, ibid., at p. 64-65; CRR 19 September 1996, Gaidys, ibid., at p. 94; CRR, 24 July 1996, 
Sali, ibid., at p. 95; CRR, 27 February 1996, Cabrena Serna, ibid., at p. 95; CRR 2 May 1996, 
Bettahar, ibid., at p. 96 and CRR, 1 October 1996, Boucif ibid, at p. 96; CRR, 23 May 1997, 
Khali Reda in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du 
Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre d’information contentieuse, 
1997, at p. 50; CRR 29 July 1998, Diop, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux 
des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat e t de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, 
Centre d ’information contentieuse, 1998, at p.50-51; Conseil d’Etat, 12 October 1998, Henni, in 
ibid., at p. 51; Conseil d’Etat, 28 October 1998, Ameur, in ibid, at p. 52 and CRR 8 Jime 1998, 
Basraoui, in ibid.
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the country of nationality have voluntarily encouraged or tolerated persecution so 
that the individual seeking refugee status is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection of the country in question. Failure to examine this point of 
law may be brought to the Conseil d’Etat as juge de cassation. In Jgartua 
Amondarairr’^ , a Spanish national claimed that he had been persecuted by groups 
tolerated by the Spanish government. The CRR rejected his application on the 
ground that he had failed to establish the existence of ill-treatment and serious 
threats emanating from public authorities. The Conseil d'Etat declared that, in 
omitting to verify whether these acts were voluntarily tolerated or encouraged by 
the Spanish authorities, the CRR did not answer the applicant's argument in a 
satisfactory manner^ \
It results from the CRR's case-law that applicants have faced great difficulty in 
establishing that persecution had been voluntarily tolerated or encouraged by the 
State. As observed in the chapter on fair and effective procedures, asylum seekers 
are confronted with a number of difficulties inherent in their situation when 
attempting to gather evidence in support of their claim^ .^ The French case-law 
indicates that evidence of persecution voluntarily tolerated or encouraged by the 
State often fails to satisfy the competent authorities. Between 1983 and 1987, the 
CRR only recognised the existence of persecution voluntarily encouraged or 
tolerated by the State in two cases. In the first case, the involvement of the police 
could not be questioned in the face of the evidence provided^ .^ In the second case.
Conseil d’Etat, 27 July 1987, Igartua Amondarain, in Tibergliien, supra n. 8, at p. 396.
See also, for instance, Conseil d’Etat, 6 Jime 1984, UrtiagaMartinez, ibid., at p. 361 and 395
32 See chapter V  on fair and effective procedures.
CRR, 26 January 1984, Sabbar, in Tiberghien, supra n. 8, at p. 3 94.
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no attempt by the authorities to disarm the group responsible for persecuting the 
applicant could be established '^ .^
The increase subsequent to 1987 in the number of successful claims before the CRR 
is attributable to an increase in the number of applications for asylum involving acts 
committed by non-State entities. For instance, in Patanjaf^, the Lithuanian 
authorities voluntarily tolerated xenophobic acts perpetrated by the population. The 
police was the passive witness of the applicant's lynching and subsequently refused 
to carry him to hospital despite the seriousness of his injuries. In Karroubf^, the 
applicant, an Algerian national, was harassed and threatened by members of an 
Islamic group because he was a communist militant married to a national of the 
former Soviet Union. The police formally refused to register his complaint. While 
he was attempting to have his complaint registered, he was actually insulted and 
physically assaulted by the police forces^ .^ In Isaok, the Sudanese authorities
CRR, 31 August 1984, Misquita, in ib id , at p. 337 and 394.
CRR, 25 October 1994, Patanjan, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des 
Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre 
d’information contentieuse, 1994, at p. 83 and 111.
CRR, 28 February 1995, Karroubi, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des 
Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat e t de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre 
d’information contentieuse, 1995, at p. 103.
Can also be mentioned the decision in Lopez Wilches where the applicant, a Colombian 
national, was, on several occasions, threatened by para-govemmental militias because of her 
father’s political involvement with opposition parties. Her father was staying in France where he 
was granted refugee status (CRR, 10 February 1995, Lopez Wilches, in Commission des Recours 
des Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat e t de la Commission des 
Recours des Réfugiés, Centre d’information contentieuse, 1995, at p. 102). In Bouchoueva, an 
Armenian national was persecuted owing to her Russian origin. She and her mother were forced to 
sale their flat at an extremely low price. They were threatened by members o f militias. They were 
also refused identification documents by the Armenian Consulate in Moscow while being 
considered Armenian by Russian authorities (CRR, 30 June 1995, Bouchoueva, ibid., at p. 80 and
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voluntarily tolerated and even encouraged persecutions directed against a Sudanese 
national, converted to the Christian religion, by both the authorities and members of 
Islamic groups^*. It is argued that these cases may be regarded as involving direct 
State persecution and indicates a restrictive approach to the concepts of voluntarily 
tolerated and encouraged persecution by the State. This view is supported by the 
fact that voluntary tolerance or encouragement by the State authorities has only 
been established in a minority of cases^ .^ For instance, in M'Zerighe, the CRR 
concluded that the State authorities had voluntarily tolerated the treatment inflicted 
on the applicant. The claimant, a national of Mauritania, was, because, of his social 
origins, subjected to slavery
The restrictive manner in which the French competent bodies have interpreted the 
concepts of persecution voluntarily tolerated and encouraged by the State was 
further evidenced in the way the CRR further elaborated the concepts in question. 
The CRR ruled that it had to be satisfied that the individual claiming non-State 
persecution had been refused the protection promised by the State authorities'^  ^ or
105). See also CRR 20 June 1995, Mehdi, ibid., at p. 104; CRR, 12 December 1995, Diaf, ibid., at 
p. 104; CRR 30 May 1995, Mokhtari, ibid., at p. 103 and CRR, 12 December 1995, Hamitouche 
épouse Diaf, ibid., at p. 105.
CRR, 5 October 1994, Isaak, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des 
Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre 
d’information Contentieuse, 1994, at p. 110.
Between 1994 and 1998, out of the 57 cases reported in the Jurisprudence du Conseil d'Etat et 
de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés where persecution voluntarily tolerated or encouraged 
by State authorities was alleged, only 21 were successful.
CRR, 30 Jmie 1995, M'Zerighe, Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des
Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre
d’information Contentieuse, 1995, at p. 102.
CRR, 5 May 1995, Benarmas, ibid., at p. 47.
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that the applicant had really solicited State protection'^  ^and that he or she had been 
refused such protection in a systematic manner'^ .^ However refugee status can be 
granted to an individual who did not expressly ask for protection where the 
competent body is satisfied that such a request would have been systematically 
rejected, rendering any call for protection a vain exercise'*'^ . The CRR also examines 
the general behaviour of the State authorities towards the applicant'*^
It is argued that, to date, non-State persecution is not recognised for refugee 
purposes in France. Indeed, applicants have to establish the direct or indirect 
involvement of the State. As currently construed, the concepts of persecution 
voluntarily tolerated or encouraged by the State prevent those whose State is 
unable, but not necessarily unwilling, to provide protection from obtaining refugee 
status. This is a source of discrimination that undermines refugee protection by 
breaching Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention and disregarding the purpose and 
spirit of the latter. As already noted, the restrictive approach developed by the CRR 
and the Conseil d’Etat prevents individuals persecuted by non-State agents who fail 
to establish State involvement from being granted refugee status.
See, for example, CRR, 10 November 1993, Soto Huamani, in Commission des Recours des 
Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d'Etat e t de la Commission des 
Recours des Réfugiés, Centre d’information Contentieuse, 1993, at p. 57.
See, for instance the decision in Gaidys, supra n. 29.
CRR, 25 February 1994, Naas, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des 
Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d'Etat e t de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre 
d’information Contentieuse, 1995, at p. 47 and CRR, 25 February \99A, Ameur, ibid., at p. 48.
CRR, 17 February 1995, Meziane, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des
Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre
d’information Contentieuse, 1995, at p. 39.
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1.1.2. The consequences of the Dankha ruling
The concepts of persecution voluntarily tolerated or encouraged by the State means 
that those persecuted by non-State agents must establish that the State authorities 
are involved. Thus, where the State is simply unable to provide the required 
protection asylum seekers will be refused refugee status while they would have been 
granted this status had they been the victims of State persecution. The same applies 
to those who were not in a position to prove State involvement. It is a well 
established facts that asylum seekers encounter specific difficulties in that respect.
It is argued that the Dankha ruling denies refugee status to people who are in need 
of international protection and are entitled to it under the provisions of the 1951 
Convention. Indeed, as already stressed, the Convention does not impose any 
requirements as to the identity of the perpetrator.
In order to demonstrate the adverse effect of the Dankha ruling on refiigee 
protection, the case-law regarding Algerian nationals is discussed. This case-law is 
considered particularly relevant as the vast majority of Algerian nationals who have 
claimed refugee status in France in recent years, as well as in other countries, have 
alleged non-State persecution. Therefore, decisions on their asylum claims are 
representative of the consequences of the Dankha ruling on the personal scope of 
refugee status as construed in France.
Owing to the situation in Algeria, the OFPRA, the CRR and, in last resort, the 
Conseil d'Etat have dealt with a significant number of claims lodged by Algerian 
nationals alleging persecution by extremist Islamic groups. France has only granted 
refugee status in a handful of cases where the Algerian authorities were considered 
unwilling to provide protection'^ .^ For instance, in Mehdf^, the applicant was a
Germany has only granted refugee status to Algerian nationals who have been victim o f state 
persecution. Switzerland has not recognised any Algerian claims at all (see Rupert Colville, supm  
n. 5).
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nurse working in a State hospital in Algiers. She refused to take part in religious 
rituals organised within the hospital premises and to dress according to Islamic 
groups' requirements. As a result, she was subjected to serious threats, including 
threats to take her life, emanating from Islamic militants. She tried in vain to obtain 
protection from the hospital authorities and then from the police. The police refijsed 
to intervene and register her complaint. Considering the police's refusal to grant her 
any form of protection, the CRR concluded that the authorities had voluntarily 
tolerated the acts in question.
In Ali Bouaouina^^, the applicant suffered an extremely violent assault carried out 
by Islamic militants during which her friend had his throat slit. The authorities 
deliberately refused to protect her and convinced her not to lodge a complaint. 
Being unable to leave Algeria, she had to hide at one of her friend’s house. Her 
fears of being persecuted by Islamic militants increased as she witnessed the murder 
of a French national working for the French Consulate in Algiers. She left Algeria 
the day after the murder. The CRR concluded that, in these specific circumstances, 
the Algerian authorities had voluntarily tolerated the persecution in question.
In Khmdf^, the applicant was excluded from a national institute owing to his 
actions in favour of the Berber culture and his involvement in the creation of a free 
student committee. He subsequently joined an opposition party and became the 
General Secretary of a cultural association. He was assaulted by members of the 
Salvation Islamic Front. The Salvation Islamic Front had won the local elections 
and dissolved his association, but he subsequently created another one. Islamic 
militants threatened him with death and attempted to put the association’s library on
47 See supra n. 37.
CRR, 1 Februaiy 1996, vt// Bouaouina, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux 
des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, 
Centre d’information Contentieuse, 1996, at p. 93.
CRR, 15 October 1996, Khoudi, ibid., at p. 94.
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fire. He tried to complain to the police, but the police expressly refused to assist him 
and reproached him for his political and cultural activities. The applicant fled 
Algeria following the murder of two members of the association. The CRR granted 
him refugee status as it considered that the authorities had voluntarily tolerated the 
acts perpetrated by the Islamic militants^ ®.
In D ia f,  the Algerian police denied the applicant the right to lodge a complaint 
against an Imam who singled him out on several occasions as a threat to Islamic 
rules. The applicant was subsequently assaulted by Islamic militants. Once again the 
police refused to register his complaint. The CRR declared that the police's 
behaviour amounted to voluntary tolerance. It is argued that, in cases where 
voluntary tolerance is established on the ground that the refusal of protection is 
such that it excludes any search for the persecutors by state authorities, the 
authorities' behaviour goes beyond voluntary tolerance.
In Terahf, the applicant, an Algerian national, was, owing to his Christian 
convictions, increasingly threatened by Islamic militants who sentenced him to 
death. He asked the authorities for protection, but they refused to grant him any. 
This refusal excluded any search for the perpetrators by the authorities. The CRR 
concluded that, considering the circumstances, voluntary tolerance was established. 
Besides, the CRR noted that the applicant's sister and brother in law had both been 
granted refugee status for similar reasons^ .^
See CRR, 31 Januaiy 1996, Khaldoun, ibid., at p. 93.
See supra n. 37.
CRR, 25 February 1994, Terahi, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des 
Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat e t de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre 
d’information Contentieuse, 1994, at p. 46.
See also the CRR’s decision in Slepcik {supra n. 17); CRR, 1 June 1994, Gaborova épouse 
Slepcik in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du
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It is also interesting to observe that, in some other cases, the CRR agreed that the 
nature of the links that the applicant and his or her family had with France rendered 
him or her unable to ask the Algerian authorities for protection. In D ikouf, several 
members of the applicant's family had served in the French army, including her 
father. He left for France with his wife and minor daughter. He was reintegrated in 
the French nationality. The applicant herself was an active supporter of Algerian 
women's liberation and emancipation. For this reason, she was threatened and 
harassed. Due to her family's past, she was unable to ask the Algerian authorities for 
protection. The CRR came to the conclusion that voluntary tolerance was 
established. The circumstances in Mokhtari^^ were quite similar. The applicant's 
family was known for having supported the French presence in Algeria. His father 
was executed in 1958 because he was a member of the back-up French forces 
(forces supplétives de Varmée française - Harki), The applicant himself was a 
French teacher known for his cultural action in favour of the French language. In 
1992 he became the target of Islamic militants. He lodged a complaint with the 
police who refiised him any kind of protection following consultations with higher 
authorities. Such an attitude was declared to amount to voluntary tolerance. In 
Elkebir^^, although the CRR did not expressly base its conclusions on the links the 
applicant had with France, the latter may have been of some relevance in the 
appraisal of the facts. The applicant was an Algerian national who came in France in 
1973 aged two with her family. She was therefore educated in France. In 1985, her 
parents decided to go back to Algeria. She carried on her studies in a French 
secondary school in Oran but had to give them up owing to the arabisation of
Conseil d ’Etat e t de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre d’information Contentieuse, 
1994, at p. 59 and CRR, 18 March 1994, Oukolova in ibid., at p. 50.
CRR, 4 May 1994, Dikous, in ibid., at p. 111. 
See supra ii. 37.
CRR, 22 July 1994, Elkebir, ibid., at p. 66.
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teaching programmes. The applicant had hardly any knowledge of Arabic. 
However, she found clerical work in the town where her parents lived. She was the 
victim of repeated threats and violence by Islamic militants because of her work and 
her refiisal, despite pressure, to abide by Islamic rules. Following a particularly 
violent aggression, she felt that she had no choice but to resign and leave Algeria. 
The CRR concluded that the local authorities' deliberate refusal to take action 
despite their knowledge of the facts amounted to voluntarily tolerance^^. In 
Khaldouf^, the CRR expressly recognised that the authorities’ attitude went 
beyond voluntary tolerance or encouragement. Indeed, the CRR held that the 
applicant’s fear of persecution by Islamic extremists was founded as well as his fear 
to see the authorities deliberately refuse him protection because of his personal 
political opinions and his father’s action in favour of an opposition party. The 
applicant was a musician who had been threatened by Islamic militants and 
wounded by a bullet because of the lyrics of his songs that criticised the 
fundamentalist theories on women’s status in force since the adoption of the new 
family code. He was, therefore, perceived as an opponent to the Islamic 
fundamentalist groups, but also to the Algerian government. He left Algeria after a 
second murder attempt. Soon after his arrival in France, one of the members of his 
band was murdered. Willing to go back to his country, he had to change his plans 
when he found out that his father, who had been harassed by Islamic militants for 
many years, had been arrested by the authorities owing to his political action in 
favour of an opposition leader. Since the applicant’s departure, two Algerian 
singers - one being a close fiiend - and his producer had been murdered by Islamic 
extremists.
In all these cases, applicants succeeded in proving State involvement by showing 
that the State authorities had voluntarily tolerated acts amounting to persecution.
In a similar case, the CRR denied refugee status to a woman who, like the applicant in Elkebir 
{supra n. 56), refused to abide by the rules imposed by Islamic groups on women. However, unlike 
Ms Elkebir, the applicant did not have any specific link with France: she was teaching Arabic and 
the Koran.
See supra n. 50.
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Moreover, it is argued that, although these decisions were based on the concept of 
persecution voluntarily tolerated by the State, the State authorities’ attitude may be 
considered as indicating a more active involvement. From 1994 to 1998, the CRR 
granted refugee status to a small number of Algerian nationals alleging persecution 
by Islamic militants^ .^ In most cases, the Algerian authorities' behaviour could be 
regarded as going beyond encouragement or voluntary tolerance. In many cases, 
asylum seekers were unable to prove State involvement and were therefore refused 
refugee status on this sole ground*^ .^
In a number of unsuccessful cases, although the CRR recognised the existence of 
persecution, it refused to grant refugee status on the ground that the state’s inability 
to offer its nationals effective protection did not amount to encouragement or 
voluntary tolerance. This has been confirmed by the Conseil d'Etat^\ In Sahnoun^^,
See, for example, the CRR’s decision in Dikous, supra n. 54; CRR, 28 February 1995, Karroubi, 
see supra n. 36; CRR, 30 May 1995, Mokhtari, see supra n. 37; CRR, 20 Jmie 1995, Mehdi, ibid.; 
CRR, 12 December 1995, Diaf, ibid.; CRR, 12 December 1995, Hamitouche épouse D ia f ibid.; 
the CRR’s decision in Terahi, supra n. 52; the CRR’s decision in Elkebir, supra n. 56; the CRR’s 
decision in Khaldoun, supra n. 50; the CRR’s decision in Ali Bouaouina, supra n, 48; CRR, 6 
October 1997, Bouziani, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, 
Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat e t de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre 
d’information Contentieuse, 1997, at p. 48 and CRR, 13 February 1998, Djabouabdellah, in 
Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat 
et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre d’information Contentieuse, 1998, at p. 53.
^  See supra n. 39 for figures.
See, for instance. Conseil d’Etat, 22 November 1996, M. Messara, supra n. 29 and Conseil
d’Etat, 22 November 1996, Mme Messara, ibid.
CRR, 13 July 1994, Sahnoun, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des 
Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre 
d’information Contentieuse, 1994, at p. 114.
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although the protection granted by the Algerian authorities was not considered 
sufficiently effective, the CRR refused to consider that there was voluntary 
tolerance^ .^ It is argued that the notion of voluntary tolerance is interpreted in an 
excessively restrictive manner that seriously undermines refugee protection. The 
expression ‘Voluntarily tolerated” is actually quite revealing. Indeed, the term 
“tolerated” could have been used on its own without any fiirther specification. It 
appears that the Conseil d'Etat was unwilling to see situations where the State 
authorities are no longer in control to fall within the scope of the 1951 Convention. 
Such an approach goes against the object of the international system of refugee 
protection. Refugee status acts as a substitute for deficient or non-existent 
protection on the part of the State of nationality. Therefore, the implicit distinction 
between ‘Voluntary tolerance” and “involuntary tolerance” is not justified and is a 
source of discrimination between individuals being in comparable situations with 
regard to the persecution being alleged. The view taken is that for the concept of 
State tolerance to be compatible with the 1951 Convention, it must cover cases 
where the State is unable to provide protection regardless of the causes its failure.
The adverse effects of the concepts of persecution voluntarily tolerated or 
encouraged are aggravated by the fact that asylum seekers must show that they 
have requested State protection and have been refused protection. Furthermore, in 
some cases applicants were required to establish that protection had been denied on 
a systematic basis.
In Naas^^, the applicant, an English teacher of Algerian nationality, alleged 
persecution owing to his conversion to Catholicism. He was harassed by members
See also CRR, 13 December 1994, Rizi, in ibid., at p. 117; CRR, 30 June 1995, Zekri, in 
Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat 
et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre d’infonnation Contentieiise, Aimée 1995, 
at p. 109; CRR, 12 September 1995, Benahmed, in ibid., at p. 109; CRR, 11 April 1995, 
Redouane, supra n. 14 and CRR, 22 May 1995, Saidî, in ibid., at p. 110.
See supra n. 44.
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of his family, ostracised at work, confronted by the hostility of some of his pupils 
and under the surveillance of two individuals dressed in plain-clothes. Following his 
involvement in meetings of the Oran Evangelic group, the police compiled a file on 
him. He asked to be transferred to Oran University to study English. He was then 
assaulted twice by Islamic militants. He did not lodge a complaint as he feared that 
it would only make things worse. Following the town elections in 1990, he had no 
choice but to worship clandestinely. He was on several occasions insulted by youths 
of his neighbourhood. For the purpose of his University dissertation, he met up with 
the Rabbi of Oran and was subject to police surveillance as a result. From 1992, he 
received anonymous threats on the phone; he was accused of being pro-Zionist. 
Individuals he identified as being Islamic militants attempted to run him over. 
Having received a letter threatening him with death he decided to leave Algeria. He 
believed that he was unable to obtain protection from the Algerian authorities. 
Firstly, the CRR considered that the fact that the applicant was the object of a file 
and was under the surveillance of the authorities could not in itself amount to 
persecution in the sense of the 1951 Convention. Secondly, the CRR considered 
that the alleged acts of persecution could not be regarded as encouraged or 
voluntarily tolerated by the Algerian State authorities. In this respect, the CRR 
declared that the above mentioned circumstances did not justify the fact that the 
applicant did not approach the authorities for protection. In the CRR's opinion, the 
applicant had failed to establish that requests for protection would have been in 
vain^^
See also the CRR’s decision inAmeur, supra n. 44. The applicant, an Algerian national became 
a Christian. He was identified by the police as being acquainted with Christian groups. He was 
brutalised and threatened by members of his family who discovered his religious conversion as 
well as despised by his work colleagues. He approached the Bishop of Oran about his conversion 
to Catholicism. The ceremony was postponed owing to the general situation in Algeria. He 
received an anonymous letter threatening him with death. He then decided to leave his country. 
With regard to the notions of State autliorities' encouragement and voluntary tolerance, the CRR 
adopted the same reasoning as in Naas (see supra n. 44).
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In a few decisions^®, including the decision in Naas^^, failure to solicit State 
protection was held against applicants without the CRR having explored the reasons 
for the applicants’ attitude. It is argued that such an approach is inconsistent with 
Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention which expressly refers to the asylum 
claimant's unwillingness to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her 
country of nationality. It appears that the only circumstances in which the CRR 
recognised the applicant's incapacity to ask the State authorities for protection 
concerned Algerian nationals having close links with France^ .^ In these cases, the 
applicants were regarded as unable to ask protection as opposed to unwilling.
In some instances, the burden of proof imposed on asylum seekers was aggravated 
by the fact that the CRR required State protection to have been refused on a 
systematic basis. In Redouane^^, the CRR concluded that the Algerian authorities' 
incapacity to protect the applicant in an effective manner could not, in the absence 
of a systematic refusal to provide protection, be regarded as amounting to voluntary 
tolerance. This additional requirement constitutes a further violation of the 1951 
Convention. Firstly, it lacks legal basis. It is a concept unknown to the 1951 
Convention. Secondly, it is a source of unfairness and discrimination since it 
introduces distinctions based on the “periodicity” of the states’ refusals to grant 
protection. Fortunately, the notion of “systematic refusal” only appears in a handful
See, for instance, CRR, 19 June 1995, Sellami, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, 
Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des 
Réfugiés, Centre d’information Contentieuse, 1995, at p. 111 and CRR, 26 July 1995, Mme D, in 
ibid.
67 See supra n. 44.
See, for instance, the CRR’s decision in Dikous, supra n. 54 and CRR, 30 May 1995, Mokhtari, 
supra n. 37.
See supra n. 14.
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of CRR's^ *^  decisions and does not seem to have been endorsed by the Conseil 
d'Etat.
The requirements imposed by the French case-law regarding the identity of the 
perpetrator of persecution are in breach of the 1951 Convention as the latter does 
not require persecution to emanate directly or indirectly from State authorities. 
According to Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention, asylum seekers, in addition to 
establish a well-founded fear of persecution based on one or more Convention 
grounds, asylum seekers only need to show that they are unwilling or unable, owing 
to that fear, to avail themselves of the protection of the State of their nationality. By 
requiring individuals alleging non-State persecution to demonstrate that the 
persecution in question has been voluntarily tolerated or encouraged by the State, 
the French case-law unnecessarily and illegally restricts access to refugee status. 
The view taken, based on Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention, is that the 
identity of the perpetrator is irrelevant and that individuals persecuted by non-State 
entities should enjoy the same degree of protection as those persecuted by State 
agents. This position must be expressly endorsed by EC law.
1.2. The identity of the perpetrator: an irrelevant factor
For EC law to be in line with international refiigee law, its provisions must be 
consistent with the Convention definition of the term refugee. To ensure 
compliance, EC law must expressly mention that people who fear persecution 
emanating from non-State agents fall within the scope of the Convention provided 
that they satisfy the requirements of Article 1(A)(2). The express inclusion of non- 
State persecution within the definition of refugee at EC level is designed to prevent 
the development of restrictive concepts and interpretations detrimental to refijgee
Owing to the difficulties concerning access to the OFPRA's decisions, it is not possible to say 
whether or not the OFPRA uses the notion of “i^stematic refiisal”. However, since the relevant 
decisions of the CRR and the Conseil d'Etat are available, the comments made on the French case- 
law are reliable.
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protection as those developed in France. Compliance with the 1951 Convention in 
that respect requires EC law to depart from the position agreed in the Joint Position 
on the definition of the term refijgee.
However, before analysing the Joint Position, it is usefijl to examine the Canadian 
case-law resulting from the decision in Warcf^. The criteria for determining the 
relevance of the Canadian case-law are both quantitative and qualitative. Canada is 
a very large country that deals with a considerable number of applications for 
asylum. It is an important factor to take into consideration when contemplating the 
transfer of some of the Canadian solutions to the European scene. In terms of 
quality, the Canadian case-law on non-state persecution has proved to comply with 
the 1951 Convention as it fully embraces non-State persecution.
In Ward, the Supreme Court of Canada took the view that “[s]tate complicity in 
persecution [was] not a prerequisite to a valid refugee claim under the definition. 
Thus, the definition extend[ed] to situations in which the state is not an accomplice 
in persecution, but is unable to protect its citizens (...)”.
In Ward, the applicant was bom in Northern Ireland. He joined the Irish National 
Liberation Army (INLA) as a volunteer. Asked to execute hostages, he refused and 
helped them to escape. The police let slip to an INLA member that one of its 
members had assisted the hostages in their escape. The INLA suspected Ward who 
was tortured as a result. He escaped and sought police protection. The police 
charged him for his part in the hostage incident. His wife and children were taken 
hostage by the INLA. He was sentenced to three years in jail. Towards the end of 
his sentence. Ward sought the assistance of the prison chaplain. The latter, with the 
help of the police, obtained a Republic of Ireland passport for Ward and airline 
tickets to Canada where he applied for refiigee status. The Immigration Appeal 
Board concluded that the definition of the term refijgee did not necessarily
See Attorney-General o f  Canada and Ward, United Nations Commissioner fo r  Refugees and 
al.. Interveners, 30 June 1993 [1993] 2 SCR 689 (Supreme Court of Canada).
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contemplate State complicity, the State's inability to ensure effective protection 
being sufficient^ .^ Unlike the Board and subsequently the Supreme Court, the 
Federal Court of Appeal decided that State complicity was a necessary 
prerequisite^^. Urie J.A. based his reasoning on the meaning he attributed to the 
terms “unable” and “unwilling” contained in Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 
Convention; he made the following comments:
“If a claimant is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his country of 
nationality, it is implicit from that fact that his unwillingness stems from his belief 
that the State and its authorities, cannot protect him from those he fears will 
persecute him. That inability may arise because the state and its authorities are 
either themselves the direct persecutors of the feared acts of persecution, assist 
actively those who do them or simply turn a blind eye to the activities which the 
claimant fears. While there may well be other manifestations of it, these possibilities 
clearly demonstrate that for the claimant to be unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of his country of nationality, to provide the foundation for a claim to be a 
refijgee he must establish that the state cannot protect him from the persecution he 
fears arising, in this case, from his former membership in the INLA, i.e. he must 
establish that what he fears is in fact persecution as that term is statutorily and 
jurisprudentially understood. On that basis the involvement of the state is a sine qua 
non where unwillingness to avail himself of the protection is the fact.”
According to Urie J.A. the Board had confijsed the determination of persecution 
and effective protection. These are two distinct issues: once persecution within the 
meaning of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention is established, the availability of 
State protection must be determined. The identity of the persecutor should be taken 
into consideration where examining whether the applicant has a well-founded fear 
of persecution within the meaning of the Convention. Moreover, the applicant’s
Immigration Appeal Board {Ward) [1988] 9 Imm. L.R. (2d) 48.
Attorney General v. Ward [1990] 2 FC 667 (Federal Court of Appeal).
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unwillingness to approach the State authorities in order to obtain protection may 
not only be motivated by a fear of persecution. Asylum seekers may be aware of the 
fact that the State is unable to offer them the protection that they need. They may 
also fear reprisals if those persecuting them hear of their request for protection.
The Supreme Court took the same view as the Board and rejected State complicity 
as a necessary prerequisite to a successful asylum claim. It is interesting to note that 
the Supreme Court started by recalling the rationale underlying the international 
refiigee protection regime. This international regime is construed as a substitute for 
national protection and should apply where the State fails to provide its nationals 
with the needed protection regardless of the reasons for the State’s incapacity to 
fulfil its duties.
In Ward, the Attorney General’s legal reasoning differed fi"om that of the Supreme 
Court, although it achieved the same result. Indeed, while arguing that State 
complicity was a necessary prerequisite to a valid refugee claim, the Attorney 
General conceded that the state's inability to protect its nationals amounted to 
sufficient State complicity within the meaning of the 1951 Convention. It is argued 
that, although it allowed protection, the Attorney General’s reasoning was not 
satisfactory as it stretched the meaning of the term complicity. Moreover, the use of 
the notion of complicity in that context appeared unnecessary as it followed from 
the interpretation advocated by the Attorney General that the State’s failure to 
protect its nationals should amount to complicity for the purpose of refugee status. 
The position adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in that respect is considered 
preferable.
Although similar in its consequences, the Supreme Court's reasoning was different 
from that of the Attorney General as it was based on the irrelevance of State 
complicity. In the Court’s opinion, its position was supported by the history of the 
concept of refugee endorsed by academics '^  ^ and reflected in a growing number of
See, for, instance, Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1983) at p. 71-72, referred to in Ward, see supra n. 71.
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Canadian decisions. In Rajudeen^^, the Federal Court of Appeal seemed to consider 
that a State's inability to protect its nationals was a subset of State complicity. The 
Federal Court of Appeal's conception of state complicity is similar to the Attomey- 
General's in Ward^ .^ The reference to Rajudeen in support of its decision on State 
complicity demonstrated that the main concern of the Supreme Court was to 
prevent any systematic exclusion from the protection offered by refugee status of 
individuals whose country of origin was unable to offer effective protection. The 
Supreme Court of Canada came to the conclusion that “(...) persecution under the 
Convention include[d] situations where the state [was] not in strictness an 
accomplice to the persecution, but [was] simply unable to protect its citizens”. The 
United States case-law, referred to in Ward, takes the view that a well-founded fear 
of persecution owing to the actions of non-governmental agents where the State 
cannot or will not protect the applicant should fall within the scope of the refugee 
definition. In McMullen^^, the Court of Appeal declared that likelihood of 
persecution should be interpreted as including “(...) [p]ersecution by the 
government or by a group which the government is unable to control”. This 
principle was confirmed in a number of decisions^ .^
The position of the Canadian Supreme Court finds support in the UNHCR 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status. Indeed, 
Paragraph 65 of the UNHCR Handbook reads:
Rajudeen v. Minister o f  Employment and Immigration [1984] 55 NR 129.
Surujpal V. Minister o f  Employment and Immigration [1985] 60 NR 73 and Zalzali v. Canada 
{Minister o f  Employment and Immigration) [1991] 126 NR 126.
McMullen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 658 F2d. 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) at p. 1315.
SeQÂrtiaga Turciosv. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 829 F2d. 720 (9th Cir. 1987), at 
p. 723; Artega  v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 836 F2d. 1227 (9th Cir. 1988) at p. 
1231 and Estrada-Posadas v. Immigratin and Naturalization Service, 924 F. 2d. 916 (9th Cir. 
1991) at p. 919.
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“Persecution is normally related to action by the authorities of a country. It may 
also emanate from sections of the population that do not respect the standards 
established by the laws of the country concerned. A case in point may be religious 
intolerance, amounting to persecution, in a country otherwise secular, but where 
sizeable factions of the population do not respect the religious beliefs of their 
neighbours. Where serious discriminatory or other offensive acts are committed by 
the local populace, they can be considered as persecution if they are knowingly 
tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer 
effective protection.”
UNHCR clearly extends the scope of refugee status to cases where the State is 
unable to protect its nationals. Where persecution is established, the critical issue is 
to determine whether effective State protection is available and not whether 
persecution emanates from State authorities or has been “voluntarily” or 
“knowingly” tolerated by them. This pressing need to provide international 
protection to those who face non-State persecution in accordance with Article 
1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention was reiterated in an UNHCR information Note of 
March 1995 addressed to the EU Member States. UNHCR stressed that 
“[p]ersecution that d[id] not involve state complicity [was] still, nonetheless, 
persecution”. The Note reminded the Member States the need to interpret the 
Convention in good faith according to the same “spirit of generosity which ha[d] 
characterised its drafting”. It also stressed that the 1951 Convention was a treaty in 
the sense of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and, therefore, should 
be interpreted in good faith and in the light of its object and purpose. Moreover, as 
noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Warc^ ,^ “[t]he international community 
was meant to be a forum of second resort for the persecuted, a surrogate, 
approachable upon failure of local protection. The rationale upon which 
international refugee law rests is not simply the need to give shelter to those
Attorney-General o f  Canada and Ward, United Nations Commissioner fo r  Refugees and a l, 
Interveners, supra n. 71 at p. 739.
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persecuted by the state but, more widely, to provide refuge to those whose home 
state cannot or does not afford them protection from persecution.” In Ward, 
reference was also made to humanitarian tradition as an element to be taken into 
consideration in answering the questions addressed to the Court. As a member of 
the international community committed to the protection of human rights whose 
Member States are all signatories of the 1951 Convention, the EC has a moral and 
legal duty to offer protection to those in need according to the Convention 
provisions. This includes protection from non-State protection where the national 
State is unable to offer effective protection. With this in mind, it is argued that EC 
law should expressly provide that the identity of the perpetrator is an irrelevant 
factor when determining whether an asylum seeker falls within the scope of Article 
1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention.
It is argued that the EU approach to the concept of refugee status has been a source 
of serious concern which needs to be addressed and redressed by EC law.
The Joint Position on the definition of the term refugee agreed by the Member 
States reflects the restrictive nature of the asylum policy developed in the EU and 
many of its Member States. Indeed, the Joint Position narrows down the personal 
scope of the term refugee by restricting access to refiigee status in cases of non- 
State persecution. In that respect, the Joint Position appears to endorse the French 
position. Indeed, Section 5(2) on persecution by third parties provides that 
“[p]ersecution by third parties will be considered to fall within the scope of the 
Geneva Convention where it is based on one of the grounds in Article 1 (A)(2) of 
that Convention, is individual in nature and is encouraged or permitted by the 
authorities (...).” Section 5(2) further provides that “[w]here the official authorities 
fail to act, such persecution should give rise to individual examination of each 
application for refugee status, in accordance with national judicial practice, in the 
light in particular of whether or not the failure to act was deliberate” Section 5(2) 
excludes failures to protect which are not deliberate as they will not be considered 
as being “encouraged” or “permitted” by the State authorities. Section 5(2) 
subsequently states that “[t]he persons concerned may be eligible in any event for
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appropriate forms of protection under national law.” This “safety-net” is not judged 
sufficient as there is no indication as to the availability, nature and effectiveness of 
national alternate modes of protection^®.
As in the French case-law, refugee status in cases of non-State persecution is 
conditional on the applicant proving State complicity which is construed in a 
twofold manner. Both the French case-law and the Joint Position refer to 
persecution “tolerated” by the State. However, they differ in that French decisions 
refer to persecution “voluntarily tolerated” by the State while the Joint Position 
refers to “permitted” persecution. However, the differences in the terminology must 
not be artificially emphasised. The view taken is that both expressions cover similar 
circumstances. Persecution voluntarily tolerated by the State authorities can be 
regarded as actually permitted by the State authorities. Most importantly, both 
expressions result in denying refiigee status to those whose State is unable, but not 
necessarily unwilling, to offer them protection. One may inferred from the wording 
of the Joint Position in relation to non-State persecution that it must have been 
influenced by the French case-law which served the restrictive nature of the EU 
asylum policy.
It is argued that Section 5(2) of the Joint Position is inconsistent with Article 
1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention. Reference to the UNHCR Handbook in the Joint 
Position did not prevent the Member States from disregarding its recommendations. 
The UNHCR Handbook suffers from a lack of binding effect. However, binding 
effect in itself would not have secured compliance. Indeed, although the 1951
There has been a tendency to develop other “forms of protection” in lieu o f refiigee status, 
which are often based on the concept of temporary protection and do not offer the guarantees of 
fiill refugee status. These statuses distinguish between difierent categories of refugees with regard 
to the dvu-ation of the protection granted, the rights attached to the statuses and the procedures to 
obtain protection. (See on this issue Christopher Hem, “Protection temporaire et définition 
complémentaire du réfugié”, France Terre d'Asile, La Lettre, Le Droit d'Asile au regard de la 
Crise Yougoslave - Protection Temporaire et Statut de Réfugié, 23ème Assemblée Générale de 
France Terre d'Asile, 15 May 1993, lettre N. 87 -September 1993, at p. 10-15).
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Convention is legally binding upon the Member States, interpretations and practices 
incompatible with its provisions have been adopted throughout the EC^\
It is argued that EC law should put an end to interpretations of the term refijgee 
incompatible with the Convention definition which jeopardise access to international 
protection in cases of non-State persecution. Article 63(l)(c) of Title IV on visas, 
asylum, immigration and other policies related to firee movement of persons which 
provides for the adoption of minimum standards with respect to the qualification of 
nationals of third countries as refugees could constitute the legal basis for the 
adoption of EC provisions compatible with the 1951 Convention in that respect. If 
the EC were to endorse the position on non-State protection enshrined in the Joint 
Position, the EC would condone violations of an international instrument legally 
binding upon its Member States. EC law should clearly state that the identity of the 
perpetrator should not be taken into consideration when determining whether an 
asylum seeker is entitled to refugee statues. So long as the applicant demonstrates 
that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution, he or she should not be 
required to establish some degree of State involvement. In that respect, one could 
refer to the English case-law which, once persecution has been established, refers to 
the State’s inability or unwillingness to protect^ .^
These inconsistencies are examined, in the course of tlie thesis.
See the decision of the Court of Appeal of 2 December 1999, in Milan Horvath v Secretary o f  
State for the Home Departtnent, supra n. 26. The appellant was unsuccessful in that case because 
it was the State’s inability to offer protection which had turned acts committed by non-State agents 
into acts of persecution. In the Tribunal’s opinion confirmed by the Court of Appeal, ill-treatment 
by non-State agents, in this case skinheads, alone was not persecution. This decision was 
confirmed by the House of Lords in a decision of 6 July 2000 (supra n. 26). The House of lords 
stressed that two distinct tests had to be satisfied. Firstly, the applicant had to prove that the ill- 
treatment amounted to persecution and, secondly, that State protection was imavailabie, the 
country of origin being unable or unwilling to provide the protection in question. The House of 
Lord emphasised the fact that the obligation to afford refiigee status arose only if  the applicants’ 
country of origin was unable or unwilling to fulfil the duty it owed to its nationals in relation to 
protection.
122
An EC legislation in line with international refiigee law commands an endorsement 
of the concept of refiigee as defined in the 1951 Convention and an 
acknowledgement of the changes that have taken place in the refugee population. 
With regard to non-State persecution, this can be achieved by “simply” 
implementing the Convention definition as Article 1(A)(2) does not impose any 
requirements as to the identity of the perpetrator. There is no legal ground for 
limiting entitlement to refugee status in cases of non-State persecution. However, 
the situation is more complex with regard to gender-based persecution as the 1951 
Convention does not expressly refer to this type of persecution.
2. Gender-based persecution
The focus on gender-based persecution is not the result of an arbitrary choice, but is 
dictated by the current refiigee situation world-wide. It is argued that disregarding 
gender issues while examining asylum seeker matters would be an unacceptable 
omission considering the high proportion of female refugees and the specificity of 
the persecution they are fleeing. Refugee women and their dependants constitute 
approximately 80% of the world refugee population^ .^ The vast majority of these 
women^  ^ are to be found in refugee camps and are often referred to as displaced 
people. Only a small percentage of these women will actually apply for refugee 
status in the EU territory, mainly because of insurmountable difficulties in leaving 
their country of origin and reaching the territory of the EU. Besides they might not 
be willing to leave their home State.
Isabelle Daoust and Kristina Folkelius, “Developments - UNHCR Symposium on gender-based 
persecution”, URL, Vol. 8 No. 1/2 (1996) 181-183, at p. 180.
The great majority of displaced people are young girls, elderly widows, single mothers and 
children. The husbands and fathers are often dead or taken prisoner or drafted as combatants 
(Women, UNHCR Issues, http: //www.unhcr.cli/ issues/ women/ women htm).
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The traditional assumption that the typical refugee is a male political dissident has 
resulted in little recognition being given to gender issues in asylum matters. As 
observed by Wallace, “[t]he relative immobility of ivomen is reflected in the 
essential male interpretation of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, as they 
have been applied on the experiences of men.”®^ The case-law is mainly based upon 
male refugees’ experiences and female-specific experiences, such as genital 
mutilation and stoning have been routinely ignored by asylum laws. The specificity 
of the persecution endured by women was formally acknowledged in Conclusion 
No. 73 of the UNHCR Executive Committee which recommends that States should 
develop “appropriate guidelines on women asylum-seekers, in recognition of the 
fact that women often experience persecution differently from refugee men”^^ . 
Besides, UNHCR has prepared Guidelines on the Protection o f Refugee Wometf 
aimed at identifying the specific protection issues relating to female refugees.
Women alleging gender-based persecution are too often denied refugee status on 
the ground that this type of persecution falls outside the scope of the 1951 
Convention. Indeed, the Convention grounds for refugee status do not comprise 
gender. However, the Canadian case-law demonstrates that gender-based 
persecution may be covered by the Convention definition through membership of a 
particular social group. Indeed, flexible by nature, this Convention ground has the 
potential to cover situations that could not be foreseen at the time of the 
Convention was drafted. However, this potential may be undermined through 
restrictive interpretations as shown by the French case-law.
Rebecca M. Wallace, “Considerations for asyluin officers adjudicating asylum claims from 
women: American guidelines”. Immigration and Nationality Law and Practice, Vol. 9 No. 4
(1995), 116-120, at p. 116.
Referred to in Isabelle Daoust and Kristina Folkelius, supra n. 83, at p. 180.
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Sub-Coimnittee of the Whole on 
International Protection, Information Note on UNHCR’s Guidelines on the Protection o f  Refugee 
Women, EC/SCP/67, 22 July 1991.
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The purpose of this section is to identify the specific problems raised by gender- 
based persecution and to determine to what extent the Convention definition may 
extend to this type of persecution through membership of a particular social group. 
It is argued that EC law should ensure that women having a well-founded fear of 
persecution, who cannot avail themselves of the protection of their State of 
nationality, are entitled to refugee status.
2.1. Identification of the problems raised by gender-based persecution as a 
ground for refugee status
Like any male asylum seeker, women may base their claim for refugee status on any 
of the Convention grounds. However, where alleging gender-based persecution, 
women face two types of obstacles. Firstly, there is a certain reluctance to recognise 
that, in certain circumstances, gender-based violence may amount to persecution for 
the purpose of refugee status. Secondly, women fleeing gender-based persecution 
do not easily fit within the scope of the 1951 Convention as the Convention 
grounds do not include gender. In the absence of a gender category, “membership 
of a particular social group” is the sole ground upon which women alleging gender- 
based persecution can rely to seek refugee status.
Women who have suffered gender-based violence in the hands of State 
representatives or members of the military have encountered tremendous difficulties 
in obtaining protection from their State of nationality. Women also face hurdles in 
their quest for State protection where violence against women is socially accepted 
and regarded as the norm.
In a number of countries, where sexual and physical assaults are committed by 
members of the military or other State representatives, it is difficult or impossible 
for the victim to report any assault to the authorities, sue her aggressor(s) and thus 
obtain State protection. For instance, as reported by Amnesty International, sexual 
assault by members of the military are widespread in Peru; however, there are no
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published convictions of the crimes in question. This will come as no surprise as 
officials of the Peruvian Government have said that these crimes could not be 
avoided and were actually “natural” where soldiers were stationed in rural areas®^ . 
Furthermore, women’s position in these circumstances may be aggravated by the 
social and cultural context. For instance, where a husband’s victim learns about his 
wife’s rape, he may repudiate or kill her to avoid the shame and cultural stigma 
attached to rape* .^ The State may tolerate such acts as being part of social, cultural 
or religious traditions. Women’s difficulties in seeking State protection are not 
confined to cases where the aggressor is related to the State. Gender-based 
violence, and in particular domestic violence, may be socially acceptable. In such 
cases, the State may tolerate or be unable to effectively protect women. In the 
worse cases, the State will encourage gender-based violence where women are 
deemed to have transgressed social norms^ ®. It is not enough for a State to officially 
proclaim that violence against women will not be tolerated and pass laws designated 
to protect them. The system of protection provided by the State has to be effective. 
Unfortunately governments often fail to adopt and enforce such laws, tolerating and 
passively encouraging and therefore legitimising the abuse of women. Bunch has 
identified four reasons for governments’ failure to enforce laws protecting women: 
1) sexual discrimination is seen as trivial; 2) the abuse of women is seen as a 
cultural, private, or individual issue; 3) women’s rights are not seen as human 
rights; and 4) the problems are seen as too pervasive to be conftonted^\
88 Amnesty International, “Women in the front line: violations against women”, 5 (1990).
^  Susan F. Martin, Refugee Women 16 (1992) referred to in Todd Stewart Schenk, “ A  proposal 
to improve the treatment of women in asylmn law: adding a “gender” category to the international 
definition of “refiigee”, Global Legal Studies Journal II (1995) 
http://www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/vol2/schenk.html
This is for instance tlie case in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime.
Charlotte Bunch, “Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Towards a Revision o f Human Rights”, 
12 Hmnan Rights Quarterly [1990] 486, at p. 488; referred to in Todd Stewart Schenk, supra n. 
89.
126
It is argued that where the State fails to protect women against gender-based 
violence, that violence may amount to persecution. Indeed, as already noted, 
persecution and fear of persecution, on the one hand, and the absence of effective 
State protection, on the other hand, are interrelated for the purpose of refugee 
status. Moreover, the way gender-based violence manifests itself may fall within the 
meaning of persecution which covers deprivation of life or physical freedom as well 
as restrictions^ .^
In the absence of State protection, some women have sought international 
protection with little success. In that respect, women face a double hurdle. Firstly, 
gender-based violence tends to be conceived as private acts and thus falls outside 
the meaning of persecution. Secondly, even where women succeed in overcoming 
the first obstacle, they may still be refused refugee status on the ground that the 
Convention does not include gender as a ground for persecution.
Violent acts against women owing to their gender are generally perceived as private 
random acts of violence. Indeed, gender-based violence is generally regarded as 
resulting from private actions committed by individuals for personal motives. Thus, 
the violence in question is not considered as involving the State. This means that a 
connection cannot be established between gender-based violence and the State’s 
failure to provide adequate protection. Thus, acts of gender-based violence are 
excluded from the scope of the 1951 Convention as they do not fall within the 
meaning of persecution. Indeed, persecution supposes a State’s failure to provide 
effective protection. For instance, on the basis of its purely private nature, domestic 
violence or rape are often perceived as being outside the scope of the protection 
offered by the 1951 Convention. However, it is argued that gender-based violence 
may lose its private nature where the State plays an active or passive part in its 
occurrence. For instance, the rapes and sexual assaults inflicted upon Bosnian 
women by members of the Serbian military with the assent and encouragement of
92 See the introduction, chapter I.
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the Serbian authorities cannot be regarded solely as private acts. Whilst it is 
recognised that States cannot totally eradicate gender-based violence, they must 
provide adequate protection. Therefore, gender-based violence must not be 
systematically excluded from the scope of persecution for the purpose of refugee 
status.
It is argued that due consideration should be given to the political and social 
context, the main concern being the availability of effective protection provided 
within the State concerned for women in need. While women may be exposed to the 
same type of violence^ ,^ their position regarding Convention protection should 
differ considerably depending upon the availability and effectiveness of State 
protection. This reasoning should apply to any kind of physical or sexual abuse that 
is gender-related. In countries where women are traditionally regarded as holding an 
inferior position in society, acts of violence against them are usually common place 
and accepted by the majority of the population. Women are still exposed to 
inhumane or degrading treatment and even torture. The imposition of extremely 
strict social norms whose transgression is heavily punished and can result in them 
facing death. In Algeria, the life of women who refuse to comply with dress codes 
and behaviours imposed by groups of fundamentalist Muslims is at risk. In Pakistan, 
a woman accused of adultery can be stoned to death^ "^ .
Where women are successful in establishing the existence of well-founded fear of 
persecution, they are confronted by a further obstacle. For someone to be granted 
refugee status, he or she must demonstrate that her well-founded fear of 
persecution is based on at least one of the Convention grounds; as already 
observed, gender is not one of these grounds.
93 This for instance the case with regard to domestic violence.
See R. V Immigration Appeal Tribunal and the Secretary o f  State, ex parte Syeda Khatoon Shah
[1996] LTL 26/10/1996 and The Guardian, 26 October 1996, at p. 5.
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In the absence of a gender category, female asylum seekers who allege that they 
have a well-founded fear of persecution owing to their gender will have to establish 
that they belong to a particular social group^\ An argument against the recognition 
of gender-based persecution as a self-standing ground for the purpose of refugee 
status lies with the fact that asylum legislation should be gender neutral. This means 
that asylum seekers should be treated equally under the law irrespective of their 
gender. However, this view ignores the fact that female asylum seekers may often 
experience situations that differ from that of men’s. The principles of equality and 
non-discrimination can only apply where individuals are in the same situation. The 
neutral character of asylum procedures may be detrimental to women refugees’ 
interests since they do not take into account their special needs. As reported by 
Daoust and Folkelius, “[f]eminist commentators argue that in order to achieve 
substantive equality one must move beyond formal legalism and adopt policies that 
will make a practical difference for groups which have been traditionally subjected 
to discriminatory measures.
If EC law is to fully comply with international standards, it must secure that women 
fleeing persecution owing to their gender who cannot avail themselves of the 
protection of their State of nationality are entitled to refugee status. While the 
addition of a gender category to the Convention definition may appear as being the 
most direct and thus the most effective method, one must acknowledge the fact that 
it is likely to be an “unpopular” move amongst Member States. However, the 
Member States’ expected opposition to the introduction of a sixth ground, i.e. 
gender, cannot justify the EC “turning its back” on these women. Hence, if refugee 
status cannot be secured through the introduction of an additional ground, the 
Convention definition of the term refiigee must be construed in a manner that allows 
protection fi*om gender-based persecution. The only ground that may be used for
95 This issue is examined in section 2.2. of the chapter.
See, for example, Greatbatch, J., “The gender difference: feminist critiques of refugee 
discourse”, URL (1989) 525, referred to in Daoust and Folkelius, supra n. 83, at p. 183.
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that purpose is “membership of a particular social group” It is argued that EC law 
must ensure that this ground is interpreted as to cover gender-based persecution.
2.2. Women as members of a particular social group
In the absence of a gender category in Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention, the 
protection of women victims of gender-based persecution depends upon the way 
the concept of particular social group is construed. As already observed, unlike the 
other Convention grounds, membership of a particular social group is characterised 
by its generality and, therefore, its potential to embrace a greater number of 
situations. However, its general nature also constitutes its main disadvantage. The 
case-law on the concept of membership of a particular social group is not consistent 
and various interpretations have been adopted.
The ability of membership of a particular social group to cover a wider range of 
situations is contingent upon the way it is construed. The English case-law on the 
concept of particular social group is examined to that end. It is argued that this 
Convention ground has the potential to cover gender-based persecution provided 
that it is not interpreted in an excessively restrictive manner and that this extension 
of the scope of refugee status is in line with the spirit and purpose of the 1951 
Convention. In that respect, the Canadian case-law provides a good illustration of 
the propensity of membership of a particular social group to cover needs for 
international protection that may not have been foreseen at the time the Convention 
was drafted, in this instance gender-based persecution. The English case-law seems 
to move towards that direction. However, the flexibility of that Convention ground 
which allows it to extend refugee status to new situations, such as gender-based 
persecution, is also its main weakness as shown in the French case-law on women 
as a particular social group. Hence, if women are to be protected against gender- 
based protection, it is imperative that restrictive interpretations of membership of a 
particular social group are prevented. It is argued that with the 
“communautarisation” of asylum matters, this has become an issue for EC law.
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2.2.1. Membership of a particular social group: a flexible concept
The 1951 Convention does not give any guidelines as to what is meant by 
membership of a particular social group. This issue is therefore left to the States’ 
discretion. This situation has two main disadvantages both detrimental to refugee 
protection. Firstly, in the absence of any binding instrument advocating an 
interpretation in line with the needs of today’s asylum seekers^ ,^ restrictive 
interpretations of the words particular social group may significantly reduce the 
scope of the Convention definition of the term refugee. Secondly, where there is no 
authoritative ruling on the matter, national courts will often resort to various tests in 
order to determine whether an individual can be considered a member of a 
particular social group, thus undermining legal certainty. As argued in section 3, 
these issues must be addressed by EC law.
English courts were, for the first time, confronted with definitional issues arising 
from the concept of membership of a particular social group, and to be more precise 
the words “particular social group”, in Otchere^ .^ The adjudicator came to the 
conclusion that the claimant, owing to his former membership of the Military 
Intelligence Unit, was facing a greater risk than average of being re-arrested and 
persecuted if returned to his country of origin. As regards the Convention grounds 
for persecution, the adjudicator held that persecution for reasons of race, religion or 
nationality were to be discarded, leaving two possible grounds i.e. membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion. Having closely examined the matter, the 
adjudicator declared that membership of a particular social group was the only 
appropriate ground for persecution. It is interesting to note that the adjudicator 
stressed the difficulties that he encountered in determining the appropriate ground
For instance, the needs o f women who have a well-founded fear o f persecution owing to their 
gender.
^  Secretary o f  State fo r the Home Department v Patrick Kwame Otchere and the UNHCR [1988] 
Imm AR21.
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for persecution in that case. He expressly referred to the UNHCR Handbook on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugees Status which reads:
“77. A “particular social group” normally comprises persons of similar background, 
habits or social status. A claim to fear of persecution under this heading may 
frequently overlap with the claim to fear of persecution on other grounds, i.e. race, 
religion or nationality.
78. Membership of such a particular social group may be at the root of persecution 
because there is no confidence in the group's loyalty to the government or because 
the outlook, antecedents or economic activity of its members, or the very existence 
of a social group as such, is held to be an obstacle to the government's policies.
79. Mere membership of a particular social group will not normally be enough to 
substantiate a claim to refugee status. There may, however, be special 
circumstances where mere membership can be sufficient ground to fear 
persecution.”
On the basis of the evidence put before him, including an Amnesty International 
letter, the adjudicator came to the conclusion that the claimant was a member of a 
particular social group, i.e. the Military Intelligence in the Ghanaian army and had a 
well-founded fear of persecution owing to this membership.
The Home Office appealed, inter alia, on the ground that membership of the 
Military Intelligence Unit of the Ghanaian Army did not constitute a social group in 
the sense of the 1951 Convention. Referring also to paragraphs 77, 78 and 79 of the 
UNHCR's Handbook, the Home Secretary argued that the individuals comprised in 
paragraph 77 did not include members of a “professional” or “occupational” group. 
Therefore, members of the Military Intelligence could not constitute a particular 
social group for the purpose of the 1951 Convention. This interpretation was 
contested by Miss Kahn who represented UNHCR and expressed its views on the 
question. According to UNHCR, “(...) the phrase “particular social group” had been
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added to the Convention in 1951 and had been deliberately left vague so that it 
could be a “catch-all” provision which could be interpreted by countries as 
necessary to fit any particular case.”^^  Reference was made by Miss Khan to the US 
decision in Acostd^^ as useful persuasive value; in that decision, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals in the United States held:
“We interpret the phrase “persecution on account of membership in a particular 
social group” to mean persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a 
member of a group of persons all of who share a common, immutable characteristic. 
The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, colour, or kinship ties, 
or in some circumstances it might be shared past experience such as former military 
leadership or land ownership. The particular kind of characteristic that will qualify 
under this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, 
whatever the characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the members 
of the group cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is 
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”
According to UNHCR, a number of criteria must be taken into consideration where 
determining the existence of a particular social group:
“1. The group must be distinct as an identity within the broader society and 
definable by characteristics shared by its members.
2. Common characteristics or uniting factors could be various - ethnic, cultural or 
linguistic, or educational; they could include family background, economic activity, 
shared experiences, or shared values, outlook or aspirations.
3. The attitude of other members of society to the group. ,101
See the decision in Otchere, supra n. 98.
Re Acosta-Solorzano, Int. Dec. 2986, 1 March 1985.
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In Otchere, although the appellant (the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department) advocated a more restrictive interpretation of the concept of 
“particular social group” than the respondent and the UNHCR, they all agree that 
the characteristics of a particular social group should exist independently of 
persecution. However, the characteristics in question must play a significant role in 
the persecution. The persecution must be feared or exist on account of the 
characteristics. According to the Tribunal, it would not be helpful to define the 
words “particular social group” in too much detail as the phrase had deliberately 
been left “vague” ®^^. The respondent was granted twelve months leave. The 
Tribunal recognised that there was a real possibility for the respondent to be 
persecuted if returned to Ghana and that his fear was well-founded. However, the 
tribunal managed to avoid the definitional issues raised in this case. The only 
definitional element present in Otchere is the exclusion of persecution as a 
characteristic of a particular social group; this is not a contentious issue. The 
emphasis on the “vague” nature of the terms “particular social group” is consistent 
with the purpose of that Convention ground which is to cover a wider range of 
situations that may not have been foreseen at the time the Convention was drafted 
However, the decision in Otchere could not secure the adequacy of future 
interpretations of the phrase “particular social group” as it did not give any 
guidelines in that respect and, in any case, did not constitute an authoritative ruling. 
Subsequent case-law on this issue was characterised by its lack of consistency.
This absence of consistency is particularly obvious in the case-law regarding 
homosexuals as a potential particular social group. In Shewaish^^ ,^ an Iranian 
national raised the question of his homosexuality only when applying for leave to 
appeal to the Tribunal and the point was dismissed in a sentence. In Binbasi^ *^ ,^ the
See Otchere, supra n. 98.
103 lAT Shewaish [1988].
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applicant argued that homosexuals could constitute a particular social group in the 
sense of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention. To support his view, he mentioned 
paragraph 77 of the UNHCR Handbook and the decision in Otchere where the 
Tribunal was told in the course of arguments that some jurisdictions had widely 
construed the concept of “particular social group” ®^^. The decision in Acosta was 
cited as an example of such broad interpretations. In the applicant's view, 
homosexuals formed a particular social group as defined in Acosta. In paragraph 9 
of his affidavit, the applicant affirmed that “[w]e [i.e. the homosexual community] 
are a social group; we have certain sexual and physical characteristics which we 
cannot change, we live together in a sexual relationship, unlike other men, we share 
our finances and domestic arrangements and plan our futures like married couples, 
we congregate socially at places where other homosexuals are to be found, we 
recognise and find comfort in socialising with each other, and we are identified by 
society at large as a group, to which epithets can be attached by way of 
identification, some of which such as Gay, are neutral, others, such as Queer or 
Poof are derogatory.”*®® The respondent, i.e. the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, disagreed with the appellant's conception of the notion of “particular 
social group”. In his opinion, the only common characteristic of homosexuals as a 
group was their sexual preference which, if it was at all revealed, was normally only 
revealed in private and concluded that “[a] group [could not] be a social group if its 
only common characteristic [was] so concealed.”*®^ Although the Secretary of State 
recognised that such a narrow approach may exclude individuals victim of 
oppression in their country of origin, it was submitted that any wider interpretation 
would be detrimental to the effectiveness of that Convention ground. Commenting 
on references to jurisdictions having applied broader interpretations, in particular
*®'7? V Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Departtttent ex parte Zia Mehmet Binbasi [1989] Imm AR 
595.
*®® See, for instance, tlie Canadian decision in Ward, supra n. 71.
*®® See supra n. 98.
*® '/W .
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the US decision in Acosta, the Secretary of State made it clear that there was no 
reason to adopt the same approach. The Secretary of State added that if the drafters 
of the 1951 Convention “(■ • •) had intended anyone who had a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted to be able to claim the status of a refugee, they could easily have 
said so.”’°® This statement contradicts the view expressed by UNHCR that 
advocates a liberal interpretation consistent with international standards regarding 
refugee protection.
It is argued that the Secretary of State's interpretation deprived that ground of its 
“catch-all” nature and thus undermined its ability to extend the scope of refiigee 
status. Moreover, the argument based on the intention of the Convention drafters is 
rather weak as there is no element in the Convention itself or in the travaux 
préparatoires supporting a narrow interpretation of the phrase “particular social 
group”. As noted in Otchere, the expression “particular social group” was intended 
to be ‘Vague” ®^^ Because of its “vagueness”, the concept of membership of a 
particular social group is flexible enough to cover grounds for persecution that were 
not contemplated by the drafters of the Convention. In Binbasi^^^, the judge did not 
rule on definitional issues as he considered that it was unnecessary for the Secretary 
of State to decide whether homosexuals constituted a particular social group for the 
purpose of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention. In his opinion, there was clearly 
no discrimination against homosexuals who were not active in Cyprus. In his view, 
the recognition of the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution owing to 
homosexuality in Cyprus would require the relevant particular social group to be 
restricted to active homosexuals.
Ibid.
Abid.
See supra n. 104.
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In Golchin^^\ the definitional issues arising fi'om the concept of “particular social 
group” were for the first time expressly tackled. Unfortunately, the Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal (lAT) opted for a rather narrow test in deciding whether 
homosexuals constituted a particular social group. The Tribunal stated that “[tjhere 
should be some historical element in a social group which predetermines 
membership of it “capable of affiliating succeeding generations”: it is not enough, in 
our view for association to arise by way of inclination. Nor has the Tribunal held in 
Ahari can a social group be created merely by identifying the distinguishing 
characteristics of a set.”“  ^ This definition is particularly restrictive as it tends to 
confine particular social groups to racial, political or religious groups and overlap 
with other Convention grounds, thus curtailing its effectiveness. Considering the 
nature of the test applied in Golchin, it is not surprising that the lAT concluded that 
homosexuals did not constitute a particular social group within the meaning of 
Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention.
A broader test"^ was applied with respect to homosexuals in Vraciu, a case decided 
in November 1994“"^, However, broader views were expressed earlier regarding
111 lAT Golchin 7623 [1991].
I AT Ahari 7333 [1990]. An appeal was lodged by an Iranian doctor forced to work in 
contravention o f medical ethics. The Tribunal, Chairman Mr Maddison decided that in this 
particular case the relevant social group should be “Iranian trained medical practitioners working 
in Iran whose duties were incompatible with the principles of the Tokyo Convention”. As a result 
of the narrow test applied, the tribunal considered that this was stretching the concept of social 
group too far and referred to the decision in Otchere (supra n. 98) as a support for its more 
restrictive approach.
Since 1992, Canada recognises homosexuals as constituting a particular social group of refugee 
status purposes (see Todd Thomas Schenk, supra n. 89, at p. 28, referring to Jacqueline Bhabba 
and Geoffrey Coll eds., Asylum Law & Practice in Europe and North America: A Comparative 
Analysis by Leading Experts, 1992).
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other categories of individuals” .^ In Vraciu, the claimant alleged that he had a well- 
founded fear of persecution in his country of origin, Romania, owing to his 
homosexuality. The lAT referred to the decision of the US Board of Immigration 
Appeals in Acostà^"^ in which the terms “membership of a particular social group” 
were said to be read eiusdem generis with the other four categories. Hence, the 
general character of the words membership of a particular social group as opposed 
to the specificity of the other Convention grounds should be acknowledged when 
interpreting that Convention ground. Referring to the English case-law on the issue 
of homosexuals as a particular social group, the lAT considered that the reasoning 
in Golchin that, in its opinion, consisted in equating a social group with a minority 
group sharing historical and cultural characteristics was wrong. Referring to the test 
in Acosta, the lAT emphasised that an “immutable characteristic [could not] be 
within the Convention scope unless the persecution flew fi*om “membership” of the 
group because of that immutable characteristic. It remains for the applicant to show 
both the persecution and the link””\  Applying this reasoning in Vraciu, the I AT 
concluded that homosexuals, at least in Romania, could be regarded as constituting 
a “particular social group” in the sense of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention.
lAT Vraciu (11559) [1994], commented in Nicholas Bamforth, “Protected Social Groups, the 
Refugee Convention and judicial review: the Vraciu case”, Public Law Review (1995) 382-385.
For instance, in SamiuUah (lAT (9339) [1992]), the Immigration Appeal Tribunal held that 
“social group must identify and unite a common characteristic of the members which they share 
for reasons connected with liistory, geography, language, religion and so on. Of particular 
importance is the answer to the question whether other people consider these people to be a 
member of a social group”. On this basis, the appellant, a member o f an association of medical 
students representing Punjabi Muslims settled in Sind, succeeded. In Duarte (IAT (10113) 
[1993]), although it concluded that the appellant was not a member of a social group, the Tribunal 
contemplated a wider test than in. Ahari (supra n. 112) and Golchin (supra n. 111). The Tribunal 
considered that a social group is “usually, but not exclusively one identified by ethnic, linguistic, 
religious, or cultural characteristics, which constitutes a minority within a particular society and 
are regarded with hostility by government or the majorify of the population on those grounds”.
U6 See supra n. 100.
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The Tribunal considered that homosexuality amounted to an “immutable 
characteristic” and that homosexuals could be regarded as a particular social group 
on that basis, and that the appellant had successfully established the link between his 
membership of that group and his fear of persecution.
While the decision in Vraciu is to be welcome in its attempt to broaden the concept 
of “membership of a particular social group”, the use of the notion of “immutable 
characteristic”, as observed by Bamforth^ is a source of concern. The notion of 
“immutable characteristic” itself raises a number of definitional but also sociological 
and philosophical questions that can prove to be troublesome regarding certain 
categories of people” .^ For instance, if the “immutable characteristic” test is to be 
applied on a systematic basis, homosexuals will only be regarded as a particular 
social group if homosexuality is considered an immutable characteristic.
The broader approach adopted in Vraciu was soon to be questioned^In a case 
decided the day after, a Tribunal constituted differently from the one in Vraciu took 
the view that Golchin had been wrongly decided and that homosexuals did not form 
a particular social group for the purpose of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention. 
These cases illustrate the difficulties in defining what are the criteria that a group of 
people must meet in order to be considered a particular social group. The only non- 
contentious element lies with the fact that persecution is not an identifying factor.
The English case-law on homosexuals as a particular social group provides a good 
example of the pitfalls inherent in that Convention ground in the absence of an
Bamforth, see supra n. 114, at p. 384.
118 Ibid.
For instance, problems could appear with respect to sexual orientation. Can homosexuality be 
considered an “immutable characteristic”? This question raises issues tliat go far beyond the scope 
of asylum.
lA i: Jacques (11580) [1994].
139
authoritative ruling or binding guidelines. However, whilst a comprehensive 
definition of the expression “particular social group” would strengthen legal 
certainty, it could result in the Convention ground being interpreted in a rigid 
manner which could stifle its propensity to adapt the Convention definition of the 
term refugee to new situations.
The English case-law shows that membership of a particular social group, 
depending upon its interpretation, may be used as a basis for granting refugee status 
to individuals who fear persecution on grounds that were not envisaged at the time 
of the conclusion of the 1951 Convention. This is the case with regard to gender- 
based persecution.
2.2.2. Women as a particular social group
The reluctance expressed by most Member States to recognise that women victims 
of gender-based persecution may constitute a particular social group for the 
purpose of refugee status has no legal foundation. There is nothing in the 1951 
Convention and the travaux préparatoires precluding such interpretation. On the 
contrary, it is in line with the “catch-all”^natu re  of the phrase particular social 
group and the spirit and object of the 1951 Convention. As stressed by Sedley J. in 
Shah^^ ,^ “[ujnless it is seen as a living thing, accepted by civilised countries for a 
humanitarian end which is constant in motive but mutable in form, the Convention 
will eventually become an anachronism”. This approach to the 1951 Convention is 
likely to be welcome by UNHCR who pleads for an interpretation of the 
Convention consistent with the changes that take place in the refiigee situation 
world-wide. UNHCR, inter alia, has urged the States parties to the 1951 
Convention to take into consideration and answer female refugees’ specific needs.
121 See for example the view expressed by the UNHCR’s representative in Otchere {supra n. 98).
R. V Immigration Appeal Tribunal and the Secretary o f  State, ex parte Syeda Khatoon Shah, 
see supra n. 94.
140
In UNHCR’s opinion, women exposed to gender-based persecution may form a 
particular social group and, therefore, be eligible for refugee status  ^ A similar 
view was expressed by the European Parliament in a Resolution on the application 
of the Geneva convention relating to the status of refugees of 13 April 1984; the 
European Parliament;
“1. Note[d] with concern the situation of women in certain countries who face 
harsh or inhuman treatment because they are considered to have transgressed social 
mores of the society in which they live;
2. Consider[ed] that women in this situation can be considered as belonging to a 
“particular social group” within the meaning of the definition of refugee figuring in 
Article I of the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the status of refugees;
3. Call[ed] upon States to apply the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the 
status of refugees and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refiagees in this 
sense(...)”^^^
The European Parliament’s resolution is quite remarkable as it embraced a position 
that met international standards at a time where issues relating to women refugees 
were not paid the attention that they are now given. Unfortunately, the European 
Parliament’s resolution had no impact on the asylum policy to be developed within 
the EU. As in the case of UNHCR conclusions and recommendations, the influence 
of such a resolution was considerably minimised by its lack of binding effect and, 
therefore, left to political will.
There is still a certain reluctance to recognise that women fleeing persecution owing 
to their gender may constitute a particular social group as illustrated by the French 
case-law on the matter. However, as demonstrated by the Canadian case-law, and 
to a lesser extent, the English case-law, gender-based persecution may be covered
See UNHCR Gmdeliiies on the Protection of Refugee Women, supra n. 87, paragraph 54, 
OJ 1984 C 127/137.
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by membership of a particular social group, thus adequately extending the scope of 
the Convention definition of the term refugee.
(1) The Canadian position on women as a particular social group
To a large extent Canadian courts have adopted a more liberal and updated 
approach to the 1951 Convention consistent with international requirements. 
References to Canadian cases in Member States’ court decisions are not unusual; 
they are usually made in support of broader interpretations of the 1951 Convention.
The leading Canadian case on the concept of particular social group is Canada v. 
Warcf^  ^where La Forest J. identified three possible categories of particular social 
group:
“(1) groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic;
(2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to their 
human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association;
(3) groups associated by former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historical 
permanence.”
Where considering the first category of particular social group, the Supreme Court 
of Canada referred to individuals fearing persecution on grounds such as gender, 
linguistic background and sexual orientation. However, the Supreme Court of 
Canada did not wait for the ruling in Ward to hold that gender per se could be the 
identifying factor of a particular social group and recognise the existence of gender 
related groups for refiigee status purposes. In Mayers v. Canada^^ ,^ the Canadian 
Federal Court of Appeal reached the conclusion that a woman from Trinidad
Canada v. Ward, see supra n. 71.
MEIV. Canada [1993] 1 FC. 154 (Federal Court). This decision was referred to in Canada v. 
Ward., see supra n. 71.
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subject to spousal abuse was a member of a particular social group within the 
meaning of Article 1 (A) (2) of the 1951 Convention. Mahoney J.A. applied the test 
proposed by the counsel for the applicant according to which:
“(...) a particular social group means: (1) a natural or non-natural group of persons 
with (2) similar shared background, habits, social status, political outlook, 
education, values, aspirations, history, economic activity or interests contrary to 
those of the prevailing government, and (3) sharing basic, innate, unalterable 
characteristics, consciousness and solidarity, or (4) sharing a temporary but 
voluntarily status, with the purpose of their association being so fundamental to 
their human dignity that they should not be required to alter it.”^^ ^
This decision constituted an important step in the improvement of female refugees’ 
protection as it expressed the view that domestic violence could amount to 
persecution in the sense of the 1951 Convention and could therefore result in the 
grant of refugee status. As already observed, domestic violence is one of the most 
controversial issues with respect to gender-based persecution since it is still 
frequently analysed as a private act falling outside the scope of the 1951 
Convention. In Cheung v. Canadd^, the Federal Court of Appeal held that Chinese 
women exposed to China’s one-child family policy constituted a particular social 
group. Linden J.A. stated:
“It is clear that women in China who have one child and are faced with forced 
sterilization satisfy enough of the above criteria to be considered a particular social 
group. These people comprise a group sharing similar social status and hold a 
similar interest which is not held by their government. They have certain basic 
characteristics in common. All the people coming within this group are united or 
identified by a purpose which is so fundamental to their human dignity that they
See also W. (Z.D.) (Ro) [1993] CRDD No. 3 (QL) where a woman from Zimbabwe exposed to 
spousal persecution was granted refugee status.
Cheung V. Canada [1993] 2 FC. 314.
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should not be required to alter it on the basis that interference with a woman’s 
reproductive liberty is a basic right ranking high in our scale of values.”
Were also identified as a particular social group: divorced Somali women whose 
rights as a parent and right to personal security are not upheld under the jurisdiction 
of the Sharia law^ ®^; Somali females who are minors and are, on that ground, 
exposed to genital mutilation^and single women living in a Muslim country 
without the protection of a male relative^^\
The Canadian jurisprudence demonstrates that the concept of particular social 
group has the potential to provide protection to female refugees fearing gender- 
related persecution. However, women as such are too broad a category to 
constitute a particular social group. The degree of protection offered by 
membership of a particular social group is contingent upon the courts’ 
interpretations. In the absence of a well-established case-law consistent with the 
spirit and purpose of the 1951 Convention, the fate of female asylum seekers facing 
persecution by reason of their gender remains uncertain as illustrated by French and
B. (P.V) (Re) [1993] CRDD No. 12 (QL), referred to in Jean-Ives Carlier, Dirk Vanheule, 
Klaus Hullmann and Carlos Pefla Galiano(Eds), Who is a Refugee? A Comparative Case Law 
Study (Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston, 1997) at p. 209.
(P.V.) (Re), [1994] CRDD No. 12 (QL), referred to in Jean-Ives Carlier, Dirk Vanheule, 
Klaus Hullmaim and Carlos Pefia (Eds), ibid.
Incirciyan v. Canada (10 August 1987), No. M87-1541X 9 Imm, referred to in Jean-Ives 
Carlier, Dirk Vanlieule, Klaus Hullmaim and Carlos Pefia (Eds), ibid. This case was decided by 
tlie precursor to the Refugee Division, the Immigration Appeal Board. It is interesting to note that 
the Immigration Appeal Board has also recognised gender-related social groups involving males 
(see, for example, Nalliah v. Canada (20 October 1987) No. M84 -1642 (Imm. App. Bd) involving 
young Tamils; Cruz v. Canada (26 June 1986) No. V83 - 6807 (Imm. App. Bd) concerning young 
El Salvadorian males; Escato v. Canada (29 July 1987) No. T87 - 9024X (Imm. App. Bd) 
concerning young men of eligible age for military duty; cases referred to in Jean-Ives Carlier, Dirk 
Vanheule, Klaus Hullmann and Carlos Pefia (Eds), ibid.
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UK decisions on the matter, although the latter is progressively moving towards 
recognition of gender-based persecution.
(ii) Women as a particular social group in the English case-law
Practitioners in the UK have sought to claim refugee status on behalf of their female 
clients as members of a particular social group presenting gender as a central 
identifying factor. They have not claimed that gender alone created a particular 
social group, nor has a country like Canada. However, gender is seen as playing a 
central role in locating the asylum seeker in a particular social group. This resulted 
in the identification of sub-groups such as those identified in the Canadian case-law 
which could be regarded as a particular social group for the purpose of refugee 
status.
To date, gender-based persecution for the purpose of refugee status is still received 
with reluctance although the decision in Shad^^ seems to have open the way to 
more liberal interpretations of the concept of particular social group in relation to 
gender-based persecution.
In Nareeka Hutchinson v. Immigration OfficeV^^, the applicant applied for refugee 
status owing to persecution she suffered in Jamaica as a female dependent of a 
Yardie who had been killed by a rival Yardie gang. The special adjudicator came to 
the conclusion that she was a member of a particular social group comprised of 
vulnerable young women at risk of persecution as female dependants of Yardies in a 
culture where such female dependants were often the target of retaliatory acts by 
rival gangs. Progressively the courts recognised that women fleeing persecution
R. V Immigration Appeal Tribunal and the Secretary o f  State, ex parte Syeda Khatoon Shah, 
see supra n. 94.
Nareeka Hutchinson v. Immigration Officer, Gatwick (HX/ 71192/ 94), referred to in Nadine 
Finch and Jane Coker, “Does the Refiigee Convention protect women or is it blind to issues of 
gender”. Immigration and Nationality Law and Practice, Vol. 10 No. 3 (1996) 83-85, at p. 84-85.
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owing to their gender could be entitled to refugee status through membership of a 
particular social group. However, in practice, women still faced serious difficulties 
in establishing their membership of such a group. In R v. Secretary o f State for the 
Home Department, ex parte Miatta Shark^ "^^ , although refiigee status was refused, 
interesting comments were made by Turner J on the position of women who feared 
rape or gender specific violence in relation to refugee status . These issues had been 
rarely examined in UK cases; Turner J stated;
“I have no difficulties with the concept that if there was systematic rape as part of 
an envisaged policy of an organisation or group within the country, that included 
rape as one of its activities, such would be capable of amounting to a Convention 
reason”. Unfortunately, his approach to gender-based persecution remained on a 
conceptual level as he agreed with the Secretary of State’s reasoning in that 
instance.
In rejecting the application for exceptional leave to remain, the Secretary of State 
considered that the claimant had failed to establish that she was persecuted owing to 
her membership of a particular social group constituted by women^^  ^ or women 
without relatives. In the Secretary of State’s opinion, “(...) it appear[ed] that she 
might [have been] caught up in the general unrest like other civilians(...) While there 
may be incidents of gender-specific crimes committed against women because they 
are women(...) it [was] not accepted that these [were] more than isolated incidents
i? V. Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department, ex parte Miatta Sharka, 1 November 1995, 
referred to in Immigration and Nationality Law and Practice, Quarterly Legal Update, Vol. 10 No. 
3 (1996) at p. 103.
Turner J’s remark is also interesting in relation to the nature o f the perpetrator. He does not 
seem to make any distinction between governmental and non-govermnental agents and chose to 
use the terms “organisation” or “group” that are neutral.
As already noted, women as a particular social group is too broad a category for the purpose of 
Article 1(A)(2) o f the 1951 Convention.
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against the background of more general violence.” The Secretary of State refused to 
consider that the violence that the applicant had experienced significantly differed 
from that inflicted upon other civilians. The Secretary of State admitted the 
existence of gender specific crimes, but considered them as being isolated and 
incidental to the general climate of violence. Hence, women in Sierra Leone who 
faced persecution owing to their gender did not constitute a particular social group 
in the Secretary of State’s view. The Secretary of State’s argument is contradictory 
as it recognises the specificity of gender-based violence, but refuses to differentiate 
this type of violence from others with a view to granting refugee status. It is argued 
that this view marginalises gender-related violence and is likely to deprive female 
asylum seekers from the international protection they may need. Despite the liberal 
approach he took in his comment. Turner J allowed the Secretary of State’s 
reasoning. He ruled that “[cjonsideration was given (...) to gender specific violence, 
not only as who committed it but also against whom, and there was certainly 
material available , if not material that was strongly in favour of the proposition, 
that there was no reason to fear gender specific violence or rape if the applicant 
were to return to Freetown”.
Until the decision in Shad^\ the recognition of gender-based persecution in the 
context of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention remained purely hypothetical. To 
date, this case remains the most interesting and satisfying on the matter. The 
applicant, a national from Pakistan, was a battered wife. She had been brought up 
partly in the UK, but had been forced by her family to return to Pakistan at the age 
of 17 to marry. She and her husband had six children, all of whom were being 
brought up by her husband’s extended family. Her husband, after years of violence, 
had driven her out of the family home. On arrival in the UK, she found out that she 
was pregnant. She gave birth and according to the special adjudicator credibly 
feared that, if returned to Pakistan, she would be accused by her husband of
R. V Immigration A ppeal Tribunal and the Secretary o f  State, ex parte Syeda Khatoon Shah, 
supra 11. 94.
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conceiving the child adulterously, exposing herself to the Sharia law which 
prescribed stoning to death as the punishment for adultery. Moreover, if returned to 
Pakistan she would have nowhere to go but her husband’s house. The special 
adjudicator held that “[she was] satisfied that she has been persecuted and that there 
[was] a reasonable expectation that she would be persecuted by her husband in the 
future if she were to return to him.”
The key of the special adjudicator’s reasoning lay with the meaning of particular 
social group. The counsel for the applicant argued that she belonged to “a definable 
group, namely women who had suffered domestic violence in Pakistan”. This was 
not accepted by the special adjudicator who firstly stressed the absence of any 
definition of the terms particular social group and then affirmed that women who 
suffered domestic violence could not fall within the scope of the 1951 Convention. 
The special adjudicator in order to illustrate its conclusion drew a parallel with 
groups formed of divorcees or people having a criminal record^^ .^ The special 
adjudicator’s approach to the notion of particular social group was quite simplistic 
since she did not explain why, according to her, domestic violence fell automatically 
outside the scope of the Convention. It is assumed that women who suffered 
domestic violence were regarding as constituting too broad a category. Before the 
lAT, the particular social group the applicant claimed she belonged to was recast as 
‘Vomen who [were] perceived to have transgressed Islamic mores.” However, 
since in the course of argument, it became apparent that this group could also be 
considered too wide, the relevant social group was refined as embodying “women 
rejected by their husbands on the ground of alleged adultery” and further 
circumscribed by its location, i.e. Pakistani society. It is interesting to note that 
ordinarily an applicant for judicial review cannot alter the issues upon which the 
decision was challenged. However, the Tribunal made an exception on the basis of
The special adjudicator said: "It appears to me that there is no accepted definition of social 
group and it is no more possible for a woman who has suffered domestic violence to bring herself 
within the meaning of social group in the Convention than it is for anyone who has been divorced 
to say tliat he or she is a member of a social group for the purposes of [tlie] Convention or, indeed, 
for anyone who has a criminal record to be able to say similarly.”
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the nature of asylum matters. Sedley J. decided that “(...) in the area of asylum law, 
potentially involving as it always does the right to life, the court ought not in my 
view to be difficult or rigid provided a sensible endeavour is being made to 
crystallise in serviceable form the legal issue (...) What matters is that proper 
consideration should be given to the question whether the applicant’s case as 
accepted by the Special Adjudicator is capable of founding a claim for asylum, and 
Ms Webber’s final formulation has enabled Mr Shaw to advance helpful and cogent 
submissions on an undoubtedly difficult question.” This case illustrates the 
difficulties, acknowledged by Sedley J., in determining the appropriate particular 
social group.
The court reiterated the four principles regarding the interpretation of the 
expression social group mentioned in Savchenkov^^^ :
“(1) The Convention does not entitle a person to asylum whenever he fears 
persecution if returned to his own country. Had the Convention so intended, it 
could and would have said so. Instead, asylum was confined to those who could 
show a well-founded fear of persecution on one of or number of specific grounds, 
set out in Article 1(A) (2).
(2) To give the phrase “membership of a particular social group” too broad an 
interpretation would conflict with the object identified in (1).
(3) The other “Convention reasons” (race, religion, nationality and political opinion) 
reflect a civil or political status. “Membership of a particular social group” should 
be interpreted ejusdem generis.
(4) The concept of “particular social group” must have been intended to apply to 
social groups which exist independently of persecution. Otherwise the limited scope
Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department v Sergei Vasilyevich Savchenkov [1996] Imm AR
29.
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of the Convention would be defeated: there would be a social group, and so a right 
of asylum, whenever a number of persons fear persecution for a reason common to 
them.”
The court stressed the “(...) obvious dangers in attempting any kind of 
lexicographical definition of the expression “particular social group.” Sedley J. 
considered that Mr Shaw was right in saying that “(...) the applicability of the 
phrase [was] essentially a question of fact in every case, but one which [was] 
bounded by law”, one of these boundaries being the exclusion of persecution as an 
identifying factor of a particular social group. In Savchenkov^"^ ,^ the Court of Appeal 
held that “membership of a particular social group involve [d] the idea of a group of 
people who [could] demonstrate cohesiveness and homogeneity”. The Court added 
that “the group must be one which exist[ed] and [could] be identified independently 
of the risk of persecution upon which the applicant relie[d].” Referring to the 
characteristics of a particular social group as defined in Warcf^^ and to the 
counsel’s agreed parameters in Savchenkov, Sedley J. considered that these should 
not be regarded as definitive.
On appeal, it was held that the appellant was not a member of a particular social 
group as this expression involved “(...) a number of people being joined together in 
a group with some degree of cohesiveness, co-operation or interdependence” "^^ .^ 
This test was close to the test established in Savchenkov^^^. The House of lords
' Ibid.
141 See supra n. 71.
R  V (1) Immigration Appeal Tribunal (2) Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department 
(applicants), ex parte Syeda Khatoon Shah (respondent)): (1) Shahana Sadiq Islam (2) Jahanzab 
M am  (3) Orangzeb Islam (applicants) v Secretary o f  state fo r  the Home Department (respondent), 
LTL 23/07/1997 and (1998) 1 WLR 74.
The appeal lodged against the QBD decision in Shah was heard together with another appeal.
See supra n. 139.
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granted an application for leave to appeal in this case on 26 January 1998. The 
House of Lords stressed that the woman’s position in Pakistani society was low and 
that domestic violence against women was common place. While this situation in 
itself could not justify a claim for refugee status, the Pakistani State’s failure to 
protect women meant that they may be in need of international protection. It was 
stressed that there was no English legal authority pursuant to which cohesiveness '^ '^  ^
was critical to the existence of a particular social group^ '^ .^ Furthermore, it was 
observed that the adoption of such a restrictive interpretation of the phrase 
particular social group was not consistent with the principle that a treaty must be 
construed in the light of its purpose. In that respect, the purpose of the 1951 
Convention is to offer international protection to those individuals whose State has 
failed to provide them with effective protection. Referring to the test used in the US 
decision m Acostd"^^, the House of Lords considered that Pakistani women could be 
regarded as a social group as they shared a “common immutable characteristic”: 
they were discriminated against as a group and were not protected by their State of 
nationality. The House of Lords held that the women concerned could be regarded 
as belonging to an even narrower group, i.e. women who were suspected of
Islam V Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department: R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal & 
Anor, ex parte Shah (conjoined appeals) [1999] 2 WLR 1015.
The non-critical nature of cohesiveness had already been stressed in the Court of Appeal 
decision of 23 July 1997. It was also acknowledged in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ouanes v 
Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department [1998] 2 WLR 218). The latter case concerned an 
Algerian midwife who had a well-founded fear to be persecuted by fundamentalists who opposed 
her duties because they involved providing advice on contraception. The Algerian authorities were 
unable to protect her. hi tliat case, the Court of Appeal considered that, although the expression 
“particular social group ” did not ordinarily cover groups of people who were solely linked by their 
work, an exception should be made in that case. The applicant was therefore regarded as a 
member of a particular social group. As stressed by the Court, this flexibility was allowed by the 
fact that the phrase particular social group should be interpreted ejusdem generis.
See supra n. 100.
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adultery. It was stressed that the existence of this group was independent from that 
of persecution. The appeal was allowed on this narrower ground.
The position adopted by the House of Lords demonstrates that the concept of 
membership of a particular social group has the potential to extend the scope of the 
Convention definition of the term refugee to women fleeing persecution by reason 
of their gender. As suggested by the House of Lords, such an approach is inferred 
from the purpose of the 1951 Convention. However, this potential may be 
undermined by restrictive interpretations of the words particular social group. Had 
the House of Lords followed the dissenting opinion of Lord Millett, the appeals 
would have been dismissed on the ground that the women in question were 
persecuted because they were thought to have transgressed social mores and not 
because they were women. In Lord Millett’ s opinion, persecution in these cases 
was not gender-based. Moreover, he took the view that the group was defined by 
persecution '^^ .^ In this context, the challenge is to secure the application of 
interpretations or tests in line with the object and spirit of the 1951 Convention. It is 
argued that with the “communautarisation” of asylum matters, this issue must be 
addressed by EC law^ '^ .^
(iii) Women as a particular social group in the French case-law
The French case-law on the concept of particular social group is not very abundant 
although it has become more precise in recent years. It is very much a case-by-case 
approach. It is argued that to date the French case-law on membership of a 
particular social group does not address the issue of gender-based persecution in a 
satisfactory manner.
See supra n. 144.
See section 2.3. o f the chapter.
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Comments on the concept of particular social group in French cases are usually 
quite brief and generally limited to a simple statement acknowledging the existence 
or absence of such a group. For example in Ourbid^^, the CRR held that the fact 
that the applicant, an Algerian national, was a transsexual who was, as a result, put 
on the fringe of Algerian society did not allow him to be regarded as a member of a 
particular social group in the sense of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention 
Likewise, in Guerroumf^\ the CRR said without any further comment that the 
threats faced by an Algerian soldier in the exercise of its profession did not make 
him a member of a particular social group’
CRR, 7 July 1995, Ourbih, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, 
Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre 
d’information Contentieuse, 1995, at p. 52.
Contrast with the CRR’s decision in O. where the CRR changed its position on transsexuals in 
Algeria and took the view tliat they were exposed to persecution emanating from large segments of 
the Community which were deliberately tolerated by the State (15 May 1998, in Commission des 
Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat e t de la 
Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre d’information Contentieuse, 1998, at p. 37).
CRR, 15 October 1996, Guerroumi, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des 
Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre 
d’information Contentieuse, 1996, at p. 80. See also, for example, CRR, 16 October 1996, 
Benkhanouche, in ibid., at p. 81, where tlie CRR held that the applicant, an Algerian national, 
could not be regarded as a member of a particular social group owing to his attachment to French 
culture and liis involvement with Jehovah’s witnesses in France.
See also CRR, 22 January 1996, Hamisovic, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, 
Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des 
Réfugiés, Centre d’information Contentieuse, 1995, at p. 83. A national from former Yugoslavia 
sought refugee status in order to flee persecution owing to his alleged membership of a social 
group constituted by Muslim individuals o f Rom origin in Sandjak, a region seriously troubled. 
The CRR agreed on his membership to such group but considered that the membership in question 
as well as the situation in the applicant’s region did not suffice to justify the establish the existence 
of personal persecution if  returned to his country of origin. The CRR in its decision did not appear 
to give away any arguments in support of its twofold affirmation.
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One of the rare definitional elements is to be found in a statement of the OFPRA 
before the CRR in which it declared that membership of a particular social group 
was taken into consideration where persecution was founded on the common 
characteristics of the group being considered’ This interpretation of the phrase 
particular social group is close to that adopted in the US decision in Acosta^^^ 
which referred to a “common immutable characteristic”. Another definitional 
element can be inferred from the decision in MarandP^ where the CRR stated that 
the sole fact of having a behaviour that did not conform to current practices did not 
amount to membership of a particular social group within the meaning of the 1951 
Convention. A further definitional element may be found in Ayoubi where the CRR 
suggested that membership of a particular social group required membership to be 
confined to a group of sufficiently identifiable individuals i f  appartenance à un 
ensemble de personnes circonscrit et suffisamment identifiable^’Ÿ^^.
A number of Algerian policemen - or members of other security forces - have lodged asylum 
claims in France owing to persecution or fear of persecution by Islamic militants. Although 
membership of a particular social group was not an issue in the cases mentioned at the end of tliis 
footnote, it is interesting to note the stance that the CRR decided to take regarding the individuals 
in question (and their dependants). The CRR considered that, whatever the seriousness of the 
difficulties they had encountered, the fact that they occurred in the context o f their profession 
make the acts in question unable to amount to persecution within the meaning o f article 1 (A) (2) 
of the 1951 Convention and, thus, denied refugee status. See, for instance, CRR, 12 March 1996, 
Seddikt, supra n. 29; CRR, 25 October 1996, Bey Osman, in Commission des Recours des 
Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat e t de la Commission des 
Recours des Réfugiés, Centre d’information Contentieuse, 1996, at p. 61-62 and CRR, 25 October 
1996, Benafia épouse Bey Osman, in ibid., at p. 62.
See, for instance, the CRR’s decision in O., supra n. 150.
See supra n. 100.
155 CRR, 26 February 1987, Marandi, referred to in Tiberghien, see supra n, 8, at p. 317.
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The French case-law does not provide any proper guidelines as to what should be 
regarded as a particular social group for the purpose of the 1951 Convention. It is 
argued that a more rigorous approach would improve legal certainty and allow 
more effective appeals on points of law or fact arising from the concept of 
membership of a particular social group as well as clarify the position of the CRR. 
In that respect, the difference between French cases and Canadian cases as well as 
English cases, but to a lesser extent, is striking. One may argue that the approach of 
the CRR reflects the nature of the powers granted to judges under French law. They 
may have the power to interpret the law, by they cannot “make the law” in the same 
way as their common law counterparts. However, French judges play nonetheless a 
crucial part in the implementation and interpretation of the law with a view to 
adapting it to the current needs of society. With respect to the notion of particular 
social group, it is argued that the CRR does not fully exercise its powers of 
interpretation. This statement is reinforced by the vagueness of its approach. It is 
believed that the absence of guidelines regarding the words particular social group 
is more the reflect of a desire to apply the concept of particular social group on a 
purely case-by-case basis than the produce of limited powers.
The French case-law on gender-based persecution is not abundant. This is due to 
the fact that the CRR and the Conseil d’Etat as well as the OFPRA do not generally 
address claims of persecution owing to gender through the concept of membership 
of a particular social group. The existence of gender-related persecution may be 
acknowledged and result in the grant of the refugee status, but not on the basis of 
that Convention ground.
One rare reference to women as a particular social group is to be found in a 
statement of the OFPRA where the Office recalled situations where women may be 
regarded as being members of a particular social group. The OFPRA stated that
CRR, Ayoubi, 23 November 1998, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des
Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre
d’infonnation Contentieuse, 1998, at p. 38.
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women who “combat [ed] serious discrimination preventing the exercise of 
fundamental rights or experience[d] such injustice that it place[d] them in a situation 
of fear that justifie[d] their refusal to ask their national authorities for protection.”’ 
The terms “serious discrimination” have been construed in rather restrictive manner 
that is reflected in the use of the concept of "^"mesures d'application générale'’' 
(measures of general application).
Three main categories of women appear to have been seeking refugee status in 
France owing to gender-based persecution: women subjected to the Chinese birth- 
control policy, women facing excision and women who refuse to abide by and 
sometimes actively oppose the rules governing women’s status in the society they 
live in. The French case-law reflects the CRR’s reluctance to overtly, if at all, use 
membership of particular social group to cover gender-based persecution. This is 
evidenced in the case-law developed by the CRR in that area. In order to 
understand how this reluctance manifests itself, one shall consider the treatment 
reserved to women who fled persecution owing to their gender. To that end, one 
shall focus on three forms of alleged gender-based persecution: cases where 
applicants were subjected to China’s birth-control policy, cases where women faced 
excision in their country of nationality and cases where women actively or passively 
challenged women’s status in their country of nationality.
Unlike Canadian decisions on that issue, the CRR’s decisions concerning China’s 
birth-control policy are not based on the notion of particular social group, but 
decided by reference to the notion of ^^mesures d'application généralé'\ The 
CRR’^  ^ as well as the Conseil d’Etat’ held that the existence of a birth-control
See supra n. 129, at p.413.
See CRR, 19 April 1994, Wu, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des 
Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat e t de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre 
d’information Contentieuse, 1994, at p. 57 and CRR, 21 May 1996, Jin épouse Chen, in 
Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat 
et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre d’information Contentieuse, 1996, at p. 88.
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policy in China was not in itself sufficient to justify the grant of refugee status in the 
absence of a personal persecution or fear of persecution’ based on a Convention 
ground. Both jurisdictions considered that China’s birth-control policy applied to all 
and thus was not discriminatory’^ ’. Hence, it could not constitute an acceptable 
basis for refugee status in the absence of personal persecution or fear of such 
persecution. This reasoning seems to disregard the fact that, as a Chinese woman, 
the claimant would have to personally obey the policy in question and suffer the 
consequences of any breach. Reference to the notion of ^"mesure d'application 
générale’'' is not confined to cases involving China’s birth-control policy. For 
instance, in Elkebir^^^, the CRR firstly noted that the provisions of the Algerian 
provisions on women’s status applied to all women without distinction and then 
stated that the fact that some women intended to challenge the provisions in 
question did not, on this sole ground, make them the members of a particular social 
group in the sense of article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention’^  ^ The use of the 
notion of mesure d ’application générale” implicitly suggest a very narrow 
interpretation of the phrase particular social group that will require the groups in 
question to be narrowly defined if they are to be successfiil under that Convention 
ground. This reluctance to use membership of a particular social group as the means
See Conseil d ’Etat, 29 December 1993, Cheng, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, 
Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat e t de la Commission des Recours des 
Réfugiés, Centre d ’information Contentieuse, 1993, at p. 20 and Conseil d’Etat, 9 January 1994, 
Gao Bo, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du 
Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre d’infonnation Contentieuse, 
1994, at p. 11.
In Gao Bo {supra n. 159), the Conseil d’Etat only referred to the absence of personal fears.
’ ’^ See, for example, Wu and J/w épouse Chen, supra n. 158.
See supra n. 56.
In Elkebir {ibid.), the applicant was granted refugee status, but not as a member o f a particular 
social group.
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to extend refiigee status to women fleeing gender-based persecution was further 
evidenced in cases where that Convention ground was simply declared inapplicable. 
In Wu, the applicant alleged that she had been forced to have an abortion and a 
sterilisation as part of the Chinese birth-control policy. In Jin épouse Chen, the 
asylum seeker was in charge of the women service in Wenzhou; she mainly dealt 
with birth-control issues. She was sanctioned for having informed her employer of 
her wish to have a second child. In both cases, the CRR noted that the applicants 
did not allege persecution based on a Convention reason and, thus, refused them 
refugee status.
Women have also been forced to leave their country of origin and claim refugee 
status due to women’s condition in society. In the case of a woman who fled Mali in 
order to escape family pressure to be subjected to excision and discrimination 
against non-excised women’ the CRR considered that non-excised women could 
constitute a particular social group within the meaning of Article 1(A)(2) of the 
1951 Convention if society values of the State itself socially excluded those who did 
not abide by the prevailing social mores. In the CRR’s opinion, if non-excised 
women were subject to discriminatory measures, as opposed to measures of general 
application, which were organised, encouraged or tolerated by the State, they could 
claim membership of a socially-defined group. However, the CRR did not explicitly 
say that the applicant was a member of a particular social group within the meaning 
of Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention. Indeed, although the CRR did grant refugee 
status in that case, it did not found its decision on any of the Convention grounds, 
nor did it disclose its legal reasoning. Shank and Pena Galiano inferred from that 
decision that “... there [was] reason to consider that [the CRR] had implicitly 
decided that women who reflise[d] to submit to excision belong[ed] to a social 
g r o u p . T h e  use of the phrase “membership of a socially-defined group” supports
See supra n. 129, at p. 413.
Ibid. The quotation was originally in French.
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the view taken by Shank and Pena Galiano’ However, it is unfortunate that the 
CRR did not expressly base its decision on the concept of membership of a 
particular social group instead of making use of a close phrase. This is quite typical 
of the case-law which lacks in consistency and clarity. Moreover, in a similar 
case’^ \ the CRR addressed the issues raised by excision without referring to the 
expression “membership of a socially-defined group” or to the Convention grounds. 
Firstly, the CRR held that excision was a mutilation of the woman’s body. 
Furthermore, where required, accepted or voluntary tolerated by public authorities, 
excision could amount to persecution of those women who intended to escape that 
mutilation. The CRR considered that the fact that excision was not punished under 
national law amounted to voluntary tolerance by the State authorities. However, the 
CRR confined its reasoning to cases where families required female children upon 
whom they had legal authority to undergo excision and to women whose family no 
longer exerted legal rights upon them who had been personally exposed to excision 
and denied protection by the State. In that particular case, the CRR said that it was 
not established that the applicant had been personally threatened with forced 
excision and that the alleged threat was the real cause of her leaving and fearing to 
return to her country of origin. Finally, the CRR noted that the applicant failed to 
ask her national authorities for protection. This last requirement appears to be 
inconsistent with the CRR’s previous comment on State’s voluntary tolerance in the 
absence of laws sanctioning excision. If this practice is not illegal, there is no point 
in attempting to seek State protection.
Another category of women who claimed that they had a well-founded fear of 
persecution owing to their gender consists of women who disagree with women’s 
status within society in their country of nationality. A number of cases concerned
CRR, 19 July 1995, Soumahoro, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des
Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre
d’information Contentieuse, 1995, at p. 81.
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Algerian women who opposed Algerian laws on women’s status’^ ® as well as 
extremist Islamic groups’ views on the matter. In most cases, the Algerian 
authorities failed to provide them with effective protection. It follows from the 
available case-law that neither the CRR nor the Conseil d’Etat have yet admitted 
that women who challenged their status in society as women may be regarded as 
members of a particular social group. The main obstacle lies with the fact that 
measures regulating women’s status are considered of general application and thus 
of a non-discriminatory nature. Moreover, another obstacle may be inferred from 
Marandi where the CRR held that the adoption of a behaviour that did not conform 
with prevailing mores did not amount to membership of a particular social group . 
These two obstacles defeated the applicant’s claim in Sarahoui The applicant, an 
Algerian woman, alleged that following her mother’s death, she had to go to France 
and stay with relatives. She was harassed and ill-treated by them. An order to be 
escorted back to the border was issued against the applicant. As a result she was 
arrested and put under house arrest. She claimed that she was a member of a 
particular social group constituted by occidentalised Muslim women and that she 
feared persecution in Algeria because of this membership. Besides, as a single 
mother of two children, she feared to be ostracised by the local population. The 
CRR, firstly, observed that the ill-treatments that she suffered in the hands of her 
relatives in France were not relevant for the purpose of refugee status. Secondly, 
the Commission noted that Algerian laws on women’s status applied to all female 
nationals without distinction. The CRR considered that the fact that some women 
intended to contest its provisions did not allow them to be regarded, on this sole
See, for instance, the CRR’s decision in Elkebir, supra n. 54 and CRR, 8 February 1995, 
Sarahoui, in Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Contentieux des Réfugiés, Jurisprudence du 
Conseil d ’Etat et de la Commission des Recours des Réfugiés, Centre d’information Contentieuse, 
1995, at p. 83.
See supra n. 155.
See supra n. 168.
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ground, as members of a particular social group within the meaning of Article 
1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention.
The fate of women seeking refugee status owing to gender-based persecution 
remains uncertain. To date, the case-law relating to membership of a particular 
social group, including cases concerning gender-based persecution, remains 
fragmentary and cases are very much decided on case-by-case basis. However, the 
French case-law indicates a reluctance to recognise gender-based persecution.
Membership of a particular social group has the potential to offer women fleeing 
gender-based persecution the protection they need provided that that Convention 
ground is interpreted in line with the spirit and purpose of the 1951 Convention. 
However, this potential may be undermined by restrictive interpretations. It is 
therefore argued that, in the absence of a gender category, EC law should ensure 
that the expression particular social group covers gender-based persecution and that 
national interpretations do not undermine the degree of protection that may be 
offered. However, another solution would be to add a gender category to the 
Convention definition within the framework of EC law.
2.3. Gender-based persecution under EC law
Access to refugee status by women who have been persecuted owing to their 
gender has been in some instances difihcult because of their inability to fit the 
traditional asylum seeker’s profile. To date, protection has been granted through 
membership of a particular social group. However, the efficiency of the protection 
conferred through that Convention ground depends upon the way the expression 
particular social group is construed. Protection from gender-based persecution may 
be achieved through the addition of a gender category to the Convention definition 
of the term refugee. However, the latter method is likely to face strong opposition 
from most Member States. It is argued that pragmatism requires us to take into 
consideration this foreseeable resistance.
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Since the adoption of the 1951 Convention, the fate of refugee women has been a 
source of growing concern and it is now widely accepted that gender-based 
persecution is widespread. Some scholars argue that this situation calls for an 
amendment of the Convention definition of refugee if this instrument is not to 
become an anachronism^^\ It is argued that the introduction of an extra ground in 
the Convention definition would amount to a formal recognition of gender-based 
persecution and the need to provide international protection while securing and thus 
strengthening protection. Whilst it is recognised that an amendment of the 
Convention in that respect would constitute a considerable achievement, it is argued 
that it is not the most effective solution in the short and medium term. Indeed, an 
amendment of the 1951 Convention is likely to be a lengthy process which cannot 
address the pressing need for international protection. It is argued that the EC 
framework has the capacity to address this situation more rapidly. It is argued that if 
EC law is to meet international standards regarding refugee protection, it must 
recognise the existence of gender-based persecution and legislate accordingly. In 
that respect, it is argued that the required extension of the definition of refugee can 
be achieved using two methods. Firstly, a gender category could be added to the 
definition of the term refugee for the purpose of EC law. Secondly, membership of 
a particular social group could be interpreted in a way that secures the coverage of 
persecution owing to gender.
It is argued that an enlargement of the definition of refugee through the insertion in 
EC law of a supplementary ground would bring gender on an equal footing with the 
other recognised grounds for a well-founded fear of persecution. As already 
stressed, such an amendment would address the need to construe the 1951 
Convention in a purposive sense. An enlargement of the definition of refugee is 
indispensable if gender-based persecution is to be recognised for the purpose of 
refugee status. Thus, the issue at stake is not the enlargement itself, but the means 
by which it is to be achieved.
Todd Stewart Schenk, supra n. 89, at p. 35.
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The most obvious and direct manner to achieve this result would be to add an extra 
category for the purpose of EC law. However, the major drawback of this solution 
is the opposition that it would face. In the current political climate, it is unlikely that 
the Member States would support a measure that they would perceive as a trigger 
for “even” more asylum claims^ ^^ . Whilst pragmatism requires us to take into 
consideration the Member States’ views, this should not be done at the expense of 
asylum seekers. Thus, a compromise has to be found between the Member States’ 
likely position and the need to extend the protection conferred by refugee status to 
gender-based persecution. It is argued that the compromise lies with securing that 
gender-based persecution falls within the scope of membership of a particular social 
group. This finds support in the UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee 
Women^^ .^ In that respect, the position that emerged from the Joint Position of 4 
March 1996 on the harmonized application of the definition of the term “refugee” in 
Article 1 of the 1951 Convention’^ '’ is a source of concern as the Joint Position is 
silent on gender issues. It is vital that the EC departs firom that overt indifference 
and legislate on the matter with a view to securing adequate protection through 
membership of a particular social group. Article 63(l)(c) on minimum standards 
with respect to the qualification of nationals of third countries as refugees could be 
used as the legal basis for the adoption of the required measures.
It is interesting to note that the adoption o f Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing 
Gender-Related Persecution in Canada has not significantly increased the numbers of claims based 
upon gender-based persecution; they only account for one per cent of tlie total o f asylum claims in 
Canada (see Isabelle Daoust and Kristina Folkelius, supra n. 83, at p. 181). This is not a reflection 
on the importance of gender-based persecution. This figure is mainly attributable to the fact that 
many women in need of international protection have difficulties in reaching a State where they 
can seek refugee status.
173 See supra n. 87.
See supra n. 10.
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As shown in the previous sections, membership of a particular social group has the 
potential to cover gender-based persecution provided that that Convention ground 
is interpreted adequately, i.e. in a purposive manner. However, in addition to 
recognising that gender-based persecution falls within the scope of the 1951 
Convention, it is vital that EC law recognises the irrelevance of the identity of the 
perpetrator as women may be persecuted by non-State agents. As already stressed, 
the only factor that should be taken into consideration in that respect is the State’s 
failure to provide its nationals with effective protection
With this in mind it is argued that EC law should expressly state that women who 
have a well-founded fear of persecution owing to their gender should be regarded 
by the Member States as members of a particular social group for the purpose of 
refugee status. However, this legal obligation imposed on Member States would 
remain of limited effect in the absence of guidelines regarding the interpretation of 
the phrase particular social group. Indeed, restrictive national interpretations could 
seriously undermine the extent to which membership of a particular social group 
could cover gender-based persecution.
In that respect, EC law should endorse the recommendation of UNHCR according 
to which women who fear harsh or inhumane treatment because of having 
transgressed their society’s laws or customs regarding the status of women should 
be regarded as forming a particular social groupHowever ,  while it is recognised 
that most cases of gender-based persecution involve transgressions of social mores, 
EC law should not confine persecution owing to gender to this type of 
circumstances as this type of persecution may arise in other circumstances. The 
systematic rapes of Bosnian women during the conflict in former Yugoslavia shows 
that gender-based person goes beyond non-compliance with social mores.
As already observed, membership of a particular social group has the potential to 
cover a wider range of situations and thus to adapt the 1951 Convention to the
Ibid., paragraph 54.
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changes that take place in the refugee situation world-wide. It is critical to its 
effectiveness that EC law preserves its flexibility. This commands the adoption of a 
number of legally binding guidelines regarding the way the expression particular 
social group shall be interpreted.
It is important to recognise that membership of a particular social group is a self­
standing ground. Thus, it must not be construed by reference to the other 
Convention grounds. As stressed by Sedley I. in Shah^^ ,^ that Convention ground 
must be interpreted ejusdem generis. This means that particular social groups for 
the purpose of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention should not be exclusively 
defined by criteria that relate to race, political opinion, religion or nationality, thus 
confining the Convention definition to the traditional, however outdated, asylum 
seekers’ profile. One may take the view that the best way to secure that membership 
of a particular social group retains its flexibility and thus its propensity to adapt the 
Convention definition to new needs for international protection would be to give a 
definition of what is intended by the phrase particular social group. However, it is 
argued that this is likely to result in a rigid approach to that Convention ground that 
would be inconsistent with its flexible nature. As agreed by Sedley J in Shah^^ ,^ 
determining the existence of a particular social group is mainly a question of fact. 
Attempting to define what is a particular social group once for all could well 
prevent any enlargement of the scope of the Convention definition. In securing that 
gender-based persecution is covered by membership of a particular social group, EC 
law should not take the risk of excluding other groups that may need international 
protection at some point.
With this in mind, it is argued that, while EC law must secure that women seeking 
protection fi"om gender-based persecution can obtain refugee status through 
membership of a particular social group, it must also protect the ability of that
176 See supra n. 144.
Ibid.
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Convention ground to update the Convention definition of the term refugee. Hence, 
in addition to stressing that gender-based persecution must be covered, EC law 
should specify that the expression particular social group has to be interpreted in a 
purposive sense in line with the flexible nature of that Convention ground.
3. Refugee status for EC nationals
A Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European Union was 
annexed to the TEC by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Its sole Article seriously limits 
EC nationals’ right to seek refugee status within the EC. The principle, which is not 
absolute, is that such claims should not be taken into consideration or should, be 
declared inadmissible. This principle only knows a few exceptions. This restriction 
on EC nationals’ right to seek refiigee status within the EC was legitimised in the 
light of the presumed safety of the Member States.
It is argued that this Protocol is in breach of the right to seek refugee status and is 
therefore inconsistent with international refugee law. It is unlikely that many EC 
nationals will seek refugee status in another Member State. Thus, the reason for 
adopting this Protocol does not lie with a fear of a massive increase in the numbers 
of asylum claims. As observed by Peers, this Protocol is “an extradition measure in 
disguise”^^ .^ It was designed to prevent Basque nationalists whom Spain wanted to 
try for terrorist acts fi"om lodging an asylum claim in Belgium^^ .^ However, the 
potential effect of the Protocol goes beyond this particular case as the restriction 
imposed on the right to seek refugee status within the EC is drafted in general 
terms. The fact that the Member States are regarded as safe countries that do not in 
general “produce” asylum seekers does not justify this breach of the right to seek
Steve Peers, EU  Justice and Home Affairs Law (European Law Series, Pearson education, 
Harlow, 2000) at p. 129.
Ibid.
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refugee status. Moreover, the impact of the restriction contained in the Protocol 
must be considered in the light of the future enlargement of the EC membership.
One can take the view that this violation of the right to seek refugee status is only 
apparent because of the exceptions mentioned in the sole Article of the Protocol. 
Asylum claims will be considered:
“(a) if the Member State of which the applicant is a national proceeds after the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, availing itself of the provisions of Article 15 
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
[ECHR], to take measures derogating in its territory from its obligations under that 
Convention[^^^];
(b) if the procedure referred to in Article F .l(l) of the Treaty on European 
Union[^* ]^ has been initiated and until the Council takes a decision in respect 
thereof;
Article 15 of the ECHR reads;
“1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High 
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under tliis Convention to tlie 
extent strictly required by tlie exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with its other obligations under inteniational law.
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or 
from Articles 3, 4(paragraph I) and 7 shall be made under this provision.
(3) Any High Contracting Party availing itself o f this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary- 
General of the Council o f Europe fully informed of tlie measures which it has taken and the 
reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary-General of the Council o f Europe when such 
measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully 
executed.”
Article F. 1(1), now Article 7(1), o f the TEU reads:
“The Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Govennnent and acting by 
unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the Commission after obtaining 
the assent of the European Parliament, may determine the existence of a serious and persistent 
breach by a Member State of principles mentioned in Article 6(1).”
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(c) if the Council, acting on the basis of Article F. 1(1) of the Treaty of European 
Union, has determined, in respect of the Member State which the applicant is a 
national, the existence of a serious and persistent breach by that Member state of 
principles mentioned in Article F. 1(1);
(d) if a Member State should so decide unilaterally in respect of the application of a 
national of another Member State; in that case the Council shall be immediately 
informed; the application shall be dealt with on the basis of the presumption that it 
is manifestly unfounded without affecting in any way, whatever the cases may be, 
the decision-making power of the Member State.”
These exceptions undermine the restrictions imposed on the EC nationals’ right to 
claim refugee status within the EC and thus minimise the effects of the violation of 
the right to seek refugee status. However, the inconsistency with international 
refugee law remains as it is inherent in the principle laid down in the sole Article of 
the Protocol. The fact that the principle enshrined in the Protocol amounts to a 
breach of the right to seek refugee status combined with the fact that this principle 
is likely to be affected by exceptions calls for a repeal of the Protocol.
4. Conclusion
The effectiveness of the 1951 Convention lies with its capacity to confer refugee 
status to those in need. The Convention definition of the term refijgee must be 
interpreted in the light of its spirit and purpose. This means that interpretations of 
the Convention definition must take into consideration changes in the refugee 
situation such as the emergence of non-State persecution and gender-based 
persecution. It is argued that, if EC law is to develop an asylum policy in line with 
international refugee law, the EC must interpret the term refugee in a manner 
consistent with the object of the 1951 Convention. With this in mind, EC law must 
specify that persecution is not confined to State persecution. Moreover, it is 
essential that membership of a particular social group is interpreted as to cover
The principles in question are liberty, democracy, respect for human riglits and fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law.
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gender-based persecution. It is also important that that Convention ground retains 
its flexible nature. Finally, it is argued that the Protocol on asylum for nationals of 
Member States of the European Union should be repealed.
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Chapter IV 
Access to Substantive Asylum Procedures
In recent years, the Member States have developed methods that allow them to 
decline responsibility with regard to increasing numbers of asylum claims. Such 
practices have gained strength through their incorporation into various EC and EU 
measures’. They result in asylum seekers being removed to another State prior to 
substantive examination on the ground that responsibility for considering their claim 
lies with that other State. These practices will be referred to as transfers of 
responsibility. The terminology used is intended to reflect and emphasise the 
Member States’ restrictive approach to the handling of applications for asylum.
It would, however, be misleading to believe that transfers of responsibility are the 
sole mechanisms used by the Member States to minimise their collective and 
individual responsibility towards asylum claims. The Member States’ attitudes must 
also be assessed in the light of European as well as national legislation on access to 
the EC. Indeed, these transfers of responsibility suppose, in the first place, that 
asylum seekers have successfully reached ‘Tortress Europe”. The Member States 
have “addressed” this issue by placing hurdles on asylum seekers’ access to the EU 
territory; these consist of strict travel document requirements and carrier sanctions. 
These measures exacerbate the effects of the restrictions imposed on access to 
asylum procedures. Access does not guarantee substantive examination as the 
Member States may decline responsibility and remove the asylum seeker concerned 
to another State. Candidates for refugee status are thus confi-onted with a double 
set of hurdles. Both types of restrictions, although not officially presented as having
’ See, for instance, the Resolution on a harmonised approach to questions concerning host third 
countries adopted by the Ministers of the Member States of the European Communities at their 
meetings in London on November to 1 December 1992, in European Parliament, Asylmn in the 
European Union: the “safe country of origin principle”, People's Europe Series, November 1996, 
Aimex II, at p. 33-37.
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that purpose, contribute to the erosion of Member States’ responsibility towards 
asylum seekers and cannot therefore be considered individually.
The transfers of responsibility organised by the Member States are of two kinds. As 
already suggested, the expression ‘ffansfer of responsibility” implies that the asylum 
seeker is removed by the State with which he or she intended to lodge his or her 
claim to another State prior to substantive examination of his or her application.
The first type of transfers will be referred to as “internal transfers” as they are 
confined to the EC territory. These transfers are organised by the Convention 
determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in 
one of the Member States of the European Communities of 15 June 1990 ,^ referred 
to as the Dublin Convention. According to the Convention, each asylum claim 
submitted in the EC or at its borders must be considered by a single Member State. 
The second type of transfers consists in removing an asylum seeker to a third 
country, i.e. a non-Member State, which is considered accountable for the 
examination of his or her asylum claim; these transfers will be referred to as 
“external transfers”. These external transfers rest upon the application of the safe 
third country principle as well as readmission agreements concluded with third 
countries.
Before examining the direct restrictions imposed on access to asylum procedures 
through transfers of responsibility, it is important to consider the impact of the 
restrictions imposed on asylum seekers’ access to the EC territory.
1. Restricted access to the EC territory
The Member States found in the restrictions imposed on asylum seekers’ access to 
the EU effective tools to deter and prevent the submission of asylum claims. Indeed, 
access to asylum procedures supposes access to the territory - or at least the
 ^OJ C 254/1 1997.
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borders - of the targeted Member State. The Member States justified these 
restrictions in the usual manner; they were presented as means to protect genuine 
applicants’ interests fi'om abuses emanating fi'om increasing numbers of “bogus” 
asylum seekers. This line of reasoning resulted in the imposition of document 
requirements on asylum seekers combined with carrier sanctions. The latter 
measures are designed to sanction carriers’ failure to ensure that their passengers 
are adequately documented.
1.1. Document requirements
Controls at the external borders of the EC were perceived as the necessary 
counterpart to the dismantling of internal borders .^ While checks were progressively 
removed at internal fi*ontiers and fi*ee movement established, controls at external 
borders were reinforced, greatly affecting accessibility to the Community territory 
for third-country nationals, including people seeking refugee status.
Tighter controls at the external borders of the EC resulted in the imposition of 
increasing travel document requirements on third country nationals wishing to enter 
the EC Officially, these measures were justified by the need to prevent third 
country nationals in an irregular position fi-om taking advantage of the abolition of 
internal borders. In other words, these measures were designed to combat illegal 
immigration within the EC, but they also aimed at preventing a “massive influx” of 
“bogus” asylum seekers. This is how officials at national and European level 
attempted to legitimise the fact that the provisions on documentation did not 
acknowledge the specificity of asylum seekers’ circumstances.
 ^Concern that controls at external borders would not be exercised efficiently was one of the main 
motives for some Member States (i.e., the UK and Ireland) remaining outside the Schengen 
agreements. This concern was also at the origin of the French suspension o f the implementation of 
the Agreement and the late entry into force of the Agreement for Italy,
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However, it is argued that these document requirements were devised as a means to 
cut down the numbers of asylum seekers applying within the EC or at its borders. 
Moreover, a distinction between “genuine” and ‘l^ogus” asylum claims at this stage 
is not feasible as the merits of the claim have not yet been examined. Indeed, it is 
argued that, even in the case of unsuccessful applicants, the term “bogus” is far 
from being adequate. Many applicants are refused refugee status because their claim 
is not based on one of the 1951 Convention grounds. However, this does not mean 
that their search for international protection is not legitimate. The same reasoning 
applies to those who fled economic harshness. Too often media and governments 
make a parallel between “economic migrants” and “abuse” which is seriously 
prejudicial to asylum seekers as well as migrants as it conveys a very negative image 
of the individuals concerned. This hostile climate is aggravated by the use of 
negative language which creates and fosters irrational fears and prejudices and fails 
to reflect the complexity of the situation. For instance, the Preamble to the 
Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum refers to the “(...) rising 
number of applicants for asylum in the Member States who are not in genuine need 
of protection EC and national officials heavily rely upon the distinction they 
make between “genuine” and “bogus” asylum seekers to justify the adoption of 
increasingly restrictive measures affecting people seeking protection. As already 
suggested, this line of argument has been used and abused with a view to 
legitimising the travel document requirements imposed on asylum seekers.
In a Council Regulation of 12 March 1999, the Council of the European Union 
determined the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders of the Member States^ It is alarming, however not
Resolution on manifestly unfoimded applications for asylum adopted by the Ministers of the 
Member States o f the European Communities at their meetings in London on 30 November to 1 
December 1992, in European Parliament, Asylum in tlie European Union: the “safe country of 
origin principle”. People’s Europe Series, November 1996, Annex 1, at p. 26-32.
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surprising, to note that the Council Regulation is totally silent on the issue of 
asylum seekers. The Regulation only provides that the Member States shall be 
responsible for determining visa requirements for stateless persons and recognised 
refugees (Article 2). The Regulation provides for three types of exemption from 
visa requirements none of which applies to asylum seekers®. Article 1 of the 
Regulation provides that “[n]ationals of third countries on the common list in the 
Annex shall be required to be in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders of the Member States”. Article 5 reads;
“For the purposes of this Regulation, “visa” shall mean an authorisation given or a 
decision taken by a Member State which is required for entry into the territory with 
a view to:
- an intended stay in that Member State or in several Member States of no more 
than three months;
- transit through the territory of that Member State or several Member States, 
except for transit through the international zone of airports and transfers between 
airports in a Member State.”
It results from the combined effect of Articles 1 and 5 that asylum seekers who are 
nationals of third countries listed in the Annex to the Regulation must be in 
possession of the required visa. The list mentions 111 States and territorial entities, 
including the EC main “providers” of asylum seekers.
® Council Regulation (EC) No. 574/1999 of 12 March 1999 determining the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession o f visas when crossing the external borders o f the Member States, 
O IL 072/2, 18/03/1999.
 ^Ibid., Article 5 reads:
“A Member State may exempt from visa requirements:
" civilian air and sea crew;
- fliglit crew and attendants on emergency or rescue flights and other helpers in the event of 
disaster or accident;
- holders of diplomatic passports, official duty passports and other official passports.”
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The importance attached to documentation requirements, even in the case of asylum 
seekers, is reflected in the criteria laid down in the Dublin Convention with a view 
to determining the Member State responsible for considering a given asylum claim. 
Most of these criteria establish a connection between responsibility for an asylum 
seeker's presence in the EC and responsibility for handling his or her claim. Article 5 
of the Dublin Convention expressly refers to the issue of visas\
It is argued that failing to acknowledge the specificity of asylum seekers’ 
circumstances constitutes a threat to the right to seek refugee status as travel 
document requirements may prevent individuals in need of international protection 
from having access to the EC and thus fi-om submitting their application for asylum. 
International standards recognise that people in need of international protection are 
often in no position to obtain the adequate documentation to leave their country of 
origin. They may be in hiding firom their government and thus must leave 
clandestinely. Sometimes, the situation is too urgent for them to go through the 
required administrative formalities. In other cases, the functions of the State may 
have broken down rendering the issue of documents impossible. The need for 
international protection has not decreased with the imposition of such requirements. 
On the contrary, it appears that these requirements have forced people to 
increasingly resort to false documents and other illegal practices. This has created a 
vicious circle that has an adverse effect on the right to seek refugee status and 
creates problems for the Member States .^
The use of inadequate documents is often regarded as evidence that the asylum 
seeker is attempting to abuse asylum procedures. According to Paragraph 9(a) of
 ^ The criteria set out in the Dublin Convention in order to determine the Member State 
accountable for examining a given asylum claim are discussed in Section 2.1.1(i) of the present 
chapter.
® The problems that the imposition of stringent documentation requirements on asylum seekers 
liave created for the Member States are examined in relation to the internal transfers organised by 
the Dublin Convention in Section 2.1.2.
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the Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum, applications based 
on false identity or forged or counterfeit documents, where the asylum seeker has 
maintained they were genuine, are considered a deliberate deception or abuse of 
asylum procedures and thus justify the claim being channelled to accelerated 
procedures. In practice, asylum claimants are very reluctant to admit that they have 
used forged documents as they fear the consequences that such “confession” may 
have on the outcome of their application. The possession of invalid documents, if 
any, seems to create a presumption that the asylum seekers concerned are not 
genuine; this presumption can be very difficult to rebut. There is a tendency to hold 
entry or attempted entry in irregular conditions against asylum seekers; as a result 
they will often be referred to as “bogus asylum seekers” and face thorough 
questioning on their reasons for not having valid documents. Does this mean that to 
be considered genuine, asylum seekers need to be appropriately documented? This 
appears to be totally inconsistent with the reality of asylum seekers’ situation. 
Assimilation with other categories of third country nationals means that they are 
subject to the same treatment and may be removed from the territory of the 
Member State concerned without being given the chance to exercise their right to 
seek refugee status . In the worse cases, this could mean being returned to their 
country of origin. This of course would constitute a blatant violation of the 1951 
Convention.
It is argued that measures on travel document requirements imposed on third 
country nationals should take into consideration the specificity of asylum seekers’ 
circumstances. It seems that Member States fear that, in differentiating between 
asylum seekers and other categories of third country nationals, they will encourage 
abusive claims from those who wish to bypass document requirements with a view 
to entering the EC territory. However, a compromise could be reached between the 
Member States’ position and asylum seekers’ rights. Where an individual expresses 
his or her intention to apply for refugee status, failure to comply with these 
requirements should not be held against him or her. Thus, the practice consisting in 
equating possession of inadequate documents, if any, with abuse of asylum
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procedures should disappear. This would also require a drastic change of attitude 
on the part of decision-makers and immigration officers.
A regime reflecting the specificity of asylum seekers’ circumstances would also be 
to the Member States’ advantage. The imposition of strict travel document 
requirements on asylum seekers has actually played against them. The need for 
international protection remains the same and people are not being deterred from 
fleeing their country of origin because of these requirements. These measures have 
boosted the use of forged documents as asylum seekers have become more aware of 
the need to travel documented. This has rendered the implementation of the Dublin 
Convention extremely laborious as the Convention criteria suppose that the 
Member States are able to determine the exact itinerary of asylum seekers with a 
view to determining the Member State responsible for considering their asylum 
claim^ .
The detrimental impact of travel document requirements on the right to seek 
refugee status has been worsen by the imposition of carrier sanctions.
1.2. Carrier sanctions
The imposition of carrier sanctions together with travel document requirements 
leaves no doubt as to the intention of EC and national officials. These two sets of 
measures were conceived as weapons designed to reduce the numbers of asylum 
seekers within the EC by restricting access to its external borders.
Carrier sanctions consist in holding liable those transporting undocumented or 
inadequately documented passengers. Carrier sanctions and travel document 
requirements supplement each other with a view to obstructing asylum seekers’
 ^ The detrimental impact o f the imposition o f strict travel document requirements on asylum 
seekers on the functioning o f the Dublin Convention is examined in Section 2.1.2(i).
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entry into the EC both directly by imposing the said requirements and indirectly by 
deterring their transport.
Carrier liability has been imposed at both European and national level. Carrier 
sanctions were given an ‘European dimension” in the Convention applying the 
Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the governments of the States of the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on 
the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders of 19 June 1990’®; this 
Convention is referred to as the Convention applying the Schengen Agreement. 
Although the United Kingdom and Ireland refused to become party to the Schengen 
Conventions, both States did introduce carrier sanctions in their domestic 
legislation. Carriers’ liability is directed at two types of individuals: regular carriers, 
but also those who deliberately smuggle illegal third country nationals. It is 
suggested that, while the combat against illegal trafficking is justified, carrier 
sanctions^ ^ against regular carriers are inconsistent with the right to seek refugee 
status.
The Convention applying the Schengen Agreement provides for carriers’ liability 
and sanctions for those who smuggle third country nationals into the Schengen area.
Pursuant to Article 26(1 )(b), carriers by air, sea or land, are expected to act as 
immigration officers as they are under the obligation to take all the measures 
necessary to secure that their passengers are appropriately documented and held 
responsible for passengers who find themselves in an irregular situation (Article 
26(I)(a)). Responsibility is construed as meaning that carriers have to return the 
individuals concerned “(...) to the third State from which he was transported, to the 
Third State which issued the travel document on which he travelled or to any other
Both Conventions were subsequently signed by Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Denmark, 
Austria, Finland and Sweden.
” Unless mentioned otherwise, the words “carrier sanctions” and “carriers’ liability” refer to 
regular carriers.
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Third State to which he is guaranteed entry” (Article 26(1 )(a)). Furthermore, 
Article 26(3) imposes fines on carriers who transport third country nationals who 
do not satisfy documentation requirements. These fines are designed to ensure that 
carriers comply with their new duties.
As already stressed, the concept of carriers’ liability was also introduced at national 
level. In that respect, the position adopted within the Schengen framework was 
endorsed by Member States which refused to sign the Convention in question’^ . For 
instance, in the UK, Part II of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 exclusively 
deals with carriers’ liability and contains a provision similar to Article 26 of the 
Convention applying the Schengen Agreement. Indeed, Section 40 of the Act 
imposes charges on carriers for transporting passengers who are not adequately 
documented. Section 40(1) reads that “[t]his section applies if a person requiring 
leave to enter the United Kingdom arrives in the United Kingdom by ship, aircraft, 
road passenger vehicle or train, on being required to do so by an immigration 
officer, fails to produce_
(a) a valid passport with photograph or some other document satisfactorily
establishing his identity and nationality or citizenship; and
(b) if he requires a visa, a valid visa of the required kind.”
Failure to produce the required documents will result in carriers being fined for 
transporting inappropriately documented passengers. Indeed, Section 40(2) 
provides that “[t]he Secretary of State may charge the owner of the ship, aircraft or 
vehicle or the train operator, in respect of that person, the sum of £2,000 or such 
sums as may be prescribed.”
It is argued that carriers’ liability places an additional hurdle on asylum seekers’ 
journey to safety which undermines their right to apply for refugee access by 
restricting access to countries of refuge. It is well established that the vast majority 
of asylum seekers are in no position to satisfy documentation requirements.
12 The UK and Ireland.
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Besides undermining refugee protection, carriers’ liability also creates problems for 
carriers if they want to avoid fines. Carriers’ employees are now expected to act as 
immigration police officers. For instance, if they suspect that potential passengers 
are in possession of forged documents, carriers’ staff may refuse boarding. This may 
have extremely serious consequences where the individuals concerned intended to 
flee their country of origin with a view to seeking refugee status. They may be 
required to make decisions that will endanger the life of others. In practice, carriers’ 
liability may result in carriers’ staff singling out “suspicious” passengers on the basis 
of discriminatory criteria such as race. Resort to such discriminatory practices is 
aggravated by the fact that carriers’ employees are not qualified to carry out such 
controls. They are not immigration officers and are not familiar with asylum issues. 
However, even if carriers’ staff was aware of asylum seekers’ rights, it does not 
seem that they could act upon them and thus accept to carry inadequately 
documented asylum seekers. Indeed, carriers cannot escape liability on the ground 
that the inappropriately documented passengers intended to seek refugee status in 
the country of destination. This is the position adopted in the Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999 as well as in the Convention applying the Schengen Agreement. 
Unlike the 1999 Act, the Convention subjects provisions on carriers’ liability to 
compliance with the 1951 Convention (Articles 26(1) and (2)). However, States’ 
practices show that formal reference to the Convention does in itself secure its 
correct application. Moreover, the view taken is that there is an inherent 
contradiction between the right to seek refugee status and carriers’ liability in 
relation to asylum seekers.
Carriers’ liability also embraces measures against those who take advantage of 
others’ distress by smuggling them - or promising to smuggle them - in a safe 
country in return for remuneration. Both the Convention applying the Schengen 
Agreement and the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 contain provisions against 
such individuals. Article 27(1) of the Convention reads that “[t]he Contracting 
Parties undertake to impose appropriate penalties on any person who, for the 
purpose of gain, assists or tries to assist an alien to enter or reside within the
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territory of one of the Contracting Parties contrary to the laws of that Contracting 
Party on the entry and residence of aliens.” As in the 1999 Act, Section 32(2) 
provides that “[t]he person (or persons) responsible for a clandestine entrant is (or 
are together) liable to _
(a) a penalty of the prescribed amount in respect of the clandestine entrant; 
and
(b) an additional penalty of that amount in respect of each person who was 
concealed with the clandestine entrant in the same transporter.”
Section 32(l)(c) provides that a person is considered a “clandestine entrant” if “he 
arrives in the United Kingdom on a ship or aircraft, having embarked
(i) concealed in a vehicle; and
(ii) at a time when the ship or aircraft was outside the United Kingdom,
and claims, or indicates that he intends to seek, asylum in the United Kingdom or 
evades, or attempts to evade , immigration control.”
These provisions are to be welcome if they remain directed at trafficking networks. 
Thus, they should not target and impose sanctions on asylum seekers. In other 
words, the fact that individuals resort to such illegal practices in order to reach 
safety and seek refugee status should not be held against them. In the current 
climate, those who enter or try to enter a Member State (or a Schengen State) 
clandestinely are portrayed as “bogus” asylum seekers and treated as such; this 
means, for instance, being channelled to fast-track procedures. Such an attitude 
shows the Member States’ reluctance to take on board the specificity of asylum 
seekers’ circumstances, in this context their inability to obtain the required 
documentation. As already stressed, it is unreasonable to expect refugees to satisfy 
requirements regarding documentation. Because they ignore this situation, carrier 
sanctions have the effect of preventing individuals at risk from reaching safety and 
applying for refugee status.
Under Article 31 of the 1951 Convention, it is illegal to prosecute asylum seekers 
who enter or attempt to enter the country concerned illegally. Article 31(1), “[t]he
180
Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or 
presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or 
freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their 
territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to 
the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.” In its 
Guidelines on applicable criteria and standards relating to the detention of asylum 
seekers^ ,^ UNHCR stresses that “Article 31 exempts asylum seekers who came 
directly from a country of persecution from being punished on account of their 
illegal entry or presence, provided they present themselves without delay to the 
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence” '^^ . The 
expression “coming directly” inserted in Article 31 covers situations where asylum 
seekers have entered the country in which they intend to seek refugee status directly 
from the country of origin. However, it also embraces cases where asylum seekers 
came from another country where the their safety could not be assured or transited 
through a country for a short period of time without having applied for refugee 
status or received asylum there^ .^ UNHCR stresses that, considering asylum 
seekers’ specific circumstances, no strict time-limit should be imposed in relation to 
the words “coming directly”, nor can a time-limit be mechanically applied in relation 
to the expression “without delay”^^ . UNHCR also specifies that the words “good 
cause” require to take into consideration the circumstances under which asylum 
seekers have fled. Thus, the latter expression can only be construed on an individual 
basis.
UNHCR ’ s Guidelines on applicable criteria and standards relating to the detention o f  asylum 
seekers, Geneva, 10 February 1999.
Ibid., Paragraph 2.
Ibid., Paragraph 4.
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Breaches of Article 31 of the UN Convention were evidenced by the High Court in 
the United Kingdom. In a judgment of 29 July 1999, the High Court ruled that the 
Government had acted in breach of the 1951 Convention through its practice of 
prosecuting and imprisoning asylum seekers who enter the UK on false 
documents’\  This test case was brought on behalf of three asylum seekers, but will 
have an impact on many more. Refiigee organisations estimate that between 500 
and 1000 asylum seekers have been prosecuted each year for using false documents 
since the increase in prosecutions in 1994. Most have been arrested on arrival and 
brought before magistrates the next day. Duty advisors have typically advised them 
to plead guilty because there was no defence and they would get a shorter jail 
sentence. Lord Justice Simon Brown sitting with Mr Justice Newman strongly 
criticised the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, and the Crown Prosecution Service for 
disregarding the UK’s obligations under the 1951 Convention. The High Court held 
that “[i]t is hoped that these challenges will mark a turning point in the Crown’s 
approach to the prosecution of refugees for travelling on false passports” and added 
that “Article 31 must henceforth be honoured.’”® The Court stressed that the travel 
requirements imposed on asylum seekers combined with carriers’ liability “ha[ve] 
made it well nigh impossible for refugees to travel to countries of refuge without 
false documents” and that prosecutions should therefore be restricted to cases 
where the offence, i.e. travelling on false documents, was “manifestly unrelated to a 
genuine quest for asylum’”®. However, there is a risk that the Government and the 
Crown Prosecution Service will carry on prosecuting inadequately documented 
asylum seekers on the ground that they are not “genuine” asylum seekers, but 
“bogus” asylum seekers.
The judgment of the High Court of 29 July 1999 was referred to in the Council o f Europe, 
Report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, Parliamentary Assembly, on 
Restrictions on Asylum in the Member States o f  the Council o f  Europe and the European Union, 
Doc. 8598, 21 December 1999 and in Clare Dyer, "Asylum seekers wrongly jailed”, The 
Guardian, 30 July 1999, at p. 8.
’® The Guardian, ibid.
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Besides contravening the 1951 Convention, carriers’ liability, and indirectly 
documentation requirements for asylum seekers, are also incompatible with 
provisions of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 7 
December 1944^ ®. Indeed, Note 2 of Annex 9 to the Chicago Convention provides:
“Nothing in this provision [Provision 3.36] or in Note Ip ]  is to be construed so as 
to allow the return of a person seeking asylum in the territory of a Contracting 
State, to a country where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
Ibid.
®^ On tlie issue of carrier sanctions, see Amnesty International, No Flights to Safety, Carrier 
Sanctions, Airline Employees and the Rights o f  Refugees, Report, ACT 34/21/97, November 1997.
Provision 3.36 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation reads;
“Each Contracting State shall ensure that a person found inadmissible is transferred back into the 
custody of the operator(s) who shall be responsible for prompt removal to:
- the point where the person commenced his journey;
- to any other place where the person is admissible.
Note.- The public authorities shall without delay inform the operator(s) when a person is found 
inadmissible and consult the operator (s) regarding the possibilities o f  departure.”
Provision 3.36.1 says:
“Contracting States shall accept for examination a person being returned from liis point of 
disembarkation after having been found inadmissible if  this person previously stayed in their 
territoiy before embarkation, other than in direct transit. Contracting States shall not return such a 
person to tlie country where he was earlier fomid to be admissible.
Note L- This provision is not intended to prevent public authorities from  further examining a 
returned inadmissible person to determine his eventual acceptability in the State or make 
arrangements fo r  his transfer, removal or deportation to a State o f  which he is a national or 
where he is otherwise acceptable. Where a person who has been found to be inadmissible has lost 
or destroyed his travel document, a Contracting State will accept instead a document attesting to 
the circumstances o f  embarkation and arrival issued by the public authorities o f  the Contracting 
State where the person was found to be inadmissible.”
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race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.”
It is argued that a strict application of carriers’ liability is in many instances 
incompatible with the right to seek refugee status as well as a violation of the 
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation.
Concerned about the impact of carrier sanctions on asylum seekers’ rights. Amnesty 
International recommends that airline employees should adopt a certain attitude in 
reaction to these extra duties imposed on them. Although, Amnesty International’s 
recommendation only concerns airlines’ liability, it is argued that the scope of the 
suggested attitude should extend to other carriers; while carrier sanctions greatly 
affect airlines, they also apply to other types of carrier. With a view to minimising 
the detrimental effects of carrier liability on refugee protection. Amnesty 
International advocates that:
Airline staff should remember that refugees should not be treated like criminals. 
Often they are very vulnerable and need assistance.
- If airline employees are asked by their company to check travel papers, they 
should explain that they are not qualified to do this, and that they do not wish to 
perform these duties.
- If the company demands that airline employees detain a passenger on board, they 
should insist that an immigration officer meets the aircraft on landing. Airline staff 
should inform the passenger that this request has been made, and that this will 
provide them with an opportunity to claim asylum.
- If such incident occurs, airline employees should inform their trade union 
representative[^^] as soon as possible and also pass the information to a local
It has been the policy of the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) since 1992 that 
civil aviation workers should not be required to act as immigration officers. This position was 
expressed in the Resolution concerning the improper involvement of aviation employees by their
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Amnesty group or other organization concerned with the welfare of refugees, who 
will try to ensure that the rights of any refugee are respected.
The absence of provisions making allowance for asylum seekers’ circumstances in 
both the measures on travel document requirements and carriers” liability is the 
reflection of and consequence of hostile asylum policies. The combined effect of 
these measures is to restrict asylum seekers’ access to the EC and thus to asylum 
procedures there. Thus, these measures cannot be isolated and must be seen as part 
of vrider plan to drastically cut down the numbers of asylum seekers in the EC. With 
this in mind, the Member States have elaborated other methods designed to limit 
access to asylum procedures within the EC; these are referred to as transfers of 
responsibility.
2. Transfers of responsibility
Transfers of responsibility raise the question of their compatibility with the right to 
seek refugee status^ '*. It is argued that this right calls for a literal interpretation of 
the words ‘transfer of responsibility”. This means that where a State refuses to 
endorse responsibility for the examination of an asylum claim, responsibility should 
be assumed by another State. This is to prevent the right to seek refugee status 
being undermined by such practices.
The position adopted towards transfers of responsibility rests upon a pragmatic 
approach to the Member States’ obligations in the field of asylum. It is argued that 
totally disregarding their views and practices would actually be detrimental to 
asylum seekers as such an attitude would impede positive legislative changes.
employers in violations of the rights o f refugees and asylum seekers adopted by tlie ITF in 1992 
(see supra n. 20).
See supra n. 20.
See the introduction, chapter I.
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However, pragmatism does not mean that the Member States are given a blanket 
cover. The challenge is therefore to find an acceptable compromise between 
transfers of responsibly and the Member States’ obligations in the light of the right 
to seek refugee status. As already suggested, such transfers must be contingent on 
the identification of a State willing to endorse responsibility for the asylum claim 
concerned; indeed, such practices must not result in asylum seekers being deprived 
of their right to seek refugee status.
This issue should be addressed with extreme care and diligence as the very 
foundation of the right to seek refijgee status has been under attack within the EU 
forum. Indeed, in its Draft Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy of 1 
July 1998, the Austrian Presidency suggested a worrying shift fi"om an asylum 
system based on the right of the individual to protection to one where, at its 
discretion, the State may offer protection to a person or group at risk^\ 
Reassuringly, in its Memo 98/55 on the Implementation of the Amsterdam treaty of 
15 July 1998, the Commission took the opposite view and stressed the importance 
of the 1951 Convention as the basis for the right of the individual to seek 
international protection^ .^
As already mentioned, there are two types of transfers of responsibility, namely 
internal and external transfers. The purpose of the following sections is to examine 
how these may be reconciled with the right to seek refugee status. It is argued that
See The Austrian Presidency's Draft Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy of 1 July 
1998 referred in the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, European Update; September 
1998, at p.5.
See the European Commission's Memo 98/55 of 15 July 1998 on the Implementation of the 
Amsterdam Treaty in Immigration and Asylum, ibid., at p. 7-8.
The Commission's supported the “communautarisation” of asyliun matters (see chapter II on the 
EC: a more suitable framework).
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this necessitates the establishment of a “safety test” consistent with international 
refugee law.
2.1. Internal transfers of responsibility: the Dublin Convention
The adoption of the Dublin Convention was prompted by the approach of the 31 
December 1992 deadline for the abolition of border controls on individuals 
travelling within the EU territory provided for in Article 7A of the TEC. The 
Convention was perceived as a necessary countermeasure.
The Convention was designed to establish a common framework for determining 
which is the Member State accountable for the examination of a given asylum claim. 
To this end, the Convention sets out criteria designed to identify that Member State. 
Where an asylum claim fails to initially reach the Member State held responsible 
under the Convention criteria, the Member State wrongly solicited will, in principle, 
pass on the claim to the former State.
The transfers organised by the Dublin Convention were not a novelty. Chapter 7 of 
the Schengen Agreement of 19 June 1990 on the responsibility for the processing of 
applications for asylum contained similar provisions. Furthermore, in many cases 
Member States had concluded readmission agreements between themselves 
according to which asylum seekers could be sent back to another Member State if 
they had passed through that State on their way to the Member State in which they 
intended to apply for refugee status. However, with the entry into force of the 
Dublin Convention on 1 September \991^\ readmission agreements between 
Member States ceased to apply. As to the coexistence of the Dublin Convention and 
the Schengen Agreement, it is clear that, as a Convention concluded between the 
Member States, the effect of the former could not be undermined by an instrument 
negotiated outside the EC framework^^ To this end was adopted the Protocol on
The Dublin Convention entered in force on 1 October 1997 for Austria, Finland and Sweden, OJ 
L 194/1, 20/06/1998.
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the consequences of the Dublin Agreement coming into effect for some regulations 
of the Schengen Supplementary Agreement of 26 April 1994, referred to as the 
Bonn Protocol. The Bonn Protocol clarifies the conditions under which, as the 
result of its entry into force, the Dublin Convention replaces the provisions of the 
Schengen Agreement on asylum^ .^ The focus is therefore on the system established 
by the Dublin Convention.
The Dublin Convention was branded by its drafters as an instrument designed to 
prevent the situation of refiigees in orbit by allocating responsibility for the 
examination of asylum claims lodged within the EC or at its borders to a specific 
Member State. The system established by the Dublin Convention was supposed to
The Bonn Protocol was adopted on the basis o f Article 142 of the Schengen Agreement. The 
Protocol was designed to conciliate the provisions of the said Agreement with those o f conventions 
concluded between the Member States in relation to the completion o f an area without internal 
frontiers. Article 142 of the Schengen Agreement reads:
“1. Wlien Conventions are concluded between the Member States of the European Communities 
with a view to the completion of an area without internal frontiers, the Contracting Parties shall 
agree on the conditions under which the provisions o f the present Convention are to be replaced or 
amended in the light of the corresponding provisions of such Conventions.
The Contracting Parties shall, to that end, take account of the fact that the provisions of this 
Convention may provide for more extensive co-operation than tliat resulting from the provisions of 
the said Conventions.
Provisions which are in breach of those agreed between the Member States of the European 
Communities shall in any case be adapted in any circumstances.
2. Amendments to this Convention deemed necessary by the Contracting Parties shall be subject to 
ratification, acceptance or approval. The provision contained in Article 141(3) shall apply, it being 
imderstood that the amendments will not enter into force before the said Conventions between the 
Member States o f the European Communities come into force.”
The prevalence of the Dublin Convention over the asylum chapter o f the Schengen Agreement 
can be welcome in the sense that asylum issues will not be directly affected by the troublesome 
incorporation o f the Schengen acquis into the EU (see the Protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam 
integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union).
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prevent situations where asylum seekers are successively referred from Member 
State to Member Sate without any of them accepting to endorse responsibility. The 
Convention also aimed at dissuading successive or concurrent applications 
submitted by the same individual in more than one Member State.
The purpose of this section is to assess the impact of the mechanisms established by 
the Dublin Convention on refugee protection. Doubts have been raised as to its 
compliance with international standards regarding refugee protection. Under the 
pretext of securing examination, the drafters of the Dublin Convention have actually 
deprived asylum seekers from the right to lodge multiple applications. In their 
opinion, this loss is largely compensated by the certainty that their claim will be 
considered. However, in the absence of a comprehensive harmonisation of asylum 
procedures in line with international refugee law, the Dublin Convention is believed 
to have a detrimental effect on the right to seek refugee status as it makes access to 
substantive asylum procedures more difficult.
Before addressing issues regarding the effectiveness, legality and appropriateness of 
the Dublin Convention, it is necessary to describe the system that it sets up.
2.1.1. The Dublin Convention system
The system established by the Dublin Convention rests upon the principle that 
asylum claims lodged within the EC or at its borders must be considered by a single 
Member State. This principle is enunciated in Article 3(1) and (2); it reads;
“1. Member States undertake to examine the application of any alien who applies at 
the border or in their territory to any one of them for asylum.
2. That application shall be examined by a single Member State, which shall be 
determined in accordance with the criteria defined in [the Dublin Convention]. The 
criteria set out in Articles 4 to 8 shall apply in the order in which they appear.”
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The Convention enumerates a number of criteria designed to identify the Member 
State held responsible. The Member State in question shall undertake this duty in 
accordance with both the Dublin Convention and its own national law. Indeed, the 
purpose of the Convention is confined to allocating responsibility within the EC; the 
Convention does not establish common asylum procedures. Asylum claims are 
therefore determined pursuant to the national law of the Member State held 
responsible.
However, the principle enshrined in the Dublin Convention is not absolute as an 
asylum claim may be examined by another Member State than the one designated by 
the Convention criteria. Firstly, the Convention contains an “opt-out” option that 
entitles Member States to examine applications for asylum although it is not 
incumbent upon them to determine the claims in question under the Convention 
criteria (Articles 3(4)) and 9). Secondly, Member States retain the right to send 
asylum seekers to a third country pursuant to their national laws (Article 3(5)).
(i) The criteria for determining the responsible Member State
The criteria listed in Articles 4 to 8 are not alternative criteria, but must be applied 
in the order set out in the Dublin Convention (Article 3(2)). Although the first 
criterion is based on the asylum seeker's personal links with a particular Member 
State, provided that the individual concerned so agrees (Article 4), the Convention 
establishes a strong connection between Member States’ individual responsibility 
for asylum seekers’ presence in the EC and their accountability for examining their 
claims (Article 5 to 7).
Unlike the other Convention criteria, the criterion laid down in Article 4 rests upon 
asylum seekers’ personal circumstances and not upon border control considerations. 
Under Article 4, where a member of the asylum seeker's family has been granted 
refiigee status by a Member State and is a legal resident of that State, the Member 
State in question is accountable for considering his or her application for asylum 
(Article 4(1)). A family member is defined as a spouse, an unmarried child who is a
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minor under the age of eighteen or his or her father or mother where the asylum 
seeker is himself or herself an unmarried child who is a minor under the age of 
eighteen (Article 4(2)). Article 4 is obviously based on the concept of family 
reunion and is therefore welcome. The implementation of this criterion contributes 
to the protection of the right to family life, a right that the Member States, as 
signatories of the ECHR^° inter alia, are bound to enforce regardless of the 
nationality or status of those involved. However, one must bear in mind the limits of 
this criterion as most asylum seekers fall within the scope of the other criteria.
As already mentioned, the Convention criteria are, with the exception of the first 
criterion, based on the strong correlation made between responsibility for dealing 
with an asylum claim and the circumstances of the applicant's entry into the EC 
territory. Responsibility is construed as a consequence of the issue of official 
documents by Member States to asylum seekers or as a repercussion of the Member 
States’ failure to prevent their illegal entry into the EC.
In principle, where an asylum seeker has a valid resident permit (Article 5(1)) or a 
valid visa (Article 5(2)), the State that issued the document in question is 
responsible for examining the asylum claim. However, there are several exceptions 
to this principle. Where the grant of the visa necessitated the written authorisation 
of another Member State, this State must process the claim (Article 5(2)(a)). Where 
the asylum seeker lodged his or her claim with a Member State while being issued a 
transit visa by another one, the latter State is held responsible (Article 5(2)(b)).
Article 8 of the ECHR protects the right to respect for private and family life; it reads;
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for Iris private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as 
in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for tire prevention o f disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of  
others.”
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Finally, where the application was submitted in the Member State that issued the 
transit visa after securing in consultation with the State of destination that the 
asylum claimant met the conditions of entry into its territory, the latter State is 
responsible (Article 5(2)(c)). Specific rules exist to deal with individuals having 
more than one valid document issued by different Member States (Article 5(3))^’. In 
cases where the asylum seeker has one or more recently expired visas (less than six 
months previously) or residence permits (less than two years previously), the rules 
relating to valid documents apply so long as the asylum seeker has not left the 
ten itory of the Member State (Article 5(4), first Paragraph). Where the documents 
are long expired (more than two years for residence permits and more than six 
months for visas), the application for asylum shall be processed in the Member State 
where it was initially introduced (Article 5(4), 2nd Paragraph).
Generally accountable for the determination of asylum claims lodged by people in 
possession of documents issued by them, the Member States face also responsibility 
in the event of deficient border checks. Where it can be proved that an asylum 
seeker has irregularly crossed the external border of a Member State, that Member
Article 5(3) of the Dublin Convention reads:
“3. Where the applicant for asylum is in possession of more than one valid resident permit or visa 
issued by different Member States, the responsibility for examining the application for asylmn 
shall be assumed by the Member States in tlie following order:
(a) the State which issued the residence permit conferring the right to the longest period of 
residency or, where the periods of validity o f all the permits are identical, the State which issued 
the residence permit having the latest expiry date;
(b) the State which issued the visa having the latest expiry date where the various visas are of the 
same type;
(c) where visas are of different kinds, the State which issued the visa having tlie longest period of 
validity, or where the periods o f validity are identical, the State which issued the visa having the 
latest expiry date. This provision shall not apply where the applicant is in possession of one or 
more transit visas, issued on presentation of an entry visa for another Member State. In that case, 
that Member State shall be responsible.”
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State is under the obligation to consider his or her application (Article 6, Paragraph 
1). However, if the applicant has been living in the Member State with which his or 
her claim was introduced at least six months before applying, responsibility is 
incumbent upon the latter State (Article 6, Paragraph 2).
Article 7 provides for various exceptions to the principle according to which 
Member States are accountable for examining applications lodged by individuals 
whose entry into the EU falls under their control. Of particular relevance is the 
exception relating to asylum claimants’ presence in transit zones of Member States’ 
airports. Under Article 7(2), pending the coming into force of an agreement 
between the Member States on arrangements for crossing external borders, 
responsibility for controlling entry cannot be inferred from the fact that a Member 
State has allowed an asylum seeker to go through its transit zone without a visa as 
long as the applicant does not leave that zone. However, where the asylum claim is 
actually made in a Member State’s airport while the applicant is in transit, the 
Member State concerned is held responsible for its examination (Article 7(3))^ .^
Following the entry into force of the Dublin Convention, the Council of the 
European Union adopted a Text on the means of proof in the framework of the 
Dublin Convention^^ The object of this instrument was to give examples of proof to 
be used with a view to implementing the Dublin Convention. Concern was 
expressed regarding recourse to excessive proof requirements that would delay the
Article 7(1) provides another exception to the connection established between responsibility for 
border control and responsibility for examining an asylum claim; it reads:
“1. The responsibihty for examining an application for asylum shall be incumbent upon the 
Member State responsible for controlling the entry into the territory of the Member States, except 
where, after legally entering a Member State in which tlie need for him or her to have a visa for 
entry is waived, the alien lodged his or her application for asylum in another Member State in 
which the need for him or her to have a visa for entry into the territory is also waived. In tliis case, 
the latter State shall be responsible for examining the application for asylum.”
Text adopted by the European Council 20 June 1994 on the means of proof in the framework of 
the Dublin Convention, OJ C 274/35, 19/09/96.
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identification of the Member State held responsible. This was considered 
incompatible with the celerity required under the Convention system and seen as 
entailing the risk of creating a new category of refugees in orbit. With this in mind, 
the text recommends that “[rjesponsibility for processing an asylum application 
should in principle be determined on the basis of as few requirements of proof as 
possible.” '^’ The text suggests that the Member States should be prepared to assume 
responsibility on the basis of indicative evidence (Paragraph I), In order to provide 
guidelines to the Member States, two lists of possible means of proof are annexed 
to the Text, subject to revision (Paragraph II). List A sets out the means of 
probative evidence^^ Unlike List A, List B is not exhaustive and contains indicative 
evidence the probative value of which is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis^ ®. 
Subsequently, the Supervisory Committee established under Article 18 of the 
Dublin Convention adopted Decision Number 1/97 of 9 September 1997 
concerning provisions for the implementation of the Conventions^ The Decision 
aims, inter alia, at assisting Member States in the collection of evidence to 
determine the State responsible (Chapter IV). The Decision includes an Annex III 
List A - Means of proof in seven areas: evidence that a family member has refiigee 
status in one Member State, evidence that the applicant has a valid resident permit, 
evidence regarding valid visas, illegal entry, departure from a Member State, 
evidence of residence in a Member State and regard to the time of the application. 
In List B is found the “indicative evidence” as regards the topics and includes for 
example as evidence of illegal entry hotel bills, entry cards for public or private 
institutions in the Member States and appointment cards for doctors or dentists.
Ibid., Paragraph!.
Ibid., Annex to Annex III.2.
Ibid.
Decision Number 1/97 of 9 September 1997 of the Committee set up by Article 18 of the Dublin 
Convention of 15 June 1990, concerning provisions for the implementation of tlie Convention, OJ 
L 281/1, 14/10/1997.
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Finally, where none of the Convention criteria can be applied, responsibility lies 
with the first Member State with which the application for asylum was lodged 
(Article 8).
(ii) Exceptions to the principle set out in the Dublin Convention
There are exceptions to the rule according to which the Member State designated 
by the Convention criteria shall examine the asylum claim. A Member State may 
decide to assume responsibility although it is not bound to do so under the 
Convention criteria. A Member State may also in line with the Convention and its 
national law send an asylum seeker to a third country.
Article 3(4) offers the Member States the possibility to consider an asylum claim 
even where the Convention criteria point at another Member State, provided that 
the applicant agrees. The effect of this “opt out” clause is to transfer the asylum 
claim to the State which wishes to examine it. The right to depart from the 
Convention system is confirmed by Article 9 which, unlike Article 3(4), mentions 
the reasons why a Member State may decide to process a particular asylum claim; 
Article 9 reads;
“Any Member State, even when it is not responsible under the criteria laid out in the 
Convention, based in particular on family or cultural grounds, examine an 
application for asylum at the request of another Member State, provided that the 
applicant so desires (...)”
The Convention does not limit the exercise of the right to “opt-out”. This 
“openness” of the Dublin Convention is welcome since this “opt-out” clause has the 
potential to serve asylum seekers’ interests. This idea is reinforced in a twofold 
manner. Firstly, the implementation of the “opt-out” clause in both Articles 3(4) and 
(9) is subject to the asylum claimant’s agreement. Secondly, Article 9 stresses the 
significance of “family” and “cultural grounds” in relation to the State’s 
endorsement of responsibility. This provision can be regarded as echoing the first
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criterion of the Convention (Article 4) although the scope of the latter is strictly 
limited. The latter infers Member States' responsibility from the fact that they have 
granted refiigee status to asylum seekers’ relatives who are now legally residing in 
their territory. It is suggested that asylum seekers’ personal circumstances should 
not be dismissed when tackling asylum issues. This “opt-out” clause is therefore 
seen as a provision that may correct the potential negative effects of criteria 
essentially based on the Member States’ respective obligations regarding control at 
the EC external borders. This idea is reinforced by the fact that the applicant's 
consent is required for the “opt-out” clause to operate. The reasons for limiting the 
scope of Article 4 lie with the fact that its implementation will generally generate 
responsibility. Article 4 and Article 9 differ in their consequences on the extent of 
the responsibility assumed: the former imposes an obligation to examine the claims 
falling within its scope whereas the latter allows the States to consider claims at 
their discretion. The Member States would have been reluctant to see their 
responsibility inferred from broadly defined links existing between themselves and 
asylum claimants.
Unlike the first exception to the Dublin Convention system, the second one is 
believed to have the potential to undermine the right to seek refugee status.
Article 3(5) of the Dublin Convention authorises the Member States to remove 
asylum seekers to a third country in accordance with their national legislation. This 
provision very much appears as a concession granted to the Member States and the 
EC as a whole. It is argued that Article 3(5) is likely to be inconsistent with one of 
the main objectives pursued by the drafters of the Dublin Convention. Indeed, in the 
Preamble to the Convention, it is expressly stated that the Convention is designed, 
inter alia, to secure the determination of asylum claims lodged within the EC or at 
its borders by a Member State, thus reducing the number of refiigees in orbit. This 
persistence of the Member States’ right to send asylum seekers to third countries 
prior to an examination amounts to an implicit recognition of the precedence of 
external transfers over internal ones. This assertion is confirmed in the Resolution 
on a harmonised approach to questions concerning host third countries referred to
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as the Resolution on host third countries^ ®. The Resolution leaves no doubt as to the 
prioritised application of the host third country principle as it provides that it shall 
precede any kind of substantive determination of the asylum claim concerned 
(Paragraph 1(a)). In other words, the Resolution establishes a hierarchy between the 
safe third country principle and the Convention mechanism to the advantage of the 
former (Paragraph 3). It follows from Paragraph 3(a) of the Resolution that it is for 
the Member State where the asylum claim is lodged to decide on the application of 
the safe third country principle. Although a Member State may not decline its 
responsibility on the ground that the requesting Member State should have removed 
the applicant to a third country (Paragraph 3(b)), the former retains the right to 
carry out such removal itself under its national laws (Paragraph 3(c)); this provision 
constitutes a formal endorsement of Article 3(5) of the Dublin Convention. The 
potential limits to the implementation of the host third country principle inserted in 
Paragraph 3(b) are thus undermined by Paragraph 3(c).
The combined effect of the Dublin Convention and the Resolution on host third 
countries gives priority to external transfers over internal transfers of competence. 
This comes as no surprise considering the Member States’ determination to cut 
down the numbers of asylum seekers knocking at the door of the EC.
2.1,2. The Dublin Convention: a failure
Originally regarded as the first essential step towards harmonisation, the Dublin 
Convention soon started to face attacks emanating from those concerned about its 
impact on refugee protection, but also from those who initiated its conclusion. The 
Convention aimed at securing the examination of asylum claims lodged within the 
EU or at its borders by a single Member State. This principle was elaborated in the 
context of the achievement of an area without internal frontiers and was designed to 
ensure the consistency of EU and EC measures on asylum with this particular 
objective. The Convention was presented by its drafters as a “refugee-friendly”
Resolution on a harmonised approach to questions concerning host third coimtries, supra n. 1.
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instrument the aim of which was to offer certainty to asylum claimants as to the 
determination of their claims avoiding successive referrals and thus agonising 
delays. Its purpose was also to contribute to shortening the decision-making 
process.
Has the Dublin Convention kept its promises and brought effectiveness by 
organising the allocation of asylum claims between Member States while protecting 
asylum seekers’ best interests?
It is argued that not only does the Convention fail to provide the Member States 
with an effective system for the distribution of asylum claims amongst themselves, it 
also undermines the right to seek refugee status.
(i) The Dublin Convention: a defective system...
The system established by the Dublin Convention aimed at identifying and 
transferring asylum claims to the Member States held responsible for their 
examination “as quickly as possible”. However, soon after its entry into force, it 
became evident that the Member States were facing serious problems when trying 
to implement the Convention. Two main difficulties were identified and soon 
acknowledged by the Member States themselves. Determining the Member State 
responsible under the Convention criteria had proven to be an arduous task and, as 
a result, the Member States felt unable to meet the strict time-limits of the 
Convention.
The problems faced by the Member States in applying the Dublin Convention are 
inherent in the Convention itself, but are also caused by inconsistencies in the 
asylum policy developed within the intergovernmental framework. As already 
observed, the Convention criteria are mainly based on the Member States’ 
responsibility for external border checks. To some extent, responsibility under the 
Dublin Convention can be perceived as a sanction for letting asylum seekers into the 
EC either voluntarily or involuntarily. As already mentioned, the conclusion of the
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Convention was followed by measures designed to intensify documentation 
requirements and impose carrier sanctions^ .^ These restrictive measures contributed 
to cutting down the numbers of asylum applicants within the EC by rendering 
access to its territory increasingly difficult. The specificity of asylum seekers’ 
situation was dismissed. Indeed, people seeking refugee status are often unable to 
approach the competent authorities in order to obtain the required documents and, 
since the need for international protection remains, some will resort to forged 
documents or will travel undocumented. As a result, the Member States started to 
face an increase in the numbers of undocumented or inappropriately documented 
asylum seekers. The Member States misjudged the “expected deterrent” effects of 
these requirements on asylum seekers’ determination to find refuge; this should 
have been foreseen by the Member States. The requirements in question had 
another serious and worrying “side-effect”. They boosted the development of illegal 
networks “specialised” in smuggling asylum seekers into the EC.
In these circumstances, the Member States faced growing difficulties in applying the 
criteria laid down in the Dublin Convention. Indeed, these criteria are mainly based 
on the assumption that asylum seekers' route into the EC can be easily tracked. The 
imposition of excessively strict travel document requirements drives asylum seekers 
to resort to illegal means in order to reach the EC territory. This makes it very 
difficult for Member States to determine the asylum seekers’ itinerary with a view 
to applying the Convention criteria, unless the first criterion applies. The system set 
up by the Convention works where asylum seekers are “caught” attempting to cross 
an external fi-ontier. Once they have crossed internal borders, determining their 
route becomes increasingly complex. Where there is no clear evidence of their 
itinerary, there is no clear evidence of responsibility under the Convention criteria. 
If Member State authorities cannot apply the various criteria, the Convention 
system is inoperative and asylum claims are examined by the Member State with 
which they were initially lodged (Article 8) unless an external transfer is carried out.
The problems raised by documentation requirements imposed on asylum seekers and carrier 
sanctions are discussed in section 1 of tlie present chapter.
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There is no doubt that Article 8 was supposed to be used as a last resort. To a 
considerable extent, the difficulties faced by the Member States in implementing the 
Dublin Convention are the result of their eagerness to restrict asylum seekers’ 
access to their territory. Initially regarded as a key instrument of the EU asylum 
policy, the Dublin Convention remains to date of limited use. Only 2 to 3% of the 
applications for asylum lodged within the EC result in requests for a transfer of 
responsibility under the Convention provisions'' .^
The Member States’ increasing difficulties in identifying asylum seekers from their 
documents prompted discussions in 1994 on the adoption of a Convention designed 
to help to address this problem. The Eurodac Draft Convention was designed to 
create a data-bank of the fingerprints of all asylum seekers at the external borders of 
the EC with a view to detecting concurrent or successive applications for asylum; 
this data-bank was to be called “Eurodac”. The Council reached an agreement in 
December 1998, but decided that the text of the Convention should be adopted as 
an EC measure after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam However, 
Eurodac will be ineffective in cases of illegal entry; this major drawback has been 
acknowledged by the Member States themselves. The Member States’ attempt to 
improve the implementation of the Dublin Convention by introducing a deficient 
system is quite “pathetic”''^ . The Member States appear to be “in denial”; they seem
40 See the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, European Update: June 1998, at p. 1.
See the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, European Update: March 1998, at p. 2-3. 
See also Community preparatory acts, Document 500PC0100, Amended proposal for a Council 
Regulation concerning the establishment of “Eurodac” for the comparison of the fingerprints of 
applicants for asylum and certain other third-country nationals to facilitate the implementation of  
the Dublin Convention and Amendments 599PC0260, Document delivered on 03/04/2000. On the 
decision to adopt the text of tlie Eurodac Draft Convention in the forai of an EC measure after the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, see JHA Council Press Release, 3-4 December 1998.
Besides, the cost of operating the Eurodac Convention and that of tlie teclmical measures 
necessary to its implementation are still uncertain. Moreover, in addition to the controversy it 
creates as an accessory to the Dublin Convention, tlie Eurodac Convention is now at the centre of
200
unable or unwilling to admit that the strong document requirements imposed on 
asylum seekers not only have a detrimental effect on those seeking refugee status in 
the EC, but also jeopardise the achievement of some of the primary objectives of 
the EU and now EC asylum policy. It is argued that a relaxation of documentation 
requirements currently imposed on asylum seekers would facilitate the operation of 
the Dublin Convention by reducing to a certain extent the numbers of 
undocumented applicants.
It is suggested that, in distributing asylum claims amongst Member States, greater 
use of the principle of solidarity''  ^ should be made as a means to assist Member 
States which may face important numbers of asylum claims. Article 63(2)(b) of the 
EC Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam refers implicitly to the principle 
in question. Indeed, this article provides that, within five years of the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, measures “promoting a balance of efforts 
between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving 
refugees and displaced persons” should be adopted. Although this provision is to be 
welcome, it is argued that its scope has been unnecessarily limited as it does not 
seem to apply to asylum seekers. However, in a proposal for a Council decision 
creating a European Refiigee Fund'*'^ , the target groups are defined as comprising 
persons applying for refugee status, but only where appropriate'^^ Asylum seekers
another quarrel regarding a possible extension of its scope to illegal immigrants (see the Austrian 
Presidency's Draft Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy, see supra n. 25, at p. 13).
The principle of solidarity, previously referred to as the burden sharing principle, has been and 
remains a cause of disruption following strong opposition from France and the UK and remains a 
controversial issue. This is why the principle of solidarity has not been thoroughly incorporated 
into the TEC by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
Community preparatory acts, Document 599PC0686, proposal for a Council Decision creating a 
European Refugee Fund, 1999.
Ibid., Article 1. The target groups also include persons who have been granted refiigee status 
within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as well as displaced persons, defined as tliird country
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do not therefore appear to be a priority in that respect. It is argued that the 
principle of solidarity should extend to issues relating to asylum seekers. However, 
this requires a change of attitude on the part of the Member States. Indeed, they 
should give up their individualistic approach to the Dublin Convention that consists 
of solely perceiving it as a means to transfer responsibility to another Member 
State. Using the wording of Article 63(2)(b) with regard to asylum seekers, the 
allocation of asylum seekers amongst Member States should take place on the basis 
of a “balance of efforts between Member States in receiving and bearing the 
consequences of receiving” asylum seekers.
The Member States also struggle to meet the Convention time-limits primarily 
because of the difficulties they face in identifying the Member State responsible. The 
ambition of the Dublin Convention was to set up a system characterised by its 
celerity. With this in mind, the different steps of the process are subject to strict 
time-limits sanctioned in terms of responsibility. A Member State which considers 
that an asylum claim lodged with it comes under the responsibility of another 
Member State should contact that State as quickly as possible and in any case 
within six months following the date of the introduction of the claim. Failure to 
meet the six months deadline will result in the requesting State being held 
responsible (Article 11(1)). The requested Member State must come up with a 
decision on the request vrithin three months; failure to give an answer within this 
time-limit will amount to an acceptance of the transfer of responsibility (Article 
11(4)). The transfer itself must take place within a month of the acceptance by the 
requested Member State or within a month of the conclusion of any proceedings 
initiated by the asylum seeker challenging the decision to transfer his or her claim 
(Article 11(5)). The cumulative effect of the time-limits set by the Dublin 
Convention means that the whole process of transferring an application for asylum 
to the Member State held responsible under the Convention criteria may take up to 
ten months. A ten-month delay may not in itself appear “unreasonable”, but it must 
be remembered that, at that stage, no decision has yet been taken on the outcome of
nationals or stateless persons benefiting from temporary protection arrangements in a Member 
State.
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the asylum claim. It is a well-established fact that, even before the entry into force 
of the Dublin Convention, national competent authorities already felt overloaded 
and faced shortages of resources. The system established thus appears to be more of 
an additional burden than a helpful rationalising instrument.
Besides creating problems for Member States, the Dublin Convention undermines 
refiigee protection.
(ii) ... detrimental to refugee protection
The Dublin Convention was also presented as an instrument designed to serve 
asylum seekers’ best interests. In contributing to the reduction of the numbers of 
refiigees in orbit, the Convention was considered to address the needs of both the 
Member States and asylum seekers. With respect to the latter, the purpose of the 
Convention was to guarantee that their claim would be examined by one Member 
State. However, the manner in which the Dublin Convention operates is not only 
problematic for the Member States, it also seriously threatens refugee protection. It 
is argued that the legal safeguards necessary to secure the compliance of the 
Convention with international refugee law have not yet been provided. In their 
absence, the Convention system undermines the right to seek refugee status in the 
EC. The Dublin Convention fails to guarantee the substantive examination of the 
claims lodged at the borders or within the EC. Moreover, it also removes asylum 
seekers’ right to lodge multiple applications in the absence of compensatory 
measures counteracting the effects of this loss. The pitfalls of the system lie with the 
Convention itself but also with the weaknesses of the asylum policy developed at 
European level.
One of the purposes of the Dublin Convention was to secure examination by a 
single Member State. As already stressed in Section 2.1.1(ii), the Convention 
provisions give priority to external transfers over internal transfers as Member 
States are entitled to remove asylum seekers to a third country according to their 
national laws (Article 3(5)).
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Moreover, the Dublin Convention deprives asylum seekers from their right to lodge 
multiple applications for asylum without offering compensatory measures. It is 
argued that, for this loss to be compatible with international refugee law, it is vital 
that asylum seekers are guaranteed access to satisfactory asylum procedures 
regardless of the State responsible for examining their claim. This requires the 
adoption of harmonised procedures or, at least, the introduction of minimum 
procedural standards with a view to securing compliance with international refiigee 
law throughout the EC. Indeed, before the coming into force of the Dublin 
Convention, the disparities between national procedures could, to a certain extent, 
be compensated by the fact that individuals could seek refugee status in more than 
one Member State. The need for minimum procedural standards was formally 
acknowledged in the communiqué following the Justice and Home Affairs 
Ministers’ meeting chaired by the UK Presidency on the 28 and 29 May 1998"  ^
However, to date, the Member States have mainly concentrated on the 
harmonisation of fast-track procedures. In 1995, the Member States adopted the 
Resolution on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures'^^ However, the measure 
is incomplete, unsatisfactory in terms of refugee protection and lacks legal 
authority. The new Title IV on visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related 
to free movement of persons of the TEC can offer a more reliable basis for the 
adoption of such standards''^ Article 63(l)(d) EC provides for the adoption within a 
period of five years of minimum procedural standards in the Member States for 
granting or withdrawing refugee status in accordance with the 1951 Convention and 
its Protocol.
46 See, supra n. 25, at p. 1.
Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures, OJ C 
274/13, 19/09/1996.
The potential impact of the provisions introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty on asylum 
procedures are further examined in chapter V on fair and effective procedures.
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Another major pitfall of the internal transfers organised by the Dublin Convention 
made worse by the loss of the right to submit multiple applications is that the safety 
of the Member State where the asylum seeker is to be removed is assumed without 
the necessary checks being carried out"^ .
The compliance of the Dublin Convention with international refugee law also 
supposes a harmonised interpretation of the term refugee. The Council agreed on a 
definition in the Joint Position on the harmonised application of the definition of the 
term “refugee” in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1851 relating to 
the status of refugees^ ®. Unfortunately, the content of the “Joint Position” is not 
always consistent with international standards^'.
It is argued that, if the system established by the Convention is to remain, drastic 
changes are needed in order to turn the Convention into an effective and fair 
instrument. Suggestions have gone as far proposing its abandonment. However, the 
current official position is not that radical; it stresses the urgent need to significantly 
improve its implementation. Improving the operation of the Dublin Convention has 
been part of the successive EU Presidencies^  ^and was on the agenda of the Austrian
49 This issue is examined in greater detail later in section 3 of the present chapter.
Joint Position of 4 March 1996 defined by the Comicil on the basis o f Article K.3 of the Treaty 
on European Union on the harmonized application of the definition of the term “refugee” in 
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugees, OJ L 63/2, 
13/03/1996.
See chapter III on the need for up to date interpretation of the term “refiigee”.
The improvement o f the system established by the Dublin Convention was part of the working 
Programme o f the UK Presidency (Januaiy-June 1998) known as the 46 Point Plan. The 46 Point 
Plan was adopted following the Kurdish refugee “crisis”. In January 1998, a fairly small number 
of Iraqi and Turkish Kurds reached Italy; their arrival prompted a very strong and rather 
disproportionate reaction from the Member States.
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Presidency in July 1998. The Member States’ attachment to criteria and 
mechanisms designed to identify the Member State responsible for considering an 
asylum claim is expressed in Article 63(l)(a) EC; under this Article, such measures 
must be adopted within five years. It is argued that the wording of Article 63(l)(a) 
is flexible enough to allow changes and amendments to the current system. The 
suspension of the adoption of a Convention parallel to the Dublin Conventions^, 
although it was temporarily envisaged '^', is regarded as a very wise move; indeed, 
there is no point in extending a defective system beyond the external fi*ontiers of the 
EC. A significant improvement of the Convention requires changes in the system 
itself; but a more global approach is also needed. This system must be understood in 
the light of a comprehensive asylum policy in line with international refijgee law. A 
partial harmonisation of asylum matters will only produce partial and thus 
unsatisfactory results often detrimental to the right to seek refugee status. It is 
argued that the EC offers a more appropriate fi-amework for the adoption of a 
comprehensive EC legislation on the right to seek refugee status^ .^ Measures should 
be adopted on the basis of Article 63(l)(a) EC with a view to replacing or, at least, 
amending and supplementing the Dublin Convention.
Although the Member States were anxious to set up rules designed to allocate 
responsibility amongst themselves, their primary objective appeared to be the 
removal of asylum seekers to third countries before substantive examination.
A Draft Convention parallel to the Dublin Convention was agreed on 15 June 1990, for the text 
see Key Texts on Justice and Home Affairs in the European Union, Volume 1 (1976-1993) From 
Trevi to Maastricht, a Statewatch publication edited by Tony Bunyan, London, 1997, at p. 55-60.
However, a parallel agreement to the Dublin Convention was again envisaged following the 
Kurdish refugee “crisis” that prompted the adoption of a 46 Point Plan (see supra n. 41, at p. 3).
See chapter II on the EC: a more suitable framework.
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2.2. External transfers of responsibility: removals to third countries prior to 
substantive consideration
Asylum seekers’ removals to third countries prior to the substantive examination of 
their application for asylum had become common practice in a number of Member 
States and was formally introduced in the EU asylum policy through the Resolution 
on host third countries^®. Like internal transfers of responsibility, external transfers 
raised the issue of their compliance with international refiigee law.
External transfers of responsibility can constitute a real threat to refugee protection 
in the absence of adequate safeguards. They may well jeopardise the fundamental 
right to seek refugee status in denying asylum claimants access to substantive 
procedures and expose them to further persecution. Indeed, in extreme cases, 
external transfers have resulted in asylum seekers being returned to their country of 
origin without being given the opportunity to submit their claim. Besides, when 
taking place in unsuitable circumstances, removals to third States are likely to 
generate further refiigees in orbit and thus contribute to the expansion of “buffer 
zones”. Finally, removals to third countries may also weaken refugee protection 
because of the increased pressure imposed on the EC neighbouring States 
regardless of their capacity to cope with the EC “unwanted guests”^\ These 
countries may not have the legal systems and structures necessary to deal with 
growing numbers of asylum seekers. In reaction to these new arrivals, these 
countries have started to tighten their asylum laws and resort to external transfers 
themselves. This shows that the asylum policy elaborated in the EU, and now the 
EC, and its Member States has an impact beyond their borders.
Most external transfers of responsibility take place through the implementation of 
the safe third country principle. However, removals to third countries can also be
See supra n. 1.
Tills is for instance the case of Eastern and central European countries, particularly when they 
have signed a readmission agreement (see tliis chapter, section 2.2.2.).
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carried out pursuant to readmission agreements between the Member States and 
third countries. This section will concentrate on the drawbacks of external transfers 
as currently carried out by Member States.
2.2.1. The safe third country principle
The safe third country principle is construed as an umbrella concept which embraces 
a number of practices. Disagreements as to the exact meaning and content of the 
safe third country principle are evidenced in the lack of consistency in the 
terminology used. Often presented as similar, the various expressions relating to the 
safe third county principle may differ significantly in their consequences for asylum 
seekers. In that respect, the concept of host third country introduced in the 
Resolution adopted by the EC Immigration Ministers^  ^must be distinguished from 
the concept of first country of asylum developed by UNHCR. These issues are 
examined later in the section.
Considering its importance in some national asylum policies and its role in cutting 
down the numbers of asylum seekers within the EC, the Member States felt the 
need to harmonise their approaches to the principle of safe third country. With this 
in mind, they adopted the Resolution on host third countries^ ®.
Unfortunately, the Resolution appears as a failure on two accounts: firstly, it fails to 
achieve harmonisation and, secondly, it lacks adequate criteria and safeguards. 
Considerable divergences between the Member States’ practices persist. Some 
Member States make little or no use of the safe third country principle while others 
rely upon it heavily. Finally, other Member States have opted for an intermediate 
approach. Moreover, the content of the Resolution fails to supply the necessary 
basis for substantive harmonisation. Indeed, the Resolution does not say much
See supra n. 1.
Ibid.
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about what amounts to a safe third country besides stating that it must provide 
effective guarantees against refoulement.
The object of the Resolution on host third countries was to give a common 
definition, interpretation and application of the concept of “host third country” and 
devise the procedural bases for its implementation.
It is argued that the principle of safe third country, as construed by the Resolution, 
unlike the concept of first country of asylum, is not consistent with international 
standards. Indeed, whereas the latter supposes that protection is secured in the third 
country, the Resolution allows external transfers on a much broader basis. Transfers 
may take place, inter alia, where asylum seekers have had an opportunity at the 
border or within the territory of the third country to make contact with its 
authorities in order to seek protection there (Paragraph 2(c)). Transfers may also 
occur where there is clear evidence of the asylum seeker's admissibility to a third 
country (Paragraph 2(c)). This is particularly worrying with regard to asylum 
seekers in transit who may be regarded as having had such an opportunity where, in 
practice, they were unable to approach the competent authorities. In this respect, 
there are great divergences between the Member States®®. Some Member States 
attach no or little consequence to transit through a third country; this is, for 
instance, the case of Belgium, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands and Finland. Other 
Member States, on the contrary, generally consider that transit through a third State 
means that asylum seekers have had the opportunity to seek refugee status there. 
This is the case of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Austria. A 
connection between the numbers of asylum claims lodged with a Member State and 
the treatment reserved to asylum seekers in transit can be established; indeed, it 
appears that Member States dealing with high numbers of asylum claims tend to
On the divergences existing between the Member States’ approaches to asylum seekers in transit 
and their impact on refugee protection, see Steve Peers, Mind the Gap! Ineffective Member State 
Implementation o f  European Union Asylum Measures, Immigration Law Practitioners’ 
Association, May 1998, at p. 17-20.
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construe transit as entailing an opportunity to apply for refugee status. This means 
that, in the Member States concerned, passengers in transit in search of protection 
are, in principle, expected to seek protection in the country of transit regardless of 
the length of their stay in the transit zone. It is argued that, in extreme cases, such 
an attitude seriously undermines the right to seek refugee status by depriving 
individuals of their right to claim asylum. A number of factors need to be taken into 
consideration in order to assess the existence of an opportunity to submit a claim. 
Firstly, attention must be paid to the duration of asylum seekers’ stay in the transit 
zone. Mere transit is sometimes deemed sufficient despite asylum seekers’ inability 
to make contact with competent authorities. Indeed, this supposes that asylum 
seekers know that they are expected to lodge their asylum claim in the country of 
transit. It is therefore important that they are told that that country is the one 
responsible for examining their case; they should be given the information in a 
language they understand®^
The Resolution on host third countries also refers to clear evidence of asylum 
seekers’ admissibility to a third country (Paragraph 2(c)); but the Resolution does 
not give any further explanation. However, one may distinguish this situation from 
cases where protection has been granted and cases where there had been an 
opportunity to make contact with the competent authorities with a view to seeking 
refugee status. It is argued that the issue of admissibility constitutes an unnecessary 
source of complexity and concern. The view taken is that admissibility cannot stand 
alone, but should be regarded as inherent in the grant of protection or in the 
existence of an effective opportunity to seek refugee status.
The main pitfall that external transfers of responsibility must absolutely avoid is to 
deprive individuals from their right to seek refiigee status. As argued in section 3, 
consistency with international standards is contingent on transfers, both internal and 
external, passing a safety test.
These issues are examined in greater detail in chapter V on fair and effective procedures.
210
It follows from the combined effect of the Resolution on host third countries and 
the Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum that the application 
of the concept of host third country is exclusive of any substantive examination of 
asylum claims. Pursuant to Paragraph 1(b) of the former Resolution® ,^ where an 
asylum claim falls within the scope of the Resolution on host third countries, the 
claim in question is, in principle, considered manifestly unfounded and thus 
channelled to a fast-track procedure. This mechanism is described in Paragraph 1 of 
the Resolution on host third country that reads:
“1. The Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum, adopted by 
Ministers meeting in London of 30 November - 1 December 1992, refers to in 
Paragraph 1(b) to the concept of host third country. The following principles should 
form the procedural basis for applying the concept of host third country:
(a) The formal identification of a host third country in principle precedes the 
substantive examination of the application for asylum and its justification.
(b) The principle of the host third country is to be applied to all applicants for 
asylum, irrespective of whether or not they may be regarded as refugees.
(c) Thus, if there is a host third country, the application for refugee status may not 
be examined and asylum applicants may be sent to that country.
62 Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications, see supra n. 4.
Paragraph 1 (b) of the Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum reads: 
“Furthermore, without prejudice to the Dublin Convention, an application for asylum may not be 
subject to determination by a Member State of refugee status under the terms of the Geneva 
Convention on the Status of Refiigees when it falls within the provisions of the Resolution on host 
third countries adopted by Immigration Ministers meetings in London on 30 November and 1 
December 1992.”
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(d) If the asylum applicant cannot in practice be sent to a host third country, the 
provisions of the Dublin Convention will apply.
(e) Any Member State retains the right, for humanitarian reasons, not to remove the 
asylum applicant to a host third country.
Cases falling within this concept may be considered under the accelerated 
procedures provided for in the aforementioned Resolution.”
Member States have been eager to adopt measures on so called fast-track 
procedures with a view to securing and strengthening the role played by such 
procedures. Unfortunately, these procedures have been a constant source of 
disquiet as they undermine the right to seek refijgee status. In that respect, the 
current degree of differentiation operated between fast-track and substantive 
procedures is unacceptable in the light of international refugee law®^ .
To date, asylum seekers’ removals to third countries prior to substantive 
examination following the principle of safe third country principle remain a very 
serious source of concern. This is due to unsatisfactory policies, legislation and 
practices at EC and national level; the current situation calls for urgent changes.
Concern has also been raised with regard to external transfers resulting from the 
implementation of readmission agreements.
2.2.2. Readmission agreements
Asylum seekers’ removals to third countries prior to the consideration of their 
asylum claim may also occur as a result of the implementation of readmission 
agreements. The main purpose of these agreements is to secure the readmission of
63 These issues are examined in greater depth in chapter V on fair effective procedures.
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foreigners who find themselves in an irregular situation in a State into the territory 
of the country held responsible for their illegal presence. As already mentioned, with 
the entry into force of the Dublin Convention, the readmission agreements 
concluded between the Member States became obsolete. Nowadays, readmission 
agreements take the form of bilateral agreements signed between Member States 
and third countries in which asylum seekers originate or through which they have 
transited. In that respect, the Council of the European Union adopted the 
Recommendation of 30 November 1994 concerning a specimen bilateral 
readmission agreement between a Member State and a third country, referred to as 
the Recommendation on a specimen bilateral readmission agreement®" and the 
Recommendation of 24 July 1995 on the guiding principles to be followed in 
drawing up protocols on the implementation of readmission agreements, referred to 
as the Recommendation on guiding principles®®.
The primary object of readmission agreements is to confront Contracting Parties 
with their responsibility for the illegal entry and residence of foreigners on the 
territory of the other Contracting Party. These agreements are not confined to the 
return of the Contracting Parties' nationals. The wording of the Recommendation 
places both Contracting Parties on an equal footing in terms of obligations. 
However, this formal equality is misleading; indeed, equality does not exist with 
regard to migration flows. Where Member States and certain third countries, such 
as Poland, are concerned, migration flows are very much a one way movement 
originating in the third countries and moving towards the Member States. Hence, in 
such cases, the requesting Contracting Party is generally a Member State and the 
requested Contracting Party a third country. Readmission agreements may therefore 
impose very stringent obligations on some third countries. It is not surprising that 
the preamble to the Recommendation in question exclusively refers to the Council's
®" Council Recommendation of 30 November 1994 concerning a specimen bilateral readmission 
agreement between a Member State and a third country, OJ C 274/20, 19/09/96.
®® Council Recommendation of 24 July 1995 on the guiding principles to be followed in drawing 
up protocols on the implementation o f readmission agreements, OJ C 274/25, 19/09/96.
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determination to fight unauthorised immigration to the Member States. The 
difficulties that some third parties may face in implementing readmission agreements 
are not acknowledged.
Readmission agreements are not asylum instruments per se, but tools designed to 
combat unauthorised immigration to the Member States” as stressed in the 
preamble to the Recommendation on a specimen bilateral readmission agreement. 
The Recommendation provides for the readmission of three categories of aliens. 
Firstly, each Contracting Party commits itself to readmit its own nationals at the 
request of the other Contracting Party where they do not or not longer fulfil the 
conditions for entry or residence on the territory of the latter State (Article 1)®®. 
Secondly, each Contracting Party undertakes to readmit third country nationals who 
do not or no longer meet the conditions for entry or residence on the territory of the 
other Contracting Party where the persons in question have accessed the said
®® Article 1 of the Council Recommendation concerning a specimen bilateral readmission 
agreement between a Member State and a third country (see supra n. 64) reads:
“Readmission o f own nationals 1. Each Contracting Party shall readmit at the request of the other 
Contracting Party and witliout any formality persons who do not, or who no longer, fiilfil the 
conditions in force for entry or residence on the territory of the requesting Contracting Party 
provided that it is proved or may be validly assumed that they possess the nationality of the 
requested Contracting Party. The same shall apply to persons who have been deprived from the 
nationality of tlie requested Contracting Party since entering the territory of die requesting 
Contracting Party without at least having been promised naturalization by the requesting 
Contracting Party.
2. Upon application by the requesting Contracting Party, the requested Contracting Party shall 
without delay issue the persons to be readmitted with the travel documents required for their 
repatriation.
3. The requesting Contracting Party shall readmit such persons again imder the same conditions if  
checks reveal that they were not in possession o f the nationality of the requested Contracting Party 
when they departed from the territory of the requesting Contracting Party. This shall not apply if  
the readmission obligation is based on the fact that the requested Contracting Party deprived the 
person in question o f its nationality after that person had entered the territoiy of the requesting 
Contracting Party without that person at least having been promised naturalization by the 
requesting Contracting Party.”
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territory via the external frontier of the former State (Article 2(1)). The notion of 
external frontier is understood as referring to the first border that has been crossed 
which is not a frontier common to the Contracting Parties (Article 2(2)). The 
readmission obligation does not apply where the individuals concerned have been 
issued a valid residence permit by the requesting Contracting Party before or after 
their entry on its territory (Article 2(3)). Finally, the Contracting Parties agree to 
readmit the third country nationals whose entry they are responsible for; namely the 
persons who were granted a valid visa or residence permit by the requested 
Contracting Party while not or no longer fulfilling the conditions for entry or 
residence on the territory of the requesting contracting Party (Article 3(1))®\ 
However, this provision does not apply with regard to transit visas (Article 3(3)).
The Recommendation on a specimen bilateral readmission agreement imposes very 
strict time-limits on the requested Contracting Party. The latter is under the 
obligation to respond to readmission requests without delay, and in any case within 
a maximum of 15 days (Article 5(1)). The requested Contracting Party must also 
take charge without delay of the individuals whose readmission has been agreed. 
This time-limit may be extended upon application by the requesting Contracting 
Party in order to deal with legal or practical obstacles (Article 5(2)). The strict time­
limits to be met by the requested Contracting Party contrast with the “life span” of 
the readmission obligation. Indeed, pursuant to Article 6, the requesting 
Contracting party has one year to submit an application for readmission from the 
time it noted the illegal entry or residence of the person concerned on its territory. 
There is no mention of a time-limit regarding the duration of the individual's stay on 
the territory of the requesting Contracting State after which the readmission 
obligation would lapse. This obviously serves the objectives of the Member States 
as requesting Contracting Parties. The introduction of time-limits relating to the 
length of the illegal stay would have seriously undermined the effect of readmission 
agreements in the sense that such time-limits would have seriously reduced the
Article 3(2) provides that “[i]f both Contracting Parties issued a visa or a residence permit, 
responsibility shall reside with the Contracting Party whose visa or residence permit expires last.”
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numbers of persons who could be readmitted. The Member States’ determination to 
obtain prompt réadmissions is also apparent in the Recommendation on guiding 
principles. Paragraph 1(1) in fine of the Recommendation expressly stresses that 
”[t]he need for simplicity and speed should be the prime concern.” To this end, the 
Recommendation provides for two types of return/readmission procedures: a 
simplified procedure Paragraph 1(2) and a normal procedure 1(3). Despite the use of 
the term “normal”, the Recommendation seems actually to give its preference to the 
simplified procedure. Unlike the personal scope of the latter procedure, the personal 
scope of the normal procedure is defined in a negative manner. Indeed, “[t]his 
procedure is applicable where a person cannot be returned or readmitted under the 
simplified procedure” (Paragraph 1(3), first sentence). The Recommendation 
expressly specifies that the individuals apprehended in a border area will be 
returned/readmitted under the simphfied procedure (Paragraph 1(2), first sentence). 
The simplified procedure is to take place within very short time-limits. Although the 
Recommendation does not set any time-limits as such, it refers to the time-limit 
agreed in some readmission agreements, i.e. a maximum of forty-eight hours 
(Paragraph 1(2), third sentence). At to the time-limits regarding the normal 
procedure, the Recommendation refers to the fifteen days time-limit set by Article 
5(1) of the Recommendation on a specimen bilateral readmission agreement. Where 
a simplified procedure is applicable, the formalities are reduced to a minimum; there 
is no writing requirement®*, the sole formality requirement imposed on Contracting 
Parties in the context of a normal procedure (Paragraph 1(3))®^ .
®* Paragraph 1(2), fourth sentence, of the Reconunendation on guiding principles (see supra n. 65) 
provides:
“Formalities for the return of a person should be simplified in the case of this procedure. 
Notification of the return would be given in any form (by telephone, fax, telex or orally) and it 
would be carried out directly by the local border authorities.”
®® Paragraph 1(3), second sentence, o f the Recommendation on guiding principles reads:
“The readmission request should be made and the answer given in writing (...)”
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It is argued that the Recommendation on a specimen bilateral readmission 
agreement may have a detrimental effect on the right to seek refugee status both 
directly and indirectly: directly in the sense that asylum seekers may be subject to 
readmission decisions inconsistent with international refugee law and indirectly in 
the sense that the overall impact of readmission agreements on certain third 
countries seems to be ignored.
Although the Recommendation on a specimen bilateral readmission agreement does 
not specifically target asylum seekers, some of its provisions have a direct impact on 
them. Asylum seekers may in certain circumstances be the object of readmission 
requests. This statement has become even more accurate with the increase in 
documentation requirements imposed on asylum seekers. Asylum seekers are often 
unable to obtain the required travel documents and, therefore, put themselves in an 
irregular position. The possession of a valid residence permit issued by the 
Requesting Contracting Party renders its demand for readmission void. However, 
the definition of the term residence permit for the purpose of Articles 2(3) and 3 of 
the Recommendation on a specimen bilateral readmission agreement expressly 
excludes temporary permissions to reside on the territory of one of the Contracting 
Parties in connection with the processing of an asylum application (Article 4). 
Therefore, a Contracting Party, in practice, a third country, may be requested to 
readmit an asylum claimant in case of irregular entry or residence via its external 
fi'ontier on the territory of the other Party to the agreement despite the issue by the 
latter State of a temporary authorisation to reside there. Likewise asylum seekers 
who were issued a valid visa or residence permit by the requested Contracting Party 
cannot rely upon a temporary permission to reside in order to prevent the 
readmission.
The fact that the Recommendation does not contain provisions that exclusively 
apply to asylum seekers is typical of the Member States’ failure to acknowledge the 
specificity of asylum seekers’ circumstances. The only positive concession to the 
preservation of the right to seek refiigee status is limited to a formal recall of the 
States’ obligations under the 1951 Convention (Article 11(1)). As already stressed.
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this is not sufficient to ensure compliance with the Convention provisions. The 
impact of the Recommendation articles on people seeking refugee status reflects the 
EU's restrictive approach to asylum matters. Asylum seekers’ best interests are not 
taken into consideration, nor are those of third countries party to such agreements. 
With respect to asylum seekers, readmission agreements are, in many instances, 
just another method for the Member States to discharge themselves from this 
unwanted “burden”.
In order to secure compliance with international refugee law, it is argued that 
readmission agreements should only be concluded with third countries which obey 
international refugee law and respect human rights principles at large. 
Unfortunately, to date, the Member States’ political determination to cut down the 
numbers of asylum seekers and combat illegal immigration largely prevails over 
refugee protection and human rights considerations. Moreover, since the Member 
States tend to assume the safety of the third countries party to readmission 
agreements, they are to channel asylum claims submitted by nationals of these 
countries to fast-track procedures. This illustrates the importance of securing the 
availability of procedures meeting international standards^ ®. The Recommendation 
on a specimen bilateral readmission agreement offers no safeguard to asylum 
seekers in particular and readmitted persons in general. The Recommendation only 
recalls the Contracting Parties’ obhgations under the 1951 Convention and other 
instruments relating to the rights of non-nationals (Article l i y \  However, such 
declarations do not in themselves guarantee States’ effective commitment. In its 
Preamble, the Council specified that the specimen readmission agreement was to be
70 See chapter V  on fair and effective procedures
The other instruments referred to in the Recommendation concerning a specimen bilateral 
agreement between a Member State and a third country (see supra n. 64) are;
- the ECHR;
- international conventions on extradition and transit;
- international conventions on asylum, in particular the Dublin Convention; and
- international conventions and agreements on the readmission of foreign nationals.
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used with flexibility by the Member States and that it could be adapted to the 
particular needs of the Contracting Parties. It is argued that readmission agreements 
should comprehend detailed provisions designed to protect the rights of asylum 
seekers and other categories of foreigners. Another source of disquiet is the silence 
of the Recommendation on the possibility for the people concerned to dispute the 
decision regarding their readmission.
There is no mention in the two Recommendations concerning readmission 
agreements of the difficulties that some third countries may face in readmitting 
increasing numbers of foreigners who have entered or resided illegally in a Member 
State. They may lack the necessary structures and financial resources to cope with 
the situation. It is argued that the flexibility that the Recommendation allows in 
order to adapt the agreement to the needs of the Contracting Parties should be used 
to take into consideration the difficulties that third countries may have. For 
instance, the problems that they may encounter in controlling their external 
frontiers, as expected under the Recommendation, should be acknowledged. As 
already observed, the asylum and immigration policy of the EU (and now the EC) 
and its Member States do have an impact on the policy of neighbouring third 
countries, in particular Central and Eastern European countries. In March 1991, a 
protocol of readmission was signed with Poland and other neighbouring States 
while other readmission agreements were still in preparation. One may wonder why 
third countries accept such constraining readmission obligations. At their meeting in 
Birmingham in early 1998, the EU interior ministry officials made it clear that, in 
order for accession negotiations to be open with Central European countries, they 
would have to do more to secure their Eastern borders. In Warsaw, the EU Single 
Market Commissioner, Mario Monti, told Polish officials that Poland’s chances to 
become an EU Member States partly depended upon how well Polish authorities 
could police their borders. Eastern and Central European Countries’ acceptance of 
inequitable readmission agreements is dictated by their political aspiration to 
eventually join the EU. The changes in the Polish border control policy are typical 
in this respect. For 35 years, Poland had a very liberal attitude regarding free 
movement on its Eastern border. However, Poland's desire to become a Member
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State prompted drastic changes. In the Polish Government's view, tightening 
controls at its Eastern frontier would boost its chances to join the EU. It is 
interesting to note that electronic passport-reading equipment was installed at the 
Polish eastern frontier with the help of EU funds. Under pressure from Brussels and 
Germany, many aspiring Member States are restraining free passage and imposing 
increasingly restrictive visa requirements and bureaucratic obstacles’^  Poland’s 
reaction is not unique: similar trends in the border control and visa policies have 
been for instance observed in the Czech Republic and Slovenia ®. This shows that 
the asylum policy of the EU, and now the EC, has an impact on refrigee protection 
beyond its frontiers; this reinforces the need for comprehensive legislation on the 
right to seek refrigee status in line with international refugee law.
It is argued that external transfers of responsibility irrespective of their origin as 
well as internal transfers should be conditional on them a passing a safety with a 
view to preserving the right to seek refugee status.
3. An imperative pre-requirement: the “safety test”
The purpose of this section is to devise the conditions of compliance of external as 
well as internal transfers of responsibility with international refugee law and the 
changes needed in order to achieve this goal. It is argued that, since it is a sine qua 
non condition to any transfer of responsibility, safety should be assessed in the same 
way irrespective of the identity of the State concerned. Thus, where an asylum 
seeker is to be removed to a Member State, that Member State should be subject to 
the same safety test as a non-Member State.
As already mentioned, the compliance of transfers of responsibility with 
international refugee law is seriously questioned; this is an issue central to their
Ian Traynor, “Fortress Europe shuts window to the East”, The Guardian, 9 February 1998, at p. 
10.
Ibid.
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upholding. It is therefore vital that these practices are subject to strict conditions 
and close monitoring.
With this in mind, it is argued that transfers of responsibility must not be construed 
as tools allowing the Member States to disregard their obligations under 
international refugee law. This means that Member States which want to carry out 
such transfers must verify prior to removal whether the asylum seeker's rights will 
be fully enforced by the Sate where he or she is to be sent; if this cannot be secured, 
the transfer must not take place.
This safety test supposes that safety criteria are devised and safeguards provided.
3.1. Safety criteria
It is argued that safety is contingent on compliance with three fundamental 
requirements: compliance with the 1951 Convention and other relevant instruments 
(such as the ECHR), comprehensive protection against refoulement, and existence 
and access to asylum procedures meeting international standards.
In order to assist them in assessing safety, the Member States adopted the 
Conclusions on countries in which there is generally no serious risk of persecution; 
these are referred to as the Conclusions’". According to the Conclusions 
(Paragraphs 4 and 5), in assessing safety, the Member States may take into 
consideration a number of factors: previous numbers of refugees and recognition 
rates, observance of human rights, the existence of democratic institutions, stability, 
and assessments of the risk of persecution emanating from a wide range of sources.
’" Conclusions on countries in which there is generally no serious risk of persecution adopted by 
the Ministers of the Member States of the European Communities at their meetings in London on 
30 November to 1 December 1992, in European Parliament, Asylum in the European Union: tlie 
“safe countiy of origin principle”. People's Europe Series, November 1996, Annex III at p. 33-37.
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These include UNHCR, diplomatic missions, international and non-governmental 
organisations as well as press reports.
The Conclusions suffer from a number of drawbacks owing to their scope, i.e. the 
States that may be assessed, and to the safety criteria laid down. The latter will be 
examined in the course of this section. The Conclusions are intended to apply to 
third countries, not Member States. This reflects the strong safety presumption 
enjoyed by the Member States; the dangers of such a strong presumption are 
highlighted in this section.
Although the proposed test differs from the one suggested in the Conclusions, some 
of the chosen criteria embrace elements referred to in the Conclusions. However, 
the positive aspects of the Conclusions are undermined by their lack of binding 
effect.
In determining whether a State complies with the 1951 Convention, it is not 
sufficient for Member States wishing to carry out transfers to confine their 
investigations to formal adherence. In other words. Member States must check 
whether the practices of the contemplated States of destination satisfy the 
Convention requirements. Moreover, the human rights record of these States must 
also be taken into consideration; this means evaluating the States’ practices in that 
respect. The protection of individuals’ rights as asylum seekers cannot be 
dissociated from the protection of their human rights. Human rights are actually 
mentioned in the Conclusions (Paragraph 4(b)). The Conclusions rightly regard 
States’ readiness to allow monitoring by NGOs of their human rights observance as 
an indicator of their commitment to the protection of human rights. It is argued that 
removing asylum seekers to countries where their safety cannot be ensured would 
amount to a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. Indeed, Article 3 requires the 
signatory parties, which include all the Member States, to protect individuals who 
find themselves within their jurisdiction against torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. It is interesting to note that the Resolution on host third 
countries mentions that “[t]he asylum applicant must not be exposed to torture or
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inhuman or degrading treatment in the third country” (Paragraph 2(b)), although the 
Resolution does not expressly refer to the ECHR.
The importance of human rights standards was also stressed in the 
Recommendation establishing guidelines on the application of the safe third country 
concept adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe’®. 
Paragraph 1 of the Recommendation, third countries must comply with human 
rights standards understood as entailing the prohibition of torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment. In other words, commitment to human rights implies, inter 
alia, compliance with Article 3 of the ECHR. It is argued that, as suggested by 
Paragraph 1 of the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe, human rights records should be measured against the standards set by 
the ECHR, even if the third countries concerned are not signatories to the 
Convention.
Unlike the Conclusions (Paragraph 2(c)), the proposed safety test does not present 
the existence of democratic institutions as an autonomous criterion. However, this 
does not mean that this factor is discarded. On the contrary, it is argued that it is 
vital to look at this issue when assessing States’ commitment to human rights. This 
element will also be taken on board when determining whether satisfactory asylum 
procedures are available.
The Conclusions also refer to previous numbers of refugees and recognition rates as 
an element to be taken into account when determining whether a country is safe. 
The view taken is that such figures must be handled with extreme caution. It is not 
contested that high figures will suggest a serious risk of persecution and other 
human rights violations. However, there is a high risk that lower figures will be 
interpreted as establishing a strong safety presumption. Considering Member States’ 
restrictive approaches and practices when it comes to considering asylum claims, 
giving too much credit to these figures could lead to erroneous safety assessments.
’® Recommendation No. R (97) and explanatory memorandum adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Comicil of Europe on 25 November 1997, Council of Europe, Legal Issues.
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The second element of this safety test relates to the principle of non-refoulement. 
This principle is enshrined in the 1951 Convention (Article 33). So why making this 
principle an autonomous element of the safety test? This is intended to emphasise 
the importance of the principle of non-refoulement which is actually reflected in its 
legal status. Indeed, UNHCR and many scholars consider that this principle 
constitutes a customary rule of international law’®. Thus, this principle can be 
regarded as binding on countries which may not have signed the 1951 Convention.
Observance of the principle of non-refoulement is the main criterion to be met by 
third countries according to the Resolution on host third countries. Besides being 
recalled in the Preamble to the Resolution, the imperative need to protect asylum 
seekers fi'om refoulement is reiterated in Paragraph 2(a) and (d) as well as in 
Paragraph 2 in fine. However, the principle is not part of the factors mentioned in 
the Conclusions with a view to assessing safety.
It is argued that, for protection against refoulement to be effective, the principle 
must be fully observed by both the Member State intending to carry out the removal 
and the State where the asylum seeker is to be sent. Such a requirement may be 
inferred fi-om Paragraph 2(d) of the Resolution on host third countries; it reads that 
“[t]he asylum applicant must be afforded effective protection in the host third 
country against refoulement, within the meaning of the Geneva Convention.” 
However, this provision has not prevented Member States from enforcing practices 
inconsistent with the principle of non-refoulement. For instance, concern was raised 
with regard to practices in force in France and Belgium. It was not the safety in 
France and Belgium that was a source of disquiet, but the fact that these countries 
had removed asylum seekers to third countries in breach of the principle of non- 
refoulement. The 1996 Immigration and Asylum Act allowed immigration 
authorities to expel immediately people claiming asylum at ports of entry to the 
“safe third country” through which they had arrived. In the five months before the
’® See the introduction, chapter I.
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entry into force of the 1996 Act, appeal adjudicators allowed 60 of 62 claimants to 
remain in the UK. Their decision was based on evidence that immigration officers 
both in France and Belgium were sending asylum seekers back to their country of 
origin without giving them the opportunity to lodge their claim to remain. Judge 
Davis Pearl declared that “[i]t ha[d] been a matter of growing disquiet among the 
adjudicators this year that in individual cases, France and Belgium [were] unsafe 
countries for asylum seekers to be returned to. As a result, there ha[d] been a 
tendency to refer more cases to the Home Office with a recommendation that the 
full asylum claim be heard here”” .
The asylum rules introduced in the 1996 Act were challenged in the test case R v 
Secretary o f State for the Home Department and another, ex parte Canbolaf^. The 
applicant, a Turkish citizen of Kurdish origin, travelled through France to the UK. 
She arrived at Waterloo Station from Paris and claimed refugee status there. She 
had travelled overland from Osmaniye in south-western Turkey, but did not know 
which countries other than France she had visited. The day following her arrival in 
the UK, the Secretary of State issued a certificate pursuant to Section 2(2) of the 
1996 Act”  ordering her to return to France, a safe country where she would be able
”  For instance, in early 1996, France was cauglit trying to remove to Pakistan an asylum applicant 
Mohamed Iqbal. He had been returned to France from the UK for his asylum claim to be heard 
there. Only the intervention of a French lawyer prevented his being sent back to his country of 
origin where he claimed he faced persecution (see James Hardy and Ian Henry, “Judges challenge 
new immigration rules”. Electronic Telegraph, http://www/telegraph.co.uk, 29 September 1996).
i? V Secretary o f  State fo r the Home Department and another, ex parte Canbolat, 14 February 
1997, The Times, 24 February 1997 confirmed by the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [1997] 1 
WLR 1569.
”  Pursuant to Section 2(2) of the 1996 Act, in order for the Home Secretary to certify that a third 
country is safe, the said country has to meet three conditions; “(2) [t]he conditions are (...)
(a) that the person is not a national or citizen of the comitry or territory to which he is to be sent;
(b) that his life and liberty would not be threatened in that country or territory by reason of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion; and
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to submit her asylum claim in line with the requirements of the 1951 Convention. As 
a result, she was refused leave to enter into the UK and was served a removal order 
to France with no possibility to lodge an appeal against that decision from within 
the UK*®. Section 2(3) of the 1996 Act removes the asylum seekers’ right to bring 
or pursue an appeal from within the UK where they are returned to countries 
considered safe; in that respect. Section 2(3) expressly refers to the Member States 
as safe countries. The applicant challenged this new rule and argued that France 
could not be regarded as a safe country because of the risk of being returned to her 
country of origin or another State without her case being adequately examined by 
the French authorities. The Council for the applicant accused the then Home 
Secretary, Michael Howard, of acting ‘Unreasonably and unlawfully” in certifying 
that France was a safe third country and failing to properly consider evidence that it 
was not the case. The concern raised with regard to France and other Member 
States did not relate to a risk of persecution within their territory, but to 
unsatisfactory practices resulting in asylum seekers being sent to their country of 
origin or a third country without having had the opportunity to exercise their rights. 
In other words, the disquiet so created regarded compliance with the principle of 
non-refoulement. In a decision of 14 February 1997, two High Court Judges ruled 
that the Home Secretary was entitled to return the applicant to France*’. Lord 
Bingham, the Lord Chief Justice, sitting with Mr Justice Moses took the view that 
Michael Howard had not acted irrationally and unlawfully in declaring that France 
constituted a safe third country. The High Court's decision later confirmed by the 
Court of Appeal*  ^was welcome relief for the Government as an important number 
of asylum seekers arrived from France. A different ruling would have affected 
hundred of pending cases in which the safety of France, but also Belgium, Italy, The
(c) that the government of that country or territory would not send him to another country or 
territory otherwise tlian in accordance with the Convention.”
*® Issues relating to the right of appeal are discussed in chapter V on fair and effective procedures. 
*’ See supra n. 78.
82 Ibid.
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Netherlands and Germany was challenged*®. The French authorities’ practices were 
held to conform to UK law and international standards regarding refrigee 
protection. It was decided that the inability of France to comply with Section 
2(2)(c) of the 1996 Act could not be inferred from a handful of ill-practices. The 
Court of Appeal considered that a reference to the Iqbal case was not in itself 
sufficient to support the view that France was not a safe third country*". Ali Iqbal 
had travelled via France to the UK where the Secretary of State certified that his 
claim was unfounded on the ground that France was a safe third country. When he 
returned to France, his appeal having been dismissed, officials at the Paris 
Prefecture misapplied the procedures so that his application for asylum was ignored. 
A removal order was served, apparently in the absence of an interpreter, and 
attempts were made to forcibly place him in a plane. However, the captain of the 
plane refiased to take responsibility for his presence on board. As a result of the 
press publicity given to his case, Mr Iqbal finally succeeded in lodging his asylum 
claim with the French authorities. The Court of Appeal conceded that “[t]his was 
obviously a serious departure from proper standards but [that] it ha[d] to be seen in 
the context of France having to deal with more than 20,000 asylum applications in 
each of the last 10 years. Furthermore, account ha[d] to be taken of the fact that the 
proportion of successful applications [was] higher in France than in any other 
Member State”*®. It was stressed that no State was able to provide an infallible 
system politically and that French practices were usually satisfactory. However, the 
safety of some Member States was again challenged before English courts. This 
time the Court of Appeal in a judgment of 23 July 1999*® ruled that the Home 
Secretary had acted unlawfully in ordering the return of two asylum seekers to
*® Terence Shaw, “Judges back Howard over “safe” asylum”. Electronic Telegraph, 
http://wwww.teIegraph.co.uk, 15 February 1997,
*" See supra n. 77.
* ® J W .
*® The judgement o f the Court of Appeal is referred to in the Council of Europe, Doc. 8598 of 21 
December 1999, see supra n. 17.
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Germany and France in the absence of a substantive examination of their claim, 
France and Germany had already rejected their applications on the ground that they 
were based on fear of persecution by non-State agents. These Member States, 
unlike the UK, do not recognise non-State persecution as a ground for granting 
refugee status*’. For this reason, the Court of Appeal concluded that France and 
Germany could not be regarded as “safe third countries”.
These cases involving Member States show that safety should never be taken for 
granted even in the case of Member States. There is a strong tendency to consider 
that Member States not only constitute safe countries of origin, but also safe third 
countries**. Assessing the safety of another Member State may be regarded as a 
potentially charged exercise. However, if the Member States comply with 
international standards, standards that should be those of the EC as a whole, there is 
no reason why assessing their safety should be a source of embarrassment or 
tension.
Finally, for a State to be considered safe, adequate and accessible asylum 
procedures must exist. The term adequate refers to procedures satisfying
*’ The issue of non-State persecution is examined in chapter III on the need for an up to date 
interpretation o f the term “refugee”.
** For instance, the Protocol on Asylum for Nationals of Member States of the European Union 
declares that tlie Member States shall be regarded as constituting safe countries of origin. As a 
result asylmn claims emanating from EC nationals shall only be examined by Member States in 
exceptional circumstances (sole Article). This (ywag/-exclusion is discussed in chapter 111 on the 
need for an up to date interpretation of the term “refugee”.
It is also interesting to note that the Dublin Convention does not cover claims submitted by EC 
nationals as the Convention provisions only apply to claims lodged by aliens defined as persons 
other than nationals of a Member State (Article 1(a)).
The assmnption that the Member States constitute safe countries is also enshrined in domestic law. 
For instance, as already mentioned, Section 2(3) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1996 
expressly states that the Member States are safe countries.
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international standards*®. However, it is argued that the existence of adequate 
procedures does not in itself ensure that substantive examination of the asylum 
claim will take place. Access to such procedures is a critical issue and has been a 
growing source of concern, in particular with regard to asylum seekers in transit®®. 
The Resolution on host third countries specifies, inter alia, that “[i]t must be the 
case that the asylum applicant has already been granted protection in the third 
country or has had an opportunity, at the border or within the territory of the third 
country, to make contact with that country's authorities in order to seek their 
protection, before approaching the Member State in which he is applying for 
asylum, or that there is clear evidence of his admissibility to a third country” 
(Paragraph 2(c)). The concepts of “effective opportunity” and “clear evidence of 
admissibility” are particularly worrying in the case of asylum seekers in transit.
The right to seek refugee status supposes that asylum seekers are in a position to 
approach the competent authorities and that they are informed of the procedure to 
be followed in a language they understand®’. As already stressed, some Member 
States will expect asylum seekers in transit to apply for asylum in the country of 
transit regardless of the length of their stay in the transit zone. It is argued that, in 
certain cases, such attitudes seriously undermine refugee protection by depriving 
individuals of their right to claim refugee status. A number of factors need to be 
taken into consideration in order to assess the existence of an opportunity to submit 
a claim. Firstly, attention must be paid to the duration of the asylum seeker's stay in 
the transit zone. Mere transit is sometimes deemed sufficient to conclude that the 
asylum seeker could have applied in the country of transit regardless of issues of 
time and knowledge. Indeed, for an asylum seeker to be able to submit his or her 
claim in the country of transit, he or she must have the time to do so. Furthermore,
89 The reader is referred to chapter V  on fair and effective procedures.
®® The expression “asylum seekers in transit” essentially refers to asylum seekers who find 
themselves in airport transit zones.
®’ These issues are examined in chapter V on fair and effective procedures.
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he or she must also be aware of the fact that he or she is expected to apply in that 
country. Considering the little knowledge, if any, that asylum applicants have of 
asylum procedures in addition to the stress generated by the situation, it is 
suggested that the information should be conveyed to potential asylum seekers, in a 
language they understand, if an effective opportunity to seek protection is to exist®^ .
Paragraph 2(c) of the Resolution on host third countries also refers to the concept 
of clear evidence of the asylum seeker's admissibility to a third country as an 
alternative to the grant of protection in a third State or the opportunity to make 
contact with the authorities of a third State in order to seek protection. As in the 
case of an “opportunity to make contact”, the Resolution does not give any 
indication as to the meaning of the words “evidence of admissibility”. It results from 
the wording that the concept of evidence of admissibility must be distinguished from 
the concepts of protection and opportunity to make contact. This is most 
unfortunate as, it is argued, the issue of admissibility should be envisaged together 
with the issues of protection and opportunity to seek such protection. Indeed, the 
grant of refrigee status in a State supposes that the asylum seeker has been admitted 
into the territory of that State. Likewise, the existence of an opportunity to make 
contact with the competent authorities suggests that the applicant will not be 
compelled to leave that territory before fully exercising his or her right to seek 
refugee status.
The view taken is that transfers of responsibility should be contingent on the 
contemplated country of destination, whether it is a Member State or a third 
country, satisfying the three safety criteria. However, compliance with these criteria 
does not in itself suffice, adequate safeguards must also be provided if safety is to 
be ensured
■Ibid.
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3.2. The safeguards
As removing States, the Member States must be held accountable for the transfers 
they may carry out. This has a number of consequences on the way safety criteria 
must be applied. Firstly, it is crucial for safety to be appraised on an individual basis. 
Indeed, safety is not an objective concept and must be appraised in the light of the 
asylum seeker's personal circumstances. Secondly, the individuals concerned should 
be given the opportunity to challenge the alleged safety of the State of destination. 
Thirdly, as an essential prerequisite to any transfer, the removing Member State 
should contact the authorities of the State of destination with a view to securing its 
consent to the transfer. Finally, it is imperative that the necessary checks are carried 
out prior to removal.
It is argued that the reliability of the safety test is contingent, inter alia, on the 
assessment taking place on an individual basis. The level of safety offered by a State 
may vary in fonction of the asylum seeker's background; factors such as ethnicity, 
gender or area of origin may considerably influence the degree of safety. In other 
words, a country safe for one applicant may be unsafe for another. Thus, in order to 
minimise the risk of erroneous assessments, asylum seekers’ personal circumstances 
need to be taken into consideration. This issue has become a serious source of 
concern with the development of so-called lists of safe third countries established by 
some Member State governments. As currently construed and used, these lists are 
considered to be a threat to the right to seek refogee status; indeed, they establish a 
strong safety presumption, not always founded®®, that asylum seekers will often find 
difficult to rebut. Such lists constitute additional hurdles for asylum claimants. The 
disquiet created by such practices is aggravated in the context of deficient safety 
tests. The criteria used to determine whether a State is safe are often unclear, 
insufficient and sometimes inappropriate; the whole process often lacks
®® Coiuitries with questionable human rights records such as India, Kenya and Pakistan have 
appeared on safe third country lists. See Amnesty International's position reported in European 
Parliament, Asylum in the European Union: the “safe country of origin principle”. People’s Europe 
Series, November 1996, at p. 22.
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transparency. The completion of such lists tends to give a rigid view of the situation 
in the listed third countries which is incompatible with the critical need for accurate 
information and thus regular updates. Safety for removal purposes is a subjective 
concept that cannot be the object of a final assessment. The UK Government's 
Immigration and Asylum White Paper called “Fairer, Faster and Firmer: A Modern 
Approach to Immigration and Asylum” proposed the abolition of the “white list of 
designated countries” with the entry into force of the Immigration and Asylum Act 
1999. Now that the Act is in force, it is hoped that the current Government will 
keep its promise. It is argued that, when appraising safety. Member States should 
give greater credit to the sources of information that international organisations 
such as UNHCR and NGOs. The importance of these sources was actually 
acknowledged in the Conclusions on countries in which there is generally no serious 
risk of persecution (Paragraph 5). Moreover, in determining whether a State is safe 
for an individual for removal purposes, particular attention must be paid to the issue 
of stability. This implies that for a country to be considered safe, the safety in 
question must present a certain degree of permanence. This requirement was 
recognised in the Conclusions as being an element of the assessment of the 
existence of a risk of persecution (Paragraph 4(d)). However, the potential positive 
impact of the Conclusions is undermined by their lack of binding effect.
Another essential safeguard lies with the possibility for asylum seekers to contest 
the alleged safety of the envisaged country of destination. This is particularly vital 
where unsatisfactory safety tests are applied and asylum claimants confi-onted with 
strong safety presumptions. Devising an infallible system is not a feasible task; 
however, the margin of error may be minimised through the introduction of a right 
of appeal. It is argued that the very nature of asylum and human rights at large 
should always be acknowledged and legally reflected in the rights and safeguards 
granted. It is suggested that, for the right to challenge decisions on safety to be 
effective, this right must be exercisable firom within and have suspensive effect®".
®" The reasons calling for a right of appeal from within with suspensive effect in the context of 
transfers of responsibility are the same as those requiring its existence in tlie context o f substantive
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A fiirther safeguard requires the Member States that wish to operate transfers of 
responsibility to secure the consent of the contemplated State of destination. In that 
respect, the Resolution on minimum guarantees on asylum procedures®®, provides 
that safe third countries must be informed, where necessary, when receiving an 
asylum applicant returned from a Member State that his or her claim has not been 
examined in substance®®. Although this provision constitutes a step in the right 
direction, it suffers from two major drawbacks. Firstly, its potential positive effect is 
undermined by its lack of binding effect. This explains why some Member States 
may not inform the country of destination that they have carried out a transfer of 
responsibility and have therefore not examined the asylum claim in substance. For 
instance, in France, the authorities will not normally inform the country of 
destination of the formal reasons for removing the individual®’. In the UEC, NGOs 
have reported that, contrary to the Government's affirmations, asylum seekers are 
not given a formal statement specifying that the merits of their application for 
asylum have not been examined®*. The second drawback of the provision lies with 
the fact that it does not go far enough. Indeed, it is argued that it is not sufficient to 
inform the country of destination of the transfer of responsibility. For transfers to be 
compatible with the right to seek refugee status, it is vital that the removing 
Member State secures the consent of the latter. In this context, the concept of 
consent is construed as encompassing the country of destination’s accord to 
consider the asylum claim is substance. In other words, consent is understood as 
meaning that the country concerned accepts to endorse responsibility for examining 
the asylum claim being transferred. Where transfers take place in the absence of the
asylum procedures, the reader is therefore referred to chapter V on fair and effective procedures 
where these issues are examined in depth.
®® See supra n. 46.
Ibid., Paragraph 22.
®’ See supra n. 60, at p. 16.
® * / W .
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required consent, the right to seek refugee status is seriously undermined as there is 
no guarantee that the application for asylum will be considered by the country of 
destination. The requirement regarding consent is necessitated by the need to secure 
that transfers are consistent with the right to seek refugee status.
Finally, although it may appear obvious, it is important to stress that all these 
checks must occur prior to removal. Checks a posteriori would be more difficult to 
carry out and thus would not allow an effective protection of asylum seekers’ 
rights. Furthermore, in many instances, removing Member States would not be in a 
position to remedy violations of the rights in question. This could mean individuals 
being subject to treatment contravening the provisions of the 1951 Convention. 
Member States cannot effectively protect asylum seekers’ rights and thus fulfil their 
obligations under international refugee law fi'om afar.
4. Conclusion
Restrictions on access to the EC territory and asylum procedures form part of a 
network of measures designed to cut down the numbers of asylum seekers in the 
EC. The first type of restrictions results from the imposition of documentation 
requirements on asylum seekers combined with carrier sanctions. It is argued that, 
as currently construed, these measures are incompatible with international refugee 
law as they ignore a fundamental fact: by definition, asylum seekers are not in a 
position to satisfy the requirements in question. Thus, a drastic change of direction 
is urgently needed in order to finally address the reality of asylum seekers’ situation. 
This is essential to the survival of the right to seek refugee status.
As to the second type of measures, restrictions on access to asylum procedures 
through transfers of responsibility, political pragmatism commands to acknowledge 
their existence; however, not at any price. In any case, should such practices 
jeopardise refugee protection by eroding asylum seekers’ rights and putting unfair 
pressure on third countries. Hence, if the right to seek refugee status is to be 
preserved, the sole acceptable compromise lies with the establishment of legal
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safeguards. The aim is to secure that the fundamental principles of international 
refiigee law are not being impaired. In that respect, it is important that the measures 
adopted under Title IV do not simply endorse those elaborated within the 
intergovernmental framework. As already stressed, the measures adopted in the 
field of asylum within the EU, and now the EC, are interconnected and have a 
combined effect on refugee protection. Their impact and their compliance with 
international refugee law must therefore be assessed globally; any attempt to isolate 
them from each other would result in distorted appraisals. With this in mind, it is 
crucial, inter alia, to establish harmonised asylum procedures meeting international 
requirements.
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Chapter V 
Fair and Effective Procedures
The existence and access to adequate asylum procedures, defined as fair and 
effective procedures, are fundamental to the protection of the right to seek refugee 
status; indeed, they are the sole medium through which refugee status may be 
acquired. Although the 1951 Convention does not deal with procedural issues, it is 
vital that States signatories to the Convention have procedures consistent with the 
provisions of the Convention^ The purpose of this chapter is therefore to determine 
what are the minimum requirements that Member States' asylum procedures must 
satisfy in order to be compatible with the right to seek refugee status. In that 
respect, recent developments in the asylum policy of the European Union and its 
Member States are a source of disquiet.
The restrictive nature of the objectives pursued by the Member States in the field of 
asylum induced dramatic changes in the procedures applicable to the determination 
of asylum claims. The identification of “bogus" asylum seekers became a priority 
which prompted the introduction and increasing use of accelerated procedures 
referred to as fast-track procedures. They were presented as tools designed to deter 
abusive asylum claims and therefore relieve the competent authorities from an 
unnecessary burden and allow them to concentrate on genuine applications. This 
type of procedure was formally introduced at EU level with the adoption of the 
Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum .^ However, fast-track 
procedures were part of a wider plan which was to cut down the numbers of asylum
 ^ Tills is stressed in the UNHCR Handbook on procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status under the 1951 Convention and tlie 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.l, reedited, Geneva, January 1992.
 ^ Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum adopted by the EC Ministers for 
immigration at their meetings in London on 30 November and 1 December 1992, European 
Parliament, asylum in the European Union: the "Safe Countiy of Origin principle”, People’ 
Europe Series, November 1996, Annex I, at p. 26-32.
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daims lodged within the EU and at its borders. This explained why issues relating 
to substantive asylum procedures were not a priority on the agenda of the EU. 
However, with the conclusion of the Dublin Convention, the Member States 
realised that issues relating to substantive procedures could no longer be excluded 
from the move towards harmonisation; this cognisance led to the adoption of the 
Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum 
procedures,^ referred to as the Resolution on minimum guarantees. The Member 
States acknowledged that the principle set out in the Dublin Convention according 
to which asylum claims must be examined by a single Member State demanded a 
certain degree of harmonisation of asylum procedures. In the Preamble to the 
Resolution on minimum guarantees, the Member States declared that they were 
“[cjonvinced that this [the Dublin Convention] require[d] decisions on asylum 
applications to be taken on the basis of equivalent procedures in all Member States 
and common procedural guarantees to be adopted for asylum seekers to that end 
(...)” Moreover, with the Dublin Convention removing asylum seekers' right to 
lodge simultaneous or consecutive asylum claims in various Member States, the 
need for harmonised procedures meeting international requirements became even 
more urgent. The purpose of the Resolution was to secure the availability and 
access to fair and eflScient asylum procedures irrespective of the identity of the 
Member State held responsible under the criteria set out in the Dublin Convention. 
This acknowledgement of the consequences of the adoption of the Dublin 
Convention in terms of procedural requirements constituted a step in the right 
direction. Unfortunately, the Resolution failed to fulfil the hopes it raised. The 
Resolution on minimum guarantees suffers from two major weaknesses caused by 
its content and its lack of legal authority. Firstly, although the Resolution contains 
principles important to the preservation of asylum seekers’ rights, its positive effect 
is considerably undermined by its non-binding nature. Indeed, non-binding 
guarantees cannot constitute adequate guarantees, especially where human rights- 
related issues are at stake. Secondly, the Resolution undermines refugee protection
 ^ Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asyliun procedures, OJ C 
274/13, 19/09/1996.
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in providing for significant derogations to fundamental procedural guarantees in the 
case of manifestly unfounded apphcations and claims made at the border. For 
instance, where an asylum claim falls within the scope of the Resolution on 
manifestly unfounded applications for asylum, the minimum procedural guarantees 
granted are seriously curtailed. This is a major drawback considering the large 
numbers of applications for asylum being channelled to fast-track procedures.
To date, the EU and its Member States have failed to provide the necessary 
compensatory measures to the system established by the Dublin Convention. This 
generates inequalities amongst asylum seekers with regard to access to adequate 
procedures. The “communautarisation” operated by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
covers procedural aspects. Indeed, Article 63(1 )(d) EC provides that “minimum 
standards on procedures for granting or withdrawing refugee status” in line with the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol are to be adopted within a period a five 
years of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which took place on 1 
May 1999. Tliis provision prompted the Commission’s working document of 3 
March 1999, called “Towards common standards on asylum procedures”^ referred 
to as the Commission’s working document. This document was intended to launch 
a debate on asylum procedures within the Council and the European Parliament 
which would result in a final proposal from the Commission for a Community legal 
instrument on asylum procedures after the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. In the Commission’s view, there were two possible general approaches 
to such an instrument^ The first approach would consist in establishing a certain 
level of harmonisation in order to achieve “a certain level of procedural safeguards 
and guarantees” allowing Member States to retain some degree of flexibility in the 
implementing measures (Paragraph 9(a)). The second approach would require the 
Member States to adopt exactly the same procedures, so that frill harmonisation
European Commission, working document, “Towards common standards on asylum procedures”, 
Brussels, 3 March 1999, SEC 1999.
 ^ See supra. Paragraph 9.
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could be achieved (Paragraph 9(b)). In the Commission's opinion, the first approach 
would be more suitable in the near future. However, in the longer term, the merits 
of common procedures could be considered. It is argued that the first approach is 
satisfactory provided that the standards set are strictly in line with international 
refiigee law and that the flexibility allowed does not affect compliance with the 
standards in question. With this in mind, it is argued that the provisions of the 
contemplated instrument should be drafted with extreme care in order to prevent 
any interpretation or implementation detrimental to refiigee protection. Moreover, 
the view taken is that the notion of flexibility should be primarily construed in the 
interest of asylum seekers and Member States should, therefore, only be allowed to 
go beyond the set level. In the short term, the proposed approach can be described 
as an intermediate approach mainly designed to retain flexibility within boundaries 
compatible with the requirements of international refugee law. In its working 
document, the Commission refers to existing soft law, and in particular the 
Resolution on minimum guarantees and the Resolution on manifestly unfounded 
applications for asylum‘s as well as the Resolution on a harmonised approach to 
questions concerning host third countries^ The Commission views these 
instalments as the first steps towards common minimum standards on asylum 
procedures. This could be regarded as a source of concern considering the 
inconsistencies with international refugee law contained in these measures. 
However, this comment must be tempered in the light of the Commission’s 
affirmation that the TEC as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam must “(...) 
enshrine the basic principle that Community legislation on asylum must be 
compatible with key international refugee and human rights instruments.”® Most
® See supra n. 2.
 ^ Resolution on a harmonised approach to questions concerning host tliird countiies asylum 
adopted by the EC Ministers for immigration at their meetings in London on 30 November and 1 
December 1992, European Parliament, asylum in the European Union: the "Safe Country of 
Origin principle”. People’ Europe Series, November 1996, Aimex II, at p. 33-37,
® See supra n. 4, Paragraph 6.
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importantly, the Commission considers that some of the principles and concepts laid 
down in the above mentioned instruments may be a cause for reconsideration and 
suggests that some of the exceptions and derogations that weaken these instruments 
should be removed®. It is interesting to note the gap between the Commission’s 
position and the position adopted by the Austrian Presidency, In its Draft Strategy 
Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy of I July 1998, the Austrian Presidency 
suggested a worrying shift from an asylum system based on the right of the 
individual to protection to one where at its discretion the State may offer protection 
to a person or group at risk^ ®. This strong divergence was already apparent in the 
Commission’s Memo 98/55 on the Implementation of the Amsterdam treaty of 15 
July 1998 where the Commission stressed the importance of the 1951 Convention 
as the basis for the right of the individual to seek international protection".
The aim of this chapter is to determine the minimum standards that asylum 
procedures must meet in order to achieve consistency with international refugee 
law; these standards cover asylum proceedings in their entirety. It is important that 
the measures to be adopted on the basis of Title IV do not simply endorse those 
elaborated within the intergovernmental framework as their compliance with 
international standards is questioned. In that respect, Declaration 49 to the Treaty 
of Amsterdam stresses the importance of the Resolution on host third countries and 
the Resolution on minimum guarantees. However, it also declares that “the question 
of abuse of asylum procedures and appropriate rapid procedures to dispense with 
manifestly unfounded applications for asylum should be further examined with a
 ^Ibid., Paragraph 10.
The Austrian H'esidency’s Draft Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy o f 1 July 
1998 referred in the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, European Update; September 
1998, at p. 5.
" See the European Commission’s Memo 98/55 of 15 July 1998 on the Implementation of the 
Amsterdam Treaty in hmnigration and Asylum referred to in ibid., at p. 7-8.
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view to introducing new improvements in order to accelerate these procedures ’’^  ^It 
is argued that, while avoiding unnecessary delays is in the interest of both asylum 
seekers and Member States, it should not be achieved at the detriment of fairness. 
Moreover, although some degree of differentiation may be tolerated between 
substantive and fast-track procedures, the current curtailments in the procedural 
rights and guarantees granted to applicants channelled to the latter type of 
procedures cannot be justified. In establishing the standards to be met by asylum 
procedures, particular attention is paid to the Resolution on minimum guarantees as 
it is currently the sole harmonised EU measure on procedural aspects. The content 
of the Resolution is measured against the requirements of international refiigee law 
in order to determine the necessary changes and amendments.
For the purpose of this chapter, asylum proceedings have been divided into three 
main stages: submission, determination and review or appeal of the initial decision. 
However, before examining the rights and guarantees to be offered to asylum 
claimants throughout the proceedings, particular attention is paid to the concept of 
manifestly unfounded applications for asylum and to the characteristics of fast track 
procedures.
1. Manifestly unfounded claims: a “catch-all” concept?
The Member States have been eager to distinguish and oppose two types of asylum 
seekers: those who deserve protection, i.e. genuine asylum seekers and those who 
abuse asylum procedures with a view to entering the EC, i.e. “bogus” asylum 
seekers. This resulted in the adoption of the Resolution on manifestly unfounded 
applications for asylum which was designed to combat misuses of asylum 
procedures. However, it is argued that this Resolution was mainly designed as a 
means to reduce the numbers of asylum claims. The concept of manifestly 
unfounded applications for asylum is a source of concern on two accounts. Firstly, 
it is construed in a very broad manner. Secondly, claims considered manifestly
See Steve Peers, EU  Justice and Home Affairs Law (European Law Series, Pearson Education, 
Harlow, 2000) at p. 128.
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unfounded are channelled to fast-track procedures which are subject to much lower 
standards.
1.1. The concept of manifestly unfounded applications for asylum
The Member States defined the concept of manifestly unfounded application for 
asylum in a specific Resolution, i.e. the Resolution on manifestly unfounded 
applications for asylum^ .^ This shows that identifying such claims had become a 
matter of general concern across the EU. According to the Resolution, applications 
may be considered unfounded on three accounts: firstly, where ‘There is clearly no 
substance to the applicant’s claim to fear persecution in his own countiy”, secondly, 
where “the claim is based on deliberate deception or is an abuse of asylum 
procedures” (Paragraph 1(a)) and, finally, where the claim falls within the scope of 
the Resolution on host third country (Paragraph 1(b)).
1.1.1. “No substance to claim to fear persecution”
Paragraph 6 of the Resolution envisages three situations where the Member States 
may consider that there is “no substance to claim fear of persecution”. Firstly, 
where asylum claims fall outside the scope of the 1951 Convention, namely where 
the claim is not based on one of the five grounds listed in Aiticle 1(A)(2) of the 
Convention (Paragraph 6(a)); these are race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group and political opinion. The resolution mentions “the search 
for a job or better living conditions” (Paragraph 6(a)). This reflects the Member 
States’ firm intention to maintain a clear distinction between asylum seekers and 
economic migrants and the rejection of any overlap between these two categories of 
third country nationals '^*. Considering the Member States’ restrictive approach to 
asylum matters, it is unlikely that they would grant refugee status to individuals who
See supra n. 2.
See the introduction, chapter I.
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fall outside the scope of the Convention definition of the term refugee. Thus, the 
challenge is to make sure that the definition in question addresses the needs of 
today’s asylum seekers and is properly implemented by the Member States^^ 
However, pragmatism requires us to acknowledge the fact that the Member States 
will oppose economic circumstances being taken into consideration.
An application for asylum will also fall within the scope of Paragraph 6 where “the 
application is totally lacking in substance” (Paragraph 6(b)). This refers to cases 
where “the applicant provides no indications that he [or she] would be exposed to 
fear of persecution” or where “his [or her] story contains no circumstantial or 
personal detail.” Finally, a claim to fear persecution will be considered as not being 
substantiated where “the application is manifestly lacking in any credibility”. This 
means that the asylum seekers’ “story is inconsistent, contradictory or 
fundamentally improbable.” These two grounds raise concern in the light of the 
procedures applicable to claims declared manifestly unfounded. Indeed, to make 
sure that an application for asylum falls within the scope of Paragraph 6(b) or (c) of 
the Resolution, a thorough interview should take place, in particular in relation to 
the latter sub-Paragraph. For instance, there may be various reasons why an asylum 
claimant’s story may at first appear inconsistent; this may, for example, be caused 
by stress or language barriers. It is therefore important that procedures, regardless 
of their nature, address these difficulties^®. In that respect, fast-track procedures 
have been a source of disquiet as celerity tends to prevail over fairness to the 
detriment of asylum seekers’ rights.
15 See chapter III on the need for an up to date interpretation of the term "refugee’
The standards to be met by procedures, both substantive and accelerated, are examined in the 
subsequent sections.
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1.1,2. Deliberate deception or abuse of asylum procedures
The main justification for the introduction of fast-tack procedures was the alleged 
need to deter and impose sanctions on abuses of asylum proceedings. The Member 
States argued that asylum procedures were increasingly taken over by individuals 
who did not have a genuine case. In that context, the fact that Paragraph 9 of the 
Resolution presents “deliberate deception or abuse of asylum procedures” as a 
ground for declaring an application for asylum manifestly unfounded comes as no 
surprise.
Paragraph 9(a) and (c) concerns failure to comply with documentation 
requirements. Pursuant to Paragraph 9(a), an application will be considered 
manifestly unfounded if the applicant based his or her claim “on a false identity or 
on forged or counterfeit documents which he [or she] has maintained are genuine 
when questioned about them” in the absence of a reasonable explanation. An 
asylum claim will also be considered without substance, in the absence of a 
reasonable explanation, if the asylum seeker has “in bad faith destroyed, damaged or 
disposed of any passport, other document or ticket relevant to his [or her] claim, 
either in order to establish a false identity for the puipose of his [or her] asylum 
application or to make the consideration of his [or her] application] more difficult” 
(Paragraph 9(c)). These provisions, it is argued, have the potential to undermine the 
right to seek refugee status by preventing substantive examination. Indeed, for these 
provisions to be compatible with the right to seek refugee status, it is vital that 
asylum seekers’ general inability to comply with documentation requirements is 
acknowledged^^. Hence, the interpretation given to the words “without reasonable 
explanation” are critical. The view taken is that they should be construed in a 
manner that address the specificity of asylum seekers’ circumstances. Moreover, 
competent authorities should make it clear to asylum seekers that the difficulties 
they face in relation to documentation are recognised and thus not detrimental to 
the outcome of their claim. If applicants fear that failure to satisfy these
" This issue is examined in chapter IV on access to substantive asylum procedures.
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requirements will be held against them, they are likely to be reluctant to admit that 
they have, for instance, travelled on a forged passport. In the current context, the 
Resolution is a source of disquiet as many Member States have been keen to subject 
asylum seekers to the same documentation requirements as other categories of third 
nationals as it contributes to reduce the numbers of asylum claims. It is therefore 
crucial that EC law adapts the provisions on documentation requirements for non- 
EC nationals to the needs and difficulties of those seeking refiigee status^ ®.
Paragraph 9 also reflects the Member States’ attachment to the principle enshrined 
in the Dublin Convention and its main consequence for asylum seekers, namely the 
loss of the right to lodge multiple applications within the EC^^ . Indeed, where an 
asylum claimant “deliberately fail[s] to reveal that he [or she] has previously lodged 
an application in one or more countries, particularly when false identities are used”, 
his or her application will be held manifestly unfounded (Paragraph 9(d)). It is 
interesting to note that the wording of Paragraph 9(d) seems to go beyond the 
restriction resulting from the Dublin Convention. Indeed, this sub-Paragraph does 
not specify that the countries in question must be Member States. Furthermore, 
under Paragraph 9(g), if an asylum seeker had his or her claim rejected by a country 
which provided procedural guarantees in line with the 1951 Convention, his or 
claim will be considered manifestly unfounded. In practice, the combined effect of 
sub-Paragraphs 9(d) and (g) may mean that the loss of the right to lodge multiple 
applications goes beyond the borders of the EC. It is true that sub-Paragraph 9(d) 
only applies to cases where the asylum seeker has deliberately failed to admit that he 
or she has applied for refugee status elsewhere. Thus, where he or she admits that 
he or she has lodged one or more applications, his or her claim should not be 
regarded as manifestly unfounded. However, the exact scope of this provision very 
much depends upon the interpretation given to the word “deliberately”. What if an 
asylum seeker is not asked whether he or she has applied elsewhere and this fact is
18 Ibid.
'Ibid.
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subsequently discovered? Will the claim be held manifestly unfounded on the 
ground that the applicant has “deliberately” withheld this piece of information? Sub- 
Paragraph 9(g) also raises concern with regard to what may happen in practice. A 
claim will only be considered manifestly unfounded if the asylum seeker had his or 
her claim rejected by another country following proceedings consistent with the 
provisions of the 1951 Convention. To tliis end, Sub-Paragraph 9(g) provides that 
“contacts between Member States and third countries would, when necessary, be 
made through UNHCR”. This constitutes an adequate safeguard provided that the 
Member State which is about to declare a claim manifestly unfounded verifies that 
the claim in question has already been examined in compliance with international 
standards. In that respect, the Member States should be under the same obligations 
as those applying to transfers of responsibility^ .^ The involvement of UNHCR is 
welcome as the Member States’ interpretation of what is a procedure satisfying 
international standards may differ from that of UNHCR. However, the positive 
impact of the provision is seriously tempered by the fact that contacts are 
established at the Member States’ discretion; indeed, they shall take place “where 
necessary”.
An asylum claim may also be considered manifestly unfounded where the asylum 
seeker has “flagrantly failed to comply with substantive obligations imposed by 
national rules relating to asylum procedures” (Paragraph 9(f)). It is argued that this 
provision is acceptable provided that asylum seekers are given thorough information 
about the procedure to be foUowed^\ Paragraph 9(e) concerns cases where the 
asylum seeker had the opportunity to lodge his or her claim at an earlier stage and 
finally submitted one for the sole purpose of forestalling an impending expulsion 
measure. What this provision seems to ignore is that a late submission does not 
necessarily mean that the claim falls outside the scope of the 1951 Convention. 
Finally, Paragraph 9(b) deals with situations where the asylum claimant has
Ibid.
Tiiis issue is examined in section 2.2. o f the present chapter.
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“deliberately made false representations about his [or her] claim, either orally or in 
writing, after applying for asylum.” This provision constitutes a reminder and a 
sanction designed to reinforce asylum seekers’ obligation to tell the truth.
Paragraph 10 contains a general safeguard in that it expressly stresses that, although 
Paragraph 9 refers to behaviours indicating bad faith, none of the factors listed in 
that Paragraph may in itself outweigh a well-founded fear of persecution. However, 
the safeguard provided by paragraph 10 is seriously undermined by Member States’ 
practices in the context of unsatisfactory fast-track procedures. As currently 
construed, these procedures may not allow for a determination of the asylum claim 
consistent with the right to seek refugee status. If an applicant falls within the scope 
of Paragraph 9, in most cases he or she will automatically be channelled to a fast- 
track procedure.
1.1.3. Applicability of the Resolution on host third countries
Paragraph 1(b) of the Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum 
provides that claims which fall within the scope of the Resolution on host third 
countries will be considered manifestly unfounded. This provision complements and 
strengthens the Resolution on host third countries as Paragraph 1(a) of the latter 
resolution reads that “the formal identification of a host third country in principle 
precedes the substantive examination of the application for asylum and its 
justification.” The combined effect of both Resolutions shows the Member States’ 
attachment to external transfers of responsibility^ .^
It follows fi'om the provisions of the Resolution on manifestly unfounded 
applications for asylum that the Member States intended the concept of manifestly 
unfounded asylum claims to be construed in a very broad manner. Moreover, its
Transfers o f responsibility and the problems they raise with regard to their compatibility with 
the right to seek refiigee status are examined in chapter IV on access to substantive asylum 
procedures.
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scope is susceptible of extension through national interpretation. There is no doubt 
that this Resolution was the produce of restrictive asylum policies. In order to 
prevent the concept in question from having an adverse effect on the right to seek 
refugee status, it is critical that so called fast-track procedures are consistent with 
international refugee law. This is why it is argued that, although some degree of 
differentiation may be tolerated between substantive and fast-track procedures, the 
latter must nonetheless meet certain minimum standards dictated by the need to 
preserve the right to seek refugee status. To date, however, fast-track procedures 
are characterised by their low standards.
1.2. The characteristics of fast-track procedures
The characteristics of fast-track procedures must be understood in the light of the 
purpose that they serve. As already mentioned, in the Member States’ opinion, 
these procedures were needed to address the problems created by a constant rise in 
the numbers of “bogus” asylum claims. To a certain extent, fast-track procedures 
were construed as sanctions and this is reflected in their main features, namely their 
celerity and truncated procedural safeguards.
The terminology used in the Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for 
asylum, i.e. “accelerated procedures”, clearly indicates what is their objective. The 
rationale for their introduction was that asylum claims deemed manifestly 
unfounded should be dealt within a shorter period of time. To that end, the 
Resolution provides that “Member States will aim to reach initial decision on 
applications which fall within the terms of Paragraph 1 as soon as possible and at 
the latest within one month and to complete any appeal or review procedures as 
soon as possible” (Paragraph 2).
Accelerated procedures were officially justified by the fact that manifestly 
unfounded claims did not require frill examination at every level of the procedure 
and could be rejected very quickly on objective grounds, namely those laid down in 
the Resolution (Paragraph 1). However, the Resolution does not specify the type of
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examination that is required. Indeed, the Resolution expressly provides that 
“[a]ppeal or any review procedures [could] be more simplified than those generally 
available in the case of other rejected asylum applications” (Paragraph 2).This 
provision has resulted in the introduction or maintenance in certain Member States 
of truncated rights of appeal for those claims channelled to fast-track procedures. 
As observed by Peers, “[i]f there is no effective appeal, the asylum seeker will only 
have had one opportunity to state his or her case and will not be able to refiite any 
objectionable finding of the authorities. If there is no right to remain during the 
appeal, then there is a risk o î ^ ''refoulement^ to an unsafe country or to a third State 
which will itself return the applicant to an unsafe country.”^  It is argued that a lack 
of “full determination” combined with a restricted right of appeal is likely to entail 
the risk of letting a considerable number of errors go “unnoticed”. This is 
particularly worrying considering the broad nature of the scope and interpretations 
given to the concept of manifestly unfounded application for asylum. There is a high 
risk that asylum seekers are unjustifiably denied access to substantive asylum 
procedures.
It is argued that the procedural safeguards laid down in the Resolution are 
insufficient to counterbalance the pitfalls of fast-track procedures as currently 
construed. Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of the Resolution, decisions to reject asylum 
claims on the ground that they are manifestly unfounded must be taken by “a 
competent authority at the appropriate level fully qualified in asylum or refugee 
matters.” Moreover, the asylum seeker “should be given the opportunity for a 
personal interview with a qualified official empowered under national law before 
any national decision is taken” (Paragraph 4). However, in practice, the purpose of 
these safeguards may be defeated by the provisions of the Resolution itself and by 
its lack of binding effect. Indeed, the resolution fails to explain how these 
safeguards fit in the context of a “[non-]full examination at every level of [a]
Steve Peers, Mind the Gap!, Ineffective Member State Implementation o f  European Union 
Asylum Measures, Report prepared for the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and the 
Refugee Council, May 1998, at p. 10.
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procedure (...) under which applications may be rejected very quickly on objective 
grounds”, i.e. the grounds laid down in the Resolution. These safeguards are also 
undermined by the lack of binding effect of the Resolution which may result in 
Member States introducing or maintaining fast-track procedures without providing 
the safeguards in question '^ .^
The legitimisation of the need for fast-track procedures specially designed to deal 
with “non-deserving” asylum claims in the context of restrictive asylum policies has 
resulted in a serious decline of procedural standards which affect great numbers of 
asylum seekers. In that respect, these procedures may constitute a threat to the right 
to seek refugee status. Thus, if pragmatism requires acknowledgement of their 
existence, it is important that certain minimum standards are maintained. With this 
in mind, it is argued that, while some degree of differentiation may be tolerated 
between fast-track and substantive procedures, this should not be at the detriment 
of asylum seekers rights. This is why both types of procedures are examined within 
the same chapter.
2. Submission
The conditions in which applications for asylum are lodged have a determining 
impact on their outcome. When asylum seekers are not in a position to adequately 
lodge their claim, the right to seek refugee status is threatened. Hence, in order to 
secure the fairness and efficiency of asylum procedures, a number of procedural 
rights and guarantees must be granted to asylum seekers from the very start of the 
proceedings.
For instance, in the 4 / /  Iqbal case, officials at the Paris Prefecture misapplied the procedures so 
that his application for ai^liun was ignored. A removal order was served, apparently in the 
absence o f an interpreter, and attempts were made to forcibly place him on a plane. See James 
Hardy and Ian Henry, “Judges challenge new immigration rules”. Electronic Telegraph, 
http;//www/telegiaph.co.uk, 29 September 1996), This case is examined in chapter IV on access to 
substantive asylum procedures.
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2.1. The right to have one’s claim lodged with a competent officer as quickly 
as possible
Fairness and effective asylum procedures firstly require asylum claimants to be able 
to submit their applications with a competent official regardless of the 
circumstances of their submission. Moreover, unnecessary delays in the introduction 
of asylum claims must be avoided in the interest of both applicants and competent 
authorities.
2.1.1. Competent officers
The intervention of competent officers at this early stage of the proceedings is 
critical as they are responsible for receiving asylum seekers’ statements. These 
statements are crucial since they constitute the basis for the assessment of asylum 
claims. With this in mind, it is vital that these statements are taken by individuals 
who are adequately qualified.
It is argued that officers held competent to receive asylum claims within or at the 
borders of the EC must be fully qualified. This supposes them having received 
adequate training in the field of asylum. The training in question should cover both 
procedural and substantive issues. This requirement is generally only requested fi*om 
authorities which examine claims in the first instance or on appeal. However, it must 
be stressed that the authorities which take applicants’ initial statements and those 
that will subsequently determine the claims may not be the same. It is, therefore, 
argued that competence requirements must not be limited to the latter authorities. 
In this respect, the Resolution on minimum guarantees either lacks clarity or, more 
seriously, omits to mention an essential guarantee. Indeed, Paragraph 4 of the 
Resolution reads that “[a]sylum applications will be examined by an authority fully 
qualified in the field of asylum and refugee matters (...).” This may be sufficient 
where asylum claims are lodged with the authorities responsible for determining 
them; however, the Resolution itself recognises that this is not always the case. 
Paragraph 7 provides that “[t]he authorities responsible for border controls and the 
local authorities with which asylum applications are lodged must receive clear and
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detailed instructions so that the applications, together with all other information 
available, can be forwarded without delay to the competent authority for 
examination.” The Resolution does not appear to impose competence requirements 
upon the authorities with which asylum claims are lodged. This is particularly 
worrying with respect to asylum claims submitted at the border. Indeed, these 
applications are usually lodged with immigration or border police officers who often 
lack the necessary training. A fiirther source of disquiet is found in Paragraph 25 of 
the Resolution which allows, inter alia, for exceptions to Paragraph 7 where the 
host third country principle is applicable according to the Resolution on host third 
countries^^ This means that where the safe third country principle applies to a claim 
which has been submitted to border control authorities, the latter may not be in 
possession of the necessary information and nonetheless decide on the external 
transfer themselves. This situation very much reflects the reality of the treatment 
currently reserved to applications considered manifestly unfounded. It is argued that 
in order to ensure, as much as possible, that a claim is legitimately held manifestly 
unfounded, it is vital that decisions are taken by competent officers. There is no 
justification for lesser standards in that respect.
Whatever their official title, local authorities or border control authorities, the 
authorities involved in the submission of asylum claims should be properly qualified. 
Adequate training should therefore be provided to the authorities concerned. This 
requirement should be the object of a specific provision in EC law. With this in 
mind, one can refer to the Odysseus programme^®. One of the purposes of this Joint 
Action is to establish a framework for training, information and exchange activities 
with a view to improving the effectiveness of cooperation between the Member 
States in the areas of asylum, immigration and crossing of external borders. Article 
3 of the joint Action defines training measures as the “(...) organisation of practical
See supra n. 7.
Joint Action of 19 March 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis o f Article K.3 o f the Treaty 
on European Union, introducing a programme of training, exchanges and cooperation in the field 
of asylum, immigration and crossing of external borders (Odysseus-programme), OJ L 99/2, 
31/03/1998.
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training courses focusing on theoretical and practical knowledge Article 4 
provides that “[i]n the field of training, the Odysseus programme shall focus on: 
training for instructors; specialist training, in particular advanced course for 
decision-makers, officials responsible for preparing administrative decisions, judges 
and courses designed for those in charge of training; [and] the exchange of 
infoimation and expertise between national authorities.” The relevance of such 
training would obviously depend on its content. Provided that the training in 
question is in line with international refugee law, it could be of valuable assistance in 
bringing competent officers’ qualifications in line with these requirements.
The required training should obviously cover substantive and procedural asylum 
law; however, it should not be confined to these issues. Considering the importance 
of asylum seekers’ statements when submitting their claim, it is essential for officers 
in charge to have the necessary interviewing skills in order to be able to address 
asylum seekers’ specific needs and difficulties. Experience shows that asylum 
applicants are usually under extreme stress and intense psychological fatigue. 
Stating the reasons why they are seeking refugee status often proves to be an 
extremely demanding and distressing exercise. Asylum claimants will have to recall 
painfiil events and share them with a complete stranger. There may be a certain 
reluctance in evoking certain facts. Applicants may fear that certain facts will have 
an adverse impact on the outcome of their claim and that it is better to remain vague 
or simply pass over them. This is for instance the case where asylum seekers have 
used forged documentation. They may also feel that certain facts are too personal or 
traumatic to be spontaneously mentioned. This is for example the case of many 
women who have suffered sexual persecution^^. Moreover, as noted in the UNHCR 
Handbook, “[a] person who, because of his [or her] experiences, was in fear of the 
authorities in his [or her] country may still feel apprehensive vis-à-vis any authority. 
He [or she] may be afraid to speak fi-eely and give a full and accurate account of his
Refugee Women Legal’s Group, Gender Guidelines fo r  the Détermination o f  Asylum Claims in 
the UK, July 1998, in particular at p. 19-20.
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[or her] case.” ®^ In such circumstances, the competent officers must assist asylum 
seekers in giving comprehensive and consistent statements as any inconsistency in 
their story will usually be held against them. Applicants’ duty to tell the truth does 
not undermine the authorities’ role in trying to obtain coherent statements. They 
must therefore acquire the skills necessary to establish adequate and effective 
communication between them and asylum claimants.
This competence requirement does not solely serve the interests of asylum 
claimants, but also those of the Member States. Designed to contribute to the 
fairness of asylum procedures, this requirement also aims at setting up a more 
efficient system. Where applicants’ statements are received by officers who are not 
adequately qualified, the risk of statements being taken improperly is higher. Such 
statements are more likely to lead to unsatisfactory decisions and thus be the object 
of procedural challenges.
2.1.2. The right to have one’s claim lodged as early as possible
As already observed, individuals intending to claim refugee status are generally 
under extreme stress. Hence, imposing unnecessary delays only adds to their 
distress even more so with the deterioration of their living conditions pending 
determination.^®
Asylum applicants are not the only ones who would benefit fiom shorter delays. 
The Member States have a legitimate interest in quicker asylum proceedings. 
However, this legitimate interest does not justify the current situation where fairness 
is often sacrificed to speed. Moreover, besides undermining asylum seekers’ rights, 
this trend also affects the whole decision-making system as it results in more lengthy 
proceedings. Indeed, where the time needed to correctly receive asylum claims has 
been shortened for reasons of expediency, the time “saved” is likely to be lost when
See supra n. 1, Paragraph 198.
See chapter VI on asylum seekers’ status pending determination.
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examining the case in the first instance and on appeal. In that respect, the 
Resolution on minimum guarantees reads that “[a]n asylum seeker must have an 
effective opportunity to lodge his [or her] asylum application as early as possible” 
(Paragraph 10). However, the Resolution fails to secure the existence of such an 
opportunity as it lacks binding authority and does not further elaborate on this 
point.
It is argued that, for asylum seekers to be able to lodge their claims as early as 
possible, their contact with competent authorities must be facilitated. It is important 
that asylum claimants are given information to that end. Thus, the first authorities 
that they encounter should be able to inform them and direct them to the competent 
authorities, if they are not competent themselves. Expressing one’s intention to seek 
refugee status is not always as straightforward as it may appear; for instance, 
language barriers may interfere. It is argued that such difficulties must be overcome; 
this may, for instance, require the services of an interpreter. Although submission 
may be delayed as a result, addressing these difficulties is an essential step towards 
fair and effective proceedings. The words “as soon as possible” must be construed 
in the context of the right to seek refugee status and must not be seen a goal in 
themselves. The right to introduce one's claim as early as possible is, therefore, 
contingent on the availability of satisfactory procedures, i.e. procedures consistent 
with international refugee law.
2.2. Guidance as to the procedure to be followed
When asylum seekers are about to submit their asylum claims, they usually enter an 
unknown tenitory. In most cases, they are ignorant of the procedure and are 
therefore unaware of their rights and obligations. Hence, it is essential that 
individuals seeking refugee status are given relevant and comprehensive information 
before proceedings are initiated. This is formally acknowledged in UNHCR 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for the Determination of Refugee Status^ ®
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and the Resolution on minimum guarantees provides that asylum seekers must be 
informed about the procedure in a language they understand (Paragraph 15). 
However, in order to secure that the information is comprehensive, guidelines as to 
its content must be given.
The information in question should firstly, but not only, focus on asylum seekers' 
rights and obligations. Where unaware of their rights, asylum claimants are in no 
position to invoke them and allege eventual breaches. Likewise, where left ignorant 
of their obligations, they are not capable of properly complying with them. Both 
situations are detrimental to the fairness of asylum procedures and may well 
undermine their effectiveness. The provision of information should not be confined 
to the first stages, i.e. submission and first instance determination, but cover the 
whole proceedings. This means that asylum seekers should be made aware of their 
right to challenge the first instance decision and informed of the conditions under 
which such a right may be exercised. As suggested above, information should not 
be restricted to procedural issues, but should also concern asylum seekers’ status 
pending determination^^. They should therefore be made aware, inter alia, of their 
rights in terms of housing and access to health care.
Finally, it is argued that the right to be informed should be granted to all asylum 
seekers in a non-discriminatory manner. It follows that this right should be 
conferred upon those whose claims have been channelled to fast-track procedures. 
This means, for instance, that where an applicant falls within the scope of the safe 
third countiy principle, he or she should receive full information on the procedure to 
be applied and, in particular, be made aware of his or her right to contest the safety 
of the contemplated safe third country^ .^
Paragraph I92(ii) of the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for the Determination of 
Refugee Status reads that “[t]he applicant should receive the necessary guidance as to the 
procedure to be followed” (see supra n. 1).
These issues are examined in chapter VI on asylum seekers’ status pending determination.
See chapter IV on access to substantive asylum procedures.
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To secure that asylum claims are lodged in suitable conditions, it is essential that the 
necessary facilities are available.
2.3. Availability of the necessary facilities
For asylum claimants to apply for refugee status in satisfactory conditions, they 
must be provided with various facilities; these include the services of an independent 
interpreter, the presence of a representative and the opportunity to contact a 
UNHCR representative.
Fairness at this early stage of asylum proceedings is contingent on the availability of 
these facilities. Hence, it is argued that they should be provided to all asylum 
seekers, including those whose applications are considered manifestly unfounded or 
lodged at the border.
2.3.1. The services of a independent competent interpreter
For asylum seekers to be able to properly lodge their claims, it is indispensable to 
remove language barriers. Where claimants do not have sufficient command of the 
language used, the services of an interpreter must be made available to them. Resort 
to an interpreter can only be considered superfluous where applicants feel confident 
to express themselves in the language of the proceedings. The UNHCR handbook 
specifies that applicants should be entitled to the services of a competent 
interpreter^^
Being able to express oneself and make oneself understood is absolutely crucial to 
the fairness and effectiveness of the proceedings®  ^ The Resolution on minimum
33 See supra n. 1, Paragraph 192(iv).
See, for instance, Fiona Lindsley, Best Practice Guide to the Preparation o f  Asylum 
Applications from Arrival to First Substantive Decision, ILPA, London, May 1994.
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guarantees mentions asylum seekers' right to an interpreter. Paragraph 15 states that 
‘^ they [asylum seekers] must be given the services of an interpreter, whenever 
necessary, for submitting their case to the authorities concerned.” Paragraph 15 also 
provides that interpreters must be paid for out of public funds, but limits its 
“generosity” to cases where the interpreter is called upon by the authorities. 
Moreover, although this paragraph construes the right to an interpreter in rather 
broad terms, the task of assessing the need for an inteipreter essentially lies with the 
competent authorities. This may be a source of disquiet where Member States' 
practices are inconsistent with international requirements. With this in mind, it is 
argued that EC law must lay down asylum seekers' right to an interpreter in 
sufficient detail to prevent it from being undermined by national practices.
The independent interpreters' main role during asylum interviews is to ensure that 
official interpreters translate properly. Independent interpreters may also act as 
witnesses; disquiet has been caused by some official interpreters’ attitude as there 
have been allegations of political and cultural bias and of official interpreters 
crossing the boundaries of their duties by actually “running” the interview. There 
have also been cases where official interpreters belonged to an ethnic group who 
had been or was still in conflict with the asylum seekers' own group creating 
tensions between them detrimental to the fairness and effectiveness of interviews or, 
in the worse instances, resulting in interpreters behaving unethically.
Independence with regard to interpreters means that they are independent from the 
authorities dealing vrith asylum claims and from the Government at large as well as 
from asylum claimants. It is preferable for psychological, practical and legal reasons 
that interpreters are not applicants' friends or family members as it may, for 
instance, be extremely difficult for claimants to evoke painful experiences in front of 
someone they emotionally relate to.^ *^  One could take the view that the presence of a
These concerns have been raised with respect to certain practices in the UK, ibid., at p. 52. 
Ibid. at p. 53.
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relative or a friend could be a source of comfort. However, there are other reasons 
for preferring totally independent interpreters. It is in asylum seekers' best interests 
that interpreters are qualified. Indeed, besides having the required language skills, 
interpreters involved in asylum proceedings must have some knowledge of 
procedural and substantive asylum law as well as awareness of asylum claimants’ 
specific circumstances. Moreover, the role of family members as interpreters would 
be extremely limited as they would not be allowed to attend formal interviews. 
Family may assist applicants, in particular with every day struggles, but they cannot 
be regarded as a substitute for independent interpreters.
The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILFA) defined the role of 
independent interpreters in the light of the lack of checks carried out on official 
interpreters. The ILPA stressed in the UK context that “[ojfficial interpreters [were] 
not examined in their competence in either English or the foreign language being 
translated. Nor [were] they vetted for political or cultural bias.”^^ In the light of 
these facts, the ILPA identified a number of issues to look out for:
failure to translate the interviewing officer’s questions or the clients’ replies fully 
and accurately;
- the official interpreter asking questions instead of the immigration officer, 
commenting on answers given or otherwise interfering in the interview;
" lack of knowledge of the political or cultural position in the country in question 
resulting in an inability to translate properly. This is common with interpreters who 
are non-nationals or who have not lived in their country for a long time;
- aggression to the client.
The presence of an independent interpreter at the screening interviews, i.e. the 
interviews taking place where applicants are submitting their asylum claim, is
37
38
Ibid. at p. 57.
Ibid.
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designed to prevent language barriers becoming detrimental to asylum seekers’ 
rights.
2.3.2. The right to a representative
Asylum seekers' right to a representative at screening interviews is considered an 
essential procedural guarantee. His or her presence is mainly designed to contribute 
to the fairness of the interview. Any reluctance or opposition emanating from the 
authorities in this respect would create a presumption of unfairness upon which 
asylum seekers could rely on appeal. The presence of a representative is thus in the 
interest of both parties.
The presence of a representative is construed as a means to strengthen asylum 
seekers' position during interviews. Applicants may not have the confidence to 
assert their rights during interviews when they feel that they are being disregarded. 
The situation is even worse where they have been left unaware of their rights. 
Awareness can, to a certain extent, be achieved by providing them with relevant 
information regarding proceedings that must include their rights as asylum 
claimants.^  ^ However, their knowledge is unlikely to match that of the officers 
conducting interviews. Moreover, it is extremely difficult for asylum claimants to 
establish that the officer who received their statement failed to properly perform his 
or her duties. For instance, inconsistencies in applicants' statements may be the 
result of officers’ inability or unvrillingness to establish adequate communication'^ .^ 
There may be a risk that these inconsistencies may be construed as evidence of a 
lack of accuracy in the applicant’s story. It is for asylum claimants to prove that 
these inconsistencies are only apparent and that they could have been avoided had 
the initial interview been carried out properly. It is argued that the most effective 
way to overcome these unavoidable inequalities between interviewing officers and
See section 2.2. of the present chapter. 
See Fiona Lindsley, supra n, 34, at p. 54.
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applicants consists in entitling asylum seekers to the presence of a representative. 
As observed by Lindsley, the presence of a representative “(...) at the least (...) 
ensures that an independent record is kept of the interview. At best, it enables an 
applicant to put over his (...) story properly and completely, thus facilitating a full 
examination to take place (..
For their role to be effective, representatives must take a comprehensive and timed 
record of everything that is said and done. They should also take down any 
interruptions that may occur in the course of the interview whatever their cause. 
Representatives should therefore record any breaks for refreshment, any 
communication problems, any disputes over the meaning of the asylum seeker’s 
statement and the way it has been resolved as well as their own interventions. 
Representatives should also report in writing anything in the officers' attitude that 
they consider unethical; these can go from obvious signs of boredom to open 
hostility.
It is argued that representatives should also play a more active role in the interview 
and intervene where necessary. For instance, applicants may need one or more 
breaks, particularly in the case of lengthy interviews; however, this can go against 
the wishes of “bored” officers who want to speed up the interview. In such cases, 
representatives should be firm and insist on applicants having their breaks. Besides 
taking record of any unacceptable attitude, asylum seekers’ representatives should 
let officers know that they are unhappy vrith their behaviour and that a change of 
attitude is required. One should bear in mind that recalling painful events is a 
stressful and potentially traumatic exercise that is exhausting both physically and 
morally. With this in mind, any behaviour adding to the stress inherent in such 
interviews must be avoided. Moreover, any attitude preventing the applicant from 
stating his or her story fully and properly should be drawn to the officer’s attention 
in order to allow immediate rectification and should, in any case, be reported.
Ibid., at p. 52.
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It is argued that asylum seekers’ representatives attending interviews should be 
familiar with procedural issues in order to be able to detect any irregularities in the 
way the interview is conducted. Moreover, some experience in dealing with people 
seeking refiigee status is highly desirable as it would allow greater awareness of 
applicants’ needs during interviews. Representatives do not necessarily need to be 
lawyers, individuals involved with asylum seekers and refugees may constitute 
suitable candidates.
Paragraph 13 of the Resolution on minimum guarantees provides, inter alia  ^ that 
“in accordance with the rules of the Member State concerned, they [asylum seekers] 
may call in a legal adviser or other counsellor to assist them during the procedure.” 
It is argued that this paragraph Is to be welcome as it recognises the need for a 
representative. However, it is unsatisfactory in that it leaves the right to a 
representative within the realm of national law. It is argued that this issue should be 
inserted in EC law pursuant to the guidelines laid down above.
The importance attached to the presence of a representative during interviews 
should be reflected in the way it is funded. With this in mind, its is argued that 
representatives should be paid tor out of public flinds considering the state of 
destitution of most asylum seekers. To date, asylum seekers, in most Member 
States, have no choice but to rely on the voluntary sector in order to benefit from 
the assistance of a representative.
Another essential safeguard lies with the possibility offered to applicants to contact 
a UNHCR representative.
2.3.3. The opportunity to contact a UNHCR representative
The intervention of UNHCR at this early stage of the asylum proceedings is 
construed as an additional means to secure that asylum claims are lodged in 
satisfactory conditions. The right to contact a UNHCR representative is mentioned
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in the UNHCR Handbook'^ .^ The degree of cooperation with UNHCR that a State 
is willing to accept is a good indicator of its commitment to international refugee 
law. Restrictions imposed on applicants' right to contact a UNHCR representative 
raise doubts as to the compliance of the procedure with international standards. It is 
extremely difficult for UNHCR representatives to identify breaches of international 
reffigee law and induce the necessaiy changes when access to asylum claimants is 
confined to strict boundaries. In such circumstances, the relationship established 
with the authorities is one of confrontation and not one of cooperation.
Contact with a UNHCR representative can be of great assistance to asylum seekers 
who need further information or have doubts as to the observance of their rights. 
However, contact does not in itself constitute a sufficient safeguard. Due 
consideration has to be given to UNHCR representatives’ observations. At this 
stage of the procedure, cooperation with UNHCR should include the right for 
UNHCR representatives to attend screening interviews.
At first glance, the Resolution on minimum guarantees appears to adopt a rather 
liberal attitude towards UNHCR representatives’ intervention. However, subtle 
limits are laid down. Paragraph 13 of the Resolution provides for reciprocal 
communication between asylum seekers and UNHCR representatives at all stages of 
the procedure. It specifies, inter alia, that UNHCR representatives must be 
informed of the course of the procedure. This duty of information thus covers the 
submission of the claim itself. However, the Resolution on minimum guarantees 
does not go as far as expressly opening screening interviews to UNHCR 
representatives; it is assumed that this possibility is left to the laws of the Member 
States. Hence, in the absence of an EC legislation allowing UNHCR 
representatives’ presence at screening interviews, practices and thus standards will 
vary from Member State to Member State. The same statement applies to the 
possibility offered to asylum seekers to contact other refugee organisations. In that 
respect, the most important limit brought to the positive effect of the Resolution
supra n. 1, Paragraph 192(iv).
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provision lies with the insertion of a discrete “precaution”. Indeed, Paragraph 13 
expressly mentions that “[t]he opportunity for an asylum seeker to communicate 
with the UNHCR and other refugee organizations need not necessarilv prevent 
implementation of a decision'*^ ” The wording is confusing and ambiguous and is 
open to multiple interpretations. This clumsy provision seems to reflect the dilemma 
faced by the drafters of the Resolution. It seems that they felt obliged to involve 
UNHCR representatives, but remained reluctant to fully cooperate with them. This 
resulted in the issue being left to national laws and thus to the Member States’ 
discretion. Considering the current restrictive nature of asylum practices in most 
Member States, the influence of UNHCR representatives is likely to be limited. 
There is no guarantee that their observations will be taken into consideration at this 
or at any other stage of the procedure. This is a deficiency that EC law should 
remedy.
It is argued that for cooperation with UNHCR to be effective, it must take place at 
two levels: firstly, at a macro level, this involves cooperation between UNHCR, the 
EC and its Member States towards the adoption and implementation of asylum 
measures; secondly, at a micro level, this implies developing cooperation with 
national authorities competent for receiving applications for asylum. These two 
facets of cooperation with UNHCR are complementary.
The next stage in the proceedings consists in the examination of the asylum claim 
itself.
3. First instance determination
Determination is a critical step in the proceedings as it determines - subject to 
appeal - the outcome of the asylum claim. It is therefore vital to secure its 
consistency with the right to seek refirgee status. With this in mind, it is essential to 
devise a system that minimises the risk of error. This is of course in the interest of
Emphasis added
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applicants, but also in that of the Member States as efficient first instance 
deterniination means less appeal and thus shorter proceedings.
For first instance proceedings to be fair and effective, a number of conditions have 
to be satisfied. Firstly, decision-makers must be competent. Secondly, all the 
necessary facilities must be made available to asylum claimants. Finally, the 
decision-making process itself must be consistent with the right to seek refugee 
status.
3.1. Competent first instance decision-makers
Assurance that asylum claims are determined in line with international refugee law 
lies, in the first place, with the existence of competent authorities for determining 
applications. With this in mind, any EC legislation should set out harmonised 
requirements to be met by first instance decision-makers.
The notion of competent decision-makers has three implications. Firstly, first 
instance decision-makers must be fiilly qualified in the sense that they must have a 
comprehensive knowledge of asylum law including international refugee law. 
Secondly, they must be independent in order to allow for an objective and impartial 
decision-making process. This means that their decisions should not be dictated by 
Government’s positions. Finally, they should be clearly identified and preferably be 
single central authorities"**; in that respect Paragraph 192(iii) of the UNHCR 
Handbook provides that “[t]here should be a clearly identified authority - wherever 
possible a single central authority- with responsibility for examining requests for 
refugee status and taking a decision in the first instance.”'*^ The existence of a 
central authority would secure the adoption of a more consistent body of decisions
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996) (2nd 
ed) at p. 327.
See supra n. 1.
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which could be relied upon by applicants, thus strengthening the principle of legal 
certainty. Dealing with a central authority would also facilitate compliance with the 
set standards
3.1.1. Fully qualified decision-makers
First instance decision-makers must have a thorough and updated knowledge of 
asylum law and refugee matters at large. In this respect. Paragraph 4 of the 
Resolution on minimum guarantees mentions, inter alia, that “[a]sylum applications 
will be examined by an authority fully qualified in the field of asylum and refugee 
matters.” Moreover, Paragraph 6 specifies that:
“The authorities responsible for the examination of the asylum application must be 
fially qualified in the field of asylum and refugee matters. To this effect, they must:
- have at their disposal specialized personnel with the necessary knowledge and 
experience in the field of asylum and refugee matters, who have an understanding of 
an applicant’s particular situation, (...),
- have the right to ask advice, whenever necessary, from experts on particular 
issues, e.g. a medical issue or an issue of a cultural nature.”
With this in mind, training organised within the framework of the Odysseus 
programme could be of valuable assistance with a view to improving the 
qualifications of first instance decision-makers. The potential usefulness of the 
Odysseus programme is examined in relation to the qualifications required from 
officers with whom asylum claims are lodged; the comments made are considered to 
be relevant to first instance decision-makers’ qualifications" .^
Knowledge of asylum law is understood as comprising international refugee law in 
addition to EC and national law; this includes both substantive and procedural 
aspects. This requirement is viewed as a means to strengthen and promote
See this chapter, section 2.1.1.
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international standards regarding refugee protection. Moreover, it is argued that 
expertise in human rights is also necessary for two reasons. Firstly, asylum and 
refugee matters have a strong human rights content which cannot be ignored. 
Incidentally, requiring in depth knowledge of human rights law would pre-empt 
debates on subsidiary protection. The concept of subsidiary protection relates to 
other forms of protection than the one offered by refugee status under the 1951 
Convention; one may mention the protection granted under the provisions of the 
ECHR. This issue, which is being examined by the Council and the European 
Parliament, is raised by the Commission in its working document."^ The idea is that 
asylum procedures could cover not only protection under the 1951 Convention, but 
also protection inferred from other international instruments. In the Commission’s 
opinion, a single procedure would have the advantage of preventing multiple 
proceedings; this view is supported by organisations involved with asylum seekers"®. 
Moreover, Article 63(2)(a) of the TEC as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
provides for the adoption of minimum standards for complementary/subsidiary 
protection for persons in need of international protection. It is argued that the 
concept of subsidiary protection could have a positive impact on the level of 
protection conferred upon those in need; however, it should not be construed as a 
substitute for protection under the 1951 Convention and therefore be potentially 
detrimental to refugee protection. With this in mind, extreme care should be paid to 
the terminology being used. In that respect, it would be wise to abandon the term 
subsidiary and refer exclusively to the notion of complementary protection. 
Protection under the 1951 Convention, in other words refiigee status, must be 
granted where individuals fall within the scope of Article 1(A)(2) of the 
Convention. The Commission in its working document does not specify which are 
these other instruments. It is argued that the primary instrument to be taken into 
consideration is the ECHR as it is binding upon all the Member States. Article 3 of
47 See supra n. 4, Paragraph 11.
JUSTICE, Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA) and Asylum Rights Campaign 
(ARC), Providing protection, Towards Fair and Effective Asylum Procedures, London, July 1997, 
at p. 52.
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the ECHR is considered of particular relevance Avith respect to those in need of 
international protection as it prohibits torture, inhuman treatment, degrading 
treatment or punishment"®; this prohibition is reinforced by the fact that no 
derogation to Article 3 pursuant to Article 15(1)^ ® is pennitted (Article 15 (2)^ *. 
Moreover, it is important to stress that protection based upon the ECHR benefits 
any individual who finds himself or herself in the territory of a Convention signatory 
regardless of his or her nationality^ .^ However, as acknowledged by the Commission 
in its working document^ ,^ the difficulties inherent in the existence of a single 
procedure should not be disregarded.
3.1.2. Independent decision-makers
The notion of independence is construed as a means to secure objective and 
impartial decisions. It is argued that these authorities must be independent from the
"® In Chahal, the European Court of Human Rights held that those facing a violation of the 
prohibition laid down in Article 3 of the ECHR required independent judicial scrutiny of this risk 
{Chahal v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, judgment o f 25 October 1996, 
Series A No. 22),
Article 15(1) of the ECHR reads:
“In time o f war or otlier public emergency threatening the life erf the nation any High Contracting 
party may take measures derogating from its obligations mider tliis Convention to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.”
Article 15(2) reads:
“No derogation from Article 2, except in respect o f deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or 
from Articles 3, 4 (Paragraph 1), and 7 sltall be made mider this provision.”
Article 1 of the ECHR reads:
“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention.”
33 See supra n. 4, Paragraph 11.
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Member States’ governments. Cases must be decided by applying asylum law to the 
facts and must not be dictated by governmental positions on asylum matters.
To date, there are two main models of primary decision-making process in the 
Member States. The first model consists in conferring decision-making powers 
upon bodies which are independent fi-om the government whereas, in the second 
model, decisions are made within government departments^". The UK system, for 
instance, falls within the second category; decisions on asylum claims are made by 
officials in the Asylum Division of the Immigration Directorate of the Home Office. 
In France, on the other hand, applications for asylum are decided by an independent 
body established by statute, namely the Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés 
et Apatrides (OFPRA)^ .^ The first model is considered more likely to secure 
independence. However, this statement is not always verified in practice. For 
instance, OFPRA’s interpretations of the criteria laid down in Article 1 of the 1951 
Convention are not more liberal than those of the UK Asylum Division and very 
much reflect the positions expressed by the French Government. For example, the 
OFPRA is still reluctant to recognise persecution perpetrated by non-governmental 
entities^ .^ This demonstrates that the existence of a body independent from the 
government by its status does not in itself guarantee a decision-making process 
independent fi’om government’s influences and consistent with international refugee 
law.
54 Tills, for instance, the case in Germany and The Netherlands.
The OFPRA was established by the Loi N °52-893 of 25 July 1952 portant création d'un Office 
Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides amended by the Loi N '"93-1027 of 24 August 
1993, the Loi N  '"93-1417 o f 30 December 1993 and the Loi N ° 98-349 o f 11 May 1998 relative à 
l ’entrée et au séjour des étrangers en France et au droit d ’asile, Journal Officiel de la République 
Française of 12 May 1998.
56 See chapter III on tlie need for an up to date interpretation of the term “refugee”.
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It is argued that the objective of EC law in that respect is not so much to define the 
exact nature of the body responsible for initially deciding asylum claims, but to 
ensure that its members are independent and have the required qualifications.
3.1.3. Clearly identified decision-makers
Besides being independent and having a fully qualified personnel, first instance 
decision-makers must be clearly identified. This is indispensable to the transparency 
and effectiveness of the procedure. It is argued that this could be better achieved by 
granting competence to bodies which would exclusively deal with asylum cases. 
With this in mind, it is argued that no distinction should be made between 
substantive claims and manifestly unfounded applications as well as those lodged at 
the border. A service specialised in dealing with the former type of claims could be 
created within this single body, but should not result in a breaking up of 
responsibility. There are several advantages to a single authority. Firstly, it would 
facilitate consistency within the decision-making process. If more than one body is 
responsible for examining applications, the risk of irreconcilable decisions and 
interpretations is much higher. Moreover, consistency would render decisions on 
asylum claims more predictable in accordance with the principle of legal certainty. 
Consistency would also allow for the development of a “case-law” that would be of 
valuable help in the preparation of asylum cases. Any EC legislation should stress 
the need for consistency in the initial decision-making process. Thirdly, it is easier 
to monitor the activities of a single body. In other words, infiingements of 
international refugee law would be more likely to be identified and hopefully 
rectified. Finally, the existence of a unique authority would render proceedings 
more accessible to asylum seekers in reducing structural complexity, at least at this 
stage of the proceedings.
The Member States’ authorities accountable for determining asylum claims must 
also provide applicants with the facilities necessary to the fairness and effectiveness 
of the first instance decision-making process.
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3.2. Availability of the necessary facilities
As in the case of the submission of asylum claims, the appropriateness of the initial 
decision-making process is also contingent on the availability of certain facilities. 
However, these facilities must be distinguished in the sense that, while the services 
of an independent interpreter and the need to contact a UNHCR representative 
where necessary remain, asylum seekers’ right to a representative - it is argued - 
gives way to the right to a lawyer; the emphasis is, therefore, on the latter.
3.2,1, Access to a lawyer: the right to informed legal advice
The fairness and effectiveness of the decision-making process suppose asylum 
seekers having access to informed advice. In order to maintain quality standards, 
such advice should ideally be provided by lawyers specialised in asylum and 
immigration issues, although advice could also be given to a certain extent by non- 
legally qualified individuals. However, it is argued that essentially or purely legal 
issues should be dealt with or, at least, checked by members of the legal profession. 
While the role of legally and non-legally qualified advisers should be 
complementary, primary importance should be given to the former.
Asylum claimants need the lawyer’s knowledge and experience of asylum law. 
Considering the significance of lawyers’ role in asylum proceedings, it is important 
to control their professionalism. Asylum seekers, who are often particularly 
vulnerable clients, have in some instances been the victims of unscrupulous lawyers. 
In February 1999, in the UK, fifty solicitors’ firms dealing with asylum claims were 
being investigated by the Legal Aid Board. The investigations were prompted by 
evidence of catalogues of errors committed by lawyers detrimental to asylum 
seekers that may have resulted in some of them being returned to their country of 
original In its Immigration and Asylum White Paper called ‘Tairer, Faster and 
Firmer; A Modem Approach to immigration and Asylum” ®^, the UK Government
Channel 4 News, 15 February 1999.
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stressed that it was committed to control unscrupulous immigration advisers^ ®. 
However, while it expressed its intention to introduce statutory regulations 
requiring non-legally qualified advisers to register with a regulatory body, the 
Government appeared to be much more hesitant with respect to lawyers^ ®. Indeed, 
Paragraph 7.22 of the White Paper reads that “(...) [t]he Government is considering 
the extent to which members of the legal profession should be subject to regulation 
in respect of advice of this kind and will announce its intentions as soon as possible 
(...)”. However, the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, in its part V on immigration 
advisers and immigration service providers, suggest that advisers need to be legally 
qualified although it does not expressly say so. Section 84(1) prohibits non-qualified 
persons from providing immigration advice or immigration services; section 84(2) 
defines the notion of “qualified person” *^. Moreover, the new Act provides for an
Fairer, Faster and Firmer: A M odem Approach to Immigration and Asylum, presented to 
Parliament by The Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, 
Stationary Office, 27 M y  1998, Cm 4018.
Ibid., Paragraphs. 7.20 and 7.21.
Ibid., Paragraph. 7.22.
Section 84(2) of the 1999 Act reads:
“A person is a qualified person if-
(a) he is registered with the Commissioner or is employed by, or works under the supervision of, 
such a person;
(b) he is a member or employee of a body wliich is a registered person, or works under the 
supervision of such a member or employee;
(c) he is authorised by a designated professional body to practise as a member of the profession 
whose members are regulated by tliat body, or works under the supervision of such a person;
(d) he is registered with, or authorised by, a person in another EEA State responsible for 
regulating the provision in that EEA State o f advice or services corresponding to iimnigration 
advice or immigration services or would be required to be so registered or authorised were he not 
exempt from such a requirement;
(e) he is authorised by a botty regulating the le ^ l  profession, or any branch o f it, in another EEA 
State to practise as a member o f that profession or branch; or
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Immigration Services Commissioner, referred to as the Commissioner (section 
83(1)). The Commissioner’s general duty is “(...) to promote good practice by those 
who provide immigration advice or immigration services” (section 83(2))^ .^ 
Furthermore, the organisations regarded as designated professional bodies pursuant 
to the 1999 Act are exclusively bodies closely involved with the legal professions^ 
These provisions of the 1999 Act can be interpreted as reflecting and strengthening 
the importance of informed legal advice for asylum claimants. It is argued that 
lawyers specialised in asylum and immigration law are the most qualified to provide 
advice and seiwices. With this in mind, EC law should acknowledge asylum seekers' 
right to infonned legal advice and thus guarantee its provision. Moreover, to further 
secure this right, EC law should impose on the Member States the obligation to 
regulate the activities of immigration advisers, including lawyers.
In other words, whatever the source, advice must be informed. Quality raises the 
question of the qualifications of those providing such advice. It is argued that 
competence in asylum law constitutes an essential requirement and cannot be 
overlooked. Ideally advice to asylum seekers should emanate from lawyers having 
expertise in asylum law. Flowever, where advice is not provided by lawyers,
(f) he is employed by a person who falls within Paragraph (d) or (e) or works under the 
supervision of such a person or o f an employee of such a person.”
Section 83(2) of the 1999 Act provides that the “[tjhe Commissioner is to be appointed by the 
Secretary o f State after consulting the Lord Chancellor and the Scottish Ministers.”
Section 86(1) o f the 1999 Act reads:
“Designated professional body” meaiis_
(a) The Law Society;
(b) The Law Society of Scotland;
(c) The Law Society of Northern Ireland;
(d) The Institute o f Legal Executives;
(e) The General Council of the Bar;
(f) The Faculty of Advocates; or
(g) The General Council of the Bar of Northern Ireland.”
273
equivalent quality should nonetheless be secured. To an extent, expertise in asylum 
law should prevail over requirements regarding legal qualifications. In other words, 
given the choice between a lawyer wdth no expertise in asylum law and a consultant 
adequately specialised in that area, the latter is considered to constitute a more 
suitable source of advice. The fact that legal advice is being provided by qualified 
lawyers does not in itself guarantee high quality; this stresses the importance of a 
tight scrutiny of firms advising asylum claimants.
The setting up of a system of control is not intended to reflect general defiance 
towards asylum and immigration lawyers, but to sanction the few whose actions are 
detrimental to asylum seekers as well as to the profession as a whole. The Member 
States could be given some discretion in choosing the means of control. This 
control implies that the Member States must secure adequate funding. For instance, 
the provisions of the UK Government’s white paper stated that “(...) [i]t is 
envisaged that any regulatory scheme will be self-financing with costs being met 
from registration fee income.”'*" Such a system is acceptable provided that it 
generates sufficient fiinding; if it fails to do so, governments should intervene and 
provide the necessary funding. In any case, resort to non-public funds should not 
reflect the Member States’ reluctance to secure adequate control of asylum and 
immigration advisers.
Access to informed legal advice does not solely raise quality issues; the advice in 
question must also satisfy quantity standards. It is argued that quality cannot be 
achieved without simultaneously addressing the issue of quantity. Meeting 
acceptable standards with regard to quantity suppose that quality advice is offered 
to those in need: any discrimination in the provision of advice would be inconsistent 
with the requirements of international refugee law. The problem is that someone has 
to “pay the bill” generated by the provision of advice. The Member States have not 
gone as far as expressly denying asylum seekers’ the right to informed legal advice; 
however, what most of them have done is to gradually withdraw public funding by 
restricting access to legal aid. Considering the financial hardship faced by most
See supm n. 58.
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asylum seekers, limiting access to legal aid generally amounts to deprive them of 
their right to informed advice. With this in mind, it is argued that it is hypocritical of 
the Member States to stress their commitment to refugee protection Avhile cutting 
down access to legal aid and thus undermining the protection in question. Hence, it 
is crucial to secure that appropriate sources of funding exist in order to adequately 
satisfy the demand for legal aid; it is argued that this responsibility should be 
endorsed by the Member States.
In determining the Member States' obligations in this respect, EC law should take 
into consideration the pressure faced by the Member States in rationalising and 
controlling the overall level of public fonding allocated to the provision of informed 
legal advice. However, this legitimate goal should not be used as a pretext for 
cutting down asylum claimants’ right to advice. The view taken is that EC law 
should define the nature of the Member States’ obligations with regard to legal 
advice and corresponding funding without however imposing a specific model with 
respect to the latter. This would require drastic reforms in many Member States and 
would probably delay implementation; the Member States would “simply” be 
required to introduce the changes and amendments necessary to meet EC law 
standards. When regulating and deciding on the grant of legal aid, the Member 
States should overcome the fact that they provide funding while being a party in 
asylum cases. Moreover, although financial responsibility should be endorsed by the 
Member States, it is argued that EC law should provide for support mechanisms 
pursuant to the principle of solidarity®^  where Member States are facing difficulties 
in fulfilling their obligations
Nothing in the 1999 Act appears to contradict the Government’s white paper on that point (see 
schedules 5 and 6 to the Act).
See, for instance, the Commission’s Working document, supra n. 4, Paragraph 8.
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3.2.2. The services of an independent competent interpreter
Fairness and effectiveness require compensation for any language problem that may 
jeopardise asylum applicants’ rights. Therefore, the services of an independent 
interpreter must be made available throughout the procedure whenever necessary.
In that respect, the wording of the Resolution on minimum guarantees is a source of 
disquiet as it opens the path to national restrictive interpretations of the right to an 
interpreter. Paragraph 13 provides, inter alia, that “they [asylum seekers] must be 
given the services of an interpreter, whenever, necessary, for submitting their case 
to the authorities concerned (...)” These words should not be construed as 
excluding the right to an interpreter at later stages of the procedure- i.e. once the 
claim has been lodged - leaving it to the discretion of national provisions. Hence, 
the view taken is that asylum seekers’ right to an independent interpreter at every 
stage of the proceedings should be expressly inserted in EC law®®.
3.2.3. The opportunity to contact a UNHCR representative
The possibility to contact a UNHCR representative is considered a means to 
monitor the compliance of asylum procedures with international standards, but can 
also be a source of valuable assistance and expertise provided that the Member 
States and their authorities are willing to cooperate.
It is argued that UNHCR representatives' involvement could bring a much needed 
change to the current climate. Practices in many Member States, often prompted by 
the recent developments in the EU asylum policy, have exacerbated the antagonistic 
nature of the positions of those involved with asylum seekers. Decision-makers' 
views increasingly appear irreconcilable with those expressed by asylum claimants
®® It is understood that independent interpreters must satisfy the same standards irrespective of the 
procedural stage; the reader is therefore referred to section 2.3.1 of this chapter for a description of 
these standards.
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and their representatives. Dialogue has given way to systematic opposition. The 
concern does not so much lie with the existence of divergent opinions, but in the 
absence of adequate fora where productive exchanges can take place. At national 
level, asylum issues are generally highly sensitive and the views of an often mis­
informed public opinion play a significant role. This is, for instance, the case in the 
UK where tabloids have long taken the habit of alarming public opinion by twisting 
public perceptions of asylum seekers and refogees and thus fostering “cruel 
myths”®\ This kind of reports constitute a favourable ground for the introduction of 
restrictive asylum legislation. In such a context, the real issue, namely the need for 
protection, does not seem to occupy the place it deseives in parliamentary debates. 
In the UK, the disquiet created by the adoption of the 1999 Act was mainly 
expressed outside Parliament. The opposition to the new Act took, inter alia, the 
form of demonstrations by organisations involved with asylum seekers and human 
rights. However, one may note that the Government's drastic proposals to curtail 
support for asylum seekers faced Labour back benchers' strong opposition. 
However, no proper dialogue seems to have taken place between the Government 
and the organisations concerned with asylum seekers' rights. This confrontational 
atmosphere is felt in the decision-making process itself.
The involvement of UNHCR in the decision-making process through its 
representatives would be a means to reconcile the positions adopted by decision­
makers and those representing asylum applicants. UNHCR representatives' 
intervention could infer positive changes in the “decision-making culture” which 
very much appears as a “battleground”®®. With the “communautarisation” of asylum
Nick Hardwick, “Cruel Myths”, The Guardian, Society, 17 February 1999, at p. 6-7. The article 
mentions some tabloid headlines on asylum seekers and refugees covering many decades:
- “We Are Being Swamped by Crimewaves of Migrants”, The Sun, 1998;
- “So-called Refiigees - Disgraceful Scenes”, Daily Mail, 1900;
- “Refiigee Flood Looks to Set New Higli”, Daily Mail, 1998;
- “German Jews Pouring into Tliis Country”, Daily Mail, 1938.
68 See supra n. 48, at p. 12.
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matters, it is argued that UNHCR should be involved in the decision-making
process^ .^
As stressed in JUSTICE’S asylum research project, “[fjailure to engage with non­
governmental agencies and individuals weakens the system enormously. First, it 
reinforces the adversarial model: contact occurs only in the context of contesting a 
case, or criticising proposals or laws. Second, it fails to make use of a valuable 
source of expertise
Another element central to the existence of suitable procedures relates to the 
adoption of the first instance decision.
3.3. The adoption of first instance decisions
The adoption of first instance decisions comprehends two crucial steps: the first one 
relates to the gathering of information and the second one to its examination in view 
of the adoption of a decision. It is vital that the process leading to decisions on 
asylum claims is consistent with the right to seek refugee status.
3.3.1. The gathering of information
The information collated in order to decide an asylum claim has a twofold nature: it 
consists of information provided by the applicant himself or herself as well as 
information on his or her country of origin. These two types of information must 
supplement each other in order to allow a comprehensive assessment.
See chapter II on tlie EC: a more suitable framework. 
™ On tliis issue, see, inter alia, supra n. 48, at p. 12.
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(i) Information provided by asylum seekers
The infomiation provided by asylum seekers plays a determining role in the 
assessment of their claims. This information must concern the reasons why they are 
applying for refugee status and asylum seekers have a duty to tell the truth^\ As 
noted in the UNHCR Handbook, “[t]he relevant facts of the individual case will 
have to be furnished in the first place by the applicant. It will then be up to the 
person charged with determining his [or her status] to assess the validity of any 
evidence and the credibility of the applicant’s statements” (Paragraph 195). 
Applicants have a duty to assist the examiner in establishing the full facts of their
77case .
Although the information provided by asylum claimants are essential and constitute 
the very basis for the examination of their application, it is important that the 
information in question is supplemented by information on their country of origin. 
This information is designed to help examiners having a better understanding of 
asylum seekers’ personal circumstances.
(ii) Country information
Information on asylum seekers’ countries of origin is designed to supplement the 
information that they have provided on their particular case.
Information on countries of origin (and third countries in general) must not be 
confined to the present situation or recent past as such limitations could jeopardise 
the assessment and fail to provide grounds for reasonable predictions. One must 
bear in mind that determining the risk of persecution also involves taking into
See supra n. 1, Paragraph 205(i). 
Ibid., Paragraph 205(1).
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consideration future risks. It is not sufficient to say that there is currently no risk of 
persecution in the country of origin; safety must be assessed in the longer term. In 
other words, the safety of countries of origin must present a strong degree of 
permanence in the light of the asylum seeker’s personal circumstances. This means 
that safety must present a certain degree of stability and any foreseeable risk of 
dramatic changes must be taken into account. As already observed, information on 
countries of origin must be as accurate and comprehensive as possible although it is 
accepted that a “full picture” cannot be realistically expected as it would require the 
availability of perfectly up to date and comprehensive information; information on 
certain countries may be scarce.
Various sources of information are available to national decision-makers who must 
determine their respective reliability. Information, for instance, may emanate from 
governmental departments of the Member States or third countries®  ^as well as from 
NGOs involved with asylum seekers and human rights at large "^. Of particular 
assistance is UNHCR Centre for Documentation on Refugees (CDR). The 
availability of diverse sources of information has both advantages and 
disadvantages. They may complement each other allowing a more comprehensive 
and accurate understanding of the situation in the country concerned. This diversity 
may also be a means of evaluating their veracity; corroboration may be a strong 
indicator of exactness. With this in mind, one can refer to Paragraph 6 of the 
Resolution on minimum guarantees which provides, inter alia, that the authorities 
responsible for examining asylum claims must “(...) have access to precise and up to 
date information from various sources, including information from the UNHCR, 
concerning the situation prevailing in the countries of origin of asylum seekers and 
in transit countries” ®^. However, diversity also renders accuracy more difficult to 
determine and decision-makers should, therefore, be helped in that respect. It is
III particular the United States and Canada. 
For instance, Anmesty international.
Information on transit countries is used where the asylum seeker’s removal to a tliird country is 
contemplated.
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argued that they should not be left with the task of having to assess the veracity of 
the information available to them as there is a higli risk of divergences across the 
EU and within the Member States.
Hence, the setting up of an information centre common to the Member States is 
highly recommended. This system could centralise data on third countries and be a 
forum for exchanges of information. Accuracy controls could be exercised within 
this system facilitating access to relevant information. Moreover, the time formerly 
spent by national authorities on the collection of relevant information could be 
invested in the decision-making process itself to the benefit of all parties involved.
However, since no system is infallible, the accurate and comprehensive nature of the 
information so provided must be open to challenge by the Member States as well as 
by asylum applicants in the course of asylum proceedings. Moreover, controls of 
this information system could be inferred from cooperation with other centres of 
information and, in particular, the CDR.
The gravity attached to first instance decisions on asylum claims means that 
information on countries of origin must satisfy certain requirements. This means 
that information must meet the same standards regardless of the circumstances; no 
differentiation must take place between substantive claims and those declared 
manifestly unfounded or lodged at the border.
Reliable information on asylum seekers countries of origin is indispensable to the 
understanding of their personal circumstances and is therefore crucial to the* 
decision-making process. However, as already observed, this background 
infonnation is not perfect and cannot, in any manner, be considered a substitute for 
the information provided by claimants.
The gathering of information constitutes the first step in the decision-making 
process; the second one concerns the examination of the claim itself based on the 
information provided.
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3.3.2. Examination of the information
The second step in the first instance decision-making process consists in assessing 
whether, considering the gathered information, asylum claims fall within the scope 
of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention. In other words, decision-makers must 
determine whether applicants have a well-founded fear of persecution in the sense 
of the Convention. To this end, asylum claimants’ narratives as well as the 
background information on their country of origin must be examined in the light of 
the criteria laid down in Article 1(A)(2).
Determining whether individuals are entitled to refugee status under the 1951 
Convention raises the issue of the definition of the term refugee. This definition is 
laid down in Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention. However, the personal scope 
of the convention definition has been the object of numerous debates. It is argued 
that the Convention definition as interpreted by most Member States no longer 
corresponds to the needs of today’s refugee situation^ ®. With this in mind, the 
incorporation in EC law of amendments to the Convention definition corresponding 
to more a more up to date interpretation is recommended^*'.
Determining whether an individual has a well-founded fear of persecution raises a 
number of issues, i.e. the exact scope of this requirement as well as questions 
relating to the burden and standard of proof.
(i) A well-founded fear of persecution
Candidates for refugee status must demonstrate that they have a well-founded fear 
of persecution based on at least one of the five criteria laid down in Article 1(A)(2)
76
77
See chapter III on tlie need for an up to date interpretation of the tenn “refugee”.
Ibid,
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of the 1951 Convention; these criteria are race* religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion^l This requirement is reiterated in the 
Joint Position on an harmonised definition of the term refiigee^ .^
The purpose of refugee status as laid down in the 1951 Convention is to protect 
those falling within its scope against persecution in their country of origin. What 
needs to be established is the risk of persecution in the future, thus not a past or 
present risk of persecution. The objective is to grant effective protection to those in 
need; that is why the protection conferred through refugee status pre-empts 
persecution as much as possible. In that respect. Paragraph 3 of the Joint Position 
may appear to state the obvious in so far as it provides that “[t]he fact that an 
individual, prior to his departure firom his country of origin, was not subject to 
persecution or directly threatened with persecution does not per se mean that he 
cannot in asylum proceedings claim a well-founded fear of persecution.” Requiring 
persecution as a pre-requirement to eligibility to refugee status would seriously 
undermine the very essence of the notion of protection. In assessing the credibility 
of asylum claims, evidence of past persecution will have a considerable weight in 
the outcome of the claims; however, it cannot be considered a prerequisite. Where a 
person claiming refugee status has already been a victim of persecution, asylum 
proceedings must be construed and applied as a means to prevent any further ill- 
treatment. However, for the risk of persecution to be taken into consideration, it 
must present a personal character.
The risk of persecution alleged by applicants must also be personal in the sense that 
asylum seekers must be identifiable targets. Thus, they must establish that they are 
likely to be exposed to persecution if returned to their country of origin. Hence,
78 îbid.
Joint Position of 4 March 1996 defined by the Council on the basis o f Article K.3 of the Treaty 
on European Union on the harmonized application of tiie definition of tlie term “refugee” in 
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the status of refugee, OJ L 63/2, 
13/03/1996, paragraph 15.
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they cannot base their applications for refugee status on the existence of a general 
risk of persecution. The past, present and foreseen political climate in the country of 
origin is taken into consideration and is indispensable to an informed decision­
making process^ ®. However, it does not in itself suffice to found asylum claims 
within the meaning of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention. This requirement of 
a personal risk has been interpreted by most Member States in an excessively 
restrictive manner. For instance, it has been used as a tool to keep gender-based 
persecution outside the scope of the 1951 Convention^'.
This requirement is also part of the distinction existing between individuals seeking 
refugee status as defined in the 1951 Convention and those referred to as displaced 
people or individuals who are caught in events generating mass flows of people in 
need of international protection. This was the case of those fleeing Bosnia in the 
early 90s and more recently Kosovo®^ . As explained in the introduction, the issues 
specific to mass influx of refugees are not addressed^ .^
It is argued that, for the purpose of granting refugee status, the existence of a 
personal risk of persecution is a legitimate requirement and can, therefore, be 
mentioned in an EC legislation on asylum. However, this requirement should not be 
misused in order restrict the personal scope of the definition of the term refugee and 
limit its practical application. A valuable safeguard against restrictive interpretations 
of the term refugee lies with the adoption and implementation of a definition
See tills chapter, section 3.3.1(11).
On gender-based persecution, see chapter III on tlie need for an up to date interpretation of the 
term “refugee”.
In mid-April 1999, UNHCR estimated that less than a quarter of the Kosovan ethnic Albanian 
population was left in Kosovo, Radio 4 News, 15 April 1999.
See the introduction, chapter I,
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consistent with international standards. This once again stresses the importance of a 
global approach to asylum matters.
(ii) Burden and standard of proof
The issues regarding the burden and standard of proof cannot be dissociated in the 
sense that the principle governing the former dictates the rules applying to the latter.
The mle is that the burden of proof is on asylum claimants; this rule is formally 
acknowledged in the UNHCR Handbook®'*. It is for applicants to establish that they 
have a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning Article 1(A)(2) of the 
1951 Convention*^ The difficulties inherent in this task have been exacerbated by 
restrictive interpretations of the Convention definition of the term “refugee” 
reflecting the development of hostile policies.
Although the principle relating to the burden of proof is not in itself questioned® ,^ its 
implementation *• it is argued - should take into consideration the particular
Paragraph 196 of the UNHCR Handbook (see supra n. 1) reads, inter alia, that “[i]t is a general 
principle that the burden of proof lies on the person submitting a claim.”
As already mentioned, a well-founded fear of persecution must be based on, at least, one of the 
Convention criteria; this is expressly mentioned in the Joint Position on the harmonized definition 
of the term refugee (see supra n. 79).
However, the principle according to which the burden of proof is on the applicant should not be 
applied in an absolute mamrer. This principle must lighten in the case of mentally disturbed 
asylum claimants. In such cases, information may have to emanate firom otlier individuals, for 
example friends or relatives. Moreover, if  the mentally disturbed asylum seeker is part of a group, 
his or her case may be assessed on the basis o f that of the members of tlie group. If they do qualify 
for refugee status, he or she will be eligible in the same manner (see supra n. 1, Paragraph 210).
Flexibility should also be introduced in relation to unaccompanied minors. They have not reach 
the matmity necessary to establish a fear o f persecution in the same way as adults. This means, for
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vulnerability of asylum seekers. This has usually been acknowledged by national 
courts which have held that there should be a low threshold of proof. In the UK 
leading case in Sivakumaram, Lord Keith of Kinkel suggested that the standard of 
proof should be one of “reasonable degree of likelihood”*^  Pursuant to the Joint 
Position on the definition of the term refugee, once applicants’ credibility has been 
sufficiently established, no further confirmation of the facts should be required from 
them and they should be given the benefit of the doubt**. However, the positive 
impact of this statement is undermined by its wording. Indeed, paragraph 3 of the 
Joint Position does not give any guideline regarding the interpretation of the 
expression “sufficiently established credibility”. Mention of what may constitute 
evidence of a risk of persecution remains too vague to amount to guidelines 
common to the Member States. Moreover, paragraph 3 provides that, where there 
are “good reasons”, detailed confirmation of the alleged acts may be requested; this 
may well facilitate the application of excessively demanding standards of proof.
Asylum claimants are confronted with various hurdles where trying to prove their 
case. Firstly, they are faced with practical difficulties often inherent in their situation 
of asylum seekers; these difficulties mainly regard the provision of evidence. In 
many instances, asylum claimants are not in a position to provide concrete elements 
of proof in support of their claim such as written documents, nor can they resort to 
witnesses. Considering the difficulties faced by asylum claimants in providing 
evidence, “(...) while the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty 
to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts [must be] shared by the applicant and 
the examiner UNHCR recommends that the requirement of evidence should
instance, that the circumstances of the parents and other relatives, including their situation in the 
unaccompanied minor’s country of origin, must be taken into consideration. Therefore, a liberal 
application of the benefit of the doubt may be required in cases involving unaccompanied minors 
(see UNHCR Handbook, supra n. 1, Paragraphs 213-219).
i? V Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department, ex parte Sivakumaram [1988] AC 958.
** See supra n. 79, Paragraph 3.
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not be applied too strictly^ '*. For these reasons, it is crucial to avoid formalism with 
regard to evidence requirements. In that respect, one can refer to paragraph 5 in  
f in e  of the Resolution on minimum guarantees which reads that “[rjecognition of 
refugee status is not dependent on the production of any particular formal 
evidence.” However, the positive impact of this provision is undermined by the fact 
that it is laid down in a soft law instrument. Secondly, as already mentioned, asylum 
seekers aie the victims of restrictive concepts and interpretations that affect their 
chances to be considered refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Convention^'. 
Finally, applicants’ personal circumstances make any account of their reasons for 
fleeing their country of origin and fearing persecution if returned an extremely 
painful experience; this may generate hesitations and inconsistencies in the 
claimants’ narratives that may be detrimental to their credibility. It is argued that the 
standard of proof required fi*om asylum applicants should take into consideration 
these difficulties inherent in their situation. Asylum seekers cannot be expected to 
establish with certainty that they will be exposed to persecution if returned to their 
country of origin. No Member State has raised its standard of proof to such an 
inaccessible and thus unacceptable level; but practices based on restrictive laws, 
interpretations and attitudes may result in asylum claimants facing excessively 
demanding standards of proof.
With this in mind, the notion of “reasonable degree of likelihood” appears to 
constitute an acceptable standard of proof. However, its consistency with 
international refugee law is contingent on the context within which this standard of 
proof is construed and applied. An essential pre-requirement to the adoption and 
implementation of a satisfactory standard of proof consists in the existence of a 
legislation meeting international requirements. This issue is closely connected to 
issues relating to the scope and interpretation of the concept of reftigee. Restrictive
See supra n. 1, Paragraph 196.
Ibid., Paragraph 197.
See chapter III on the need for an up to date interpretation of the term “reftigee”.
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and outdated interpretations prevent acceptable rules on standard of proof from 
producing their intended effect. This is another illustration of the closely 
interconnected nature of the different elements of asylum law and policies and the 
need for a global approach. It is argued that applicants should also be given the 
benefit of the doubt as they are not in a position to prove every part of their story. If 
such a requirement were imposed on asylum seekers, most of them would be 
unsuccessfliP. However, as stressed by UNHCR, “[t]he benefit of the doubt 
should, however, only be given when all available evidence has been obtained and 
checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s general credibility. 
The applicant’s statements must be coherent and plausible, and must not run 
counter the generally known facts”^^ .
Bearing these factors in mind, it is argued that EC law should tackle the issue of 
standard of proof. In that respect, the concept of “reasonable degree of likelihood” 
is considered a suitable standard. To date, the standard of proof applied in asylum 
cases varies among the Member States. For instance, in the UK, the standard of 
proof is that of real likelihood. That test was established in R v. Secretary o f State 
for the Home Department, ex parte Sivakitmarar^^. The House of Lords approved 
the words of Lord Diplock regarding the standard of proof as expressed in 
Fernandez v. Government o f Singapore^^ In that case. Lord Diplock suggested that 
the requisite degree of likelihood could be indicated by expressions such as “a 
reasonable chance”, “substantial grounds for thinking”, or “serious possibility”^^ . In
92 This is formally acknowledged in the UNHCR Handbook, see supra n. 1, Paragraph 203.
Ibid., Paragraph 204.
See supra n. 87.
Fernandez v. Government o f  Singapore [1971] 2 ALL ER 691.
See Ian A. Macdonald and Nicholas J. Blake, M acdonald’s Immigration Law and Practice 
(Butterworths, London/Dublin/Edinburgh, 1995) (4th ed) at p. 381.
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France, the case-law does not allow the identification of a test systematically 
applicable to asylum cases. Competent bodies must be satisfied that the evidence 
provided is reliable; the evidence must have "Valeur probcmte’^ '^ .^ The applicant’s 
arguments must also be assessed with a view to determining whether the alleged 
facts can justify a well-founded fear of persecution^®. The fact that standards of 
proof vary in the EC means that asylum claims m*e likely to be assessed differently 
in the Member States. These divergences are intensified by disparities existing in the 
interpretation of the term refugee. This is acknowledged in the Commission’s 
Working document where this question is presented as “(...)one of the most 
important procedural issues”^^ . In the Commission’s opinion, the adoption of a 
common standard of proof is indispensable to the completion of one of the main 
objectives of the Treaty of Amsterdam, namely equivalent treatment of asylum 
claims throughout the EC. The Commission also expresses concern regarding the 
effects of these disparities on the distribution of asylum claims among the Member 
States. In the Commission’s view, they entail the risk that a greater proportion of 
asylum seekers will seek refiigee status in the Member States having the less 
demanding standards of proof; this relates to a certain extent to the notion of 
“burden sharing” now referred as “solidarity”'®''. The Commission’s conclusions can 
be pushed further by raising the issue of facto harmonisation”. The increasing 
restrictive nature of the legislation introduced in some Member States has inferred 
similar developments in the Member States which traditionally had liberal asylum 
laws. This resulted in certain areas of asylum law being de facto harmonised, but at 
the lowest level. A comprehensive EC legislation on asylum is seen as the most
CRR, 15 June 1982, Nokabo, referred to in Tiberghien, La Protection des Réfugiés en France 
(Collection Droit Public Positif, Presses Universitaires d’Aix Marseilles, Economica, Paris, 1988) 
(2nd ed) at p. 244.
Conseil d’Etat, 26 February 1986, Si ta, referred to in ibid., at p. 435.
See supra n. 4, Paragraph 20.
'®® See, for instance, ibid. Paragraph 8.
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effective way to secure that harmonisation takes place at a level consistent with 
international refugee law. For these reasons, a common standard of proof is 
considered an indispensable element of this legislation. Mention of the need for a 
common standard of proof in the Commission’s Working document is a step in the 
right direction; however, the Commission remained silent on the substance of this 
standard and simply noted that “(...) the standard of proof [was] a difficult issue 
related to Member States’ individual legal systems, and [that] it would be necessary 
to proceed with caution in this area.”'®' It is hoped that this will not have a 
restrictive impact on the content of the contemplated measures. It is argued that the 
standard of proof to be applied across the Member States should reflect asylum 
seekers’ circumstances. In other words, the standard in question must take on board 
the fact that asylum seekers may face serious difficulties in gathering evidence. To 
that end, one should turn to the UNHCR Guidelines for assistance. Indeed, 
Paragraph 42 provides that “(...) [i]n general, the applicant’s fear should be 
considered well-founded if he [or she] can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his 
[or her] continued stay in his [or her] country of origin has become intolerable to 
him [or her] for the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons 
be intolerable if he [or she] returned there.”
A satisfactory first instance decision-making process also requires other 
requirements to be satisfied.
3.4. Additional requirements
The adequacy of first instance determination is also contingent on the observance of 
other requirements. Asylum claimants should systematically be entitled to a decision 
in writing and first instance proceedings must have suspensive effect.
'®' Ihid.
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3.4.1. Right to a decision in writing
It is argued that all asylum applicants should be entitled to a written decision. This 
right is understood as being absolute and any alteration to this right is therefore 
considered unacceptable. Moreover, decisions on asylum claims should precisely 
mention the reasons for granting or refusing refugee status.
The absolute character of the right to a decision in writing prohibits exceptions. 
Hence, the fact that a claim has been held manifestly unfounded or lodged at the 
border does not justify the application of less demanding rules. In that respect, the 
relevant provisions of the Resolution on minimum guarantees are detrimental to the 
effectiveness and fairness of the proceedings. Indeed, paragraph 25 of the 
Resolution introduced a significant derogation to the already restricted right to a 
decision in writing laid down in paragraph 15. Paragraph 25 provides that, where 
claims are lodged at the border, negative decisions and the reasons for these refusals 
as well as any possibility to appeal may be only communicated to applicants orally; 
decisions will only be confirmed in writing upon request. The Resolution fails to 
furnish any justification for such a derogation. It seems to have been prompted by 
the nature of the treatment reserved to applications submitted at the border in EU 
and many national measures. However, it is argued that an EC legislation on asylum
- as an instrument designed to rectify inconsistencies with international refugee law
- should not permit this kind of derogation, This demanding approach is founded on 
the potential importance attached to the possession of a decision in writing, 
particularly in relation to appeals. The right to a decision in writing should also exist 
irrespective of the outcome of the application for asylum. In other words, both 
positive and negative decisions should be confirmed in writing.
For the right to a decision in writing to amount to an adequate guarantee, the 
reasons for the decision must be clearly and precisely stated. This is essential to the 
existence of satisfactory proceedings. In particular, unsuccessfiil asylum seekers 
need to know why their application has been rejected if they are to lodge an 
effective appeal. For negative decisions to be contested in a constructive manner.
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appellants must have knowledge of the reasons behind the outcome of their claim. 
Mention of these reasons is indispensable in determining the weaknesses of 
claimants’ applications in the decision makers’ opinion with regard to their 
credibility and the weight attached to the information relating to their country of 
origin. Decisions should expressly mention the availability of a right of appeal. This 
is designed to secure that applicants are aware of their right to lodge an appeal; this 
is particularly important where the competent authorities have failed to give 
claimants comprehensive information on the procedure'® .^
3.4,2. Suspensive effect
The view taken is that applicants must be entitled to remain in the territory of the 
country accountable for examining their claims pending determination. If claimants 
are removed to a third country'®  ^ - a removal to their country of origin would 
constitute a flagrant violation of the principle of non-refoulement - while a decision 
is being taken on their application, the issue relating to the enforcement of positive 
decisions would be threatened. Depriving first instance proceedings fi'om suspensive 
effect would seriously undermine the fairness and effectiveness of asylum 
proceedings. Indeed, the implementation of positive decisions * decisions 
recognising the need for international protection - would be hazardous and highly 
complex to the detriment of recognised refugees as their return to the country of 
reflige would have to be organised. Failure to secure their return would amount to 
deny asylum applicants the benefit of their newly gained refugee status and would 
thus constitute a blatant violation of the 1951 Convention.
The suspensive effect of the first instance decision-making process is actually 
recognised in the 1995 Resolution. Paragraph 12 of the Resolution on minimum
102 See this chapter, section 2.2.
'®^  The notion of third country in tliis context is imderstood as referring to a safe tliird countiy; 
indeed, removal to a tliird countiy which would not meet safety criteria would in Itself constitute 
an intolerable infringement of the principle of non-refoulement.
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guarantees provides that “[a]s long as the asylum application has not been decided 
on, the general principle applies that the applicant is allowed to remain in the 
territory of the State in which his application has been lodged or is being 
examined.” Moreover, paragraph 17 of the Resolution on minimum guarantees 
provides, inter alia, that no expulsion measure must be carried out while deciding 
whether an application for asylum is manifestly unfounded. This principle should 
therefore apply to claims considered manifestly unfounded as well as to those 
lodged at the border. Unfortunately, some Member States have adopted a restrictive 
approach to suspensive effect. For instance, asylum claimants may be removed from 
the UK where the Secretary of State has issued a certificate under section 11 or 
section 12 of the 1999 Act (section 72(2))'®\ UNHCR recommends that 
proceedings pending initial decisions should have suspensive effect and that 
applicants should therefore be entitled to remain in the country where their claim is 
being examined***^ . In UNHCR’s opinion, suspensive effect should only be denied in 
cases where the claim is “clearly abusive”*'*'’. However, considering the difficulties 
in asserting beyond doubt that an asylum claim is “clearly abusive” and the hostile 
practices developed in some Member States, it is argued that suspensive effect 
should be construed as an absolute principle. It is therefore recommended that, in 
that respect, EC law should go beyond UNHCR’s recommendations.
Section 11 o f the 1999 Act deals with cases where the asylum claim falls witliin the scope of  
arrangements between Member States which command tlie applicant’s removal from the UK. 
Section 12 of the 1999 Act concerns removal of asylum seekers in circumstances tliat are not 
considered under section 11. The issue of a certificate under either section results in the asylum 
claimants’ removal to a “safe third country" (wliich can be a Member State) unless the certificate 
has been set aside on an appeal under section 65 or 71 or otherwise ceases to have effect (section 
72(1)).
See UNHCR Handbook, supra n. 1, Paragraph 192(iv).
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Another fundamental safeguard lies with the grant of a right of appeal to asylum 
claimants.
4. Challenge of first instance decisions
The right of appeal is central to the existence of satisfactory asylum proceedings'® ;^ 
this right has two main functions. Firstly, appeal procedures are a rectifying 
mechanism designed to minimise the number of errors committed in assessing 
applications for asylum by offering the opportunity to reconsider points of law and 
facts and overturn the decision where necessary. Secondly, appeal procedures must 
also be construed as mechanisms intended to secure a correct and consistent 
application of asylum law.
Appeal procedures cannot be dissociated from the first instance decision-making 
process as their effectiveness very much depends upon that of the latter. An 
efficient initial decision-making process constitutes the necessary foundations for 
an efficient appeal system. Decisions based on unclear reasoning are more difficult 
to analyse and appraise; this renders the review mechanism more intricate. 
Moreover, a deficient initial decision-making process is more likely to produce 
decisions that will be contested, generating greater numbers of appeals. This results 
in overloaded appeal systems causing increased delays detrimental to the 
effectiveness of the whole procedure.
Despite its fundamental character, the right of appeal in the context of asylum 
procedures has been subject to persistent attacks. Curtailments - if not removals - 
of the right to appeal were concomitant to the development of fast-track 
procedures. The reasons behind the use of such procedures were also seen by most 
Member States as means to justify limitations to the right of appeal. These 
limitations go from the imposition of unworkable time-limits to the removal of an
On this issue see, supra n. 48, Chapter 5 “The determination system; appeals and review", at 
p. 49-59.
294
in-country right of appeal. It is argued that these restrictions threaten the right to 
seek refiigee status and are therefore incompatible with international refugee law.
For appeal procedures to be appropriate, i.e. in line with international refiigee law, 
a number of elements must be present. Firstly, appellate bodies must meet certain 
requirements; secondly, entitlement to a non-truncated right of appeal must be 
ensured; and finally the facilities necessary to an effective appeal must be provided.
4.1. Competent appellate bodies
Asylum claimants, it is ai'gued, must be granted the right to have their cases 
reviewed on their merits by independent courts specialised in asylum cases the 
members of which are adequately qualified. Moreover, these courts must be 
granted suitable jurisdiction, i.e. jurisdiction to reconsider facts as well as points of 
law.
4.1.1. Independent specialised courts
The notion of independence is understood as meaning that the bodies held 
responsible for hearing appeals against decisions on asylum claims must be 
independent firom first instance decision-makers as well as from the government. 
This is an essential requirement if appellate procedures are to fulfil their two main 
functions, namely providing an opportunity to review the facts of the case and 
secure a correct and consistent application of the law. If these bodies were 
deprived of this independence, their margin of manoeuvre would be hindered by 
the influence of both first instance decision-makers and governments. In that 
respect, the principles set out in the Resolution on minimum guarantees appear to 
be satisfactory. Pursuant to Paragraph 8, the competent body must give an 
independent ruling under the conditions laid down in Paragraph 4. This paragraph 
requires, inter alia, decisions to be taken independently “(...) in the sense that all 
asylum applications will be examined and decided upon individually, objectively 
and impartially.” However, the Resolution on minimum guarantees does not define
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these terms; the real test, therefore, lies with the interpretation and implementation 
of these provisions by the Member States. Considering the persistent attempts to 
truncate the right of appeal, present in the Resolution itself®*, this is not reassuring 
and the situation calls for more specific provisions to be included in EC law.
Since the bodies responsible for dealing with appeals must provide the procedural 
safeguards that characterise any court of law, these bodies must be courts of law. 
With this in mind, it is argued that the wording of the Resolution on minimum 
guarantees adds unnecessary confusion. Paragraph 8 reads that “[i]n the case of a 
negative decision, provision must be made for an appeal to a court or a review 
authority However, paragraph 19 allows a derogation to the principle laid 
down in paragraph 8 as it permits the Member States to exclude the possibility of 
an appeal to a court or a review authority where decisions holding claims 
manifestly unfounded have been confirmed by an “independent body”, i.e. a body 
independent firom the examining authority. The Resolution fails to define the 
notions of “review authority” and “independent body”. Two questions spring 
immediately to mind: to what extent does an “independent body” or a “review 
authority” differ fi'om a court and would any kind of difference be tolerable? The 
second question is closely related to the issue regarding access to appellate 
procedures and is therefore further examined in section 4.2. With respect to the 
first question, it is argued that compliance with international refugee law requires 
appeals to be heard by courts. Hence, a “review authority” - as well as an 
“independent body” - must be subject to the same requirements as a court which 
renders resort to these concepts superfluous and, more importantly, confusing. 
Moreover, the lack of definition in the Resolution means that these concepts are 
left to the Member States’ interpretation. Considering the restrictive developments 
in legislation on appeal procedures, the terminology used by the drafters of the 
Resolution on minimum guarantees is considered a source of disquiet as it
The Resolution on minimum guarantees (see supra n. 3) provides for exceptions to the right of 
appeal enshrined in Paragraph 8 with respect to manifestly unfounded asylum claims (Paragraph 
19).
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constitutes a favourable ground for restrictive interpretations likely to be 
detrimental to an adequate enforcement of the right of appeal.
The essential requirement regarding the nature of appellate bodies is that they must 
be courts of law. Moreover, it is argued that the specificity of asylum issues 
requires jurisdiction to be given to specialised courts. Such courts are also needed 
for practical reasons; the importance of the workload generated by asylum appeals 
in most Member States must be addressed if appeal systems are to be effective. In 
the UK, jurisdiction over asylum appeals is conferred upon adjudicators, the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal (the Court of Session in 
Scotland)*'*^ . Adjudicators and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal may, to a certain 
extent, be considered specialised jurisdiction as they “solely” deal with immigration 
and asylum issues. However, the extent of their competences remains burdensome 
and causes their resources to be over stretched. This situation has contributed to 
the development of an important backlog**'*. In France, jurisdiction has been 
granted to the Commission des recours des réfugiés (CRR), a specialised appellate 
body. The CRR was established by the loi n° 52-893 of 25 July 1952 concerning 
the Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA)” ', the first 
instance decision-maker. A fiirther appeal may be lodged with the Conseil d’Etat, 
but only on points of law. Unlike the CRR, the Conseil d’Etat is not a specialised 
Court; as the supreme administrative court, the Conseil d’Etat deals with the 
matters falling within the scope of administrative jurisdiction. In that respect, the 
French system appears to provide a more adequate system as there is an appellate 
body whose jurisdiction is confined to asylum cases.
See Part V  on appeals and Schedule 4 on appeals to the 1999 Act. 
See, for instance, JUSTICE, supra n. 48, at p. 12 and 15.
I l l See supra n. 55.
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4.1.2. Jurisdiction to reconsider initial decisions on asylum
In order for appeal systems to fulfil their functions, i.e. review facts and ensure a 
correct and consistent application of the law, appellate bodies must be given 
jurisdiction allowing them to reconsider facts as well as points of law. Appellate 
bodies must be in a position to overturn decisions taken by first instance decision­
makers. Despite its obvious character, this requirement should expressly be 
inserted in EC law in order to prevent any attempts to truncate the jurisdiction of 
appellate bodies.
The CRR is an administrative court de plein contentieux; this means that the CRR 
has jurisdiction to reconsider facts as well as points of law. Adjudicators and the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal in the UK enjoy the same kind of jurisdiction. Such a 
jurisdiction is essential as the raison d'être of an appeal system lies with the fact 
that a totally reliable first instance decision-making process cannot exist. In the 
UK, appeal procedures are also in the hands of judicial bodies** .^ A first instance 
decision-making process consistent with the requirements of international refugee 
law may minimise errors in the appraisal of asylum claims. However, the risk of 
error cannot be completely eliminated and its particular dramatic dimension in the 
case of asylum seekers cannot be ignored; for this reason, one cannot afford 
deficient appeal systems.
The existence of competent appellate bodies is also contingent on the quality of its 
personnel. Their members must, therefore, be adequately qualified.
4.1.3. Adequately qualified personnel
Members of appellate bodies must be legally qualified; however, this requirement 
must be more specific in the sense that they must be specialised in asylum and
See Schedule 2 on the Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Schedule 3 on adjudicators of the 
1999 Act.
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human rights issues. To date, specialisation in these fields has not been considered 
a pre-requirement to access to these positions. In the UK, adjudicators are not 
required to be specialised in asylum and human rights law. In most cases, in depth 
knowledge is, for its main part, acquired through experience. The requirement 
regarding prior expertise in asylum and human rights law must not be understood 
as undermining the benefit of experience. It is intended to take into consideration 
the complexity of asylum law and refugee matters at large. It is argued that this 
required expertise should be supplemented by regular training designed to address 
the fast-moving nature of asylum law and the changes in the refiigee situation, 
changes that the courts should take into account. With this in mind, training 
organised witliin the Odysseus programme”  ^ could also benefit the members of 
appellate bodies provided that this training is consistent with international refiigee 
law. It is argued that these qualification requirements also apply to the members of 
any further appellate bodies in the case of multi-tier appeal systems" \  The reader 
is referred to the comments made with regard to the training of officers competent 
to receive asylum claims"^.
With this in mind, it is argued that EC law should embody the necessary 
requirements regarding qualification and training. The Resolution on minimum
113 See supra n. 26.
For instance, with respect to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal,
Paragraph 11 of Schedule 2 provides:
“A person is legally qualified for the purposes of this Schedule if  -
(a) he has a 7 year general qualification, within the meaning of section 71 of the Courts and Legal 
Services Act 1990;
(b) he is an advocate or solicitor in Scotland of at least 7 years’ standing; or
(c) he is a member of the Bar of Northern Ireland of at least 7 years’ standing.”
It is unfortunate that no specific knowledge in asylum as well as relevant experience in that field is 
required.
See tins chapter, section 2.1.1.
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guarantees is silent on the issue; it only mentions the need for fully qualified 
personnel in the field of asylum and refugee matters with respect to authorities 
competent for deciding asylum claims in the first instance (paragraph 4),
The effectiveness of appellate systems is also contingent on the existence of a 
consistent case-law.
4.1.4. A consistent case-law
The view taken is that the efficiency of appeal systems is closely linked to the 
existence of a consistent case-law. This case-law must be construed as a source of 
interpretative and implementing guidelines on which decision-making bodies and 
applicants can rely upon for the benefit of legal certainty. The lack of adequate 
case-law is detrimental to the interests of both decision-makers and asylum 
claimants. The development of an adequate case-law can only be achieved through 
effective first instance and appeal decision-making processes. Where assessing the 
effectiveness of the decision-making system, the latter must be considered in its 
entirety. As already noted, first instance decisions which are not based on a 
satisfactory reasoning are more likely to be challenged, adding to the caseload of 
appellate bodies. Moreover, the poorer the quality of initial decisions, the more 
difficult it is to appropriately review them. The absence of a reliable case-law does 
not only affect appeal decision-makers, it also has repercussions on first instance 
decision-makers who will have no adequate case-law to turn to.
The objective is therefore to ensure that appellate bodies are in a position to 
develop and rely upon an adequate case-law. It is argued that this can be achieved 
through the setting up of an appropriate appeal structure supported by access to 
updated background information,
The adequacy of appeal procedures raise, inter alia, the question of their 
structures. In that respect, the basic choice lies between a multi-tier or a one-tier 
system where cases can be re-examined on their merits, without prejudice to the
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power of higher courts to rule on points of law. Multi-tier appeal systems appear 
to be the most common models; it is, for instance, the case in France and the UK. 
In the UK, unsuccessful applicants may apply to an adjudicator** .^ A further appeal 
to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) may be available, except where the 
appeal falls within the scope of section 72 of the 1999 Act which applies where a 
certificate has been issued under section 11 or section 12 of the same Act**^ . This 
means, for instance, that an asylum seeker who is about to be removed to another 
Member State on the basis of the Dublin Convention will not be entitled to appeal 
to the lAT against the adjudicator’s decision. Finally, leave to appeal to the Court 
of Appeal or the Court of Session may be granted by the lAT**®. The former 
system was largely laid down in the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, 
referred to as the 1993 Act, which created an unified asylum appeals system. The 
1993 Act provided for special adjudicators to hear all asylum appeals. 
Unsuccessful applicants could seek leave for further appeal by the lAT The lAT 
was faced with considerable numbers of appeals; around half of the unsuccessful 
appeals lodged with special adjudicators were subsequently brought to the lAT. In 
1995 and 1996, the lAT found that one in ten asylum cases had been wrongly 
decided"''. In 1996, 550 of the cases in question were remitted to a special 
adjudicator for reconsideration'^®. This situation generated a considerable increase 
in the caseload of the Tribunal and questioned the quality of the decision-making 
by special adjudicators as well as by first instance decision-makers. This increase in 
the workload of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal was partially blamed on special 
adjudicators’ insufficient qualifications - they would rarely have the needed
Schedule 4 on Appeals (Part I on procedure) of the 1999 Act.
See supra n. 104.
"* Paragraph 7 of Schedule 4 to the 1999 Act.
Leave to apply for judicial review may also be obtained.
119 See supra n. 48, at p. 51.
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background in asylum law and human rights - and on the fact that they lacked the 
necessary resources. The same reproaches were made with regard to first instance 
decision-makers. It is therefore essential that adjudicators, under the 1999 Act, 
have the required qualifications. It is unfortunate that comprehensive knowledge of 
asylum law and experience in that field are not amongst the qualification 
requirements laid down in Schedule 3 to the 1999 Act*^ *. However, lower 
instances were not the only ones responsible for the lAT being overburdened with 
applications for leave to appeal. As noticed in the JUSTICE’S report'^, the lAT 
bore its share of responsibility. The Tribunal had failed to set up a clear and 
consistent case-law upon which first instance appellate bodies could rely. To date, 
the lAT lacks the status which would allow it to produce authoritative precedents 
and the 1999 Act has not changed the status of the Tribunal in that respect despite 
what was suggested in the Government white paper*^^
In France, appeals against the OFPRA, the first instance decision-maker, are heard 
by the CRR which has jurisdiction to reconsider first instance decisions on their
120 Ibid., Home Office statistics, 1996, table 8.3.
Paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 on adjudicators of tlie 1999 Act reads:
“A person is qualified for appointment as an adjudicator only if_
(a) he has a 7 year general qualification, within the meaning of section 71 o f the Courts and Legal 
Services Act 1990;
(b) he is an adi ocate or solicitor in Scotland of at least 7 years’ standing;
(c) he is a member of tlie Bar of Northern Ireland or solicitor of the Supreme Court of Northern 
Ireland of at least 7 years’ standing; or
(d) he has such legal and other experience as appears to the Lord Chancellor to make liim suited 
for appointment as an adjudicator.”
122 See supra n. 48, at p. 51.
In its wlute paper called Fairer, Faster and Firmer a modem approach to immigration and 
asylum (see supra n. 57), the Government suggested tliat the lAT could become a court of record 
with the ability to create binding precedents (point 7.18). However, the status of the I AT has not 
been changed in tliat respect.
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m erits'Appeals against the decisions of the CRR may be brought to the Conseil 
d’Etat, the supreme administrative court, on points of law material to the case. The 
CRR is a collegial body which includes an assesseur who represents UNHCR. 
UNHCR is also represented in the Sections réunies of the CCR which are 
responsible for ruling on important points of law and ensuring the consistency of 
the case-law. It is argued that EC law should require the presence of a UNHCR 
representative at the appeal process as an additional means to ensure compliance 
with international refugee law. In doing so, the Sections réunies of the CCR are 
assisted by an information centre which was created within the CRR in 1992, the 
Centre d ’information contentieuse. For each case brought before the Sections 
réunies, the Centre d ’information contentieuse produces a working document 
mentioning the points of law to be decided and the relevant case-law as well as a 
working document recording the decision that has been taken. The duties of the 
Centre d ’information contentieuse also include the elaboration of a yearly case 
report'M oreover, it also acts as an internal and external adviser. The CRR 
appears to be more likely to produce a consistent case-law. However, this must be 
tempered by the fact that certain questions relating to asylum law remain grey 
areas. In these areas, the decisions of the CRR lack clarity, affecting the 
consistency of its case-law'
With this in mind, it is argued that the key concepts upon which asylum law rests 
should be clearly defined in EC law and should be supported in every Member
The jurisdiction o f the CRR to reconsider OPFRA’s decisions on their merits - jurisdiction of 
plein contentieux - was expressly recognised by the Conseil d’Etat (Conseil d’Etat, 8 January 
1982, Aldana Barreha, in Tiberghien, supra n. 97, at p. 242 ).
The yearly case reports of the CRR also includes the most relevant decisions of the Conseil 
d’Etat on asylum matters. The reports in question are called Contentieux des réfugiés. 
Jurisprudence du Conseil d ’Etat e t de la Commission des recours des réfugiés.
This is for instance the case with regard to women who allege gender-basW persecution (see 
chapter HI on the need for an up to date interpretation of the term “refiigee").
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State by appeal structures allowing for the development of a consistent case-law in 
line with international refugee law. In its working docum ent'the  Commission 
expressed the view that the Member States should retain a certain degree of 
latitude in determining the structure of the appeal system. As a concrete example 
of the approach it would adopt, the Commission specified that it would not require 
the Member States to introduce or maintain a multi-tier appeal system on the 
ground that it would demand changes that go beyond the scope of asylum law. In 
the Commission’s opinion, “[t]he starting point of the proposal will, however, be 
that provided the necessary safeguards are in place to ensure a good standard of 
decision making by asylum determination bodies, a single appeal or review of the 
substance of the decision will normally be sufficient (without prejudice to the 
power of higher courts to rule on points of law).”'^ * It is argued that the 
Commission is right in stressing that the establishment of an effective decision­
making system is contingent on the existence of the necessary safeguards. With this 
in mind, the view taken is that an EC instrument on asylum procedures should 
mention the structural requirements for adequate national appeal systems. This 
does not necessarily mean setting up an harmonised appeal system. However, it is 
argued that, in the longer term, such a system could be envisaged; but, in the 
meantime, priority should be given to the introduction of the conditions necessary 
to the existence of effective and fair appeal systems, including the conditions for a 
clear case-law in line with international refugee law.
EC provisions on appeal procedures should be without prejudice to the power of 
the Member States’ highest courts to rule on points of law*^ .^ However, as any 
national court, the highest courts would be under the obligation to correctly 
implement EC law and thus the provisions in question. This stresses the importance 
of the adoption of provisions in line with international refiigee law in the context of
See supra n. 4, Paragraph 16.
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Ibid.
This idea was expressed by the Coiiuiiission in its working paper, ibid.. Paragraph 16.
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a legally binding framework, namely the Community legal order. One should not 
undermine the role that highest national courts can play in promoting 
interpretations consistent with international refugee law. With this in mind, one can 
refer to the decision in ex parte Shah where the House of Lords ruled that 
Pakistani women who had been falsely accused of adultery in their country of 
origin and forced to leave their homes by their husbands could be considered a 
particular social group within the meaning of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 
Convention'^®. Provided that they folly endorse international requirements 
regarding international refugee law, highest national courts can play a fundamental 
role in the interpretation and implementation of asylum law, thus contributing to 
the development of a reliable case-law. However, the intervention of the highest 
courts should not be the symptom and the product of deficient appeal systems. 
Judicial review should not be construed as the substitute for an effective asylum 
appeal system. In other words, resort to judicial review should not be driven by 
applicants’ distrust in the appeal system. If the highest courts are to play a positive 
role in the promotion of refugee protection, they must be able to rely upon an 
effective and fair decision-making process at first instance and appeal levels.
The development of a consistent case-law in line with international refugee law 
requires, in addition to adequate appeal structures, access to reliable background 
information; this includes information on applicants’ countries of origin as well as 
information on third countries considered safe in order to prevent any infi’ingement 
of the principle of non-refoulement. The importance of reliable background 
information has already been stressed with respect to first instance decision- 
making'^'. In order to allow appellate bodies to reconsider the cases brought before 
them on their merits, it is important to secure their access to adequate background 
information. With this in mind, it is argued that appellate bodies should be assisted
Islam V Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department: R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal & 
Another, ex parte Shah (conjoined appeals) [1999] 2 WLR 1015.
' '^ See this present chapter, subsection 3.3.1(11).
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by information services. This is for instance the case of the CRR that comprehends 
such services known as the services de documentation et d ’études. Their role is to 
collect information on applicants’ countries of origin and produce punctual and 
general studies as well as news reviews. In that respect, as already suggested, the 
setting up of an information system common to the Member States would be of 
valuable assistance to decision-makers'^^.
Besides depending on the existence of adequate appellate bodies, the fairness and 
effectiveness of the appeal system are also contingent on the existence of a non­
truncated right of appeal and appropriate procedural safeguards.
4.2. A non-truncated right of appeal
One of the main “victims” of the restrictive approaches to asylum matters within 
the EU is the right of appeal. Determined to accelerate asylum procedures, the 
Member States have introduced fast-track procedures. One of their principal and 
most regrettable features consists in a curtailment of the right of appeal. This right 
is absolutely essential to the preservation of asylum seekers’ rights. Considering its 
fundamental character, it is argued that most of the limitations brought to the right 
of appeal by the Member States are inconsistent with international reftigee law as 
they seriously undermine the right to seek refugee status. With this in mind, the 
view taken is that all asylum applicants - irrespective of the type of procedure 
being applied - must be entitled to a non-truncated right of appeal. This means that 
they must be granted an in-country right of appeal which operates within 
reasonable and practical time-limits and has suspensive effect.
4.2,1. All in-country right of appeal
It is argued that where an in-country right of appeal is denied, the fairness and 
effectiveness of appeal systems are seriously undermined. Lodging an appeal from
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abroad renders the whole procedure hazardous and more complex. The Member 
State in which the appeal is to be introduced must keep track of the applicant and 
verify that he or she is given the opportunity to lodge his or her appeal from the 
third country. In any case, should the Member State concerned retain full 
responsibility for the appeal even where it is lodged from abroad. Moreover, 
successful appeals would render the asylum seekers’ removal to a third country 
rather pointless. Exercising a right of appeal from abroad exacerbates the 
complexity inherent in asylum procedures for claimants, but is also a source of 
unnecessary complication for the competent appellate bodies. In this respect, it is 
tempting to suggest that the withdrawal of an in-country right of appeal in certain 
cases reflects governments’ hopes that it may deter potential appellants from 
pursuing asylum proceedings any further. Furthermore, it is probably construed as 
a means to secure asylum seekers’ removal from the temtory of the Member States 
competent to hear their claims'**.
This hostility expressed towards a right of appeal from abroad does not only lie 
with the practical difficulties it entails, but also in the rationale behind it. A right of 
appeal exercisable from abroad made its appearance in the context of the 
development of increasingly restrictive asylum policies across the EU. An in­
country right of appeal is usually denied where applications for asylum are deemed 
to be manifestly unfounded. The removal of such a right has been used as a device 
to shorten asylum procedures. For instance, in the UK, before the adoption of the 
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, certain categories of asylum seekers 
were denied an in-country right of appeal'*\ The decision to grant an in-country 
right of appeal to all asylum claimants was therefore more than welcome by those 
concerned with refugee protection. Unfortunately, the 1996 Act reintroduced
'** The Member States have faced - and are still facing - tremendous difficulties in removing 
imsuccessful asylum seekers from their territory.
'*'' Applicants who entered the UK through a port, without entiy clearance, and who were refused 
refiigee status or exceptional leave to remain, had no right of appeal before being returned to the 
originating country (Inunigration Act 1971 s 13(3)).
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limitations to in-country rights of appeal in the case of applicants coming from 
third countries certified to be safe under section 2(2). Pursuant to this section, the 
Secretary of State may certify that a third country is safe if the following 
conditions aie satisfied:
“(a) (...) the person [the asylum seeker] is not a national of the country or territoiy 
to which he is to be sent;
(b) (...) his life and liberty would not be threatened in that country or territory by 
reason of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion; and
(c) (...) the government of that country or territory would not send him to another 
country or territory otherwise than in accordance with the [1951] Convention.”
Section 2(3) of the 1996 Act specifies that this “(• ■•) applies to any country or 
territory which is or forms part of a Member State, or is designated for the 
purposes of this subsection in an order made by the Secretary of State by statutory 
instrument.”
This withdrawal of a general in-country right of appeal, which is maintained in the 
1999 Act*^  ^ three years after its introduction, partially finds its origin in the 
exasperation manifested by the Home OfiSce with regard to the handling of safe 
third country cases. In the period following the adoption of the 1993 Act, most 
cases channelled to fast-track procedures on the ground that they were manifestly 
unfounded were safe third country cases. Under the regime established by the 1993 
Act, these unsuccessful applicants enjoyed a right of appeal to a special adjudicator 
from within the UK, the special adjudicators’ task being to appraise the safety of 
the contemplated third country. Although special adjudicators could allow appeals 
where they disagree with the Secretary of State’s views on safety, the most 
common practice consisted in referring these cases to the Secretary of State for
Section 72(2) provides that “[a] person who has been, or is to be, sent to a member State or to a 
connuy designated under section 12(l)(b) is not, while in the United Kingdom, entitled to appeal.”
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reconsideration, a possibility that was removed under the 1996 Act^ ^^ . Michael 
Howard, clearly “irritated” by this practice, suggested that, in the cases referred to 
the Home Office for reconsideration, the asylum seekers concerned “could no 
doubt have been removed to a third country had their claims been dealt with 
promptly”^H ow ever, Howard’s statement proved not to be quite accurate.
As stressed in relation to the principle of safe third country  ^ no State can be 
regarded as one hundred per cent secure even where it enjoys a strong safety 
presumption. This issue has been raised before the UK authorities with respect to 
asylum seekers’ removals to France and Belgium^as safe countries. Hence, 
entitlement to in-county right of appeal remains necessary regardless of the 
circumstances.
It is argued that depriving certain categories of asylum seekers from an in-country 
right of appeal constitutes an unacceptable curtailment of the right of appeal and 
may well amount to deny them a fundamental procedural guarantee. Fast-track
Section 3(l)(a) of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 read:
“Where a certificate has been issued under section 2(1) above in respect o f any person -
(a) that person may appeal against the certificate to a special adjudicator on the ground that any of 
the conditions mentioned in section 2(2) above was not fulfilled when the certificate was issued, or 
has since ceased to be fulfilled; but
(b) unless and until the certificate is set aside on such an appeal, he shall not be entitled to bring or 
pursue any appeal under -
(i) Part II of the 1971 Act (appeals: general); or
(ii) section 8 o f the 1993 Act (appeals to special adjudicator on [1951] Convention grounds), as 
respects matters arising before his removal from the United Kingdom.”
HC Deb vol 286 col 705 11 December 1995.
138 See chapter IV on access to substantive asylum procedures.
Ibid., in particular, R. v Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department, ex parte Canbolat, 14 
February 1997, the Times, 24 February 1997, confirmed by the Court of [1997] 1 WLR 1569.
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procedures may be maintained but not at the detriment of the right of appeal. An 
in-country right of appeal should therefore be granted to all asylum seekers 
irrespective of the type of procedure being applied; some degree of differentiation 
may be tolerated, but not at such a crucial level. With this in mind, the view taken 
is that EC law should expressly provide for an absolute in-country right of appeal.
4.2.2. Suspensive effect
Another feature essential to an adequate right of appeal is suspensive effect. This 
requirement is seen as a necessaiy complement to an in-country right of appeal; not 
only should asylum seekers be entitled to a right of appeal from within, they should 
also be allowed to remain within the territory of the competent Member State 
pending appeal proceedings. In that respect, the UNHCR Handbook expressly 
states that appellants should be entitled to remain in the country while an appeal is 
being examined
Granting a right of appeal with no suspensive effect would compromise its 
effectiveness in the same way as denying an in-country right of appeal would, 
although at a slightly later stage. As observed with regard to appeals lodged from 
abroad, “premature” removals complicate appeal proceedings unnecessarily and 
are generally symptomatic of hostile attitudes towards asylum seekers.
In the UK, where asylum seekers may be removed to safe third countries, 
suspensive effect is denied. As mentioned in section 3.5.2., suspensive effect is 
withdrawn at an early stage in safe third country cases, i.e. from the time the 
application for asylum is introduced '^*\ French law knows the same kind of 
restriction where applicants are permitted entry in a safe third country. However, 
French law further extends derogations to the principle of suspensive effect and
See supm  n. 1, Paragraph 192(vii).
As) him and Immigration Act 1996, section 2(1).
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provides for substantial exceptions to the right to stay pending an appeal; 
suspensive effect is disallowed in another three situations:
- where the rules laid down in the Dublin Convention (and previously the Schengen 
Agreement) transfer responsibility for processing the asylum claim to another 
Member State;
- where an applicant is a serious threat to public order;
- where an applicant was deliberately deceitfiil, abused asylum procedures or made 
an application in order to forestall expulsion.
Except in cases where the Dublin Convention applies, applicants may ask an 
ordinary administrative court to exercise its discretion and allow suspensive 
effect’"'^ . However, in safe third country cases, this right is limited in practice 
because, by the time a decision to appeal is taken, applicants have been removed 
from the French territory.
The Resolution on minimum guarantees recognises the principle of suspensive 
effect vrith respect to appeals (Paragraph 17); however, the Resolution does not 
construe this principle as an absolute rule^ ''^  and therefore permits alterations. To 
be more precise, the Resolution acknowledges the derogations permitted under 
national law; this is typical of an instrument negotiated within the 
intergovernmental framework. Paragraph 17 of the Resolution allows for national 
derogations to apply provided that appellants are granted the right to ask for leave 
to remain within the territory of the Member State concerned due to the particular 
circumstances of their case. Such a right is, for instance, granted to asylum 
claimants under French law; however, as observed above, this right fails to 
constitute an adequate safeguard in practice. The second derogation to the
142 However, the appeal itself is exaininedby the CRR.
Paragraph 17 of the Resolution on minimiun guarantees reads (see supra n. 3), inter alia, that 
“[u]ntil a decision has been taken on the appeal, the general principle will apply that the asylum 
seeker may remain in the territory of the Member State concerned (...)”
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principle of suspensive effect concerns claims considered manifestly unfounded. 
Paragraph 24 of the Resolution allows for national exceptions to apply with 
respect to manifestly unfounded claims provided that “{...) the decision on the 
refusal of admission is taken by a ministry or comparable central authority and that 
additional sufficient safeguards (for example, prior examination of by another 
central authority) ensure the correctness of the decision.” However, it is argued 
that no system can guarantee that no error will be made in assessing claims; this 
includes determining whether an application is manifestly unfounded. In these 
circumstances, the right of appeal remains vital and anything likely to undermine its 
effectiveness must, therefore, be avoided. Finally, Paragraph 25 of the Resolution 
on minimum guarantees endorses national derogations where the principle of host 
third country - as laid down in the Resolution on host third country^ - applies. 
This third derogation is also a source of disquiet as the safety of a third countries - 
including Member States - may be misjudged and an effective right of appeal is 
therefore required.
Suspensive effect is essential to the existence of an effective right of appeal. As 
already observed, deciding whether a case is manifestly unfounded must take place 
in the context of procedures providing all the necessary safeguards. It is argued 
that the principle of suspensive effect must be incorporated in EC law and 
construed as an absolute principle; hence, no derogations must be permitted.
Another element essential to satisfactory appeal procedures regards the application 
of reasonable time-limits.
4.2,3. Reasonable time-limits
Time-limits for submitting and examining appeals must be determined in terms of 
effectiveness and fairness; the term reasonable is intended to reflect this idea. With 
this in mind, it is argued that time-limits regarding submission must allow
See supra n. 7.
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applicants to lodge their appeal in appropriate conditions while contributing to the 
efficiency of the whole proceedings. As to the time-limits regarding examination, 
they must permit fair determination in line with international refugee law.
In recent years, the Member States’ firm intent to accelerate asylum procedures 
have resulted in the introduction and increasing use of fast-track procedures which 
are, inter alia, characterised by tight time-limits. This “speed” element is also 
present in substantive procedures. The concern expressed does not mean that this 
objective is illegitimate in itself. On the contrary, faster procedures are also in 
asylum seekers’ interest. They have not much to gain in spending months, 
sometimes years, waiting for a decision on their appeal. Some may suggest that 
asylum claimants actually benefit from lengthy proceedings in that it gives them the 
opportunity to remain longer within the territory of the Member States responsible 
for examining their claim, thus delaying an eventual expulsion. This position is 
weakened by the fact that it assumes that suspensive effect is systematically 
granted and thus ignores various practices resulting in claimants being removed 
before a final decision is taken (for instance in safe third country cases^ ^^ ). More 
importantly, the increasingly harsh nature of the conditions in which candidates for 
refugee status are kept pending determination seriously questions the accuracy of 
this position^
The view taken is that these time-limits must be the result of a balance between the 
need to shorten asylum procedures and the need to secure the existence of a fair 
right of appeal. In other words, the introduction of excessively stringent time-limits 
must not undermine claimants’ right of appeal. In the UK, the 1996 Asylum 
Appeals (Procedure) Rules impose extremely strict time-limits; the appeal papers 
must be filled within two days under certain conditions (primarily when the
See this chapter, previous section.
These issues are examined in tlie next chapter, cliapter VI on asylum seekers’ status pending 
determination.
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applicant is in custody) or seven days where the conditions do not apply; the case 
must be dealt with within a further ten days^ "*^  and substantive appeals are supposed 
to be heard within forty-two days^ '*^ . However, in practice, these deadlines are not 
met and both applicants’ representatives and appellate bodies have stressed that 
these time-limits set out unrealistic targets^ "^ .^
The issue of time-limits has also been contemplated at European level, but in vague 
terms only. It was firstly envisaged in Paragraph 3 of the Resolution on manifestly 
unfounded asylum claims  ^ Paragraph 3 provides, inter alia, that any appeal or 
review procedures must be completed as soon as possible. The question of time­
limits is also raised in the Commission’s working document (Paragraph 18) in 
relation to the Member States’ expressed intention to further speed up 
procedures’^ ’. However, the input of the Commission in that respect is confined to 
suggesting that time-limits covering the various stages of asylum procedures could 
be laid down in EC law. It is argued that EC law should tackle the issue of the 
time-limits applicable to appeal proceedings in a manner consistent with the right 
to seek refugee status.
The Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules 1996, r 5(2) and r 9(2).
Paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 to the 1999 Act entitles the Lord Chancellor to make rules of 
procedures regarding appeals; new rules have not yet been adopted.
’" ^ /W .,r9 (l) .
For instance, within 6 months of tl\e entry into force of the 1996 Asylum Appeals (Procedure) 
Rules, appeals at the fast-tracking centre at Lambeth were waiting six weeks for a hearing, not ten 
days and substantive appeals at the Hatton Centre took 15 months to be heard, not 42 days (see 
JUSTICE, supra n. 48, at p. 55).
See supra n. 2.
See supra n. 4,
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Time-limits need to present certain features if they are to address both appellants 
and appellate decision-makers’ interests. Avoiding unnecessarily lengthy appeal 
proceedings is a legitimate goal, but it must not result in the imposition of 
unrealistic time-limits. Indeed, such time-limits generate their own pitfalls; they 
may be detrimental to the introduction of the appeal itself as well as to the quality 
of the hearings and decisions. Hence, in examining issues arising from appeal time­
limits, one should bear in mind that time-limits regarding the submission of appeals 
must not render the exercise of the right of appeal more difficult or even 
impossible. Moreover, it must allow for sufficient time to prepare the case. One 
may refer to Paragraph 16 of the Resolution on minimum guarantees'^^ which 
provides that “[t]he asylum seeker must be given an adequate period of time within 
which to appeal and to prepare his [or her] case when requesting review of the 
decision (...)” However, the positive effect of this provision is altered by the fact 
that the Resolution lacks binding authority. As to time-limits regarding 
examination, they must not be curtailed at the expense of quality. Deadlines 
regarding the time allocated for considering appeals must not detrimentally affect 
the decision-making.
EC law should expressly specify that time-limits must be consistent with 
international refugee law. In order to secure correct national implementation while 
addressing the need for flexibility, EC law should not impose rigid time-limits. An 
option consists in establishing minima and maxima regarding time-limits applicable 
to the submission, preparation and determination of appeals susceptible of 
amendments where needed. The question of time-limits is practical by nature and 
thus must be tackled in a concrete manner. The differentiation made between fast- 
track and substantive procedures and the particular emphasis on faster proceedings 
is acceptable provided that it is not at the detriment of asylum seekers’ rights.
It is accepted that appeal proceedings must be fair as well as speedy. However, 
completion of the second objective is strictly subordinate to the former. In other
152 See supra ii. 3.
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words, the measures designed to accelerate appeals - including time-limits - cannot 
jeopardise their fairness. With this in mind, time-limits must be realistic as well as 
flexible. Flexibility’^  ^is construed as a means to address the practical difficulties of 
certain cases; rigid time-limits are likely to impair the right of appeal and be 
detrimental to the quality of the decision-making process by imposing unrealistic 
demands on appellate bodies.
Fairness and efficiency are also contingent on certain facilities being made available 
to appellants in the course of appeal procedures
4.3. An appeal process providing for the necessary facilities
As in previous procedural stages, fairness and effectiveness are contingent, inter 
alia, on the availability of certain facilities: these include the services of an 
independent competent interpreter where necessary, the possibility to contact a 
UNHCR representative, access to informed legal advice as well as legal 
representation at appeal hearings. The latter is the only issue specific to appeal 
proceedings and is therefore the focus of this section. The other facilities, which 
must be secured throughout the procedure, are examined in relation to the 
submission and first-instance consideration of asylum claims; hence, the reader is 
referred to the corresponding sections’ '^’.
With respect to legal representation, the aim is to secure that appellants are 
adequately represented during appeal proceedings. Appellants must be represented 
by qualified lawyers. Thus, the debate exclusively focuses on the qualifications 
required fi*om lawyers representing asylum seekers. As in the case of legal advice.
The introduction of an element o f flexibility was contemplated by the Commission in its 
Working document, see supra n. 4, Paragraph 18.
The right to an independent competent interpreter (sections 2.3.1. and 3.2.2.); the possibility to 
make contact with a UNHCR representative (sections 2.3.3. and 3,2.3.) and access to legal advice 
(section 3,2.1).
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it is argued that, in order to meet adequate standards, specialisation in asylum law 
is indispensable; this should be expressly mentioned in EC law.
Moreover, one must bear in mind that problems created by poor representation can 
be exacerbated by the way hearings are conducted. In an adversarial system^^  ^
appellants appear to be in a more vulnerable position; this situation renders the 
need for adequate representation even more critical In inquisitorial systems^^ ,^ as 
opposed to adversarial ones, decisions^^  ^ are reviewed by judges who test claims 
and conduct active investigations themselves in addition to hearing arguments from 
the parties. The view taken is that the imposition of a wholly inquisitorial model 
when it comes to asylum cases would require drastic reforms in some Member 
States and therefore is not regarded as constituting a realistic solution in the short 
and medium term. However, some inquisitorial elements could be introduced 
without inducing a profound change in the nature of the system^^ .^ For instance, 
appellate decision-makers could guide arguments in a constructive manner by 
indicating particularly relevant areas^^ ,^ thus avoiding key issues being disregarded 
or overlooked; this would of course require decision-makers to be given sufficient 
time to properly prepare hearings^^ .^ However, the introduction of inquisitorial 
elements should not be used as means to justify poor legal representation, but 
should be regarded as a valuable aid.
155 This is for instance the case in the UK.
Inquisitorial models prevail in civil law systems; tins is for instance the case in France.
These include decisions on asylum cases.
See on tliis issue JUSTICE, supra n. 48, with regard to proposals for law reform in the United 
Kingdom, at p. 57.
Ibid.
Pre-hearing preparation would of course be facilitated by quality decision-making in the first 
instance.
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The introduction and maintenance of quality legal representation call for the 
establishment of strict control mechanisms at national level. The efficiency of such 
mechanisms should be reinforced by the adoption of EC provisions imposing 
certain requirements and setting out guidelines consistent with the right to seek 
refugee status.
As in the case of legal advice, quality in itself does not suffice; it must be 
supplemented by quantity. This means that legal representation must be made 
available to all asylum appellants; any discrimination in the grant of legal 
representation would considerably alter the fairness and effectiveness of appeal 
proceedings. Hence, this requirement raises the question of legal aid and its 
availability to appellants. The view taken is that legal representation must be 
granted to those in need and adequate funding provided. The issues raised are 
similar to those discussed with respect to the availability of legal aid in the context 
of first-instance determination; the reader is therefore referred to the relevant 
section^^\ With regard to legal aid, a balance must be struck between asylum 
seekers’ right to legal representation - and legal advice - and the need to rationalise 
and control public funding. This issue should be addressed by EC law in the light 
of the need to protect the right to seek refugee status. Moreover, a safety net 
should be set up in order to address the difficulties that some Member States may 
face in financing legal aid; this could be the case where a Member State is 
confronted with particularly high numbers of asylum claims.
Finally, it should be stressed that quality and quantity considerations in relation to 
legal representation - as in the case of legal advice - should not vary with the type 
of procedure being applied. In other words, the application of fast-track 
procedures should not mean truncated rights for those whose claims have been 
channelled to these procedures. It is argued that this would amount to 
discrimination inconsistent with the right to seek refijgee status
161 See tills chapter, section 3.2.1.
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5. Conclusion
Asylum procedures are central to refugee protection as they are the medium 
through which refuge status is granted. Hence, securing the fairness and efficiency 
of asylum procedures is vital to refugee protection. In that respect, a global 
approach is recommended as the different procedural stages are closely connected. 
In other words, asylum proceedings must be construed as a whole with a view to 
ensuring compliance with international refugee law.
Considering the importance of asylum procedures, particular vigilance is required 
when it comes to differentiation. Differentiation is understood as referring to the 
increasing exemptions and derogations brought to fundamental procedural rights 
and guarantees, particularly with regard to fast-track procedures. It is argued that 
pragmatism requires us to acknowledge the Member States’ attachment to this 
kind of procedure and therefore tolerate a certain degree of differentiation. 
However, a balance must be found between the interests of the Member States and 
those of asylum seekers, the bottom line being that, whatever their characteristics, 
asylum procedures must comply with international refugee law. Therefore, it is 
argued that EC law should secure that the level of differentiation remains within 
the boundaries consistent with international refugee law.
The existence of EC provisions on the availability and access to appropriate asylum 
procedures is essential to the protection of the right to seek refugee throughout the 
EC. With tliis in mind, it is hoped that the EC, through the transfer of competence 
achieved by the Treaty of Amsterdam, will succeed where intergovernmental 
cooperation has failed.
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Chapter VI
Asylum Seekers’ Status Pending Determination
Under international refugee law, individuals have a right to seek refugee status and 
host States are responsible for the enforcement of this fundamental right'. To that 
end, the latter are under the obligation to establish adequate asylum procedures^. 
However, it would be wrong to solely consider asylum seekers as applicants and 
thus only acknowledge their procedural rights. This raises the issue of asylum 
seekers’ status pending decisions on their claims.
It is argued that failing to provide asylum claimants with the support they need 
would substantially undermine the right to seek refugee status. It follows that the 
provision of adequate support should be embodied in the right to seek refugee 
status and States should, therefore, be under the obligation to assist asylum seekers 
in meeting their most basic needs. Such an obligation should be expressly imposed 
on Member States.
Unfortunately, the restrictive nature of the asylum policies developed in most 
Members States has had an adverse impact on the level of support granted to 
asylum seekers. For instance, benefits have been withdrawn or seriously curtailed 
and housing facilities reduced to an absolute minimum.
An additional source of disquiet with regard to asylum seekers’ status pending 
determination is the use - and abuse - of detention; increasing numbers of asylum 
seekers are being detained while awaiting decisions on their claims. Such practices 
are the product and symptom of hostile policies towards asylum seekers. Privation 
of liberty is an extreme sanction which should only occur where strictly justified; 
there is no ground for derogating from this fundamental principle when it comes to
' See the introduction, chapter I.
 ^See chapter V  on fair and effective asyluin procedures.
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asylum claimants. In any case should they be branded as “presumed or potential 
criminals”! Hence, asylum seekers’ detention must be construed as an exceptional 
measure subject to strict criteria and conditions designed to secure its lawfulness.
Questions regarding asylum seekers’ status pending proceedings were very much 
left outside the scope of intergovernmental cooperation. However, with the 
“communautarisation” of asylum matters, these issues should be tackled at EC level; 
this could be achieved through Article 63(l)(b) of the TEC on minimum standards 
on the reception of asylum seekers in the Member Statesl The purpose of this 
chapter is therefore to determine the Member States’ obligations with regard to 
support for asylum seekers and detention in order to secure compliance with 
international refugee law.
1. Support for asylum seekers
The view taken is that support for asylum seekers must be governed by the 
following principle: every asylum seeker who finds himself or herself in need is 
entitled to adequate support at all levels of the proceedings. As suggested above, 
this principle finds its origin in the very essence of the right to seek refugee status. It 
would be totally inconsistent with the right to seek refugee status to allow 
individuals to apply while “sentencing” them to a destitute life pending examination 
of their claim. Accountability for the processing of asylum claims must be constmed 
as entailing the obligation to provide applicants with appropriate support. In other 
words, the right to seek refugee status implies the States' obligation to supply 
adequate support.
 ^ New Title IV on visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of 
persons inserted in the TEC by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
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1.1. The right to adequate support: a State’s responsibility
The view taken is that Member States should be under the obligation to provide 
asylum seekers with adequate support pending proceedings as the right to adequate 
support cannot be disassociated from the right to seek refugee status.
It is incumbent on the State responsible for examining the asylum claim to provide 
the asylum seeker with adequate support throughout the procedure. This implies 
that appellants should not be discriminated against in that respect and should be 
entitled to support on the same basis as first instance asylum claimants. This 
requirement finds its essence in the fundamental nature of the right of appeal. 
Restricting support for those challenging decisions on their application for asylum 
would undermine the right of appeal and thus the right to seek refugee status. To 
date, where asylum law denies a right of appeal from within or with suspensive 
effect^ this means, in practice, that the asylum seekers concerned will not be 
entitled to further support; in such cases, the State’s responsibility for providing 
support is confined to first instance proceedings.
Support for asylum seekers must also be envisaged in the context of transfers of 
responsibility^. These transfers are not immediate mechanisms and there may be 
some time before the State held responsible for considering the asylum claim is 
identified and the subsequent transfer carried out. Does this mean that the Member 
State which intends to remove the asylum seeker has no obligation in terms of 
support towards that individual? It is argued that a positive answer would be 
detrimental to those asylum seekers awaiting removal. Hence, although the 
obligation to provide adequate support for asylum seekers lies, in principle, with the 
State accountable for determining the asylum claim, this rule should be applied with
See chapter V on fair and effective procedures.
Ibid. The view taken is that appeals should be lodged from witliin and have suspensive effect. 
’ See chapter IV on access to substantive asylum procedures.
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some flexibility in order to address the issues arising from transfers of responsibility 
in relation to support. This implies that, pending removal, the Member State 
accountable for the transfer should provide these asylum seekers with adequate 
support.
It is accepted that, in imposing an obligation to provide adequate support for 
asylum seekers, one should not disregard the financial difficulties that some Member 
States may face. This can particularly be the case where Member States are 
confronted with higher numbers of asylum seekers than their counterparts; this can 
be an exceptional or constant^ phenomenon. Cooperation between the Member 
States with regard to support for asylum seekers should therefore be encouraged on 
the basis of the principle of solidarity; the latter is mentioned in Article 63(2)(b) of 
the TEC^ Providing assistance to those in need must be construed as a Member 
States’ collective responsibility and not reduced to an individual one. Therefore, the 
principle of solidarity should also apply to measures on minimum standards on the 
reception of asylum seekers to be adopted on the basis of Article 63(l)(b) of the 
TEC.
Adequate support means that the support in question must allow asylum seekers to 
satisfy their basic needs pending proceedings. Member states are therefore under the 
obligation to provide this particularly vulnerable group with appropriate shelter and 
other essential living needs such as food and clothing as well as access to health 
care and education when needed .^
 ^ For instance, countries such as the UK, France and Germany have traditionally been faced witli 
greater numbers of asylum seekers than, for example, Ireland, Portugal or Spain.
 ^ Article 63(2)(b) of the TEC (see supra n. 3) provides for the adoption of measures on refugees 
and displaced persons “promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving and 
bearing the consequences of receiving (...) [the persons in question].”
® Asylum seekers’ needs are examined in this chapter, section 1.2.2.
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The fact that States are responsible for providing asylum seekers with adequate 
support does not mean that support may not be supplied by other entities. In 
practice, many Member States have relied upon local authorities, charitable 
organisations and the private sector. However, even where assistance emanates 
from entities other than national authorities, responsibility should remain with the 
State. This means that States should ensure that these entities are in a position to 
provide the required support. In the UK, for instance, local authorities dealing with 
greater numbers of asylum seekers have complained that they were struggling to 
satisfy the demand for accommodation^^. In such cases. States should be under the 
obligation to assist them or substitute their direct help in order to meet asylum 
seekers’ needs. The fact that responsibility in relation to support is endorsed by the 
State implies that the State should address the specific problems faced by other 
entities in their capacity of providers of support for asylum seekers. For instance, 
charitable organisations often suffer from limited resources. For this reason, they 
should be adequately sponsored and assisted by the State, and should not, in any 
case, be seen as substitutes for State support. Unfortunately, curtailments in State 
support for asylum seekers in certain Member States have resulted in de facto shifts 
of responsibility from the State to charitable organisations and local authorities 
without taking into consideration their “coping capacities”  ^\  As to the private 
sector, it is not tailored to suit asylum seekers’ specific needs and thus cannot be 
considered a substitute for State intervention’^  This sector is governed by market
Tills is for instance tlie case o f Kent and London Borouglis which look after the majority of  
asylum seekers (see Diane Taylor, "Councils hit by U-turn over asylum seekers”, in Refugees in 
Britain: special report, 5 March 2000,
http://www.newsunlimited.co.ukyRefugees_in_Britain/Story/0,2763,143456,00.html).
”  This is for instance the case, to a certain extent, in the UK,
For instance, in the UK, serious alterations in asylum seekers’ rights with regard to housing 
(essentially since the introduction o f the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, c. 49, referred to as 
the 1996 Act) resulted in charitable organisations having to take over in trying to find suitable 
accommodation.
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rules and thus supposes asylum seekers having the financial means necessary to 
enter that market. For instance, accommodation in the private sector implies that 
asylum claimants can afford rent. In these circumstances, the private sector can only 
be an option where asylum seekers have or are given the means by the State to 
access it.
There are great divergences between Member States’ practices with regard to 
support for asylum seekers. However, a general trend towards more limited access 
induced by the adoption of increasingly restrictive asylum laws may be identified. 
For instance, in the UK, the 1996 Act introduced restrictions on the asylum seekers’ 
entitlement to social security benefits while failing to make up for the deficit so 
created. The then Secretary of State for Social Security, Peter Lilley, declared in his 
address to the Conservative Party in October 1995 that “Britain should be a safe 
haven, not a soft t o u c h . T h e  adoption of the 1999 Act was the object of heated 
debates '^  ^ and many hostile headlines* .^ The Member States’ responsibility in that 
area is undermined by the lack of supranational mechanisms capable of securing its 
enforcement. It is argued that asylum seekers’ right to adequate support is inherent 
in the right to seek reftigee status and should therefore be secured at EC level. As 
already suggested, such provision could be adopted on the basis of Article 63(l)(b) 
of the TEC on minimum standards on the reception of asylum seekers in the 
Member States. This Article was interpreted by the Commission of the European 
Communities as covering “(...) such matters as accommodation, means of 
subsistence, health care, education, employment and access to the labour market for
“Lilley to curb benefits to asylum seekens”, the Independent, 12 October 1995,
For instance, the Government faced rebellion from labour back benchers over curtailments of 
asylum seekers’ benefits, in particular incapacity benefits (BBC Radio 4 news, 9 February 1999, at 
6 p.m.).
See, for instance, “We hate you”, in Refugees in Britain; special report, The Guardian, 20 
March 2000, http://www.newsunlimited.co.uk/Refugees_in_Britain/Story/0,2763,148752,OO.html
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asylum seekers.”’^  Issues critical to the existence of adequate support regard the 
means to provide support as well as its scope, i.e. the needs that it addresses.
1.2. Methods for providing support
The methods used to provide support must be chosen in the light of the Member 
States' duties in that respect. There are two main ways of providing assistance to 
asylum seekers that may be combined. Asylum seekers may be given the means to 
support themselves or support may be directly secured by the State. Where 
assistance is directly provided by the State, another issue arises, namely the forms 
that State support may take. State assistance may be provided in cash or in kind. 
However, these two systems are not incompatible. Hybrid systems are perfectly 
conceivable and exist in a number of Member States. Considering the state of 
destitution of many asylum seekers, direct State support will be predominant.
1.2.1, Providing asylum seekers with the means to support themselves
Providing asylum seekers with the means to support themselves supposes that they 
have a source of income that allows them to satisfy their needs. This will usually 
suggest the existence of a paid activity and will imply that they are entitled to work. 
Indeed, it is unlikely that most candidates for refugee status will arrive in the host 
countries with the means to sustain themselves pending asylum proceedings.
This method suffers from a major drawback; asylum seekers are generally denied 
access to the labour market, at least in the first months of their stay. These 
restrictions are generally justified on the ground that their status of asylum claimants 
is uncertain and temporary. Under French law, for example, asylum seekers do not, 
in principle, enjoy the right to work’ ;^ this right is reserved to those who have come
European Commission, Commission working document; Towards conuuon standards on asylum 
procedures, Bmssels, 3 March 1999, SEC (1999), paragraph 5(3).
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to France with the prior agreement of the French authorities’^ . In the UK, asylum 
seekers may be granted a “permission to work” where they have been awaiting a 
decision on their claim for at least six months. Tliis “permission to work” gives 
them the possibility to apply for any job available and not only for a specific 
position. However, it must be stressed that this “permission” does not amount to a 
right to work; it is, indeed, granted by the Home Office on a discretionary basis. 
According to NGOs assisting refugees, some asylum seekers have experienced 
difficulties in obtaining the required permission’^ .
Providing means of support through work presents the advantage of giving asylum- 
claimants more control over their own lives. However, access to employment raises 
a number of difficulties with respect to asylum seekers. Asylum seekers’ precarious 
status may arise suspicion among potential employers; if only staying for a short 
while, they may not constitute the ideal work force. Potential employers may also 
be discouraged by administrative complications and delays in obtaining work 
permits when it comes to employ asylum seekers. Moreover, language barriers and 
the fact that their qualifications and work experience may not be recognised in the 
receiving States may prevent asylum seekers from taking up employment The 
question of a right to work for asylum seekers must be tackled in the light of both 
their temporary and uncertain status and the advantages of work as a means of 
support. On the one hand, because of their status, granting asylum seekers access to
Circulaire Ministérielle o f 26 September 1991, Journal Officiel de la République Française of 
27 September 1991, at p. 12606. The Government suggested that, since proceedings before the 
OPFRA had been speeded up, asylum seekers’ need to find work was less crucial.
Tliis concerns asylmn seekers who have been admitted to the French territory with a long-term 
visa and, in particular, nationals from south-east Asia States who have come to France following 
specially organised procedures.
In certain circumstances, this permission to work can be given before six months for 
compassionate or humanitarian reasons at the discretion of the Home Office.
These difirculties are also faced by recognised refugees, although worsen in the case of asylum 
seekers because o f the imcertainty of their status.
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the labour market may be rather problematic and denying them access can therefore 
be justified to a certain extent. On the other hand, the positive effects of work 
cannot be ignored; work can constitute a direct means of subsistence that can play 
an important part in helping asylum seekers regaining some sense of “normality”. 
Asylum seekers’ rights with regard to work must be determined with these facts in 
mind and a fair balance needs to be struck. While it is accepted that a restricted 
right to work may be tolerated where asylum claims are decided in a relatively short 
period of time, these should be lifted in cases of lengthy proceedings. With this in 
mind, it is argued that where procedures exceed three to six months, asylum seekers 
should be entitled to enter the labour market^'. Indeed, beyond this period of time, 
an applicant’s stay looses some of its temporary nature. The right to work should be 
construed as a way to facilitate asylum seekers’ integration in cases of prolonged 
stay in receiving countries. It is recognised that work may not be available and 
asylum claimants may not meet the necessary requirements; this, however, should 
not be used to justify unnecessary restrictions to asylum seekers’ access to the 
labour market.
Access to work must not be disregarded as a route to provide support for asylum 
seekers; however, while its promotion is encouraged, its limits must also be 
acknowledged. Giving asylum seekers the means to satisfy their basic needs 
themselves cannot, therefore, be considered the primary medium of support. In this 
context, direct State support remains fundamental to asylum claimants’ welfare.
1.2.2. The various forms of direct State support
As observed above, the vast majority of asylum seekers are in no position to satisfy 
their essential living needs and are therefore dependent upon States for receiving
A  three month delay was proposed by the UK Refugee Coimcil, (Refugee Council, Costings (...) 
fo r  granting permission to work to asylum seekers after three months instead o f  six, February 
1997, referred to in JUSTICE, Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA) and Asylum 
Rights Campaign (ARC), Providing Protection, Towards Fair and Effective Asylum Procedures, 
London, July 1997, at p. 66).
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assistance. This raises the issue of the forms that direct State support may take. In 
determining the most suitable forms of support, it is important to take into 
consideration the specificity of asylum seekers’ essential needs. The view taken is 
that the Member States may retain the power to lay out the structure of their 
support system and decide on the most appropriate forms of support provided that 
asylum seekers’ needs are satisfied.
There are two main forms of State support; support may be supplied by means of 
entitlements to various benefits or it may be provided in kind (for instance, by 
offering food, clothing or accommodation). It is argued that, in deciding on the 
form. Member States must take into account a number of factors; these include the 
nature of the need being addressed, the impact of the contemplated form of support 
on asylum seekers’ dignity as well as cost-effectiveness. It is argued that a fair 
balance must be found between asylum seekers’ interests and States’ resources. 
However, it is essential that decent living standards for asylum seekers are 
maintained throughout the EC. Thus, where a Member State is not capable of 
supplying the required level of support, the principle of solidarity should apply in 
order to enable the Member State concerned to fulfil its obligations.
(i) Accommodation
As already stressed, most asylum seekers arrive in the receiving country destitute 
and are thus unable to provide shelter for themselves. Hence, they are entirely 
dependent upon the State for accommodation.
While the Member States may decide on the methods and forms to be used in order 
to supply accommodation to asylum claimants, they remain answerable for the 
adequacy of the accommodation offered. They are, therefore, under the obligation 
to introduce safeguards designed to secure adequate accommodation. The different 
types of accommodation available must be assessed in the light of asylum seekers’ 
specific needs.
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State support with respect to accommodation may take two forms: States may 
directly provide asylum seekers with shelter or entitle them to benefits designed to 
cover rent. There are various forms of accommodation. Asylum seekers may be sent 
to reception centres; however, places in these centres are generally granted on a 
temporary basis and alternate forms of shelter need to be found. The latter can take 
the form of State-funded hostels, bed and breakfast or private flats. Resort to these 
forms of accommodation mean that they are either subsidised or contracted out by 
the State or that asylum seekers are entitled to benefits meeting the costs of rent.
The Member States must ensure that the chosen form of accommodation is 
adequate. This means that, besides securing asylum seekers with accommodation, 
the States are accountable for maintaining quality standards. The extent of the 
Member States’ obligations in relation to accommodation has a number of 
consequences. Firstly, although the Member States may rely upon local authorities, 
the private sector or charitable organisations, they remain responsible for securing 
accommodation. Most Member States have opted for a combined system. In many 
Member States, local authorities play a major role in the provision of 
accommodation to asylum seekers^ .^ For instance, in the UK, local authorities are 
responsible for providing shelter for asylum seekers. However, as already stressed, 
responsibility ultimately lies with the Member State authorities when it comes to 
finding accommodation and ensuring its adequacy. With this in mind, it is argued 
that the Member States should be under the obligation to carry out quality controls.
In order to be adequate, accommodation must address and thus be adapted to 
asylum seekers’ specific needs. Besides offering decent living conditions, the chosen 
accommodation must not affect asylum proceedings and other aspects of support 
for asylum seekers. This means, for instance, that the location of the 
accommodation must not hinder access to information, legal advice, competent 
bodies or health care. Moreover, it is important that accommodation constitutes an
This does not mean that tlie role played by charitable organisations is underestimated. 
Unfortunately, the extent o f their intervention is often affected by their limited means.
330
environment as reassuring as possible, especially with respect to newcomers, those 
who have no contacts whatsoever in the host country and members of particularly 
vulnerable groups (for instance, women with children and unaccompanied minors). 
In the longer term, it is critical that accommodation does not hinder their integration 
- or at least their adaptation - to their new environment by alienating them from the 
local community. This requirement concerns those whose stay in the receiving 
country can no longer be regarded as transitory; this should be the case where their 
presence exceeds three to six months. It is essential that asylum seekers are not 
overly dispersed in order to avoid any kind of discrimination based on location. It is 
recognised that the numbers of asylum seekers within a Member State vary greatly 
from region to region. Therefore, those areas that receive greater numbers of 
asylum claimants may face serious difficulties in providing accommodation. In such 
cases, dispersal is often presented as the solution. However, dispersal must not be 
achieved at the detriment of asylum seekers’ rights; this means that access to asylum 
services must always be secured^l The suitability of the various types of 
accommodation must be assessed on the basis of the notion of adequate 
accommodation.
Most Member States have reception centres designed to accommodate newly 
arrived asylum seekers. These reception centres may occupy a great variety of 
premises; they may be specially built premises^", but also old hospitals, hostels or
In that respect, the Audit Commission heavily criticised the UK Government’s plan to disperse 
asylum seekers across the UK. Over 85% of asylum seekers are concentrated in London and the 
south-east England, and officials are eager to send them to other areas to help spread the task of 
caring for them. However, according to the Commission’ report, many local authorities are not 
prepared and the money allocated to help them fimd asylum services will not cover all costs. 
Councillor Tony Harris, the association chair’s declared that “[t]he Audit Commission ha[d] 
highlighted the need for adequate support services if  we [i.e. the UK Government] [were] to 
succeed in dispersing asylum seekers and easing the pressures on the capital.” (“Refugee dispersal 
plans attacked”, BBC News, UK Politics, 1 June 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/).
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even unused barracks^ .^ Opinions are divided on the use of reception centres. Those 
in favour of this mode of accommodation stress that it considerably reduces the risk 
of isolation, facilitates access to the necessary facilities, allows for regular medical 
checks and is relatively cheaper. On the other hand, it has been argued that 
reception centres cut off asylum seekers from society by creating an artificial 
environment that is not necessarily welcoming^ .^ The view taken is that, at least in 
the short-teim, reception centres constitute a suitable environment for newly arrived 
asylum claimants. Since they are specially designed to house asylum seekers, access 
to information and required services may be offered in situ or, at least, within easy 
reach. For instance, information on asylum proceedings or language training may be 
provided within the premises of reception centres. Moreover, being with people 
who find themselves in a similar situation may provide moral support and attenuate 
the effects of isolation. The claim that reception centres deprive asylum seekers 
from any chance of integration can only be sustained with respect to lengthy stays. 
As already observed, most asylum seekers have no contacts in the receiving country 
and often do not speak the language. With this in mind, it is argued that reception 
centres may be an useful transitional phase. Being confined to a bed and breakfast 
or a private flat with limited means of communication - if any - can be an extremely 
stressful experienced^ Furthermore, reception centres may constitute most suitable
d'’ 111 France, for instance, asylum seekers may be housed in special centres called ‘^ Centres 
d 'accueilpour demandeurs d ’asile’'' (CADA). However, in June 1996, there were only 51 CADAs 
with a total capacity o f 3111 beds; this was obviously insuflflcient.
In September 1998, plans suggested by Brent Council in North West London to house hmidreds 
of refugees from former Yugoslavia in tents across London parks were being studied by the UK 
Home OfBce. Fortmiately, the Home OfSce denoimced tliem as being imacceptable, see Polly 
Newton, “Refugee camps in parks are rejected”, Electronic Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk, 
21 September 1998.
For instance, in a Spanish reception centre, one group of asylum seekers had to be removed 
when Laotian and Vietnamese were housed in the same premises (Danièle Joly, Lynette Kelly and 
Clive Nettleton, Refugees in Europe: The Hostile Agenda, Minority Rights Group International, 
1997, at p. 32).
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places for particularly vulnerable groups, such as women and children. Another 
advantage of reception centres is their cost; they are relatively cheap compared to 
other modes of accommodation such as rented housing.
However, reception centres have a limited housing capacity that usually does no 
match the overall need for shelter. Therefore, it is essential to secure the existence 
of alternate forms of accommodation. Moreover, in the longer term, it is important 
to facilitate asylum seekers’ adaptation to their new environment. Reception centres 
may not constitute the most suitable form of accommodation in that respect. It is 
essential that the other forms of accommodation do not aggravate asylum seekers’ 
isolation.
It is argued that asylum seekers’ accommodation should present a certain degree of 
stability. This is important to help them adapt to their new surroundings. Moreover, 
frequent changes of address may affect access to various services. For instance, they 
may complicate the task of legal advisers and representatives who may encounter 
difficulties in keeping track of their clients’ moves. This may also be potentially 
detrimental to asylum seekers’ rights as it may, for instance, prevent regular 
contacts with their advisers and representatives. It is also important that these other 
forms of accommodation do not result in asylum seekers’ isolation. There has been 
a tendency in many Member States to move asylum claimants away from city 
centres to isolated areas. This was, for instance, a trend among London boroughs 
that was halted by a decision of the High Court. Seven individuals challenged the 
decision of the London borough of Newham to send them to Eastbourne, East 
Sussex. Their counsel perfectly illustrated the impact of such policies on asylum 
seekers by stressing that “there were “compelling psychological and spiritual 
reasons” why those who had been tortured and ill-treated in the countries from 
which they had fled should remain in London, where they had the support of ethnic 
communities, medical advisers and religious groups .Newham council claimed
Moreover, one must bear in mind that the local population is not always welcoming.
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that it did not have sufficient accommodation for all the asylum seekers as under the 
law they could not offer bare rooms without food, toiletries and laundry facilities. 
However, Mr Justice Moses ruled that the Council had misinterpreted the law and 
that the other services could be provided outside that accommodation^®. What is 
essential is that asylum seekers are given adequate access to the necessary services 
and facilities; these do not necessarily need to be provided in situ so long as they 
are easily accessible.
It is argued that asylum seekers’ right to adequate accommodation should be 
secured in EC law, the bottom line being that accommodation, whatever its form, 
should provide decent living conditions and allow access to asylum services. It is 
accepted that Member States may face difficulties in fully fulfilling their obligations 
in relation to accommodation. This is why the principle of solidarity should apply 
and EC fimded financial assistance be made available^ *^ . Moreover, it is argued that 
the adoption of fair and effective asylum procedures could contribute to ease the 
current accommodation crisis. For instance, improving the first instance decision­
making process would reduce the need for appeals and thus shorten asylum 
proceedings. In that context, a number of asylum seekers would need 
accommodation for a shorter period of time^\
“Asylum seekers won London lod^ng right”, Electronic Telegraph, http://www.telegrapli.co.uk, 
13 December 1997.
29 Higli Court, decision of 12 December 1997, TLR 26/12/1997.
The assistance referred to is essentially of a financial natme as dispersing asylum seekers within 
the EC is not regarded as a viable solution since it would complicate asyliun proceedings and 
generate problems of its own.
However, it is acknowledged that the needs for accommodation of successful applicants would 
still have to be addressed as well as those o f unsuccessful applicants who have been allowed to 
remain. However, these issues fall outside the scope o f the thesis.
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In addition to accommodation, it is crucial that asylum seekers’ other essential 
everyday needs are satisfied. Access to health care and education is considered as it 
raises specific issues.
(ii) Asylum seekers’ other essential needs
Asylum seekers’ right to support means that they are able to meet everyday life 
needs. Thus, besides accommodation, support must also address needs such as food 
and clothing. Moreover, it is crucial that asylum claimants are given the means to 
exercise their rights and obligations. They must, for instance, be in a position to 
contact their legal advisers and representatives or attend court hearings whenever 
necessary. As already stressed, asylum seekers’ access to employment is extremely 
limited. Thus, most asylum seekers are not in a position to meet living needs 
through this route. It follows that support must emanate from the State.
State support may take the form of entitlements to benefits or be supplied in kind. 
In deciding on the most suitable option. Member States must take into 
consideration the nature of the needs being addressed, the impact of their choice on 
asylum seeker’ welfare and dignity as well as its cost-effectiveness.
Withdrawals of benefits from asylum claimants have resulted in an increasing 
reliance upon support in kind. For instance, in the UK, assistance in kind has been 
increasingly promoted. The system established by the 1999 Act heavily relies upon 
the use of vouchers. Indeed, it follows fi-om Paragraph 10 of the Asylum Support 
Regulations 2000 that the essential needs of asylum seekers may be expected to be 
provided weekly in the form of vouchers redeemable for goods, services and castf 
This measure has been criticised by the Refugee Council and Legal Aid in that it 
would force asylum seekers to live in a cashless society, relying on food parcels and
The Asylum Support Regulations 2000, Statutory instrument 2000 No. 704. These regulations 
were adopted by the Secretary of State in exercise of his powers under sections 94, 95, 97, 114, 
166 and 167 of and Schedule 8 to the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.
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vouchers^ .^ It is argued that the manner in which support is provided should 
contribute to giving asylum seekers’ life some degree of “normality”; in any case, 
should it undermine their dignity. A balance must therefore be struck between 
assistance in kind and support through payments if asylum seekers are to retain 
some control over their life. Denying them access to cash has the effect of 
“branding” asylum claimants as “assisted” individuals. Besides undermining their 
dignity, this may also exacerbate hostile attitudes from the local population. One 
must bear in mind that asylum seekers are not always welcome and that purchasing 
food by means of vouchers, for example, may attract attention as well as constitute 
a constant reminder of their status of asylum seeker. Moreover, being in possession 
of a minimum amount of money is indispensable when it comes to satisfying needs 
as basic as making a phone call or paying a bus or train fare. Of course, asylum 
seekers could be given phone cards as well as transport tickets, but this would 
amount to depriving their life from any semblance of “normality”! Moreover, it has 
been argued in the context of the UK that the cheapest and most effective way of 
providing support is through entitlement to social security payments^t
While an EC instrument may not to go as far as setting up a common system for 
asylum seekers’ support, the discretion that Member States may enjoy in this area 
must not be exercised at the detriment of asylum seekers’ best interests. It is 
recommended that wholly or predominantly cash systems should, in principle, be 
encouraged. In that respect, it is encouraging to note that Portugal, which was 
presiding the Council until the end of June 2000, was pushing a proposal for a 
directive which would outlaw schemes which replace benefits by vouchers^ .^
The charity Oxfam said that it would boycott the voucher scheme and that other major retailers 
should do the same (“Asylum vouchers spark protests”, BBC News, UK Politics, 3 April 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/).
See supm  n. 21, at p. 66,
“EU threat to British asylmn crackdown”. D ie  Sunday Times, 28 May 2000.
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Another essential component of asylum seekers’ welfare lies with access to health 
care.
(iii) Access to adequate health care
Access to health care is a fundamental element of support for asylum seekers. 
Member States must therefore ensure that asylum seekers have access to 
appropriate health care from the time they arrive in the country concerned '^ .^ It is 
often the case that newly arrived asylum seekers do not ask about health care, 
unless very ill; their priorities go to the submission of their asylum claim, 
accommodation and financial matters. However, it is essential that asylum claimants 
are promptly made aware of their rights with regard to health care. However, 
although comprehensive, this information should not be overwhelming.
Moreover, many asylum seekers are concerned that ill-health may adversely affect 
the outcome of their asylum claim. For this reason, they may be reluctant to see a 
doctor for fear of the impact of his or her diagnosis on their application. Hence, it 
should be made clear to asylum seekers that health authorities are distinct from 
those dealing with their asylum claim and that the latter have no right to request 
information on their health or access to their medical record. However, 
confidentiality does not apply to medical records used as evidence of torture or 
physical or mental ill-treatment in support of an application for asylum. This should 
be the only case where medical evidence is taken into consideration in determining 
an asylum claim; this should expressly be enshrined in EC law. Reluctance to see a 
doctor may also be caused by the necessity to resort to an interpreter and the effect 
of his or her involvement on confidentiality. In order to address this legitimate 
concern, interpreters should be legally bound by a confidentiality clause.
See David Jobbing, “Healtli screening for newly-arrived asylwn seekers and tlieir access to NHS 
provision”, in Current Issues o f  UK Asylum Law and Policy, Frances Nicholson and Patrick 
Twomey (eds)(Ashgate, Aldershot, 1998) at p. 263-281.
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Adequate health care is contingent on compliance with quantity and quality 
standards; this means that access to comprehensive health care by those in need 
must be secured. Asylum seekers’ access to health care may be problematic for a 
number of reasons that need to be addressed by the Member States. Firstly, as 
already stressed, most asylum seekers arrive destitute and are not in a position to 
pay for consultation and treatment. This can only be overcome by granting them 
access to national health services free of charge or by giving them the means to 
afford it. The first option is considered to be more cost-effective as it minimises 
administrative “paper-work”. The second option implies that asylum seekers are 
entitled to payments covering health costs. However, it is unlikely that these 
entitlements will allow full payment and the remaining part of the bill will have to be 
directly covered by the State; State direct financial assistance is thus unavoidable. 
Moreover, it is argued that free access to national health services does not entail the 
stigma that other forms of direct support, such as vouchers, may have. The decision 
belongs to the Member States and may be dictated by their health services and 
social security systems; this discretion is, however, strictly confined to their 
obligation to guarantee access to appropriate health care. Another potential threat 
to the adequate health care lies with the traditional mobility of asylum seekers that 
may render their localisation more difficult; this may undermine effective medical 
follow-up. This constitutes an additional argument in favour of more permanent 
types of accommodation for asylum seekers. It is accepted that changes of address 
will remain unavoidable; however, they must be limited as much as possible and 
must not affect access to health care. For instance, health authorities should be 
given the means to keep up-dated records. A final obstacle to access to health care 
finds its origin in language barriers. Many asylum seekers can only communicate 
with health personnel through an interpreter. Denying them the services of an 
interpreter where necessary would seriously impede access to health care as well as 
undermine its quality. For health care to be adequate, it must address asylum 
seekers’ needs in their entirety. It is therefore essential that in addition to regular 
health care^ ,^ specialised care is provided; indeed, many asylum claimants have
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experienced traumas that may have scarred them psychologically as well as 
physically. Treatment by specialists, such as psychologists and psychiatrists 
experienced in dealing with victims of torture, may be required. Moreover, the 
needs specific to certain categories of asylum seekers must be addressed. For 
example, the vast majority of Muslim women will only consent to examination by 
female doctors.
Another issue raised by support for asylum seekers relates to access to education,
(iv) Education
Asylum seekers’ status pending proceedings is by definition temporary and there is 
no certainty as to whether they will settle in the State responsible for examining 
their application. Thus, since education is mainly construed as a key component to 
successful integration, its access has been seriously curtailed in the case of asylum 
seekers. Moreover, asylum seekers’ needs in that respect may vary with their 
circumstances and the duration of their stay in the receiving State. Children’s 
specific needs must be taken into consideration. The notion of education is 
understood as embodying language training, school attendance as well as access to 
higher education and vocational courses.
A good command of the language of the State of residence is crucial to successful 
integration. Poor or non-existent language skills will constitute a considerable 
obstacle to this process and will therefore aggravate isolation. However, entitlement 
to language training and education is usually limited because of asylum seekers’ 
temporary status and, in many cases, presence. Addressing these issues is often 
considered premature. It is argued that a distinction should be made between 
language training and access to education at large. The view taken is that asylum 
seekers should benefit from language tuition as early as possible. This would help 
them manage everyday life and facilitate the integration of successful applicants.
Regular health care refers to the care that may be required by any individual regardless of his or 
her ciraunstances.
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With regard to access to education, i.e. access to courses, restrictions could be 
tolerated where asylum seekers’ stay remains brief. It is argued that where asylum 
seekers’ stay exceeds three to six months, steps towards integration should be 
taken. Denying them access to education would constitute a terrible waste of time 
with respect to successful claimants while contributing to keep asylum seekers away 
from mainstream society. In other words. Member States’ responsibilities with 
regard to asylum seekers’ access to education should expand with the duration of 
asylum claimants’ stay within their territory. This should constitute an incentive 
towards the adoption of fair and effective asylum procedures as such procedures 
could contribute to shorten proceedings^®.
The needs of children should be specifically addressed. It is important that their 
living conditions are “normalised” as much as possible and a crucial element of this 
“normalisation” is school attendance. Moreover, schooling is vital to an eventual 
successful integration. The required standards in that respect could find their legal 
basis, inter alia, in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which has been 
ratified by all the Member States®®. The Convention prohibits any form of 
discrimination in the implementation of children’s rights, including discrimination 
based on status'*^ . This provision could therefore be interpreted as applying to 
children whose parents are asylum seekers or who are asylum seekers themselves. 
This interpretation of the Convention is reinforced by Article 22 that deals, inter 
alia, with the rights of children seeking refugee status; it provides that they shall 
“(...) receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of 
applicable rights set forth in (...) the Convention and in other international human
38 See chapter V  on fair and effective procedures.
®® UNGADoc A/RES/44/25 (12 December 1989). To date, only two States are not party to the UN  
Convention on the Rights o f the Child: the United States (which have only signed the Convention) 
and Somalia (which has not signed tlie Convention).
Article 2(1) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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rights or humanitarian instruments to which the said States are Parties.”'*’ 
Moreover, the Convention expressly recognises the children’s right to education 
(Article 28). Hence, one could rely upon the Convention provisions in order to set 
out acceptable standards with regard to children asylum seekers’ education (as well 
as other rights).
Ideally, children who are asylum seekers themselves or whose parents are seeking 
asylum status should attend special classes designed to address their specific needs. 
Such classes should, in the first instance, provide language support; indeed, 
language is the key to education and thus successful integration. Depriving these 
children fi-om schooling for extended periods of time cannot be justified by the 
potentially temporary nature of their presence in the State concerned. In France, for 
instance, school is fi-ee and attendance compulsory from the ages of six to sixteen 
for all children living there and foreign children attend the same schools as French 
children. Special “adaptation classes” for the children of migrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers are sometimes specially organised within schools by the Ministry of 
education. In the UK, school is also firee and compulsory (between the ages of five 
to sixteen) and children of asylum seekers are entitled to attend schools within the 
State education sector and schools have the duty to accept them. However, there is 
no provision for the reception of children who do not speak English within special 
classes. It is argued that such classes are necessary to overcome language barriers 
and allow these children access to education. However, it is accepted that the 
Member states may not be capable of providing this support throughout their 
territory. This demonstrates the importance of asylum seekers' localisation. As 
already stressed, asylum seekers, including children, must not be housed in areas 
compromising access to the facilities they need.
It is understood that the particular vulnerability of children whose parent(s) are asylum seekers 
or who are seeking refugee status themselves should not only be addressed with regard to 
education, but in every aspect, including housing, clotliing and nutrition (see, for instance Article 
27 of the UN Convention on the Rights o f the Cliild).
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Support is an essential element to the right to seek refugee status and is designed to 
secure that asylum seekers are living in decent conditions pending the outcome of 
their claim. The Member States are therefore responsible for providing adequate 
support for asylum seekers. With this in mind, common minimum standards 
regarding asylum seekers’ status pending proceedings should be adopted with a 
view to guaranteeing that support is consistent with the right to seek refugee status. 
These standards could be adopted on the basis of Article 63(l)(b) of the TEC on 
minimum standards on the reception of asylum seekers in the Member States. These 
standards should also tackle the issue of asylum seekers' detention, one of the main 
threats to asylum seekers' welfare.
2. Detention: an exceptional measure
The legality of asylum seekers’ detention must be envisaged in the light of 
international refugee law and human rights treaties'*®. International standards 
regarding the detention of asylum seekers find their main roots in European and 
international human rights law which prohibits arbitrary detention (as well as 
arrest)'*®; the 1951 Convention also offers protection against detention, although to 
a limited extent, through Article 31. However, it is important to note that UNHCR 
has now adopted Guidelines on applicable criteria and standards relating to the 
detention of asylum seekers'*'^ , referred to as UNHCR’s Guidelines on asylum
42 Ibid.
'*® O f particular relevance in the European context is the ECHR (in particular, Article 9(1)). The 
special attention paid to the ECHR is intended to reflect its particular significance in the EC 
context: the ECHR is legally binding upon the Member States and its correct implementation 
secured by adequate machinery (i.e. the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights). 
Can also be mentioned the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political R ights, referred to as 
the ICCPR (in particular, article 9(1)).
'*'* UNHCR’s Guidelines on applicable criteria and standards relating to the detention o f  asylum 
seekers, Geneva, 10 February 1999.
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seekers’ detention. UNHCR stresses that detention must be construed as an 
exceptional measure. This is reflected in the consideration given by UNHCR to 
alternatives to detention'^ .^
It is argued that detention should be considered the exception and therefore be 
subject to clear criteria and conditions; there should be a presumption that asylum 
seekers should not be detained. This was the principle endorsed by the Executive 
Committee of UNHCR; in Conclusion 44, it declared that “(...) in view of the 
hardship which it involves, detention should normally be avoided.”'*^ The principle in 
question is reiterated in the UNHCR’s Guidelines on asylum seekers’ detention'^ .^ 
The 1951 Convention was of little help in reaching this conclusion; the issue relating 
to the detention of asylum seekers is not directly considered in the Convention. 
Article 31 concerns refiigees’ illegal entry or presence in the country of refuge'*® and
45 Ibid. Guideline 4.
'*® Executive Committee Conclusion No. 44 (XXXVII)-1986, para, (b) (see Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, 
The Refugee in International Refugee Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996) (2nd ed) at p. 491). 
The detention of asylum seekers - as well as refugees - was initially examined by the Executive 
Committee at its 37th session in 1986. The debates in the Sub-Committee of the Whole on 
International Protection showed great divergences between the States which were concerned with 
confining detention within the limits o f an exception and tliose that intended to use it as a means 
to control movement and entry. The Sub-Committee failed to reach an agreement and the matter 
was transferred to a working group. The position finally adopted by the working group and 
endorsed by the Executive Committee was very much the result o f a comprise (see Goodwin-Gill, 
supra, at p. 249-250).
'*^ Supra n. 44, Guideline 3.
'*® Article 31 of the 1951 Convention reads;
“1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entiy or 
presence, on refugees who, coming fi'om a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in 
the sense o f Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they 
pmsent themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or 
presence.
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its provision for non-penalisation is of limited application since it only applies to 
those who have come directly from a country where they fear persecution in the 
sense of Article 1 of the Convention. Although Article 31 was specifically referred 
to in the Executive Committee’s conclusion on the detention of refugees and asylum 
seekers'*®, the main reasons for limiting the use of detention are found in the very 
nature of this sanction '^’ and its effects on those being detained.
Detention constitutes an extreme sanction. Hence, resorting to detention on a 
frequent basis with respect to asylum seekers would entail the risk of assimilating 
them to “criminals” and, thus, contributing to fostering prejudiced clichés, besides 
undermining their human rights as well as their rights as asylum seekers. If the right 
to seek refugee status is to be preserved and human rights respected, the treatment 
reserved to asylum seekers pending decisions on their claims for refugee status 
should be consistent with international refugee law. Detention should also be 
contingent upon the existence of adequate safeguards and appropriate facilities. 
These requirements are designed to prevent arbitrariness and poor conditions of 
detention and secure consistency with international standards. With this in mind, it 
is argued that detention must always be justified and should only occur in 
exceptional cases, where it is indispensable and the sole solution available. This 
requires the adoption of criteria and conditions for detention accompanied by 
adequate safeguards and facilities taking into account the specificity of asylum
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other tlian 
those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the 
country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country. The Contracting States sliall 
allow such refitgees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into 
another country.”
On Article 31 o f the 1951 Convention, see also Chapter IV on access to substantive asylum 
procedures.
'*® See supra n. 46.
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seekers’ circumstances. However, it is argued that before considering detention, it 
is necessary to determine whether an alternative may be envisaged.
2,1. Alternatives to detention
The exceptional nature of detention in relation to asylum seekers must also be 
reflected in the availability of alternatives. In many cases, the objective pursued by 
detention is to provide States with some control over the whereabouts of asylum 
seekers. As observed by UKHCR^^ this can be achieved by other means than 
detention which have the advantage of allowing asylum seekers basic freedom of 
movement. It is argued that, as a pre-requirement to detention, alternatives should 
be considered. This supposes that such alternatives exist in the first place and are 
duly considered by authorities competent to take decisions on detention.
UNHCR in its Guidelines on asylum seekers’ detention gives examples of possible 
alternatives to detention; these are reporting requirements, residency requirements, 
provision of a guarantor, release on bail or open centres. It follows that asylum 
seekers could be required to report to the authorities on a regular basis or to live at 
a specific address within a particular administrative region until they are given a 
final decision on their application for refugee status. Asylum seekers could also be 
required to provide a guarantor who would be accountable for ensuring their 
attendance at any official appointment. Asylum seekers’ failure to attend would 
result in a penalty imposed on their guarantor. Bail could constitute another 
alternative. However, asylum seekers must be made aware of this possibility and its 
amount must remain within reasonable limits. In other words, as noted by UNHCR, 
“(...) the amount set must not be so high as to be prohibitive.”^^  Finally UNHCR 
suggests that asylum seekers could stay out of detention so long as they reside at 
specific collective accommodation that they would be allowed to leave during
See supra n. 44.
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stipulated times. UNHCR stresses that these alternatives do not constitute an 
exhaustive list and that States could contemplate other alternatives to detention.
As already stressed, for alternatives to detention to be effective, they must be made 
available to asylum seekers. This means that they must exist, be considered and 
used in practice. It is argued that this issue should be tackled by EC law with a view 
to securing that such alternatives are made available to asylum seekers in the 
Member States with a view to preventing unnecessary detention. It is argued that 
EC law should take on board the UNHCR’s guidelines in that respect and require 
Member States to provide effective alternatives. It is important that the range of 
alternatives available in a Member State addresses asylum seekers’ circumstances in 
their specificity. For example, a system where the only alternative available would 
be bail or the provision of a guarantor could well condemn significant numbers of 
asylum seekers to detention as they may not be able to afford bail or find a 
guarantor. The guiding principle in establishing alternatives to detention is that the 
latter must remain exceptional in relation to asylum seekers. National authorities 
should bear this principle in mind when devising means to retain some control over 
asylum seekers’ movements. In other words, these alternatives should constitute the 
rule and detention the exception.
2.2. Criteria and conditions for detention
The premise is that detention is an exceptional measure the use of which must be 
confined to rigorously pre-determined cases. Furthermore, where held justified, 
detention should take place in circumstances satisfying international standards. This 
requires the adoption and implementation of strict criteria and conditions. 
Moreover, it is argued that these criteria and conditions should be widely published 
in order to allow transparency.
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2.2.1. Criteria for justified detention
The purpose of these criteria is to secure that decisions on detention are always 
justified by determining precisely the cases where this sanction may be imposed on 
asylum seekers. It is argued that this issue should not be left to the Member States’ 
discretion in order to prevent abuses. Moreover, in order to prevent discrepancies 
between the Member States’ practices and secure the protection of asylum seekers’ 
rights throughout the EC, these criteria should be laid down in EC law.
The view taken is that people applying for refugee status are presumed to have been 
granted temporary admission to remain in the host country or bail; presumption 
could only be rebutted where there are factors indicating that detention may be 
necessary. It is understood that bail sureties should be proportionate to asylum 
seekers’ resources and should not be construed as punitive measures. As already 
stressed, detention is understood as an exceptional measure the application of which 
must be confined to well-defined cases. With this in mind, it is argued, that EC law 
should mention the cases where detention may be justified. In that respect, it is 
encouraging to note that Portugal is pushing for the adoption of a directive that 
would outlaw asylum seekers’ incarceration^^.
It is argued that the main scope for detention concerns cases where the 
implementation of decisions regarding asylum seekers’ removal would be 
jeopardised by their behaviour. This supposes the existence of strong and objective 
reasons for believing that asylum seekers would abscond or fail to comply with 
decisions on deportation. In the latter case, detention could be envisaged where 
asylum seeker’s removal is imminent; this would equally apply to removals to 
another country of asylum or removals following unsuccessful asylum claims. In 
such cases, the criteria for justified detention should take into consideration the 
imminence of the removal as well as asylum seekers’ attitudes. French law does not
According to this Portuguese proposal, voucher-based schemes should also be outlawed, see 
supra n. 35.
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appear to be totally satisfactory in that respect. Out of the four cases in which 
detention may be allowed, only one refers to the asylum claimant’s attitude, i.e. 
where an asylum seeker eligible for detention under one of the other cases has failed 
to comply with a removal order within seven days of the termination of the initial 
detention^ '*. With regard to the need for an imminent removal, the ECHR and the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights are of particular relevance. In 
Chahal v the United Kingdom^^, the Court recalled, with respect to an asylum 
seeker’s detention in view of his removal from the UK, that any deprivation of 
liberty under Aiticle 5(1 of the ECHR was only justified so long as deportation
Article 32 bis o f the Ordonnance N ° 45-2658 of 2 November 1945 relative aux conditions 
d'entrée et de séjour en France des étrangers. Journal Officiel de la République Française of 4 
November of 1945 (as amended by subsequent lois) allows the detention of asylum seekers in the 
following tluee cases:
- the asylum seeker must be hander over to the authorities of another Member State competent for 
examining his or her claim, but cannot leave the French territory immediately;
- the asylum seeker is subject to a deportation order, but cannot leave the French territory 
immediately; and
- the asylum seeker must be escorted to the border, but camiot leave the French territory 
iimnediately.
Chahal v the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Riglits, judgement (Grand Chamber) 
of 25 October 1996, Reports o f Judgements and Decisions, 1996-V, N° 22, at p. 1831.
Article 5(1) of the ECHR reads:
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty 
save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for nomcompliance with the lawful order of a court or 
in Older to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority o f reasonable suspicion of having conunitted an offence or fleeing after 
having done so;
(d) the detention o f a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision of his 
lawful detention for the purpose o f bringing him before the competent legal authority;
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proceedings were in progress. Therefore, where proceedings were not carried out 
with due diligence, detention was no longer permissible under Article 5(l)(f)^\
Detention for our purpose must be distinguished from cases where an asylum seeker 
is detained because he or she is considered a danger to the public or has been 
charged with or convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment.
It is argued that, where the competent authorities consider that detention is 
justified, they should be under the obligation to provide the asylum seeker 
concerned with written reasons. For instance, under French law, asylum seekers’ 
detention is subject to a written and motivated decision emanating from the State 
representative in the département concerned®®. This requirement is particularly 
important with regard to asylum seekers’ right to challenge decisions concerning 
their detention®®.
Unfortunately, practices in many Member States show that detention occurs on a 
much larger scale. Besides being used as a dissuasive measure the prospect of which 
may deter potential asylum seekers from lodging their claim with the States
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention o f the spreading o f infectious diseases, of 
persons unsound of mind, alcoholics or drug addicts, or vagrants;
(f) the lawftd arrest and detention of a person to prevent Ms effecting an unauthorized entry into 
the country o f a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
extradition.”
See supra n. 55, paragraph 113.
The Court of Human Rights referred to Quinn v. France, judgment of 22 March 1995, Series A  
No. 311, paragraph 48 and Kolompar v. Belgium, judgment of 24 September 1992, Series A No. 
235-C, paragraph 36.
See, for instance, Article 35 bis o f the Ordonnance o f 2 November 1945 {supra n. 54) which 
requires decisions on detention (“rétention administrative”) to give written reasons; a similar 
requirement exists with regard to confinement to waiting zones (Article 35 quater (II)), ibid.
®® See tliis chapter infra, section 2.2.2(iv).
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concerned, there has been a tendency to use detention in response to mass-influx 
arrivals of asylum seekers. However, it has been observed that when the authorities 
decide to detain another group of asylum seekers, they suddenly consider it safe to 
release those previously detained on a group basis. Establishing a connection 
between large arrivals of asylum seekers and detention result in abusive practices. 
The threat of detention should not be used by national authorities as a means to 
dissuade potential candidates to refugee status. In that respect, the Bishop of 
Oxford, Rt. Rev. Richard Harries, declared that “all European governments used it 
[detention] to frighten people away from seeking sanctuary (...)” and referred to 
detention as “a morally repugnant” tactic used by governments to stop people 
seeking safety within their boundaries. An abusive usage of detention tends to 
present asylum seekers as criminals and thus fosters prejudices. Hence, besides 
undermining asylum seekers’ rights, abusive detentions are likely to exacerbate and 
legitimise hostile attitudes towards them.
Considering its gravity, detention must be construed as a measure of last resort and 
be strictly proportionate to the aim it pursues. Hence, where an asylum seeker is 
considered for detention, the competent authorities should, as a prerequisite to any 
decision on his or her detention, consider whether there is an alternative solution. 
For instance, the asylum seeker in question could be subject to strict reporting 
conditions with detention as a sanction for failure to comply with these 
requirements. Such caution when it comes to asylum seekers’ detention is intended 
to reflect the seriousness of a decision entailing detention. In the worse cases, 
detention has resulted in hunger strikes and suicide attempts'”. One must bear in 
mind that asylum seekers may not be fit to cope with detention.
Victoria Combe, “Bishop hits out at asylum detention”. Electronic Telegraph, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk, 21 Febmaiy 1997.
In early Janiiaiy 1997, five detained asylum seekers as well as a Nigerian pastor started a hunger 
strike at Rochester Prison, Kent. They were soon followed by another ten inmates; by the end of 
the month, tlie hunger strike had involved 48 of the 180 asylum seekers detained at Rochester
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With this in mind, it is argued that particularly vulnerable persons should not be 
detained even where the conditions of detention satisfy international standards^ ®. It 
is argued that the exclusion of detention should be absolute in the case of children. 
This principle is emphasised in UNHCR’s Guidelines on asylum seekers’ detention 
with special reference to the Convention on the Rights of the Child^ .^ Asylum 
support groups in the UK have expressed deep concern with regard to the detention 
of children who arrived on their own^\ In most cases, they had entered the UK with
Prison (Philip Johnston, “Pressure mounts over himger strike. Electronic Telegraph, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk, 31 January 1997).
62 See supra n. 21, at p. 65.
See supra n. 44, Guideline 6. UNHCR founds the exclusion of detention in relation to minors on 
the Convention on the Rights of Minors and, in particular, on the following Articles:
“Article 2 which requires that States take all measures appropriate to enstue that cliildren are 
protected from all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis o f the status, activities, 
expressed opinions, or beliefs o f tlie cliild’s parents, legal guardians or family members;
Article 3 wliich provides that in any action taken by State Parties concerning cliildren, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration;
Article 9 which grants cliildren the right not to be separated from their parents against their will;
Article 22 which requires that States take appropriate measures to ensure that minors who are 
seeking refugee status or who are recognised refiigees, whether accompanied or not, receive 
appropriate protection and assistance; and
Article 37 by which States Parties are required to ensure that the detention of minors shall be used 
only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”
For instance, a thirteen-years old Nigerian who arrived in the United Kingdom with forged 
documents indicating that she was twenty-one was sent to detention; she was finally allowed to 
stay witli a foster family. This experience was highly traumatic and added to the suffering
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forged documents indicating that they were over eighteen years of age. Immigration 
authorities have argued that they were not always in a position to realise that they 
were dealing with minors. However, it has been stressed that the risk of detaining 
children on the basis of fake documents could be considerably minimised by 
consulting paediatricians. It is argued that asylum seekers who are minors should 
enjoy the same level of protection as any other children in the territory of the 
Member State concerned. Furthermore, concern for cliildren’s welfare requires 
States not to detain accompanying adults in order to avoid any further distress. 
Moreover, as recommended by UNHCR^^ the detention of unaccompanied elderly 
persons, torture or trauma victims and persons with mental or physical disability 
should, in principle, be avoided as they constitute particularly vulnerable groups. In 
any case, their detention should be conditional upon certification by a qualified 
medical practitioner that detention will not adversely affect their health and well­
being. In many instances, this will amount to prohibit detention. Furthermore, the 
needs of a another vulnerable group, namely women and in particular those who 
arrive unaccompanied, must be addressed. This has a number of implications in 
relation to detention as stressed by UNHCR^ .^ Detained female asylum seekers 
should be accommodated separately from male asylum seekers. The detention of 
nursing mothers or female asylum seekers in their final months of pregnancy should 
be avoided.
It is argued that EC law should endorse the principle that detention is an 
exceptional measure that should always be justified. To that end, EC law should 
provide an exhaustive list of the circumstances under which detention may be 
authorised as well as the cases where it should never be allowed. This issue could 
be tackled under Article 63(l)(b) of the TEC on minimum standards on the 
reception of asylum seekers in Member States.
undergone in her country of origin, both of her parents had been killed in Nigeria (BBC Radio 4 
News, 6 July 1999).
See, supra n. 44, Guideline 7.
^  Ibid., Guideline 8.
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As already stressed, detention constitutes a severe sanction that must be subject to 
strict requirements if abuses are to be avoided or at least minimised. Thus, 
determining the cases where detention may take place does not suffice in itself, it is 
also indispensable to guarantee that the conditions of detention are satisfactory by 
means of appropriate safeguards and facilities.
2.2.2. Conditions for detention
The conditions in question aim at securing the lawfulness of decisions regarding 
detention. They constitute a safety-net designed to prevent arbitrariness throughout 
the detention process, i.e. from the time detention is decided to its term. Ensuring 
the legality of the initial decision does not suffice in itself, the legitimacy of 
detention must be maintained throughout its duration and therefore be subject to 
regular controls. These must be complemented by the asylum seekers’ right to 
challenge decisions on their detention.
The conditions of asylum seekers' detention comprise the existence of and 
compliance with an adequate legal basis, the imposition of time-limits and the 
establisliment of regular judicial supervision.
(i) An adequate legal basis
As already mentioned, international and European human rights law prohibits 
arbitrary detention (or arrest) and impose certain requirements to that end; the first 
requirement regards the existence of a legal basis. The contemplated detention must 
find its foundation in domestic law and comply with it. In that respect. Article 9(1) 
of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides, 
inter alia, that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and 
in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.” ; Aiticle 5(1) of the 
ECHR contains a similar provision®®. In Chahaf^, the European Court of Human
®® See supra n. 56.
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Rights stressed that the notion of “lawfulness” with regard to detention included 
the question of adherence to the “procedure prescribed by law”. The ECHR (Art. 
5(l)(f)) referred essentially to the obligation to obseiwe substantive and procedural 
rules of national law. However, as noted by the Court, “lawfulness” is also 
contingent upon compliance with Article 5 of the ECHR itself, the purpose of which 
is to protect individuals from arbitrariness®®. It follows that privation of liberty 
cannot take place in the absence of a domestic legal provision authorising it; it is 
understood that the provision in question must be in line with human rights law and 
more specifically with Article 5(1) of the ECHR™.
With the “communautarisation” of asylum matters, the legal basis for asylum 
claimants' detention should be defined and incorporated in EC law.
(ii) Time-limited detention
The imposition of tight and strictly controlled time-limits is designed to facilitate the 
regular review of the legality of detention. These time-limits aim at preventing 
detention from being unnecessarily extended, the main fear being indefinite 
detention.
The lawfulness of detention is contingent upon its being justified. In any case must 
this principle be undermined by means of derogations. This was expressly recalled 
by the UN Human Rights Committee in the context of an individual petition 
brought against Australia®’. The case concerned an asylum seeker who had been
See supra n. 55, paragraph 118.
70 See supra n. 56.
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detained in Australia for four years; the UN Human Rights Committee found that 
this detention was in breach of Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights®®. The Committee expressed the view that “detention should not 
continue beyond the period for which that State can provide justification®  ^ (...). 
[T]he fact of illegal entry may indicate a need for investigation and there may be 
other factors particular to the individual (...) which may justify detention for a 
limited period. Without such factors detention may be considered arbitrary, even if 
entry was illegal.”®'" A similar requirement can be inferred from Article 5(1 )(f) of the 
ECHR pursuant to which an individual’s detention can only be justified in view of 
his or her deportation or extradition. In ChahaP, the applicant was an Indian 
national who had been legally residing in the UK. Regarded as a danger to public 
security, he was served with a notice of intention to deport and was detained to that 
end. Because of his political and religious activities, he claimed that he had a well- 
founded fear of persecution if returned to his country of origin. Following lengthy 
and complex proceedings®®, his case was finally brought to the institutions of the
®’ A V Australia, views of the UN Human Rights Committee, Communication 560/1993, referred 
to in Providing Protection, Towards Fair and Effective Asylum Procedures, see supra n. 21, at p. 
64.
®® Article 9(1) of the ICCPR provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subject to arbitrary 
ariest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law.”
®^ Emphasis added.
®'"4 V Australia, see supra n. 71, paragraph 9(4).
75 See supra n. 55.
®® The applicant, Mr Chahal, entered the UK illegally in 1971 in search of employment; however, 
liis situation had been regularised and he had been granted indefinite leave to remain. In 1984, he 
went to Punjab to visit relatives and attended the meetings of a Sildi group that had engaged in a 
political campaign for an independent homeland which resulted in violent conflicts with the 
Indian authorities. The applicant was arrested by the Punjab police and kept in custody for twenty-
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one days, during wliich time he was regularly subjected to ill-treatment. He was then released 
without charge. On his return to the UK, Mr Chahal engaged in political and religious activities 
and supported a group who advocated violent methods in pursuance of the separatist campaign; 
the leader of this group in the UK, Jasbir Singh Rode, was subsequently expelled. In October 1985, 
the applicant was detained under the Prevention o f Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
(“PTA”) on suspicion of involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate the then Prime Minister, Rajiv 
Gandlii, during an official visit in the UK. He was released without charge. In March 1986, Mr 
Chahal was charged with assault and affray following disturbances at the East Ham gurdwara in 
London. During tlie course of his trial, there was a disturbance at tlie Belvedere gurdwara. Mr 
Chahal was acquitted of the charges resulting from the Belvedere disturbance. In 1990, the Home 
Secretary, Douglas Hurd, decided that the applicant should be deported because his presence in the 
UK was unconducive to the public good for reasons of national security and otlier reasons of a 
political nature, i.e. tlie international fight against terrorism. He was detained for deportation 
purposes pursuant to paragraph 2(2) of Schedule III of the Immigration Act 1971 (pursuant to this 
provision, a person may be detained under the authority of the Secretary of State after service upon 
him of a notice of intention to deport and pending the making of a deportation order.) Mr Chahal 
then submitted an application for asylum on the ground that if  returned to India he would have a 
well-founded fear o f persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Convention. The Home Secretary 
rejected his claim in 1991 and Mr ChahaPs solicitors informed the Home Secretary of their 
client’s intention to apply for judicial review of this refusal. However, they would wait until the 
advisory panel had considered the national security case against their client (because of the 
national security elements of Mr Chahal’s case, there was no right of appeal against the 
deportation order and Iris case was subject to an non-statutory advisory procedure set out in 
paragraph 157 of the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules (House of Commons Paper 251 
of 1990). In July 1991, the Home Secretary signed an order for Mr Chahal’s deportation. Leave to 
apply for judicial review o f the asylum refusal was granted by the High Court. The asylum refusal 
was quashed in 1991 and remitted to the Home Secretary. In 1992, the Home Secretary rejected 
once again Mr Chahal’s application for asylum and informed the applicant that he had no 
intention to withdraw the deportation proceedings. Mr Chahal was tlien granted leave to apply for 
judicial review of the decision to maintain the refusal o f asylmn. Meanwliile the Court of appeal 
quashed the applicant’s convictions of assault and affray on the gromid that the applicant’s 
appearance in court in handcuffs had been seriously prejudicial to him. The Home Secretary 
reviewed liis case in the light of tliis new development, but considered that it was still right to 
deport him. In 1993, Mr Chahal unsuccessfiilly applied to the High Court for judicial review; his 
appeal was subsequently dismissed. He decided to bring his case to the Institutions of the ECHR. 
Following the report o f the European Commission of Human Rights, he applied for temporary 
release pending the decision o f the European Court of Human Rights, by way of habeas corpus and 
judicial review (Habeas Corpus Act 1679, Habeas Corpus Act 1816, section 1 and the
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ECHR on the ground that his detention and planned deportation were in breach of 
the ECHR, At the time of the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights, 
i.e. end of October 1996, Mr Chahal was still in detention; he had been detained for 
over six years. One of the issues to be addressed by the Court was whether the 
applicant’s prolonged detention was justified all along and thus in line with Article 
5(1) of the ECHR. The applicant argued that his detention had ceased to conform 
with Article 5(1) because of its excessive duration. The Commission of Human 
Rights agreed, considering that the proceedings had not been pursued with the 
required diligence. The UK Government asserted that the various proceedings 
initiated by Mr Chahaf® had been dealt with as expeditiously as possible. The Court 
of Human Rights recalled that the sole requirement entailed in Article 5(l)(f) with 
regard to detention was that it should only be used in view to deportation. Having 
considered the time taken for the various decisions®® and the seriousness and 
complexity of Mr Chahal’s case®®, the European Court of Human Rights came to 
the conclusion that “(...) none of the periods complained of [could] be regarded as 
excessive, taken either individually or in combination. Accordingly, there [was] no 
violation of [Article 5(1 )(t)] of the [ECHR] on account of the diligence, or lack of 
it, with which the domestic procedures were conducted.”®'* However, this 
conclusion was not unanimously adopted and some of the judges gave a dissenting 
opinion on that issue. Judge De Meyer expressed the view that a period of detention 
of over six years was clearly excessive. He considered that “[t]he considerations of 
an extremely serious and weighty nature referred to in paragraph 117 of the 
judgement [could] be enough to explain the length of the deportation proceedings.
Administration o f Justice Act 1960, section 14(2) pursuant to wliich only one application for 
habeas corpus on the same grounds may be made by an individual in detention, unless fresh 
evidence is adduced in support); his application was refiised and he remained detained.
®® See supra n. 55.
®® Ibid., paragraphs 115 to 116.
79 Ibid., paragraph 117.
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They [could] not, however, justify the length of the detention, any more than the 
complexity of criminal proceedings was enough to justify the length of pre-trial 
detention.” Judge Petiti considered that there had been "‘a clear and serious 
violation” of Article 5(1)®^ . With regard to the duration of detention, he took the 
view that Article 5(l)(f) of the ECHR should be construed “(• ■ ) containing a 
safeguard as to the duration of the detention authorised, since the purpose of 
Article 5 as a whole [was] to protect the individual from arbitrariness.”*^ The 
Court's interpretation of Article 5(l)(f) is to be welcome as it imposes limits on the 
use of detention; it must take place in view of diligent deportation proceedings. 
However, the conclusion reached by the Court in the applicant’s case is not 
considered satisfactory as it may open the path to lengthy detentions. With this in 
mind, it is argued that the dissenting judges have construed Article 5(1 )(f) in a 
manner much more consistent with the imperative need to keep detention within 
tolerable time-limits.
Moreover, as an additional safeguard, detention should initially be permitted for a 
short period of time only, any prolongation having to be authorised following 
judicial control. In that respect, the present UK system is considered a serious 
source of disquiet as it allows for indefinite detention of, inter alia^ any asylum 
seeker who may be removed from the UK or anyone who is not granted admission 
to the UK or is liable to deportation or removal*' .^ The UNHCR inspector who 
visited Campsfield House (Oxfordshire), one of the biggest detention centres in the
Ibid,
'Ibid.
Section 140 of the 1999 Act which amended Paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to the 1971 
Immigration Act.
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UK, said that '‘Britain ha[d] more people in detention for longer periods of time 
than any other European Country.”*^ French law, unlike UK legislation, provides for 
time-limits. Pursuant to Article 35 bis of the Ordonnance n° 45-2658 of 2 
November 1945*% an asylum seeker may be detained (^^rétention administrative^^ 
where necessary, during the time strictly necessary to his or her departure from the 
French territory. Detention exceeding forty-eight hours is subject to judicial 
authorisation and time-limits. Asylum seekers' confinement to waiting zones {""zones 
d'attente^^) is also subject to time-limits. The waiting zone regime is applicable to 
asylum seekers who have arrived by air, sea or rail and have been refused entry or 
are about to enter the French territory. The procedures applicable are regulated by 
Article 12 of the Décret of 27 May 1982 and by Article 35 quater of the 
Ordonnance n° 45-2658 of 2 November 1945 concerning waiting zones in ports 
and airports*^ Pursuant to Article 35 quater (II) of the Ordonnance, an asylum 
seeker cannot be maintained in a waiting zone for more than forty-eight hours; 
however, detention can be renewed for another forty-eight hours. Beyond this time­
limit, asylum seekers’ detention in waiting zones must be authorised by the 
president of the tiibunal de grande instance or a judge delegated by him or her*®, 
this extension cannot exceed eight days. The administrative authority has to explain 
to the judge the reasons why the individual concerned has not yet been admitted 
into the French territory and thus justify its request for extension. The 
administrative authority must also provide the judge with information regarding the 
time deemed necessary to allow the asylum seeker out of the waiting zone. The 
president of the tribunal de grande instance (or his or her delegate) may refuse to 
authorise a prorogation if there is no ground to believe that the asylum claim is 
manifestly unfounded. Exceptionally, the administrative authority may be granted
Lucy Patton, “Conditions for asylum seekers: “utter shambles”, The Guardian, 6 March 1998, at 
p. 4.
See supra n. 54.
Ibid. Article 35 quater was introduced by the Loi o f 6 July 1992
88 Ibid., Article 35 quater (III).
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another eight days extension subject to the same conditions*®. In any case, can an 
asylum seeker be confined to a waiting zone for more than twenty days. However, 
those concerned with asylum seekers' protection considered that the judicial 
supervision organised by the Ordonnance was tardy and limited®^ .
Time-limits are essential in preventing abuses and arbitrariness. Issues relating to 
the duration of detention should not be left to the discretion of administrative 
authorities. Detention should always be subject to time-limits prescribed by law. As 
already stressed, detention should be authorised for a very short time initially (forty- 
eight hours is the recommended time-limit); this is designed to compensate for the 
absence of immediate judicial control. Moreover, the total duration of detention 
should be kept within reasonable limits. Another fundamental condition to the 
lawfulness of detention is the existence of regular and effective judicial supervision.
(iii) Regular judicial supervision
The lawfulness of detention is conditional on its being justified. However, it is not 
sufficient to secure that detention is justified at the time of the initial decision; 
detention must remain justified throughout its duration; this is designed to ensure 
that any prolongation remains legal and thus legitimate. With this in mind, it is 
indispensable that decisions on detention are subject to regular judicial control from 
an early stage. In that respect, UNHCR recommends that decisions on asylum 
seekers’ detention shall be subject to an automatic review by a judicial or 
administrative body independent from the authorities who decide on their detention 
followed by regular periodic reviews^% These requirements are designed to prevent
89 Ibid,
Between July 1992 and July 1993, only 10,5% of the administrative procedures were subject to 
judicial supervision (see Dominique Turpin, “Immigrés et réfugiés: des réformes juridiques à la 
réalité du terrain, Chroniques de l ’activité de la Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de 
l ’Homme”, Les Petites Affiches, 30 Novembre 1994, N° 143, 13-19, at p. 17).
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abuses in the use of extra-judicial detention, the principle pitfall being the risk of 
unlimited detention. However, it is argued that a further safeguard against unlimited 
detention would consist in subjecting initial detention to a strict period of time, i.e. 
forty-eight hours as previously suggested. It is understood that any prolongation 
should be subject to judicial control with a view to assess the necessity for the 
continuance of detention.
Regular judicial control is an international requirement that must be enshrined in 
domestic law®^  and, with the “communautarisation” of asylum matters”, in EC law. 
The UN Human Rights Committee stressed that “court review of the lawfulness of 
detention (...) is not limited to the mere compliance with domestic law (...)”®* The 
need for judicial supervision is based on international and European human rights 
law. In that respect, the ICCPR (Article 9(4) and the ECHR (Article 5(4) contain 
very similar provisions®  ^Article 5(4) of the ECHR reads:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings by which the lawftilness of his detention shall be decided speedily 
by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”®^
®^ See supra n. 44, Guideline 5(iii).
®^ In Chahal, the European Court o f Human Rigltts expressly noted that a detained person was 
entitled to a review of his or her detention not only in the light of the requirements o f domestic 
law, but also in the light of those embodied in the ECHR (see supra n. 55, paragraph 127).
®* See supra n. 46, paragraph 9(5).
®^ Article 9(4) o f the ICCPR and Article 5(4) of the ECHR are also considered the legal basis for 
individuals’ right to challenge decisions on their detention.
®® Article 9(4) of the ICCPR provides:
“Anyone who is deprived o f his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings 
before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention 
and order his release if  the detention is not lawful.
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Providing for regular judicial control does not suffice in itself, a key issue is the 
extent of the supervision carried out by courts. In order to secure effective control, 
it is important that courts are given the means to assess whether detention is 
justified and the power to order release when necessary. What is decisive is the 
scope and effects of judicial control®®. In the Chahal case®^ , the European Court of 
Human Rights had to appraise the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention in the light 
of the various proceedings brought by or against Mr Chahal. With respect to Article 
5(4)®*, the Court focused on the proceedings brought against the applicant on 
grounds of national security. Mr Chahal argued that he was denied the opportunity 
to have the lawfulness of his detention decided by a national court; he argued that 
“(...) the reliance placed on national security grounds as a justification for his 
detention pending deportation prevented the domestic courts from considering 
whether it was lawful and appropriate (,..)”®® The Court first observed that States’ 
obligations under Article 5(4) did vary with the type of deprivation of liberty. 
However, the Court stressed that “[tjhe review allowed for should in any case be 
wide enough to bear on those conditions which are essential for the “lawful”
®® Ibid.
®^ See supra n. 55.
®* Unlike the Court, the European Commission of Human Rights considered that it was more 
appropriate to consider the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the ECHR (see supra n. 55, 
paragraph 125).
Article 13 reads;
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention [the ECHR] are violated 
shall have an effective reme<fy before the national authority notwithstanding tliat tlie violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official authority.”
However, the European Court of Hmnan Riglits took tire view tliat since Article 5(4) provided a 
lex specialis in relation to the more general requirement of Article 13, Mr Chahal’s complaint 
should be first examined in the light of Article 5(4) (ibid., paragraph 126).
®® paragraph 124.
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detention of a person according to Article 5(1)’”°®. Hence, the Court considered 
that the issue at stake was whether adequate proceedings to challenge the 
lawfulness of the applicant’s detention before national courts were available. The 
Court accepted that the use of confidential material could be unavoidable in cases 
involving national security. However, the Court stressed that this did not mean that 
national authorities were entitled not to provide effective judicial control whenever 
they asserted that a case raised questions of national security and terrorism^ The 
Court observed that where national security was at stake, UK courts were not in a 
position to review whether Mr Chahal’s detention was justified on national security 
grounds. Moreover, the Court considered that the degree of control over the 
procedure before the advisory panel was not sufficient  ^ Mr Chahal was not 
entitled to legal representation, he was only given an outline of the grounds for the 
notice of intention to deport, the panel had no power of decision and its advice to 
the Home Secretary was not binding nor disclosed^ ®*. The Court took the view that 
neither the proceedings for habeas corpus nor for judicial review of the decision to
Ibid., paragraph 127.
Ibid., paragraph 131.
H ie Court specified tliat it attached significance to the fact that, as pointed out by the intervenors 
(Amnesty International, Liberty, the AIRE Centre and JCWI), there are forms of effective judicial 
control even where national security or terrorism issues are at stake (ibid.); the intervenors 
expressly referred to the Canadian system with respect to Article 13 of the ECHR (paragraph 144). 
Under the Canadian Immigration Act 1976 (as amended by the Immigration Act 1988) a Federal 
Court judge holds an in camera hearing of all tlie evidence. The applicant is provided with a 
statement summarising as far as possible the case against him or her; he or she has the riglit to be 
represented and to call evidence. The required confidentiality is addressed by requiring security 
material to be examined in the absence of the applicant and his or her representative. However, 
their place is then taken by a security-cleared counsel instructed by the court; he or she cross- 
examines the witnesses and generally assists tlie court in testing the strength o f  the State’s case.
102
103
Ibid.
Ibid., paragraph 130.
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detain the applicant before the national courts’ nor the procedure before the 
advisory panel satisfied the requirements of Article 5(4) of the ECHR and 
concluded that there had been a violation of that Article. The Court also concluded 
that there had been a breach of Article 13 that guarantees the general right to an 
effective remedy before a national authority’®*.
Under French law’®®, where an asylum seeker has been detained for more than forty- 
eight hours, the president of the tribunal de grande instance or a magistrate 
delegated by him or her must be informed. He or she must issue an ordonnance if a 
prorogation is requested after having heard the State representative, if present, and 
the asylum seeker assisted by his or her representative. The asylum seeker may be 
kept in detention for the period of time strictly necessary to the hearing and issuing 
of the ordonnance. The ordonnance may extend detention for a maximum of five 
days from the day it has been adopted and can be renewed for another five days in 
exceptional cases by means of a new ordonnance^^\ An appeal may be brought 
against the ordonnance; however, it has no suspensive effect. The decision must be 
taken within forty-eight hours’®*. The French system would be acceptable provided 
that the time-limits were strictly adhered to and suspensive effect granted; this is not 
currently the case.
104 Ibid.
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Ibid.
See supra n. 54, Article 32 bis.
’®^ An asylum seeker may be detained for another five days where he or she presents a particularly 
serious threat to public order or where it is impossible to carry out a removal order. This is the 
case where the asylum seeker has lost or destroyed his or her travel documents, where he or she 
lias falsified liis or her identity and, finally, where he or she refiises to comply with the removal 
order (ibid.).
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Judicial control is a vital safeguard against arbitrariness and indefinite extra-judicial 
detention. Judicial supervision should take place on a regular basis. It is accepted 
that the initial decision relating to an asylum seeker’s detention may be of an 
administrative nature; however, judicial control must take place within brief delays; 
forty-eight hours is the recommended period of time. This promptitude is designed 
to provide effective control, rectify any wrongful decision and allow immediate 
release where necessary. Moreover, any prolongation of detention should be subject 
to judicial authorisation and only permitted for a limited period of time. These 
requirements are construed as forming an absolute principle; any alterations are 
considered unacceptable. However, judicial control of detention must not be seen as 
a substitute for asylum seekers’ right to challenge decisions regarding their 
detention.
(iv) Asylum seekers' right to challenge decisions regarding their detention
As already observed, detention constitutes an extreme sanction and it is therefore 
essential to give asylum seekers the right to challenge decisions regarding their 
detention. This right constitutes a vital legal safeguard and is formally 
acknowledged in the UNHCR’s Guidelines on asylum seekers’ detention^^ .^
In order to prevent - or at least minimise arbitrariness -, it is fundamental that 
detained asylum seekers are given the power to instigate control of the lawfulness 
of their detention. This can only be achieved by granting them the right to contest 
the legality of their detention before a court. Any attempt to withdraw or alter this 
right would amount to an unacceptable denial of justice totally incompatible with 
human rights law. In that respect, one may refer to the provisions of the ICCPR and 
the ECHR; Article 9(4) of the ICCPR"® and Article 5(4) and 13 of the ECHR have
’®® See supra n. 44, Guideline 5(iv). 
See supra n. 95.
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been interpreted as conferring detained individuals the right to challenge these 
decisions.
The UN Human Rights Committee upheld the right to challenge detention before a 
court with decision-making powers with a view to ensuring compliance with Article 
9 of the ICCPR or any other relevant provisions of the Covenant. The UN 
Committee stressed the prevalence of these international standards over domestic 
provisions’". However, the precedence of such standards is more effectively 
secured within the framework of the ECHR. Considering the prevalence of these 
instruments over national law, the right to challenge decisions on detention should 
be incorporated in EC law.
Furthermore, one must ensure that the conditions in which asylum seekers are kept 
are consistent with international refugee law and human rights at large. This 
requires the existence of adequate facilities.
2.3. Access to adequate facilities
Appropriate conditions of detention are regarded as the necessary complement to 
lawful detention; poor conditions of detention would question the compliance of 
otherwise justified detention with international standards. It is essential to bear in 
mind that detained asylum seekers must not be assimilated to convicted criminals. 
Hence, they should never be detained in prisons. Besides contributing to foster 
prejudices agmnst asylum seekers, such practices would result in subjecting them to 
a distressing and totally unnecessary treatment. UNHCR recommends that the use 
of prison should be avoided^ Where separate detention facilities are not used, 
asylum seekers should not be accommodated with convicted criminals and prisoners
’" See supra n. 46, paragraph 9(5). 
See supra n. 44, Guideline lO(iii).
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on remand^However, it is argued that prisons should only be used on an 
exceptional and temporary basis and that detained asylum seekers should be 
accommodated in specialised detention centres.
The fundamental distinction between detention and imprisonment must be reflected 
in the regime applicable to asylum seekers’ detention. Asylum seekers can only be 
detained in establishments specifically set up for that purpose; they should not be 
kept in prisons"^. Moreover, these establishments must provide the facilities 
necessary to the preservation of asylum seekers’ rights.
2.3.1. Specialised detention centres
The specificity of asylum seekers’ circumstances must be reflected in the regime 
reserved to those detained; this should be materialised in the creation of centres 
specially conceived to receive asylum seekers. It is argued that these establishments 
as well as the way that they are run should be the object of special provisions legally 
binding upon the Member States.
The most disconcerting - and most revealing - aspect of Member States' practices 
regarding detention is the use of prisons as “suitable” detention centres for asylum 
seekers. It is argued that such practices violate asylum seekers’ human rights since 
their presence in these institutions cannot be legally justified: they are not charged 
with, nor are they convicted of any breach of the law sanctioned under domestic law 
by imprisonment^In that respect, French law expressly specifies that asylum
H 3 Ibid.
Inipii^nment can only be justified where asylum seekers have been charged with, or convicted 
of, breaches o f the law that carry such a sanction.
This section, i.e. section 2 o f the present chapter, does not deal with asylum seekers who may 
have been charged with or convicted o f an offence.
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seekers shall not be detained in premises under the control of the prison authorities 
(^"administration pénitentiairé'y^^.
As already mentioned, it is the Member States’ responsibility to secure that asylum 
seekers are detained - provided that such sanction is justified - in adequate centres 
addressing their needs. Thus, besides being answerable for the creation of special 
centres. Member States must be answerable for the way they are run. This raises the 
issue of contracted out detention centres.
It is argued that States can only enter into contract with another party for the 
running of such centres provided that these centres are strictly subject to the same 
requirements as those under direct State control. The fact that a detention centre is 
contracted out should not entail the risk of lower standards.
In that respect, one can refer to the controversy created by the report on Campsfield 
Detention Centre in the UK. In early 1998, inspections were carried out by the 
Chief Inspector of Prisons, David Ramsbotham, at that centre. The report strongly 
criticised the way Group 4 had been running the centre. Campsfield Detention 
Centre had been contracted out to Group 4, a private company. The Home Office 
Minister, Mike O’Brien, announced changes, but, at the same time, congratulated 
the security firm Group 4 for doing “a good job in difficult circumstances in a very 
large centre where there had been two riots in the past four years” In August 
1997, asylum seekers rioted because they believed that Group 4 had strangled and 
murdered two detainees. The rumour that triggered the riots were disclosed at the 
opening of the trial at Oxford Crown Court of nine West African asylum seekers. 
They were all charged with offences which carried penalties of up to ten years 
imprisonment”®. The case was expected to last nine months and collapsed after
” ® See supra n. 54, article 35 bis.
Alan Travis, "Group 4 clings to its asylum role”, The Guardian, 17 April 1998, at p. 5.
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three; the prosecution conceded defeat after it was unable to clearly establish the 
identity of the rioters”®. Moreover, videotape evidence from thirty-two cameras in 
the detention centre repeatedly contradicted evidence given by witnesses”®. Six 
accused remained in prison although they had been acquitted of violent disorder at 
Campsfield Detention Centre as well as three others against whom charges were 
dropped after committal”’. Despite the problems experienced with privately run 
detention centres, Mike O’Brien declared that the additional detention centres that 
the Government intended to build in order to address the substantial increase in the 
numbers of asylum seekers (and illegal entrants) being held in Britain should be run 
privately. He also said that centres were to lose their status as “secure hostels” 
and a new regime of sanctions and incentives was to be introduced in order to 
control disruptive detainees’^ *. These statements indicated an alarming shift towards 
a more systematic detention of asylum seekers and a more “prison-like” regime. 
Part VIII of the 1999 Act specifically deals with detention centres and contains
” * Alan Travis, “Asylum seekers’ riot set off by rumours o f killings”, The Guardian, 4 June 1998, 
at p. 9.
” ® The case against one of the defendants, aged seventeen, was dropped after only one week as he 
was too mentally ill to stand trial. Three of tlie defendants walked free; two of them had already 
been granted refugee status and the five others were taken back to detention wliile their claim for 
asyliun was being considered (Alan Travis, “Rioting case against asylum seekers falls apart”, The 
Guardian, 18 June 1998, at p. 7).
’ ®^ For instance, a Group 4 officer, who claimed he had been concussed after one of the defendants 
had thrown solvent over him, was shown on one of the videos walking in good healtli and in a diy 
shirt five minutes after the alleged incident (ibid.).
Louise Christian, Rosetta Offondry, Martin Penrose and Philip Turpin (solicitors for the six 
asylum seekers), “Letter; Fair play for the Campsfield Six”, The Guardian, 29 June 1998, at p. 17.
The plans to build more private detention centres were also designed to receive illegal 
immigrants; tins is an indicator o f the assimilation of asylum seekers with other categories o f non­
nationals who find tliemselves in an irregular situation.
See supra n. 117.
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provisions relating to the running of these centres”"’ as well as the custody and 
movement of detainees”*. With respect to the former, the 1999 Act subjects the 
possibility to contract out detention centres to certain conditions”®. In particular, it 
requires the appointment by the Secretary of State of a contract monitor for every 
contracted out centre” . The main duties of the monitor consist in reviewing the 
running of the centre and reporting to the Secretary of State as well as in 
investigating and reporting to the Secretary of State any allegations against a person 
carrying out custodial functions”*. Moreover, the Secretary of State is granted the 
power to take a number of initiatives where the contractor fails to control the centre 
in an efficient manner, or where individuals’ safety is at stake or property at risk”®. 
However, it is argued that the provisions of the 1999 Act concerning detention 
centres do not give due consideration to the rights of detained asylum seekers; 
nothing is said about the rights and safeguards available to detained asylum seekers. 
These provisions essentially deal with detainee custody officers' functions and 
discipline at detention centres”® and thus very much describe a “prison-like” regime. 
It is obvious that these measures were proposed in order to address situations as 
those that arose at Campsfield detention centre. Consequently, the drafters of the 
then Bill essentially reasoned in terms of discipline and effective control, not in 
terms of refugee protection and human rights. The 1999 Act only specifies that
Sections 148 to 153 of the 1999 Act. 
” * Sections 154 to 156 o f the 1999 Act. 
” ® Section 149.
Section 149(4).
” ® Section 149(7)(a) and (b).
129 Section 151(l)(a) and (b).
” ® Sections 154 to 156 and - Schedule 11 on detainee custotty officers and Schedule 12 on 
discipline etc at detention centres (Detainee custody officers),
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detention centre rules are to be adopted by the Secretary of State; these must make 
provision, inter alia, on safety, care and activities” ’. It is accepted that discipline 
issues constitute important matters that must be addressed in the interest of all 
parties; however, this does not mean that the rights and specific needs of detained 
asylum claimants should be neglected^^ .^ Hence, the regime enforced in detention 
centres must be construed in the light of asylum seekers’ rights and needs. While 
discipline and order issues cannot be ignored, this regime must be consistent with 
international refugee law and human rights. This requires the introduction of 
adequate standards with regard to every aspect of the running of detention centres. 
Firstly, it is crucial that custodial officers are adequately qualified. This requires 
them having received special training. It should be made clear that they are not 
dealing with “criminals”, but a particularly vulnerable group. This must be taken 
into consideration in the description and fiilfilment of custodial officers’ duties. 
Where detention centres accommodate female asylum seekers, the use of female 
staff is recommended “(...) in order to respect cultural values and improve the 
physical protection of women,”^^  ^In his report on Campsfield Detention Centre, the 
Chief Inspector of Prisons observed that “Group 4 [the firm responsible for the 
running of the centre] ha[d] been put in an impossible situation. They [did] not 
know what rights and responsibilities they ha[d] in dealing with [these]detainees.’”*^ 
Secondly, complain procedures should be set out allowing detainees to bring up any 
matter of concern and secure that their rights are being respected. With this in mind.
’*’ Section 153(2). However, these rules must also deal with issues regarding the discipline and 
control of detained persons. Such rules have not yet been adopted.
It is important to note that the provisions of the 1999 Act were not designed to specifically 
apply to asylum seekers. This is symptomatic o f a trend that consists in assimilating asylum 
seekers with other categories of non-nationals, thus disregarding the specificity of their situation 
and needs.
’** See supra n. 44, Guideline 8.
See supra n. 117.
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it is crucial that those defending asylum seekers have unrestricted access to the 
premises of detention centres as detainees are more likely to report to them any 
treatment they may consider in breach of their rights. They can therefore act as an 
important medium between detainees and competent authorities. Finally, regular 
inspections, including on the spot inspections, should take place. Inspections should 
be performed by States’ representatives”* since State authorities should be 
ultimately responsible for running detention centres. However, inspections should 
also be carried out by organisations concerned with asylum seekers’ rights, 
including UNHCR”®. The latter should be granted unlimited access to detention 
centres; this means the right to visit any detainee and inspect any part of the centres. 
However, these inspections can only have a positive impact provided that their 
findings are taken on board by those responsible; inspections must be more than a 
simple formality.
In order for detained asylum seekers’ rights to be thoroughly observed, a number of 
facilities must be made available to them within or from the premises of detention 
centres.
2.3.2. Facilities available from and within detention centres
It is crucial that the effectiveness and fairness of asylum procedures is maintained in 
relation to detained asylum seekers. It is argued that detention centres must 
therefore be run in a manner that allows the protection of the rights in question. It is 
also essential to maintain access to adequate health care.
” * The 1999 Act provides for the appointment of visiting committees for each detention centre 
(section 152).
” ® Can also be mentioned refugee councils and Amnesty International.
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(î) The maintenance of asylum seekers’ rights
It is argued that detention shall not interfere with the rights granted to asylum 
seekers with a view to securing the compliance of asylum procedures with the 
requirements of international refugee law^ ^^ . For instance, detained asylum seekers 
must remain entitled to the services of an interpreter and must retain their right to 
legal informed advice. In that respect, the Group Asylum Watch described 
Campsfield Detention Centre as “ an institution permanently on a knife edge, with a 
catalogue of abuses, including denial of access to legal advice and 
representation””*; these observations were consistent with the damming conclusions 
of the Chief Inspector of Prisons’ report on Campsfield Detention Centre”®.
Provision must be made for asylum seekers’ right to communicate with their 
advisers and representatives”®. This requires facilities that spread from detainees’ 
access to a phone whenever necessary, advisers and representatives’ unrestricted 
access to detention centres and detainees’ right to leave their custodial environment 
when required by the proceedings.
Another right that shall not be undermined concerns the possibility to contact a 
UNHCR representative. It is argued that the rights of detained asylum seekers 
would be further secured by allowing them to contact UNHCR representatives or 
other asylum concerned organisations as advocated by UNHCR^^\ It is important
See chapter V  on fair and effective procedures. 
” * supra n. 117.
139 Ibid.
” ® Pursuant to Article 35 quater (III) o f the Ordonnance o f 1945 (see supra n. 54), those detained 
in waiting zones may communicate with their adviser or any other person of tlreir choice.
See supra n. 44, Guideline 5(v).
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that asylum seekers are in a position to play an active part in the protection of their 
rights. Moreover, this right to initiate contact would also be of valuable assistance 
to UNHCR and other organisations as it could attract their attention to the 
problems faced by asylum seekers in certain detention centres.
(ii) Access to adequate health care
A facility central to asylum seekers’ welfare is access to adequate health care” .^ It is 
essential that those detained are not discriminated against in that respect. As 
stressed by UNHCR, “[detained] asylum seekers should have the opportunity to 
receive appropriate medical treatment, and psychological counselling where 
appropriate” '^^ .^ In any case should detention interfere with the provision of 
adequate health care”"*. This means that where such care cannot be provided in 
situ, it should be provided outside detention centres. Moreover, where asylum 
seekers’ health is seriously affected by detention, the latter should cease.
Appropriate health care is not only indispensable to the well-being of detainees 
considered individually, it is also necessary to the welfare of detained asylum 
seekers as a group. In that respect, the report of the Chief Inspector of Prisons on 
Campsfield Detention Centre said that detainees thought to have communicable 
diseases should be “required to submit to treatment and care necessary for the 
health and well-being of the detained population.””*
The right to access to a doctor is, for instance, expressly provided for in French law (see supra 
11. 54, Article 35 bis).
143 See supra n. 44, Guideline 10(v).
” 4 '2'he notion of adequate health care in relation to asylum seekers is examined in more details in 
section 1.2.2(iii) o f this chapter.
” * News in brief, “Medicals for immigrants”. The Guardian, 18 April 1998, at p. 8.
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It is accepted that medical resources in sitn could vary with the size of detention 
centres. For instance, the larger centres could have in-house psychologist(s) 
whereas smaller ones would only have visiting psychologists. It is accepted that 
detention centres cannot offer fiill health care. This stresses the importance attached 
to the need for adequately trained personnel; they must, for instance, be capable of 
identifying situations where asylum seekers must be referred to more competent 
“hands””®.
Furthermore, considering the extreme anguish faced by most asylum seekers, the 
isolation created by this custodial regime must be confined to what is strictly 
necessary. Thus, contacts between detainees as well as visits from fiiends and 
relatives should not be unnecessarily restricted. This is specifically acknowledged in 
UNHCR’s guidelines on asylum seekers’ detention^ "*^ .
The exceptional nature of detention means that detention centres do not constitute a 
normal nor adequate environment for asylum seekers. With this in mind, it is argued 
EC law should regulate the use of detention in relation to asylum seekers in order to 
protect their rights in that respect.
3. Conclusion
Asylum seekers' status pending determination must be understood in the light of 
their right to seek refiigee status. It is argued that this right entails the right to 
adequate support throughout asylum proceedings. In that context, if the EC is to 
protect the right to seek refugee status, the question of support for asylum seekers 
must be addressed. This implies establishing minimum standards consistent with the 
right to seek refugee status in order to halt and prevent national practices
” ® For instance, the personnel in question should be capable of detecting alarming signs in 
detained asylum seekers’ behaviour and take adequate measures in order to minimise the risk of 
suicide attempts.
See supra n. 44, Guideline lO(iv).
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undermining this right. These standards aim at ensuring that asylum claimants enjoy 
decent living conditions even where subject to an exceptional regime such as 
detention.
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Chapter VII
Conclusions
The EC faces a challenge crucial to asylum seekers’ protection within, but also 
beyond its borders. The challenge in question relates to the safeguard of the right to 
seek refugee status within its territory. In recent years, growing hostility towards 
asylum seekers has developed and manifested itself through the development of 
increasingly restrictive asylum policies at both European and national level. It is 
argued that these have resulted in breaches of international refugee law to the 
detriment of asylum seekers’ rights. As noted in the introduction, the primary 
source of international refugee law is the 1951 Convention as interpreted by 
UNHCR. It is argued that Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention gives rise to a right to 
seek refugee status.
In that respect, a number of inconsistencies and deficiencies have been identified 
that need to be addressed by the EC if it is to take up the challenge. The view taken 
is that this task requires a comprehensive approach. As evidenced throughout the 
chapters, the issues at stake, which are inherent in the right to seek refugee status, 
are inter-connected. In that context, a fragmentary approach is not appropriate and 
would inevitably weaken asylum seekers’ rights. A number of recommendations are 
made with a view to securing the right to seek refugee status in line with 
international refiigee law.
Whilst pragmatism commands us to disregard proposals that may be seen as going 
beyond the standards set by international refugee law, significant changes in the 
developing common asylum policy are unavoidable if the right to seek refugee 
status is to be protected within the EC. With this in mind, the proposals made in this 
thesis aim at establishing the minimum standards designed to secure compliance 
with international refugee law.
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Wliile this work focuses on the right to seek refiigee status, it is recognised that 
international protection is not confined to asylum seekers’ rights. Issues regarding 
the fate of unsuccessful applicants and the status of those who have been granted 
refiigee status arise. Moreover, the protection conferred through refiigee status is 
not the sole form of international protection.
1. Summary conclusions
Recent EU and national initiatives in the field of asylum indicate that their main 
objective is to cut down the numbers of asylum claims lodged within the EC or at 
its borders. As a result, instead of being shaped around the idea of protection, the 
relevant measures were devised as deterrent tools directed at those intending to 
apply for refugee status within the EC.
A number of inconsistencies with international refiigee law have been identified. 
With this in mind, it is argued that the “communautarisation” of asylum matters 
operated by the Treaty of Amsterdam constitutes an opportunity to shift the 
emphasis back upon protection. It is argued that these inconsistencies constitute a 
threat to the right to seek refiigee status. They undermine asylum seekers’ rights 
while curtailing Member States’ obligations towards asylum seekers. It is for the 
EC, it is argued, to redress any incompatibility with international standards. Indeed, 
as observed in the introduction, all the Members States are party to the 1951 
Convention and are therefore legally bound by its provisions. For the EC to 
disregard the Convention provisions would be to endorse breaches of international 
law. It is argued that, if the right to seek refiigee status is to be preserved within the 
EC, a number of provisions need to be inserted in EC law.
1.1. Tlie îdentilied sources of concern
Different areas of concern have been identified; they relate to the interpretation of 
the Convention definition of the term refugee, access to asylum procedures within
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the EC, the procedures themselves and, finally, asylum seekers’ status pending the 
determination of their asylum claims.
The definition of the term refugee is to be found in Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 
Convention. A refugee is described as someone who is outside his or her country of 
origin and cannot avail himself or herself to the protection of that State or return 
there owing to a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. This 
definition very much reflects the traditional profile of the refugee as perceived at the 
time the Convention was drafted. However, changes in refugee situations challenge 
this image of the asylum seeker. Restrictive asylum policies have resulted in narrow 
interpretations of the Convention definition which hold on to that traditional profile. 
In that respect, two issues have been identified, i.e. non-State persecution and 
gender-based persecution.
At the time the Convention was adopted, most asylum seekers were fleeing State 
persecution, namely persecution emanating fi*om State authorities. However, in 
recent years, increasing numbers of individuals have been exposed to non-State 
persecution, i.e. persecution inflicted by non-State agents. Some States, such as 
France, used that traditional image of the asylum seeker, which was the result of 
circumstances, to confine the scope of the Convention definition, and thus the 
benefit of refugee status, to cases involving State persecution. An approach very 
similar to that of the French competent bodies was adopted in the Joint Position on 
the definition of the term refiigee% However, the Convention definition does not 
impose any requirements as to the identity of the perpetrator, nor do the travaux 
préparatoires indicate the existence of an implicit requirement. Moreover, the 
exclusion of non-State persecution, besides being inconsistent with the wording of 
Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention, is also incompatible with its object and spirit. If 
the interpretations of the Convention definition do not keep up with the needs of 
today’s asylum seekers, the Convention could well become an anachronism. The EC 
is therefore urged to secure that the Convention definition of the term refugee is
 ^ O JL63/2, 13/03/1996.
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interpreted as including non-State persecution. Provisions to that end could be 
adopted on the basis of Article 63(1 )(c) of the TEC.
Narrow interpretations of the Convention definition also created difficulties for 
asylum seekers having a well-founded fear of persecution owing to their gender as 
the Convention grounds do not include the latter. However, it is argued that the 
Convention definition can nonetheless address gender-based persecution through 
membership of a particular social group. The Canadian case-law on that question 
provides a good example. Membership of a particular social group distinguishes 
itself from the other grounds by its “vagueness” and its ability to cover refugee 
situations that may not have been contemplated by the drafters of the 1951 
Convention. With this in mind, it is argued that EC law should specify that 
membership of a particular social group is to encompass gender-based persecution 
as well as secure that the “catch-all” nature of that Convention ground is retained. 
Another way to address gender-based persecution would be to add an additional 
ground, namely gender, to the original Convention grounds. However, this option 
would be opposed by most Member States. In that context, it is argued that 
entitlement to refugee status by reason of gender-based persecution is best secured 
though membership of a particular social group, at least in the short and medium 
term.
Another area of concern relates to asylum seekers’ access to asylum procedures. 
Eager to reduce the numbers of asylum seekers “knocking at the door” of the EC, 
the Member States have developed means to prevent asylum claimants exercising 
their right to seek refiigee status. Firstly, Member States made access to the EC 
territoiy more difficult for asylum seekers by requiring them to satisfy the same 
documentation requirements as any other categories of third-country nationals. By 
restricting asylum seekers’ access to the EC, the Member States have also restricted 
asylum seekers’ right to seek refugee status. In imposing these document 
requirements, the Member States have disregarded the specificity of asylum 
seekers’ circumstances and voluntarily overlooked the fact that those in need of 
international protection are the less likely to meet such requirements. The
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detrimental effects of document requirements are worsen by the introduction of 
carrier sanctions. It is imperative that EC provisions on travel document 
requirements for third-country nationals acknowledges the fact that these are 
inappropriate in so far as asylum claimants are concerned. Another factor that 
contributed to restrict asylum seekers’ access to asylum procedures was found in 
practices referred to as transfers of responsibility. The Member States developed 
practices consisting in transferring responsibility for examining asylum claims to 
other States, preferably third countries. Two types of transfers have been identified 
in that respect. Firstly, internal transfers of responsibility which are organised by the 
Dublin Convention^ and according to which asylum claims shall be examined by a 
single Member State. However, the Dublin Convention will only apply where 
responsibility cannot be transferred to a third country pursuant to the safe third 
country principle enshrined in the Resolution on host third countries^. It is argued 
that such transfers can only be consistent with the right to seek refugee status 
provided that examination by the State held accountable is secured.
A further source of concern lies with the existence of fair and effective asylum 
procedures, i.e. procedures which allow asylum seekers to properly exercise their 
right to seek refugee status. It is argued that compliance with international refugee 
law must be secured at every stage of the proceedings, i.e. fi'om the submission of 
the asylum claim to its final outcome. In establishing the standards to be met by 
asylum procedures, one has to take into consideration asylum seekers’ specific 
needs and circumstances.
 ^OJ C 254/1 1997.
* Resolution on a harmonised approach to questions concerning host third countries adopted by the 
Ministers of the Member States o f the European Communities at their meetings in London on 30 
November to I December 1992, referred to in European Parliament, Asylum in the European 
Union: “the safe country of origin principle”. People’s Europe Series, November 1996, Amtex II, 
at p. 33-37 (not published in the Official Journal).
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Finally, for asylum seekers to be able to fully exercise their right to seek refugee 
status, they must enjoy decent living conditions. Restrictive asylum policies have 
resulted in the adoption of deterrent measures designed, inter alia, to make asylum 
seekers’ life uncomfortable pending the determination of their asylum claim. Once 
again, asylum seekers’ specific needs and circumstances should be taken into 
account. Most asylum seekers arrive in the contemplated State of refuge in a state 
of destitution and considerable distress. They are therefore dependent upon that 
State to fulfil their essential living needs while awaiting a decision on their case. The 
provision of decent living conditions pending determination is seen as an obligation 
inherent in the existence of a right to seek refugee status that the EC and its 
Member State must enforce.
1.2. A comprehensive and pragmatic approach
It is argued that, if the EC is to safeguard the right to seek refugee status within its 
territory, it is vital that all the identified sources of concern are addressed. In other 
words, there is an imperative need for a comprehensive approach. Indeed, all these 
areas are inherent in the right to seek refugee status and cannot be dissociated. They 
must be seen as the core elements of the right to seek refugee status. A fragmentary 
approach would not allow full compliance with international refugee law and thus 
the preservation of the right in question. Indeed, the right to seek refugee status 
supposes that asylum seekers have access to asylum procedures. However, access 
would be meaningless if the procedures in question would not guarantee that their 
asylum claims are properly examined. Likewise the existence of fair and effective 
procedures would be undermined if the term refugee was interpreted in a manner 
conducive to the exclusion of people who would otherwise be entitled to refugee 
status. The positive impact of such procedures would also be compromised if access 
was unduly restricted. Finally, access to adequate asylum procedures combined with 
an appropriate interpretation of the term refugee cannot secure the implementation 
of the right to seek refiigee status if they are accompanied by deterrent measures 
rendering asylum seekers’ living conditions pending determination even more 
difficult. The interrelated nature of all these issues explain why the research does
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not concentrate on a single aspect and recommends an EC comprehensive 
approach. In that respect, it is argued that the EC offers a more suitable framework 
than intergovernmental cooperation as it has the ability to impose binding standards 
in line with international standards upon the Member States regarding the right to 
seek refugee status. With the “communautarisation” of asylum matters which 
resulted in the introduction in the TEC of a Title IV on visas, asylum, immigration 
and other policies related to free movement of persons, the EC has now the power 
to take up the challenge.
However, the preservation of the right to seek refugee status within the EC also 
commands, it is argued, the adoption of a pragmatic approach. In the context of this 
research, pragmatism refers to the need to give some consideration to the Member 
States’ points of view. Indeed, the Member States are involved in the EC decision­
making process through the Council. Thus, totally ignoring the Member States’ 
positions could have an adverse effect on asylum seekers’ rights. In that context, a 
number of compromises may have to be made, the bottom line being consistency 
with international refugee law. This pragmatic approach has had a number of 
implications on the proposals made in the course of this work. Firstly, it explains 
why the addition of a gender category to the definition of refugee for the purpose of 
EC law has not been recommended, at least in the short and medium term. Indeed, 
most Member States would be likely to perceive such an amendment as entailing a 
risk of high rises in the numbers of asylum claims. It is argued that the definition of 
the term refugee may remain unamended provided that protection from gender- 
based persecution is secured in EC law though an appropriate interpretation of 
membership of a particular social group; this is where the compromise lies. 
Likewise, transfers of responsibility, both internal and external, may be maintained 
provided that examination of the asylum claim by the State held responsible is 
guaranteed. Furthermore, pragmatism explains that proposals that may appear to go 
beyond the requirements of international law are not made. This explains why 
poverty, although it can be seen as amounting to persecution in the sense of the 
1951 Convention under certain circumstances, is not presented as a potential 
ground for a well-founded fear of persecution entitling individuals to refugee status.
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Indeed, considering the Member States’ zeal to maintain a strict distinction between 
asylum seekers and economic migrants, it is unlikely that such a proposal would be 
“popular” amongst the Member States.
Despite the adoption of a pragmatic approach and thus the existence of room for 
compromises, it is acknowledged that many of the proposals made may still face the 
opposition of some Member States. However, it is argued that this cannot be 
avoided and should not be avoided at the expense of asylum seekers’ rights. A 
change of direction in the asylum policy is indispensable if the right to seek refugee 
status is to be protected within the EC If the EC were to act otherwise, it could be 
accused of endorsing and facilitating breaches of international law as the 1951 
Convention is binding upon all the Member States. Moreover, it is important to 
stress that the standards that EC law must satisfy with regard to the right to seek 
refugee status are construed as the minimum standards necessary to secure 
compliance with international standards. In that context, the Member States are 
allowed and encouraged to go beyond these standards if they wish to further 
improve asylum seekers’ rights.
1.3. Recommendations for law reform
The need to protect the right to seek refugee status within the EC in line with 
international refugee law prompts a number of recommendations for law reform. As 
stressed in chapter II, Directives are the recommended type of legal instrument. 
With this in mind, the adoption of five Directives on the right to seek refugee status 
is strongly recommended. It is imperative that these Directives are construed as part 
of a single jigsaw as a global and consistent approach is crucial to the preservation 
of the right to seek refugee status within the EC. Any omission would jeopardise 
the chances of a successfijl law reform.
The proposed Directives are:
- a Directive on an up to date interpretation of the term “refugee”;
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- a Directive on asylum seekers’ access to the EC tenitory;
- a Directive on transfers of responsibility for determining applications for asylum;
- a Directive on fair and effective asylum procedures; and
- a Directive on asylum seekers’ status pending determination.
1.3.1. A Directive on an up to date interpretation of the term “refugee”
Considering the need to interpret and implement the definition of the term “refugee” 
enshrined in Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention in line with its spirit and object, 
the adoption of a Directive on an up to date interpretation of the term “refugee” is 
proposed.
This Directive aims at ensuring:
- the recognition of non-State persecution;
- the recognition of gender-based persecution through membership of particular 
social group;
- the correct interpretation of membership of a particular social group; and
- the abolition of current restrictions on Member States’ nationals’ right to seek 
refugee status within the EC.
A Directive on an up to date interpretation of the term “refugee” may be adopted 
on the basis of Article 63(1 )(c) of the TEC on minimum standards with respect to 
the qualification of national of third countries as refugees.
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(i) The recognition of non-State persecution
The Member States must take all the measures necessary to ensure that Article 
1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention which defines the term “refligee” is interpreted as 
including non-State persecution. This provision finds its justification in the fact that 
Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention does not impose requirements as to the 
identity of the perpetrator and thus does not confine its scope to State persecution.
It follows that asylum seekers who have a well-founded fear of persecution based 
on one or more Convention grounds, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of 
the protection of their country of nationality or residence, if they are stateless, and 
are outside that country, are eligible for refiigee status in a Member State, 
irrespective of the identity of the perpetrator.
With this in mind, it is necessary that the Member States review the position 
expressed in the Joint Position of 4 March 1996 on the harmonized application of 
the term “refiigee” in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951. Indeed, 
Section 5(2) of the Joint Position reads, inter alia, that “[pjersecution by third 
parties will be considered to fall within the scope of the Geneva Convention where 
it is based on one of the grounds in Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention, (...) [and] is 
encouraged or permitted by the authorities ( .. ).”'^
It follows from the correct interpretation of the Convention definition of the term 
“refugee” that State involvement does not have to be established in cases of non- 
State persecution.
supra n. 1.
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(ii) The recognition of gender-based persecution through membership of a 
particular social group
The Member States must take all the measures necessary to ensure that refugee 
status is available to asylum seekers who have a well-founded fear of persecution 
owing to their gender, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection 
of their country of nationality or residence and are outside that country.
With this in mind, the Member States must take all the measures necessary to 
ensure that the Convention ground “membership of a particular social group” is 
interpreted as covering gender-based persecution. To that end, it is vital that that 
Convention ground remains a self-standing ground as recommended in section 
1.3.1(iii).
Whilst the introduction of a gender category in the definition of the term refugee for 
the purpose of EC law is not envisaged at this stage, this option may be considered 
in the future.
(iii) The correct interpretation of membership of a particular social group
The Member States must take all the measures necessary to ensure that the 
Convention ground “membership of a particular social group” retains its self­
standing nature in line with the spirit and object of the 1951 Convention and thus 
international refugee law.
This means that the Member States shall not interpret the words “membership of a 
particular social group” by reference to other Convention grounds, namely race, 
religion, nationality and political opinion.
Moreover, the Member State shall interpret the words “membership of a particular 
social group” with a view to ensuring that the Convention definition of the term
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“refugee” remains up to date and thus addresses the needs of today’s asylum 
seekers.
A definition of what amounts to a particular social group for the purpose of refugee 
status has not been given as it may limit the scope of that Convention ground as 
future needs for refugee status may not always be foreseeable.
(iv) The abolition of current restrictions on Member State nationals’ right to 
seek refugee status within the EC
The Protocol on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European Union 
annexed to the TEC which restricts Member State nationals’ right to seek refugee 
status within the EU shall be repealed.
In the light of the proposed repeal of the Protocol on asylum for nationals of 
Member States of the European Union, an amendment of Article 63(1 )(c) of the 
TEC with a view to including Member States’ nationals is recommended.
1.3.2, A Directive on asylum seekers’ access to the EC territory
Considering the need to comply with international refugee law, and in particular 
Article 31 of the 1951 Convention, and the need to facilitate and improve the 
implementation of the Dublin Convention, a Directive on asylum seekers’ access to 
the EC territory is proposed.
This Directive aims at securing that the EC territory is accessible to those who 
intend to seek refugee status there. This is without prejudice of the Member States’ 
right to carry out subsequent transfers of responsibility in line with the provisions 
of the proposed Directive on transfers of responsibility.
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The proposed Directive provides for the abolition of both sanctions imposed on 
asylum-seekers for non-compliance with documentation requirements and carrier 
sanctions.
This Directive may be adopted on the basis of Article 62(2) of the TEC on 
measures on the crossing of the external borders of the Member States.
(i) The abolition of sanctions imposed on asylum seekers for non-compliance 
with documentation requirements
EC provisions on control at external borders and on documentation requirements 
for third country nationals who intend to cross these borders must make allowance 
for asylum seekers’ specific circumstances. The words “specific circumstances” in 
this context refer to the asylum seekers’ fi-equent inability to obtain the required 
documentation.
It follows that the EC measures on the crossing of external borders, to be adopted 
on the basis of Article 62(2) of the TEC, must take into consideration asylum 
seekers’ specific circumstances. As to the existing measures, they must be 
interpreted, amended or repealed to that end.
The Member States must abstain fi'om imposing sanctions on asylum seekers who 
have failed to satisfy documentation requirements.
It must be made clear to asylum seekers that failure to comply with documentation 
requirements will not be held against them.
(ii) The abolition of carrier sanctions
Sanctions imposed on carriers for transporting undocumented or inadequately 
documented passengers shall be removed as they may endanger the right to seek 
refugee status.
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However, this provision does not cover offences committed by those who smuggle 
third country nationals, including asylum seekers, into the EC
1.3.3, A Directive on transfers of responsibility
In order to secure that the transfers of responsibility, both internal and external, 
carried out by Member States are consistent with international refiigee law, and thus 
with the right to seek refugee status, the adoption of a Directive on transfers of 
responsibility is recommended.
The legal basis for this Directive is twofold. Firstly, the provisions on internal 
transfers of responsibility, which only involve Member States, may be adopted on 
the basis of Article 63(l)(a) of the TEC on criteria and mechanisms for determining 
which Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum 
submitted by a national of a third country in one of the Member States. Secondly, 
the provisions on external transfers, in the absence of a specific Treaty provision on 
external transfers of responsibility or an amendment of Article 63(l)(a) which 
currently only deals with internal transfers, may be adopted on the basis of Article 
63(1 )(d) of the TEC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting or withdrawing refugee status.
For the purpose of this Directive, the expression “internal transfers of 
responsibility” refers to mechanisms established by the Dublin Convention whereby 
a Member State transfers responsibility for determining an application for asylum to 
another Member State on the ground that the latter is responsible.
For the purpose of this directive, the expression “external transfers of 
responsibility” refers to cases where a Member State declines responsibility for 
determining an application for asylum on the ground that a third country is 
responsible following the application of the third country principle or the 
implementation of a readmission agreement.
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In order to secure compliance with international refugee law, the Member States 
shall take all the measures necessary to ensure that internal and external transfers of 
responsibility satisfy a safety test.
For the purpose of this Directive, safety is contingent upon a number of criteria and 
safeguards.
(i) Safety criteria
Internal and external transfers of responsibility must satisfy three safety criteria, 
namely compliance with the 1951 Convention and other relevant instruments, 
protection against refoulement and the existence of and access to adequate asylum 
procedures.
# Compliance with the 1951 Convention and other relevant instruments
The Member State which intends to carry out a transfer of responsibility is under 
the obligation to verify whether the State of destination, i.e. the State where the 
asylum seeker may be removed, complies with the provisions of the 1951 
Convention and other relevant instruments. This requires the Member State 
concerned to assess the human rights record of the country of destination.
* Protection against refoulement
The Member State which intends to carry out a transfer of responsibility must 
ensure its compliance with the principle of non-refoulement.
Compliance with the principle of non-refoulement must be secured at two levels. 
Firstly, the Member State concerned must verify whether the asylum seeker’s 
removal to the country of destination is consistent with the principle of non­
refoulement, Secondly, the Member State must also verify whether the laws and
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practices of the country of destination are compatible with the principle of non­
refoulement. This is designed to prevent the asylum seeker being further removed in 
breach of the principle of non-refoulement.
• Access to fair and effective asylum procedures
The Member State which intends to carry out a transfer of responsibility is under 
the obligation to verify whether the asylum seeker will have access to fair and 
effective asylum procedures in the country of destination.
The terms “fair and effective procedures” must be understood in the light of the 
provisions of the proposed Directive on fair and effective procedures.
(ii) Legal safeguards
The Member State which intends to carry out a transfer of responsibility must 
ensure the availability of the following safeguards.
• Individual assessment
The Member State concerned must assess the safety of the contemplated country of 
destination on an individual basis in the light of the asylum seeker’s circumstances.
Safety must present a certain degree of stability for the asylum seeker concerned 
and must be based upon up to date information. In that respect, information 
gathered by international organisations, such as UNHCR, would be of great 
assistance.
It follows that lists of safe countries, that may exist in certain Member States, must 
be abolished. These lists tend to give a rigid view of the situation in the listed 
countries which is inconsistent with the need for an individual assessment based 
upon up to date information.
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• The necessary consent of the authorities of the countiy of destination
The authorities of the Member State which intends to carry out a transfer of 
responsibility must contact those of the contemplated country of destination with a 
view to securing their consent.
• The need for a priori checks
The Member State which intends to operate a transfer of responsibility is under the 
obligation to carry out all the necessary checks prior to the asylum seeker’s eventual 
removal to the countiy of destination.
• The right to challenge the decision regarding the transfer of responsibility
Asylum seekers who may be subject to a transfer of responsibility must be entitled 
to challenge the decision in question. This right must be with suspensive effect and 
exercisable from within.
1.3.4, A Directive on fair and effective asylum procedures
Considering the need to protect the right to seek refugee status, and in particular 
the need to counterbalance the loss of asylum seekers’ right to lodge multiple 
applications for asylum within the EC following the entry into force of the Dublin 
Convention and the existence of fast-track procedures designed to proceed 
applications for asylum deemed manifestly unfounded, the adoption of a Directive 
on fair and effective asylum procedures is recommended.
This Directive aims at ensuring that the concept of manifestly unfounded application 
for asylum is interpreted in a manner consistent with international refiigee law and 
that substantive asylum procedures in the Member States comply with the 
requirements of international refugee law.
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The procedural standards set in this Directive apply to both substantive and fast- 
track procedures.
(i) The concept of manifestly unfounded application for asylum
For the right to seek refugee status to be fiilly protected, it is vital that the concept 
of manifestly unfounded application for asylum is interpreted in a manner consistent 
with international refugee law. It follows that the Member States are under the 
obligation to interpret and apply the concept of manifestly unfounded application 
for asylum in a manner consistent with the provisions of the proposed Directives.
To assist the Member States in this task, the concept of manifestly unfounded 
application for asylum, as defined in the Resolution on manifestly unfounded 
applications for asylum, must be further specified.
The words “reasonable explanation” contained in Paragraphs 9(a) and (c) of the 
Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum, which apply to asylum 
seekers who did not satisfy documentation requirements, must be interpreted in the 
light of the provisions of the proposed Directive on asylum seekers’ access to the 
EC territory; in particular, it must be made clear to asylum seekers that failure to 
comply with documentation requirements will not be held against them.
Paragraph 9(d) of the Resolution on manifestly unfounded applications for asylum 
according to which an application for asylum will be considered manifestly 
unfounded where the asylum seeker “deliberately fails to reveal that he [or she] has 
previously lodged an application in one or more countries, particularly when false 
identities [have been] used” must be interpreted in the light of the provisions of the 
proposed Directive on fair and effective asylum procedures. This means that, for an 
application to be considered manifestly unfounded under Paragraph 9(d), the asylum 
procedures of the country(ies) concerned must satisfy the standards regarding fair 
and effective procedures.
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Paragraph 9(g), according to which an application for asylum is considered 
manifestly unfounded where the asylum seeker had his or her application for asylum 
rejected by a country which provided procedural guarantees in line with the 1951 
Convention, must be read in the light of the standards set in this Directive regarding 
fair and effective asylum procedures.
(ii) The submission of the application for asylum
The Member States must take all the measures necessary to ensure:
- the right to have one’s application for asylum lodged with a competent officer as 
quickly as possible;
- the provision of guidance as to the procedure to be followed; and
- the availability of the necessary facilities.
• The right to have one’s application for asylum lodged with a competent 
officer as quickly as possible
To qualify as competent. Member States’ officers must receive adequate training 
with a view to acquiring a comprehensive knowledge of substantive and procedural 
asylum law.
The words “as quickly as possible” must be interpreted in the light of the right to 
seek refugee status. Hence, celerity must not be seen as a goal per se to the 
detriment of the right to seek refugee status.
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• Guidance as to the procedure to be followed
Guidance as to the procedure to be followed must be provided to asylum seekers. 
This supposes the provision of comprehensive information. The latter must cover 
asylum seekers’ rights and obligations throughout the proceedings, including appeal 
proceedings. The information conveyed to asylum seekers must also concern their 
status pending the determination of their application for asylum. Guidance must be 
provided in a language that they understand.
• The necessary facilities
These necessary facilities include the right to an independent competent interpreter 
and a representative as well as the right to contact a UNHCR representative.
The right to an independent competent interpreter
Where an asylum seeker believes that he or she has not sufficient command of the 
official language of the Member State responsible for determining his or her 
application for asylum, he or she is entitled to the services of an independent 
competent interpreter.
To qualify as independent, the interpreter must be independent from the authorities 
dealing with the application for asylum, the Government at large as well as from the 
asylum seeker himself or herself.
To qualify as competent, besides having the required language skills, the interpreter 
must have some knowledge of substantive and procedural asylum law as well as be 
aware of asylum seekers’ specific circumstances.
The interpreter’s role main role during screening interviews is to ensure that official 
interpreters translate properly. They may also act as witnesses during these 
interviews.
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Considering the state of destitution of most asylum seekers, interpreters must be 
paid for out of public fund.
The right to a representative
Asylum seekers are entitled to the presence of a representative at screening 
interviews.
The representative must take a comprehensive record of everything that is said and 
done during the interview.
The representative must also intervene where necessary with a view to securing the 
fairness of the screening interview.
Representatives must be aware of procedural issues in order to be able to detect any 
irregularities during the interview. Moreover, experience in dealing with asylum 
seekers is highly desirable as it allows greater awareness of asylum seekers’ needs 
during interviews.
Considering the state of destitution of most asylum seekers, representatives must be 
paid for out of public fund.
The opportunity to contact a UNHCR representative
Asylum seekers must be given the opportunity to contact a UNHCR representative.
With a view to securing greater cooperation with UNHCR, its representatives shall 
be entitled to attend screening interviews.
(iii) First instance determination
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The Member States must take all the measures necessary to ensure;
- the determination of applications for asylum by competent first instance decision­
makers;
- the availability of the necessary facilities;
- a satisfactory decision-making process; and
- compliance with a number of additional requirements.
•  The determination of applications for asylum by competent first instance 
decision-makers
To qualify as competent, first instance decision-makers must be fully qualified, 
independent and clearly identified.
To be considered fully qualified, first instance decision-makers must have a 
comprehensive knowledge of substantive and procedural asylum law complemented 
by expertise in human rights law. Training must be provided to that end.
To be considered independent, they must be independent fi'om the Government.
• The necessary facilities
Asylum seekers shall have access to a lawyer. They are also entitled to the services 
of an independent competent interpreter and must be given the opportunity to 
contact a UNHCR representative.
Asylum seekers are entitled to have access to a lawyer as they have a right to 
informed legal advice.
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Whilst advice may, in certain circumstances, emanate from non-lawyers, purely 
legal issues should be dealt with or, at least, checked by members of the legal 
profession.
Advice, whatever its source, must be informed. This means that those who give 
advice to asylum seekers must have expertise in asylum law.
It is incumbent upon the Member States to secure the quality of the advice provided 
to asylum seekers.
To that end, the Member States are responsible for establishing mechanisms that are 
designed to control the competence and integrity of providers of advice to asylum 
seekers. Particular attention must be paid to the establishment of adequate controls 
within the legal profession.
Considering the state of destitution of most asylum seekers, the provision of 
informed legal advice must be paid for out of public funds.
Asylum seekers are entitled to the services of an independent competent interpreter 
throughout first instance proceedings. This is designed to secure that any language 
barriers are overcome.
The terms “independent” and “competent” are defined in section 1.3.4(ii).
Asylum seekers must be given the opportunity to contact a UNHCR representative.
This involvement of UNHCR is seen as a means to secure greater cooperation with 
that organisation.
399
• A satisfactory decision-making process
In order to contribute to the adoption of first instance decisions consistent with 
international refugee law, a number of steps shall be taken.
An information centre common to the Member States shall be created. This centre 
is designed to centralise data on asylum seekers’ countries of origin and facilitate 
the availability of up to date information to first instance decision-makers. In that 
respect, information provided by organisations involved with asylum seekers, such 
as UNHCR, would be of great assistance. The existence of such a centre will also 
facilitate exchanges of information between Member States.
First instance decision-makers must construe the words “well-founded fear of 
persecution” in the light of the provisions of the proposed Directive on an up to 
date interpretation of the term “refiigee”.
Evidence of persecution shall not be considered a prerequisite to eligibility to 
refiigee status. However, the risk of persecution must present a personal character 
in the sense that the asylum seeker must be an identifiable target in his or her 
country of origin.
Whilst the burden of proof lies with the asylum seeker, the standard of proof must 
take on board the practical difficulties that asylum seekers face in providing 
evidence. It follows that the standard of proof shall be that of “reasonable degree 
of likelihood”.
• Additional requirements
With a view to securing compliance with international refugee law, asylum seekers 
are entitled to a decision in writing. Moreover, first instance proceedings must have 
suspensive effect.
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Asylum seekers’ right to a decision in writing is absolute; derogations are therefore 
prohibited.
This right exists irrespective of the outcome of the application for asylum.
The reasons for the decision must be clearly and precisely stated.
Suspensive effect shall be construed as an absolute principle. It follows that 
derogations are not allowed.
(iv) Challenge of first instance decisions
Asylum seekers shall be granted a right of appeal. In order to secure that this right 
of appeal is consistent with the requirements of international refugee law, the 
Member States shall take all the measures necessary to ensure:
- the existence of competent appellate bodies;
- the existence of a non-truncated right of appeal; and
- the provision of the necessary facilities.
• Competent appellate bodies
To qualify as competent, appellate bodies must be specialised independent courts. 
They must have jurisdiction to reconsider first instance decisions. Their personnel 
must be adequately qualified. Finally, they must be in a position to provide a 
consistent case-law.
To be considered independent, appellate bodies must be independent fi'om first 
instance decision-makers and from the Government.
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Appellate bodies must be courts of law which must be specialised in asylum matters.
Appellate must have jurisdiction to reconsider first instance decisions. Hence, they 
must have jurisdiction to reconsider facts as well as points of law.
To be considered adequately qualified, members of appellate bodies must be legally 
qualified and must have expert knowledge of asylum and human rights law. This 
expertise must be supplemented by regular training designed to ensure up to date 
knowledge.
Appellate bodies must be in a position to develop a consistent case-law. This 
requires the existence of adequate appeal structures. Whilst a particular model is not 
imposed on the Member States for the time being, the adequacy of the chosen 
structures will be assessed in the light of their ability to provide a consistent case- 
law in line with international refugee law.
Moreover, in order to facilitate their task, appellate bodies shall be assisted by 
information services. The latter are designed to further secure access to up to date 
information on asylum seekers’ countries of origin. Moreover, appellate bodies may 
also have access to the data centralised at the proposed information centre.
• A non-truncated right of appeal
Asylum seekers must be granted an in-country right of appeal. This is construed as 
an absolute right; derogations shall not be tolerated.
This right of appeal must have suspensive effect. This is construed as an absolute 
principle; derogations are not permitted.
The submission and examination of appeals must take place within reasonable time­
limits. These time-limits must be the result of a balance between the need to shorten
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asylum procedures and the need to secure the effectiveness of the right of appeal in 
line with international refugee law.
It follows that time-limits for the submission of an appeal must allow the asylum 
seeker to fully prepare his or her case while avoiding unnecessary delays.
Time-limits for the examination of an appeal must allow for an adequate review of 
the first instance decision while avoiding unnecessary delays.
The adoption of rigid time-limits is not recommended as a certain degree of 
flexibility may be necessary. With this in mind, maximum time-limits shall be 
established in EC law. Whilst these time-limits must be realistic, they must allow for 
the exercise of the right of appeal in line with international refugee law.
A certain degree of differentiation between substantive and fast-track asylum 
procedures may be acceptable with regard to time-limits within the boundaries of 
compliance with international refiigee law.
• The necessary facilities
Asylum seekers are entitled to the services of an independent competent interpreter. 
This is designed to secure that any language barriers are overcome.
The tenus “independent” and “competent” are defined in section 1.3.4(ii).
Asylum seekers must be granted the opportunity to contact a UNHCR 
representative.
This involvement of UNHCR is construed as a means to further secure cooperation 
with UNHCR.
Asylum seekers are entitled to legal representation.
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Asylum seekers must be represented by qualified lawyers with expert knowledge in 
asylum law.
In that respect, the Member States must comply with the provisions on asylum 
seekers’ access to a lawyer in relation to qualifications, control and funding laid 
down in section 1.3.4(iii),
The proposed Directive imposes a number of obligations on the Member States. 
However, it is recognised that the extent of these obligations vary with the numbers 
of applications for asylum a Member State will consider. Hence, where a Member 
State faces difficulties in fulfilling its obligations owing to high numbers of 
applications for asylum, the principle of solidarity shall apply. This means that 
assistance shall be provided to that State by the EC and the other Member States in 
order to help that State comply with its obligations. Whilst the main form of 
assistance shall be financial, other forms of assistance may be contemplated 
depending upon the nature of the difficulties faced by the Member State concerned.
1.3.5. A Directive on asylum seekers’ status pending determination
Considering the state of destitution of most asylum seekers, the need to preserve 
the right to seek refugee status in line with international refijgee law requires the 
Member States to secure asylum seekers with decent living conditions. A Directive 
on asylum seekers’ status pending determination is proposed to that end.
This Directive aims at securing that asylum seekers receive adequate support and 
that detention remains an exceptional measure.
This Directive may be adopted on the basis of Article 63(l)(b) on minimum 
standards on the reception of asylum seekers in Member States.
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(i) Support for asylum seekers
Asylum seekers are entitled to adequate support pending determination. Hence, the 
Member States shall take all the measures necessary to ensure the implementation 
of that right.
• The responsibility for providing adequate support to asylum seekers
The responsibility for providing adequate support to asylum seekers lies, in 
principle, with the Member State responsible for examining the application for 
asylum.
However, where a Member State intends to carry out a transfer of responsibility, it 
shall remain responsible for providing support until the asylum seeker concerned is 
removed.
The terms “adequate support” are defined as referring to the satisfaction of asylum 
seekers’ basic needs understood as comprising accommodation, food, clothing, 
health care and education.
# Methods for the provision of adequate support
Two main ways of providing support have been identified; providing asylum seekers 
with the means to support themselves or resorting to direct State support.
Providing asylum seekers with the means to support themselves supposes that they 
have a source of income that allows them to satisfy their needs. Considering the 
state of destitution of most asylum seekers, work would be the only source of 
income available to them in that context.
However, considering the restrictions imposed on asylum seekers’ right to work in 
most Member States and the difficulties arising from their status of asylum seeker in
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that respect, providing asylum seekers with the means to support themselves cannot 
be considered the principal way to provide adequate support.
It follows that adequate support for asylum seekers must be provided directly by the 
State unless it is established that the asylum seeker has the means to support himself 
or herself. In that respect, the asylum seeker’s access to the labour market of the 
Member State responsible for determining his or her application for asylum shall not 
be unnecessarily restricted, particularly in the case of a lengthy stay.
Direct State support may be supplied by entitlements to benefits or be provided in 
kind.
In deciding on the form that direct State shall take, the Member States shall take the 
following elements into consideration:
- the nature of the need being addressed;
- the impact of the contemplated form of direct State support on asylum seekers; 
and
- cost-effectiveness, 
f Accommodation
The Member States shall be responsible for providing asylum seekers with adequate 
accommodation pending determination.
It follows that, although the Member States may rely upon local authorities, the 
private sector and charitable organisations for finding accommodation, the Member 
States remain ultimately responsible for securing asylum seekers with adequate 
accommodation.
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To be considered adequate, accommodation must offer decent living conditions and 
a reassuring environment while avoiding to affect the course of the proceedings and 
the provision of support. This means that the location of the accommodation shall 
not interfere with asylum seekers’ rights and well-being.
Asylum seekers’ accommodation must present a certain degree of stability and 
successive changes of accommodation must therefore be avoided.
• Other essential needs
The Member States shall ensure that asylum seekers are able to satisfy everyday life 
needs such as food and clothing.
The needs in question shall be satisfied through wholly or predominantly cash 
systems. It follows that vouchers shall not be given in lieu of benefits. This aims at 
protecting asylum seekers’ dignity and facilitating their everyday life.
• Access to adequate health care
The Member States shall be responsible for providing asylum seekers with adequate 
health care.
Asylum seekers shall be promptly made aware of their rights in terms of health care.
It shall be made clear to asylum seekers that health authorities are distinct from 
those dealing with their applications for asylum and that the latter cannot request 
information on their health or access their medical record.
However, medical confidentiality shall not apply to medical records used as 
evidence of torture or physical ill-treatment in support of applications for asylum.
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The services of an interpreter may be necessary. However, in such cases, 
interpreters shall be bound by a confidentiality clause.
Considering the state of destitution of most asylum seekers, the Member States 
shall support the cost of health care.
Asylum seekers’ specific needs in terms of health care shall be satisfied.
• Education
Member States shall be responsible for providing asylum seekers with language 
tuitions as early as possible. This is designed to help asylum seekers manage 
everyday life and facilitate the integration of successful applicants.
Language tuitions shall not be provided where:
- the asylum seeker is fluent in the language of the Member State responsible for 
determining his or her application for asylum;
- the asylum seeker will be removed to a another State pursuant to a transfer of 
responsibility. However, this exception only applies where the transfer take place 
within prompt delays.
Where asylum seeker’s stay exceeds three to six months in the Member State 
concerned, access to education shall go beyond the provision of language tuitions. 
It follows that the asylum seeker shall have access to the Member State’ education 
system.
Children’s needs in terms of education shall be specifically addressed.
Children whose parents are asylum seekers or who are asylum seekers themselves 
shall be enrolled in school on the same basis as children who are resident of the
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Member State concerned. Where necessary, these children shall attend special 
classes designed to address their specific needs.
It is critical that the location of their accommodation does not hinder children’s 
right to education in the Member State concerned.
(ii) Asylum seekers’ detention: an exceptional measure
Detention shall be construed as an exceptional measure. Hence, there shall be a 
presumption that asylum seekers shall not be detained.
Moreover, before considering detention, the Member States must consider whether 
there is an alternative.
Detention must be contingent upon certain criteria and conditions. Adequate 
safeguards and facilities must also be provided.
• Alternatives to detention
In most cases, detention is used as a means to retain some control over asylum 
seekers’ whereabouts. Hence, before considering detention, the Member States 
shall consider whether such control may be achieved by other means. This is 
construed as a prerequisite to any decision to detain an asylum seeker.
Alternatives to detention may include:
- reporting requirements;
- the provision of a guarantor;
- release on bail; or
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” the creation o f open centres.
The Member States shall ensure that alternatives to detention are made available to 
asylum seekers. This means that alternatives to detention must exist in the Member 
States and be considered as well as used in practice.
The range of alternatives to detention available in a Member State shall be 
sufficiently wide to address the specificity of asylum seekers’ circumstances. This is 
designed to secure the availability of alternatives to detention in practice.
• The criteria for justified detention
Detention shall only occur where there are strong and objective reasons for 
believing that an asylum seeker will abscond or fail to comply with a decision 
relating to his or her removal from the territoiy of the Member State where he or 
she is detained.
In the latter case, detention can only be contemplated where the asylum seeker’s 
removal is imminent.
Where detention is considered justified, the asylum seeker must be provided with 
written reasons.
Minors as well as adults accompanying them shall not be detained.
The detention of unaccompanied elderly persons, torture or trauma victims and 
persons with mental or physical disability shall, in principle, be avoided. Where it is 
considered justified, detention shall be contingent upon certification by a qualified 
medical practitioner that detention will not adversely affect their health and well­
being.
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The same rules apply to nursing mothers and female asylum seekers in their final 
months of pregnancy.
Detained female asylum seekers shall be accommodated separately fi"om male 
asylum seekers.
• The conditions for detention
A decision to detain an asylum seeker shall rest upon an adequate legal basis. This 
basis is to be found in the provisions of this proposed Directive.
Asylum seekers shall not initially be detained for a period exceeding forty-eight 
hours.
The total duration of detention shall be kept within reasonable time-limits.
♦ Regular judicial supervision
In order to ensure that detention remains justified, any extension of the detention 
time beyond forty-eight hours is subject to judicial control.
Judicial control must take place on a regular basis with a view to securing the 
legitimacy of asylum seekers’ detention.
For judicial control to be effective, courts must have the means to assess whether 
detention is justified and the power to order asylum seekers’ release where 
detention is no longer justified.
# The right to challenge decisions on detention
Asylum seekers shall be entitled to challenge the decision to detain them or prolong 
their detention before a court of law.
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(iü) Access to the necessary facilities
Appropriate conditions of detention shall be secured. With this in mind, asylum 
seekers shall only be detained in specialised detention centres. They shall not be 
detained in prisons. Moreover, these centres must allow for the provision of the 
necessary facilities.
• Specialised detention centres
The Member States shall ensure that asylum seekers are detained in specially 
designed detention centres. This may require the Member States having to build 
such centres.
In the meantime, the Member States shall ensure that asylum seekers are not 
accommodated with convicted criminals or prisoners on remand.
The Member States shall be answerable for the way centres are run. This remains 
the case where the running of detention centres is contracted out.
It follows that Member States are responsible for ensuring that custodial officers are 
adequately qualified. This requires them having received special training in order to 
be able to deal with asylum seekers. It must be made clear to them that they are not 
dealing with criminals, but a particularly vulnerable group of persons. This must be 
reflected in the description of custodial officers’ duties.
Complaint procedures shall be established with a view to ensuring the good running 
of these centres.
Asylum seekers’ representatives shall have unrestricted access to these centres.
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Regular inspections, including on the spot inspections, shall be carried out by 
States’ representatives as well as representatives of organisations concerned with 
asylum seekers, such as UNHCR.
The Member States are under the obligation to act upon inspection reports.
UNHCR representatives shall be granted unrestricted access to the centres.
• Facilities available within and from detention centres
Detention shall not interfere with asylum seekers’ rights laid down in the proposed 
Directive on fair and effective procedures.
The provision of adequate health care shall be secured.
It follows that where such care cannot be provided in situ  ^ arrangements shall be 
made for its provision outside detention centres. It is recognised that the extent of 
the care available within the premises of detention centres may vary with their size.
Where it is established that detention seriously affects asylum seeker’s health, 
detention shall cease.
The isolation inherent in this custodial regime shall be confined to what is strictly 
necessary to the good running of detention centres. It follows that contacts between 
asylum seekers as well as contacts with fi-iends and relatives shall not be 
unnecessarily restricted.
This Directive imposes a number of obligations on the Member States. However, it 
is recognised that the extent of these obligations vary with the numbers of 
applications for asylum a Member State will consider. Hence, where a Member 
State faces difficulties in fulfilling its obligations ovring to high numbers of 
applications for asylum, the principle of solidarity shall apply. This means that
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assistance shall be provided to that State by the EC and the other Member States in 
order to help that State comply with its obligations. Whilst the main form of 
assistance shall be financial, other forms of assistance may be contemplated 
depending upon the nature of the difficulties faced by the Member State concerned.
These recommendations for law reform are designed to address the need for a 
global approach with a view to preserving the right to seek refugee status. With this 
in mind, the proposed Directives establish minimum standards which aim at 
ensuring compliance with international refugee law.
The Member States shall be allowed to maintain or introduce national laws that go 
beyond the standards established by the proposed Directives.
2. Further issues
The fact that this thesis focuses on the right to seek refugee status explains that a 
number of issues have not been examined. Some of these issues are closely related 
to the right to seek refugee status while other concern international protection at 
large.
2.1. Further issues arising from the right to seek refugee status
This research concentrates on the right to seek refugee status. It follows that the 
fate of unsuccessful applicants and the status of recognised refugees are not 
considered as they can no longer be regarded as asylum seekers for the purpose of 
the 1951 Convention.
2.1.1. Unsuccessful asylum seekers
Asylum seekers whose claims for asylum have been definitely rejected loose their 
status of asylum seekers and may found themselves in an irregular situation in the 
Member State where they sought refugee status. These people will usually be asked
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to leave the territoiy of that State. In that respect, they are in a position similar to 
that of other categories of third country nationals whose presence is illegal.
However, the removal of unsuccessfiil of asylum seekers cannot take place at any 
price and international refugee law remains relevant. Indeed, the principle of non­
refoulement remains applicable. This means that Member States cannot remove 
unsuccessful applicants from their temtory in contravention of that fundamental 
principle. It follows that unsuccessful applicants shall not be sent to a country where 
their life or freedom may be endangered. This may prevent Member State 
authorities from returning individuals whose applications for refugee status have 
been dismissed to their country of origin. Where a State of destination which allows 
compliance with the principle of non-refoulement cannot be identified, the State 
which determined the asylum claim should allow the individual concerned to remain 
within its territory. Proceeding to removals in such circumstances would amount to 
a breach of international refugee law. Removals at a later stage are not necessarily 
excluded, but they remain contingent upon compliance with the principle of non­
refoulement. It is argued that EC law could further secure the implementation of 
that principle by specifying that the removal of unsuccessful applicants is subject to 
observance of the principle of non-refoulement. Moreover, it would be necessary to 
consider the position of those who cannot be removed from the territory of the 
Member State which rejected their asylum claim.
2,1.2. The status of recognised refugees
Focus on the right to seek refugee status also explains the fact that the status of 
recognised refugees is not discussed. It is argued that once refugee status is 
granted, it is vital to secure the integration of the individuals concerned to their new 
environment. In that respect, their rights and obligations should be determined on 
the basis of the relevant provisions of the 1951 Convention which deal with juridical 
status, gainful employment, welfare and administrative measures^. The Convention
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organises the status of recognised refugees on a non-discriminatory basis. This 
means that the latter shall not be treated in a less favourable manner than “aliens 
generally in the same circumstances”  ^ or that they must be accorded the same 
treatment as nationals^. Transferred to the EC context, these Convention 
requirements imply that recognised refugees shall not be treated less favourably that 
third country nationals legally present in the EC territory and shall, in certain 
circumstances, be entitled to the same rights as EC nationals.
The status of recognised refugees cannot be left outside the scope of an EC policy 
on asylum and should be tackled in relation to issues regarding third country 
nationals. However, the specificity of those who fled persecution should still be 
taken into consideration. This may necessitate the adoption of measures specifically 
designed to address the needs of this particularly vulnerable group. In that respect, 
one may mention a proposal of the Commission for a Council decision establishing 
a Community action programme to promote the integration of refugees^. This 
proposal targets those who have been granted refugee status within the meaning of 
the 1951 Convention, but also those who have been granted protection on an 
individual basis according to Member States’ international obligations or on
 ^ See, in particular. Chapter II of the 1951 Convention on juridical status, Chapter III on gainful 
employment, Chapter IV on welfare and Chapter V on administrative measures.
 ^ Article 6 o f the 1951 Convention defines the term “in the same circumstances” as “(...) 
impllying] that any requirements (including requirements as to the length and conditions of 
sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfil for the enjoyment of the 
right in question, if  he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of 
requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.”
 ^ See, for instance, Article 14 of the 1951 Convention on artistic rights and industrial property. 
Article 16 on access to courts. Article 20 on rationing, Article 22(1) on public elementary 
education or Article 24(1) which deals with certain aspects of labour legislation and social 
security.
® Proposal for a Council Decision establishing a Community programme to promote the 
integration o f refugees, (1999/C 36/11) COM(1998) 731 final - 98/0356 (CNS).
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humanitarian grounds (Article 2). The purpose of this programme is to “(...) 
contribute to the effective integration into and the participation in society of 
refugees in the Member States (...)” (Article 1).
The research focuses on those who seek international protection through refugee 
status within the meaning of the 1951 Convention. However, it is acknowledged 
that refugee status does not constitute the sole form of international protection.
2.2. Further issues relating to international protection
International protection may take different forms and is therefore not confined to 
refugee status. As observed by UNHCR, “[t]he Convention is not a panacea for all 
the problems of displacement” .^ The need for international protection is a highly 
complex issue which covers a variety of situations that may require different 
responses. In that respect, on can refer to the specific issues raised by mass-influx of 
individuals seeking international protection. As noted by UNHCR, “[wjhile the 
Convention could be applicable to large scale influxes, just as to individual anivals, 
in practice States have found it too difficult or onerous to adhere to its provisions 
when faced with sudden mass arrivals.”^^  This was, for instance, the case for 
Member States with regard to people fleeing Kosovo. Such situations have resulted 
in the development of other forms of protection. Individuals may find refuge in 
refugee camps situated close to the borders with their country of origin. However, 
such camps often suffer fi’om shortages of resources and cannot fully address the 
need for protection in cases of mass-influxes of refiigees. This is where the concept 
of temporary protection intervenes. Resort to temporary protection has been 
intensified in Europe with the crisis in Bosnia followed by that in Kosovo. In that
 ^ Conference organised by the Portuguese Presidency of the Council, with the support of the 
European Commission, 15-16 June 2000, Lisbon, Presentation by Erika Feller, Director, 
Department of International Protection UNHCR, referred to in 
http://www.unhcr.cli/issues/asylum/lisbon.htm
Ibid.
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respect, the Member States expressed the view that, although there was a need for 
international protection, the vast majority of individuals concerned did fall outside 
the scope of the 1951 Convention. Moreover, they stressed that the Convention 
was not designed to deal with cases of mass-influxes. It is argued that, while the 
need for temporary protection is not contested, it should not be used as a substitute 
for refugee status where the latter is applicable, i.e. where individuals fall within the 
scope of the Convention definition of the term refugee. Indeed, there has been a 
temptation for some Member States to grant temporary protection in lieu of refugee 
status in the context of increasingly restrictive asylum policies at both European and 
national level. Indeed, the extent of the rights that temporary protection confers are 
much more limited than those granted by refugee status. However, the necessity to 
address the need for international protection of those who are not eligible for 
refugee status calls for common action at EC level^\ The required measures could 
be adopted on the basis of Article 63(2)(a) of Title IV of the TEC according to 
which measures regarding the establishment of “minimum standards for giving 
temporary protection to displaced persons firom third countries who cannot return 
to their country of origin and for persons who otherwise need international 
protection” shall be adopted within five years of the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam.
International protection, whatever its form, is solicited when “it is too late”. Indeed, 
the need for international protection is created where individuals have no choice but 
to turn to the international community for assistance. International protection, 
including refugee status, is not a tool of prevention as it does not tackle the root 
causes for the need for international protection. There has been an increasing focus 
on means to prevent or, at least, detect at an early stage the needs for international 
protection, particularly with a view to avoiding States facing “sudden” migration
“ See, for instance, Karoline Kerber, “Temporary protection: an assessment of the harmonisation 
policies of tlie European Union Member States”, URL, Vol.9 No.3 (1997) 453-471.
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flows unprepared^^. However, while prevention is an important avenue that needs to 
be further explored, the need for international protection will remain.
Today, Europe, and most specifically the EC, are at a crossroads. Europe was seen 
as the land of asylum, the place where the 1951 Convention was adopted. However, 
it is now a place where the right to seek refugee status is threatened. In that 
context, the EC and its Member States are urged to operate a change of direction in 
their asylum policy and secure asylum seekers’ rights in line with international 
standards. The influence of the EC policy on asylum must not be undermined; it is 
not confined to its territory, but expands beyond its external borders. This is 
particularly apparent with regard to aspiring Member States. If the EC and its 
Member States carry on lowering their standards, there is a risk that other countries 
will follow. Furthermore, this export of restrictive asylum policies will create further 
problems as those turned down at the door of Fortress Europe will be seeking 
refuge status elsewhere since the need for international protection will not 
disappear. At a time where the adoption of a Charter of fundamental rights to the 
benefit of EU citizens is being discussed^ ,^ the time has come for the EC and its 
Member States to endorse their responsibilities towards asylum seekers.
See, for instance, Geoff Gilbert, “The best “early warning” is prevention: refugee flows and 
European responses”, URL, Vol.9 No.2 (1997) 207-227.
Henii de Bresson et Arnaud Leparmentier, “France et Allemagne tentent de ressouder leur 
union à Rambouillet”, Le Monde, 20 May 2000
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